70 Conn. 637 | Conn. | 1898
Deeds, like all other contracts, are to be construed so as to carry out the intent of the parties to them, if this be permissible under the rules of law. In the quitclaim deed given by S. H. Hurd, in 1886, the intent is stated to be to release his title to his sister’s children. She then had six living, and it would have been a simple matter, had that been his sole purpose, to make the conveyance directly to them. The language of the deed, however, is such as to show that there was a further intent to provide for the contingency of the death of any of them, during their mother’s life. So long as that continued she had the full use of the land under a prior title, and it is evident that the great object of the parties was to provide as to its ownership and enjoyment after her decease.
To accomplish this purpose they undertook to create a freehold estate to commence in futuro, without any precedent estate to support it, and in favor of persons who were not to be definitely ascertained until the event should occur, upon which it was thus to commence. The grantees were a class which was not to be formed until the termination of Mrs. Hewit’s life. It was to be composed of her children “who shall be alive at her decease, and the issue of any
The words of limitation, which follow the description of the releasees, “their heirs and assigns, in equal shares, per stirpes,” and the habendum clause, which runs “unto the said releasees, their heirs and assigns forever,” show that whoever was to take the estate released was to take it in fee simple, and to receive a share no larger than that naturally belonging to his line of descent.
The statute against perpetuities which was in force in 1886 (General Statutes, § 2952) provided that no estate should be given by deed to any persons but such as were in being at the time of its delivery, or to their immediate issue or descendants. The deed in question purported to give an estate to a class to be formed at the decease of a person named, some of the members of which might not be either persons who were in being at the time of its delivery or children of such persons. A grandchild of Mrs. Hewit might have been born after 1886, who would die before her, surviving his own parent, and leaving children. The latter
If it can be regarded as a covenant to stand seized to uses or a declaration of trust, the equitable interest derivable from it would arise in favor either of Mrs. Hewit as the party contracted with, or of certain of her descendants, as the parties in whose behalf the contract was made. The contract was for the creation of an estate which the statute made it impossible to create, and for nothing else. The trust was therefore for an illegal purpose, and void from the beginning.
It is unnecessary to consider any other of the numerous objections urged against the validity of the deed, as that founded on the statute of perpetuities is decisive.
The Superior Court'is advised that the deed of August 18th, 1886, was void ab initio, and that the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company has the full legal and equitable title to the land in question.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.