Hester v. Case W. Res. Univ.Hester v. Case W. Res. Univ.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 23, 2019
Appearances:
Crystal Hester, pro se.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Amanda T. Quan and John Gerak, for appellee.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Crystal Hester appeals pro se after the trial court granted summary judgment to her former employer, defendant-appellee Case Western Reserve University (“CWRU“) on her claims for defamation and tortious interference with employment relationship. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} As previously set forth in Hester v. Case W. Res. Univ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104415, 2017-Ohio-103, Hester asserted ten claims against CWRU after it terminated her employment. The trial court disposed of all claims, resolving each in favor of CWRU pursuant to either
{¶ 3} As to Hester‘s defamation claim, this court found that the claim should have survived CWRU‘s
{¶ 4} As to Hester‘s tortious interference claim, this court noted the claim was in part predicated on her assertion that “a CWRU employee interfered with an ‘external employer,’ causing her to lose her job with that employer,” and found that the claim should not have been dismissed to the extent that she claimed CWRU “interfered with another third-party employer * * *.” Id. at ¶ 37-39.
{¶ 5} On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to CWRU on Hester‘s two remaining claims. It found that Hester‘s defamation claim was time barred based on conclusive evidence in the record that she did not bring it within the one-year statute of limitations. Moreover, the court found the defamation claim failed on its merits because Hester could not demonstrate that CWRU published any
Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶ 6} We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). We accord no deference to the trial court‘s decision and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
{¶ 7} Under
{¶ 8} On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving
Hester‘s Defamation Claim
{¶ 9} Defamation is a false publication “‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person‘s reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.‘” Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 77, quoting Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, 883 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 9. Libel is a defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium such as writing. Black‘s Law Dictionary 1055 (10th Ed.2014). Slander is a defamatory assertion expressed in a transitory medium such as speech. Black‘s Law Dictionary 1600 (10th Ed.2014).
{¶ 10} To establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that a false statement of fact was made, (2) that the statement was defamatory, (3) that the statement was published, (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication, and (5) that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the statement.” Am. Chem. Soc. at ¶ 77, citing Pollock v. Rashid, 117 Ohio App.3d 361, 368, 690 N.E.2d 903 (1st Dist.1996).
{¶ 11} A cause of action for defamation is governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
{¶ 12} In this case, assuming that Hester articulated a viable claim for defamation, which as discussed below is not supported by the record, her claim is nevertheless time barred because she failed to bring it within the applicable one-year statute of limitations.1
{¶ 13} As Hester articulated in her deposition, her defamation claim is based on defamatory statements that she claims CWRU published to two entities, PNC Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.2 She claims that because CWRU
{¶ 14} The undisputed evidence is that PNC hired Hester on March 25, 2013 and terminated her on May 3, 2013 within the bank‘s probationary period for new employees. Hester contends that the Federal Reserve Bank denied her employment on or before March 7, 2013. Hester did not file her complaint against CWRU until April 3, 2015, two years after she alleges it made the defamatory statements. Clearly then, Hester‘s defamation claim is outside of the one-year statute of limitations established by
{¶ 15} Nevertheless, even were we to assume that Hester‘s defamation claim is not time barred it would otherwise fail on the merits. There is no evidence in the record that CWRU published a defamatory statement to PNC or the Federal Reserve. See Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 460, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993) (“The publication of defamatory matter is an essential element to liability for defamation.“). Although Hester claimed that CWRU put defamatory material in her personnel file and further published that material to third-party employers there is no evidence in the record by which we can conclude as much.
{¶ 16} Rather, the undisputed evidence in the record indicates the contrary. For example, the person at PNC who hired, supervised and fired Hester averred that
{¶ 17} CWRU is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Hester‘s defamation claim.
Hester‘s Tortious Interference with Employment Relationship Claim
{¶ 18} To establish a tortious interference claim a plaintiff must show: (1) a business relationship or contract; (2) the wrongdoer‘s knowledge of the relationship or contract; (3) the wrongdoer‘s intentional and improper action taken to prevent a contract formation, procure a contractual breach, or terminate a business relationship; (4) a lack of privilege; and (5) resulting damages. Byrne v. Univ. Hosps., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95971, 2011-Ohio-4110, ¶ 28 citing Castle Hill Holdings, L.L.C. v. Al Hut, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86442, 2006-Ohio-1353, ¶ 46.
{¶ 19} Generally, a cause of action for tortious interference is governed by a four-year statute of limitations. See
{¶ 20} As pleaded in her amended complaint, Hester‘s defamation and tortious interference claims are both predicated on the same conduct: CWRU‘s alleged publication of her employee file,3 which she claims contained defamatory material. Compare Kienow at ¶ 13 (four-year statute of limitations applied to tortious interference claim where that claim was predicated on different act than defamation claim). Accordingly, our disposition of Hester‘s defamation claim governs our disposition of her tortious interference claim and we accordingly find it is likewise time barred.
{¶ 21} However, if Hester‘s tortious interference claim is not time barred, it nevertheless fails on its merits. There is no evidence in the record that establishes CWRU knew of Hester‘s employment at PNC Bank or that it took any improper action with regard to it. To the contrary, as previously stated, Hester‘s supervisor at
{¶ 22} CWRU is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Hester‘s tortious interference claim.
{¶ 23} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR