29 Wash. 407 | Wash. | 1902
The appellant, as a taxpayer, instituted this suit against the town of Wilbur and the respondents named, for the purpose of obtaining a restraining order and injunction, restraining and enjoining the respondents from selling or' delivering certain bonds (more fully hereinafter described) for the building of water works in the; town of Wilbur. The respondents answered and pleaded: The town of Wilbur is a municipal corporation, city, or town, of the fourth class, incorporated by an order of the hoard of county commissioners of Lincoln county, Washington, made and entered on the 4th uay of August, 1890, under the provisions of the act of March 27, 1890, which said order of the board of county commissioners was filed in the office of the secretary of state; on the 14th day of August, 1890. That ever since the date of said incorporation the town of Wilbur has main
All the errors assigned in the appellant’s brief were waived in open court on the argument in this case, except that relative to1 notice. This error is assigned as follows:
“The court erred when it held that thirty days’ notice, as given in the notice of election, was equal to- ten days’ notice, as by law required to be given.”
The appellant does not contend that ten days’ notice was not given as required by law. His contention is that the ten days’ notice, and twenty days more, in all thirty days, was given, and that this is not a compliance with the law requiring ten days’ notice. This court, in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427 (33 Pac. 1059), upheld an election where the election notice was less than the lime required by statute. In the case cited we said:
“Thei bottom question is, is literal compliance with the formalities prescribed for giving notice in this kind of an election a sm& qua non? Certain rules as to notice of elections have become well settled, and none of them are better settled than that the formalities of giving notice,*411 .although prescribed by statute, are directory merely, unless there is a declaration that unless the formalities are observed the election shall be void.”
We think the notice in this case was sufficient, and the fact that it was for thirty days, in place of ten days, does not vitiate it, and it is a substantial compliance with the statute.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.