SAPNA BEDI-HETLIN, NKA SAPNA BEDI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CHRISTOPHER HETLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CASE NO. 13-14-08
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY
November 10, 2014
[Cite as Hetlin v. Hetlin, 2014-Ohio-4997.]
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 02-DR-0166
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 10, 2014
APPEARANCES:
Andrew A. Zashin for Appellant
Kent D. Nord for Appellee
{¶1} Appellant-Mother, Sapna Hetlin-Bedi (“Bedi“), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Seneca County, Domestic Division, terminating the shared parenting plan and naming Appellee-Father, Christopher Hetlin (“Hetlin“) as V.H.‘s residential parent and legal custodian. On appeal, Bedi argues that the trial court made the following errors: (1) denying her motion to appear by telephone; (2) granting Hetlin‘s motion to reallocate parental rights; (3) adopting the magistrate‘s decision; (4) summarily overruling her motion for a 14-day extension to file her objection to the magistrate‘s decision; (5) denying her request to have the court interview V.H. remоtely; and (6) failing to conduct an independent review of the magistrate‘s decision. Bedi also argues that Hetlin failed to properly serve her with his motion to reallocate parental rights, and thus, the trial court did not have proper jurisdiction over the matter. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court‘s decision.
{¶2} Hetlin and Bedi were married on February 25, 1998. They have one child together, V.H. On May 9, 2002, Bedi filed for divorce from Hetlin. On March 10, 2003, the trial court granted Bedi‘s request for divorce. It also issued a shared parenting plan designating Bedi as the residential parent. Pursuant to the shared parenting plan, Bedi was required to enroll V.H. into a school and notify Hetlin concerning “parent-teacher meetings, school club meetings, school
{¶3} Without filing a notice of relocation, Bedi accepted a position as a designer and relocated to India with V.H. sometime in August 2003. Shortly after moving halfway across the world, Bedi changed V.H.‘s name and enrolled her in a boarding school in India. Bedi did not inform Hetlin or the trial court of her move or the whеreabouts of their child.
{¶4} On September 9, 2003, Bedi filed a motion asking the court to modify the visitation schedule established in the shared parenting plan because she had moved outside of Ohio with V.H. On October 1, 2003, Hetlin filed a motion wherein he alleged that Bedi had refused and denied him visitation with V.H., claimed he did not know the whereabouts of Bedi or V.H., and asked the court to appoint him as the residential parent. That same day he filed a “motion for charge of contempt” (“first motion for contempt“) and alleged that Bedi had failed to abide by the shared parenting plan and denied him visitation with his minor child.
{¶5} On December 5, 2003, the trial court ruled, pursuant to an agrеement between both parties, that Bedi could purge herself of any potential contempt by
{¶6} While Bedi and V.H. were in Ohio on vacation in mid-December 2004, they inadvertently ran intо Hetlin at a JCPenny. V.H.‘s maternal grandmother arranged for Hetlin to have a visitation with V.H., which lasted from December 22, 2004 to January 22, 2005. It was agreed to that Hetlin would return V.H. to Bedi on January 22, 2005, but he refused to do so. As a result, Bedi had to pick up V.H. at the Fostoria Police Department on January 23.
{¶7} On November 10, 2005, Bedi filed a motion to terminate the shared parenting plan. Bedi argued that the court should terminate the shared parenting plan, name her as the residential parent, order Hetlin to pay child support, and award her the tax exemption for V.H.
{¶9} On January 23, 2008, the magistrate denied Bedi‘s motion to terminate the shared parenting plan and also denied Hetlin‘s first motion for contempt. However, the magistrate granted Hetlin‘s second motion for contempt. Bedi filed her objections to the magistrate‘s decision on February 5, 2008. On May 30, 2008, the trial court overruled Bedi‘s objections.
{¶10} Hetlin filed another motion for contempt (“third motion for contempt“) on April 14, 2009, wherein he alleged that he has had no contact with V.H. since January 23, 2005. He also claimed that he has not received any information regarding his daughter. Bedi filed a motion for continuance, claiming
{¶11} On September 29, 2009, the magistrate filed a decision, finding Bedi in contempt for a second time. The trial court then imposed a purge condition “of future compliance with the Court‘s Orders filed March 10,2 003 [sic], and purchase of an airline ticket for [V.H.].” (Docket No. 129, p. 2). Bedi then filed a motion wherein she requested the court allow her to file objections to the magistrate‘s decision after the expiration time due to the “distance between Seneca County and India, she did not have sufficient time to voice her objections to the Magistrate‘s Decision.” (Docket No. 130, p. 1). Further, she objected to the requirement that she be required to purchase an airline ticket for her daughter to visit Hetlin during December 2009-January 2010, because “[V.H.] is too young to travel unaccompanied halfway around the work [sic] during the Christmas Holiday Season * * * [and Bedi] does not have resources to purchase a plane ticket for both her and her daughter * * *.” (Id.).2
{¶13} The magistrate allowed Bedi to appear via telephone at a pre-trial conference. At the conference, Bedi informed the court that she has been advised against traveling by her physician. The magistrate ordered Bedi to provide the court with medical verification of her inability to travel by May 31, 2013. Bedi did not file medical verificаtion by the court‘s deadline. On July 30, 2013, two months past the deadline, Bedi filed her medical verification of her inability to travel. She gave no explanation on why it took her so long to file the necessary documentation. She also requested that she be allowed to appear via telephone at the August 14, 2013 hearing regarding modification of child support. The trial court granted Bedi‘s request to appear via telephone.
