195 Iowa 141 | Iowa | 1922
On the 13th day of October 1920 a policy of insurance was issued by the defendant company to the plain
Upon the conclusion of the testimony defendant moved for a directed verdict and again upon its motion for new trial urged the following primary propositions; (1) That the record is without dispute that the automobile claimed to have been owned by the plaintiff was a stolen automobile and the plaintiff did not and could not have acquired ownership thereof by reason of his purchase of the same from anyone other than the true owner and that at the time the policy of insurance issued plaintiff, had no insurable interest in the automobile described in said policy. (2) That the property covered by the insurance policy is described as a Buiek touring car, 1919 model, factory number 321311, whereas the proof in this case shows that he owned no car of any such description and this being an action at law the plaintiff can only recover on proof of the theft of the property set out and described in the policy and cannot recover upon proof of the loss or theft of any other property than that described. (3) That the record ■ affirmatively shows that the plaintiff did not comply with all the conditions of the policy required to be done and performed by him as conditions pre-' cedent to his right to recover thereunder in that he did not prepare and file with the company the necessary proofs of loss containing the necessary data and facts as required by the terms of the policy.
Did the insured have an insurable interest in the automobile described in the policy of insurance in suit? It is unnecessary to detail the evidence in relation to the history of the insured automobile. Sufficient to state our conclusion that the automobile when purchased and insured by the plaintiff was a stolen car. This is unmistakably shown by the evidence. By the terms of the contract of insurance it is provided that the entire policy shall be void if the interest of the insured in the property be other than “unconditional and sole ownership.”
If a person has no interest, legal or equitable, in the thing insured it is viewed in law as a mere wager and the courts will not enforce such a contract. Warren v. Davenport Fire Ins. Co. 31 Iowa 464; Bartling v. German Mut. L. & T. Ins. Co. 154 Iowa 335. A person has no insurable interest in a thing where his only right arises under a contract which is void or unenforeible either at law or in equity.
Whatever interest plaintiff had in the insured property must have been derived under his contract of purchase. His vendor is not shown to have had anything more than the possession of a stolen car. Through his purchase plaintiff acquired no title and clearly never had such ownership as was required and defined by the terms of the policy. No one can convey a valid title to goods or chattels unless the vendor is the owner thereof or lawfully represents the owner. It is the duty of a vendee to determine whether he is securing good title to the thing purchased, and if title fails and loss ensues, the purchaser must look to his vendor. In general no one can transfer a better or higher title to a chattel than he himself has. Boulden v. Gough, 4 Pen. (Del.) 48 (54 Atl. 693) ; Godwin v. Taenzer, 122 Tenn. 101 (119 S. W. 1133); Tuttle v. White, 46 Mich. 485 (9 N. W. 528); Turnbow v. Beckstead, 25 Utah 468 (71 Pac. 1062).
II. This action is based on a definite contract and recovery is predicated on the allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition. It is alleged that the policy of insurance covered a Buick touring automobile, Model 1919 with a factory number 321311. Plaintiff elected to recover upon a certain definitely described automobile and his proof fails to support his allegation. The only point of description or identification between the car described in the policy and the car which plaintiff had in his possession was the name. This is not sufficient. In such cases a plaintiff may bring his action in equity to have the -written contract reformed in order that violence may not be done to the parol evidence rule and to prevent a variance between the pleading and the proofs. Eggleston v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 65 Iowa 308; Martin v. Farmers’ Ins. Co. 84 Iowa 516; Harris v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 126 N. Y. Supp. 118.
It is essential that insurance policies identify the property which the insurance covers. The description in the instant policy is not ambiguous and plaintiff seeks a recovery on a particularly described car which the evidence fails to prove. This case deals with the application and the enforcement of a written contract and we cannot disregard principles which have heretofore been announced and applied in the interpretation and enforcement of written documents.
III. The policy in suit provided that in the event of loss or damage the insured shall as soon as practicable give notice to the company or its authorized agent who issued the policy, and within 60 days thereafter unless time is extended in writing by the company render a statement to the company signed and sworn to by the insured stating the knowledge and belief of the insured as to the time and cause of the loss or damage. “Failure on
This provision is in conformity to Section 1742-a Code Supplement 1913. There was no waiver pleaded or proved. “The notice of loss and proof thereof required in Section 1742 hereof, and the notice and proof of loss under oath in case of insurance on personal property, shall be given within sixty days from the time loss occurred.” Section 1744 Code Supplement 1913.
Plaintiff had the burden of proving a compliance by him of the terms of the policy and of the provisions of the statute and as alleged by him in his petition. It affirmatively appears from the record that plaintiff failed to meet this requirement and this is fatal. Welsh v. Des Moines Ins. Co. 71 Iowa 337; Ervay v. Fire Assn. 119 Iowa 304; Mitchell v. Homie Ins. Co. 32 Iowa 421; Heusinkveld v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 96 Iowa 224.
For the reasons indicated the judgment entered must be and is — Reversed.