{¶14} At the August 14, 2013 child support modification hearing, Bedi did not call in to the court and was not present. The magistrate denied Hetlin‘s motion for modification of child support since Hetlin did not provide any evidence that would let the court determine his current income or Bedi‘s income.
{¶15} On October 1, 2013, Hetlin filed a motion requesting an in camera interview with V.H., which the trial court granted on October 8, 2013. The trial
{¶16} The reallocation of parental rights hearing was held on November 4, 2013. Both Bedi and V.H. were absent from the hearing.
{¶17} The magistrate issued her decision on November 25, 2013, which recommended terminating the shared parenting plan and designating Hetlin as the residential parent. The magistrate found that Bedi‘s interference with visitation was a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interests of V.H. to be in the custody of her father.
{¶18} On December 6, 2013, Bedi filed a motion requesting 14 additional days to file objections to the magistrate‘s decision. Bedi argued that “November 28th, 29th, 30th, and December 1st were non-working days. Therefore, Plaintiff was deprived of 4 of the 14 days to prepare said objections.” (Docket No. 189, p. 1). The trial court denied Bedi‘s request that same day. Bedi then objected to the
{¶19} On December 12, 2013, the trial court overruled Bedi‘s objection.3 On January 9, 2014, Bedi appealed this decision to this court. However, on January 25, 2014, we dismissed the appeal because it was not a final, appealable order. Specifically, the trial cоurt‘s decision did not reflect that the court had adopted the recommendations of the magistrate or filed an independent judgment ordering the specific relief afforded.
{¶20} On February 12, 2014, the trial court independently reviewed the evidence and overruled Bedi‘s objection to the magistrate‘s decision. As a result, the trial court designated Hetlin as the residential parent and terminated the shared parenting plan.
{¶21} Bedi timely appealed this judgment, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT‘S DENIAL OF APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE DEPRIVED HER OF A MEANINGUL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO REALLOCATE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN VIOLATION OF THE
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO REALLOCATE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILTIES [SIC] SINCE THE GROUNDS FOR THAT MOTION WERE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA[.]
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE NOVEMBER 25, 2013 MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION AND GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION FOR THE REALLOCATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES DUE TO A LACK OF SUFFICIENT COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
Assignment of Error No. IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION FOR THE REALLOCATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES BECAUSE HE WAIVED ANY SUCH RIGHT BY FAILING TO SEEK THAT RELIEF IN HIS PRIOR SECOND MOTION TO FIND APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT BASED UPON THE SAME FACTUAL CONDUCT.
Assignment of Error No. V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SUMMARILY OVERRULED APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR A FOURTEEN DAY EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE HER OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S NOVEMBER 25, 2013 DECISION
Assignment of Error No. VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING APPELLANT‘S REQUEST TO HAVE THE COURT INTERVIEW THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD REMOTELY.
Assignment of Error No. VII
THE TRIAL COURT‘S JUDGMENT IS VOID AB INITIO DUE TO APPELLEE‘S FAILURE TO OBTAIN PROPER SERVICE OF HIS POST-DECREE MOTION TO REALLOCATE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS REQUIRED BY
Assignment of Error No. VIII
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION AS REQUIRED BY
{¶22} Due to the nature of the assignments of error, we elect to address them out of order.
{¶23} Before addressing the merits of Bedi‘s assignments of еrror, we must first note the poor effort of Hetlin‘s attorney in writing his brief. Bedi has raised eight assignments of error and Hetlin‘s counsel has only cited two cases in his entire brief. In fact, counsel for Hetlin often addresses two to three assignments of error in a single page, by making conclusory statements without any legal support.
Assignment of Error No. VII
{¶24} In her seventh assignment of error, Bedi argues that the trial court failed to gain personal jurisdiction over Bedi because she was not properly served pursuant to
{¶25} “Generally, the continuing jurisdiction of the domestic relations court is invoked by the filing of a motion and service of process pursuant to
{¶26} However, when a party appears in court, fails to object to improper service pursuant to
{¶27} Here, Hetlin filed his motions for reallocation of parental rights and child support on March 26, 2013. At a pretrial hearing, Bedi‘s counsel and Bedi, via telephone, were present. However, it does not appear from the record that they made a limited appearance or challenged service of process. Another hearing on Hetlin‘s motions was held on August 14, 2013. Although Bedi had requested to be present via telephone, she failed to call in to the court. However, her counsel was present and cross-examined Hetlin, but again failed tо make a limited appearance or raise the issue of proper service. Once more, at the November 4, 2013 hearing, Bedi failed to challenge the service of process and instead, her
{¶28} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s seventh assignment of error.
Assignments of Error Nos. II & IV
{¶29} In her second and fourth assignments of error, Bedi asserts that Hetlin was unable to file a motion for reallocation of parental rights because of the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. We disagree.
{¶30} Bedi did not raise the issue of res judicata or waiver at the trial court level. Since these arguments were not made before the trial court, and the trial court never had an opportunity to consider them, we will not address these arguments for the first time on appeal. “It is well-established that a party may not raise any new issues or legal theories for the first time on appeal.” Dolan v. Dolan, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2000-T-0154, 2001-T-0003, 2002-Ohio-2440, ¶ 7; see also BP Communications Alaska, Inc. v. Cent. Collection Agency, 136 Ohio App.3d 807, 812 (8th Dist.2000) (“Affirmative defenses must be raised in a responsive pleading or they will be considered waived.“); Agosta v. City of Lancaster, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 28-CA-86, 1986 WL 12654, *3 (“We further observe that appellee did not raise the res judicata defense until this case was on ‘appeal’ before the Court of Common Pleas. Where a former adjudication is
{¶31} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s second and fourth assignments of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶32} In her first assignment of error, Bedi argues that the trial court erred in denying her request to appear via telephone at the reallocation of parental rights hearing and by denying her request to conduct an in camera interview with V.H. via telephone. We disagree.
{¶33} “The right to procedural due process is found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” City of Youngstown v. Traylor, 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 2009-Ohio-4184, ¶ 8. “A fundamental requirement of due process is ‘the opportunity to be heard’ * * * at a mеaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
{¶34} It is well-established that a trial judge has the power to regulate court proceedings. Lisboa v. Lisboa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92321, 2009-Ohio-5228, ¶ 19. Likewise, a magistrate is “authorized to regulate the proceedings and to do everything necessary for the efficient performance of its responsibilities.”
Bedi‘s Request to Appear Via Telephone
{¶35} Throughout this matter, the magistrate reasonably accommodated Bedi‘s requests. For example, the magistrate allowed Bedi to appear via telephone at а pretrial conference and at the child support modification hearing. However, after obliging Bedi‘s request, Bedi showed no respect for the magistrate or the judicial system. First, she refused to file the proper medical verification within the magistrate‘s deadline. Instead, she waited until two months after the deadline, and then offered no excuse or explanation as to her delay. Then Bedi failed to call in to the court on the day of the child support modification hearing, after requesting that she be allowed to appear telephonically. Again, she offered no apology or proper excuse to justify her actions.4 It was well within the magistrate‘s discretion to refuse Bedi‘s request to appear telephonically again, after she failed to obey the magistrate‘s orders.
{¶37} Moreover, Bedi‘s claims that the magistrate‘s actions prohibited her from presenting evidence at the reallocation hearing. She asserts that it was “physically and legally impossible * * * to comply with the Magistrate‘s order and * * * appear personally for trial * * *.” (Emphasis sic.) Appellant‘s Br., p. 10. If this was true, Bedi could have offered her deposition, as well as V.H.‘s, at the reallocation of parental rights hearing. Pursuant to
{¶38} Therefore, Bedi had alternative avenues to offer testimony and evidence at thе allocation hearing, which she chose not to utilize. Moreover, Bedi has family in northwest Ohio who could have been called as witnesses by her trial counsel. We also note that her counsel was present at the hearing and cross-examined Hetlin. As such, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bedi‘s request to appear telephonically at the allocation of parental rights hearing.
Request to Conduct V.H.‘s In Camera Interview Remotely
{¶39} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that ” ‘[a]ppeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from. Appeals are not allowed for the purpose of settling abstract questions, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the appellant.’ ” Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. Pub. Util. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 438, 439, (1992), quoting Ohio Contract Carriers Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 160 (1942), syllabus. Generally, an appellant does not have standing to argue issues that affect another person. Benjamin v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 167 Ohio App.3d 350, 2006-Ohio-2739, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.). Instead, an appellant “may ‘complain of an error committed against a nonappealing party
{¶40} We note that it was Hetlin, not Bedi, who requested the in camera interview. Therefore, Bedi cannot complain about the failure of the trial court to grant a non-appealing party‘s motion, unless she can demonstrate how the alleged error prejudiced her. She fails to do this. Instead, she only argues that because Hetlin requested the interview, and the trial court was required to conduct one, we must reverse the trial court‘s judgment. She does not explain how her rights were affected by the denial, or assert that an interview with V.H. would have revealed that it was in V.H.‘s best interests to remain in Bedi‘s custody. Without these arguments, Bedi fails to establish how she was prejudiced.
{¶41} Even if we were to find that Bedi could properly raise this issue on appeal, it is meritless.
{¶42} The court ordered Bedi to bring V.H. to an in camera interview, which she refused to do. She cannot now complain that the trial court erred by failing to conduct such an interview.
{¶43} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s first and sixth assignments of error.
Assignment of Error No. III
{¶44} In her third assignment of error, Bedi argues that the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate‘s decision because there was a lack of sufficient competent and credible evidence in support thereof. We disagree.
{¶45} An appellant has a duty to ensure that the record necessary to evaluate the assignment of error is filed with the appellate court. State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 160-161 (1995); App.R. 9(B). Where an appellant fails to include a necessary portion of the record, we must presume regularity in
{¶46} We also note that under
{¶47} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s third assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. V
{¶48} In her fifth assignment of error, Bedi contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying her motion to file her objections to the magistrate‘s decision past the 14-day deadline. We disagree.
{¶50} Here, the magistrate‘s decision was issued on November 25, 2013. Bedi argues that she lost four days to prepare her objections because of the Thanksgiving holiday and subsequent weekend. Because of the holiday, she did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to the magistrate‘s decision. However, Bedi did not file her motion for extension until three days before the deadline. Moreover, in her motion, she did not ask for a four-day extension to make up for the four days her attorney missed because of the holiday. Instead, she asked for an additional fourteen days, without any explanation as to why she needed that much time to prepare sufficient objections to the magistrate‘s decision.
{¶52} Lastly, the cases Bedi cites in support of her argument are distinguishable. For example, in Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Haupt, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010306, 2014-Ohio-348, the court found that the appellant had not received notice that the magistrate had issued its decision, and thus, did not have a meaningful opportunity to file objections and preserve her rights on appeal. Id. at ¶ 12. On appeal, Bedi does not dispute that she received nоtice of the magistrate‘s decision on November 25, 2013.
{¶53} In Skydive Columbus Ohio, L.L.C. v. Litter, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-563, 2010-Ohio-3325, another case cited by Bedi, the court found that the appellants had a sufficient and meaningful opportunity to file objections to the magistrate‘s decision despite only receiving notice of the decision five days before the 14-day filing period expired. Id. at ¶ 11. Thus, Skydive stands for the proposition that receiving notice five days before the deadline still provides a
{¶54} Therefore, the cases Bedi cites arе not persuasive and do not control the disposition of this matter. Since Bedi has not demonstrated “good cause” for why the court should have allowed her requested extension to file her objections to the magistrate‘s order, her arguments are not well-taken.
{¶55} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s fifth assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. VIII
{¶56} In her eighth assignment of error, Bedi contends that the trial court erred in summarily overruling her objections to the magistrate‘s decision. We disagree.
{¶57} We review a trial court‘s adoption of a magistrate‘s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Figel v. Figel, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-08-14, 2009-Ohio-1659, ¶ 9, citing Marchel v. Marchel, 160 Ohio App.3d 240, 2005-Ohio-1499, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or grossly unsound. State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 16-18 (2d Dist.). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may
If one or more objections to a magistrate‘s decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.
{¶58} Pursuant to
{¶59} An appellate court presumes that a trial court performed an independеnt analysis of a magistrate‘s decision. Gilleo at ¶ 46, citing Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein, 160 Ohio App.3d 564, 2005-Ohio-1835, ¶ 47 (4th Dist.), citing Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). Therefore, the party asserting error must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court failed to conduct an independent analysis. Gilleo at ¶ 46, citing Mahlerwein at ¶ 47.
{¶60} Bedi contends that the trial court erred when it summarily overruled Bedi‘s objection to the magistrate‘s decision only three days after her objection was filed. She also argues that the trial court could not have conducted an independent review of the proceedings because a transcript had not been prepared or filed at the time the court made its decision, nor did it wait for Hetlin to respond to Bedi‘s objection. Bedi then accuses the trial court of denying her objection merely as a “sanction for a perceived transgression against the court * * *.” Appellant‘s Br., p. 20.
{¶61} We note that the trial court‘s first entry addressing Bedi‘s objection was filed three days after the filing of her objection. However, this court dismissed Bedi‘s first appeal because the trial court did not adopt the
{¶62} Therefore, Bedi has failed to affirmatively prove that the judge failed to make an independent analysis.
{¶63} Accordingly, we overrule Bedi‘s eighth assignment of error.
{¶64} Having found no error prejudicial to Bedi in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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