*1 ADMINISTRATOR, v. UNITED HESS, STATES. January 1960. Argued 15, 1959. Decided 5.No. October for filed a brief Cory argued the cause and C. Cleveland petitioner. Boseyithal for the United argued the cause
Alan S. General brief were Solicitor him on the With States. Doub. Attorney General Assistant Rankin and opinion delivered Mr. Stewart Justice Court. States brought against was United
This action to recover for the the Federal Tort Claims Act1 under decedent, George W. Graham. petitioner’s death of drowned in the River while was- Columbia Graham employment carpenter course of his as a foreman Company, independent an con- Larson Construction perform repairs had undertaken to- at tractor which operated Bonneville Dam. That structure owned and by the States. United job
As a to the preliminary had contracted to accom- plish, working party by Larson decided to send boat (b), 1 28 S. C. §§ soundings. dam to take Lar- the foot of the spillway inspector plan and asked government told the
son be requested of the dam operating personnel, *2 the spillway gates point near where close two additional request be taken. This was com- soundings the were to then, dispatched group employees' with. plied Larson the area in a unit. was a mem- tug-and-barge to Graham the tug of this dam' the working party. Approaching ber barge pier, staving and veered struck a hole the and barge. northwardly The unit then was carried the spillway the part river towards that of the dam where capsized were There it in the turbulent gates open. all employees water. Graham and but one of his fellow navigable were killed. Their occurred on waters deaths Oregon. the territorial limits of the within State The theory petitioner’s complaint of the was that Graham’s death fail- proximately had been caused of operating ure of the close a personnel dam to sufficient of spillway number near the where the sound- gates area were ings Liability to be taken'. was asserted under general wrongful Oregon,2 death statute of as as well under another of that Employers’ statute Lia- State, the bility Law,3 which also creates a to recover for death under certain circumstances.
The wrongful recovery statute permits for death “caused by another,” act or omission of liability $20,000, limits to and the decedent’s makes con- tributory negligence recovery.4 an absolute bar In 2 Ore. Rev. Stat. 30.020. § seq. Ore. Rev. Stat. 654.305 et § by personal representative wrongjul “Action death. When /or person the -death of a is caused act or omission another, personal representatives decedent, for the spouse surviving dependents benefit and and in case there surviving spouse dependents, is no or then for the benefit of the against wrong estate of the decedent, maintain an action doer, if the might action, lived, decedent have maintained an had he Liability applies, Law Employers’
limited area where considerably in a action is recovery the road is liable failure that statute a defendant for easier. Under prac- which it is every device, precaution to “use care and safety of and protection ticable to use for the and life monetary .”5 is no limitation of lia- .. .. There limb contributory bility, negligence goes and the decedent’s only mitigate damages.6
against wrongdoer, injury for an done the same act or omis- the. years within sion.- Such action shall be commenced two after death, damages $20,000, iriay shall not and exceed therein recovery expenses paid include a for all reasonable incurred funeral, burial, doctor, nursing hospital or services for the deceased.” Rev. Stat. 30.020. Ore. safety persons employment in hazardous “Protection generally. Generally, owners, or subcontractors and all contractors *3 for, any persons' having charge of, responsible other or work involv ing danger publie, every employes or or the shall use a risk to the device, precaution practicable it is to use for the care and which necessity safety limb, only by limited the and of life and protection machine, efficiency structure, the or other preserving for the. regard apparatus device, without to the additional cost of or and safety appliance and suitable material-or devices.” Ore. Rev. [sic] Stat. 654.305. § damages may prosecute damage death; un “Who action for any there reason of of ORS limited. If loss of life violations by any owner, or or to 654.335 contractor subcontractor 654.305 654.335, surviving any person 'to the liable under ORS 654.305 spouse and, person if adopted of the so killed and children and children and, none, then the ’-none,then his or her heirs if mother lineal may be, father, as the shall have a of action without case may damages be If none limit as to the amount of which awarded. persons such action reside within the of the entitled to-maintain administrator, may person state, the deceased the executor or respective benefits in the order action for their and maintain such Rey. 654.325. named.” Ore. Stat. above “Contributory negligence. contributory negligence defense, be into person injured be but taken account shall not damage.” jury fixing Rev. Stat. the the amount of the Ore. §654.335. entered the District Court a.jury, without
After trial Since States. Graham’s for the United judgment that the court ruled navigable waters, on had occurred under maritime for decision case was one act of apply general wrongful would this case of fact findings the basis of detailed Upon Oregon. that liability no under that there was concluded
court by the was caused Graham’s death “not statute because As to employees.” or its the United States negligence it was Law, the court’s Liability view Employers’ that is not reason applicable “this Act that being not for the work there responsible was Government stand- high reason that the performed, and for the further if these Act, required applied under of care ard cases, Mar. Cas. Am. be unconstitutional.” would 660. trial that affirmed, holding Appeals
The Court not had finding negligence erred had not court Liability the Employers’ agreeing proved, been constitutionally applied to this case.” not be Law “could deciding court refrained from appellate expressly that, in ruling trial was also correct “whether the court would not applied, if act were United States for the it was responsible thereunder because liable F. 2d the decedent.” being performed by work seemingly granted 292 was consider Certiorari law. 359 question U. S. important us, petitioner longer no chal- As this case reaches *4 guilty finding the the United States was not lenges the as would make liable under negligence such here Oregon. death statute of His sole claim wrongful erroneously deprived opportunity is was that he the Employers’ Liability the Law. invoke grants The Federal Tort Claims Act District Courts “for jurisdiction against of civil the United States actions injury property, personal or loss of or or death injury
318 wrongful act or omission of negligent
caused or employee acting while within Government his or circumstances scope employment, office under States, private person, if a would be where United liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of or place where the act occurred.” 28 U. S. C. omission (b). 1346 § wrongful
Graham’s and the act or omission which allegedly Oregon, caused it occurred within the State of must liability and therefore be determined accordance place. with the law of-that on navi Since occurred gable waters, controversy 'as is, the trial court cor rectly held, admiralty jurisdiction, within the reach of Plymouth, The 20; Compagnie 3 Kermarec Wall. v. Gen erate, S. 625. Oregon required, therefore, 358 U. would be n to look to maritime law it. v. Luck deciding Chelentis Co., enbach S. S. 247 372; Packing U. S. Carlisle Co. Sandanger, 259 255.7 U. S.
Although admiralty law itself confers no of action- death, Harrisburg, The 199, yet U. S. petitioner argues place that “the where the act or omission itself, land, occurred” that, was on-the dam. an extension of and therefore, this case should be decided in with the accordance law that Oregon apply occurring clear, however, would to torts on land. “place” that the term in the Federal Torts Claims Act means the political entity, Oregon, govern in this case whose laws shall against United States “in same manner and to the private same extent as a individual under like circumstances.” 28 question Oregon U. S. C. 2674. There can be no but that would required apply private maritime law if this were an action between parties, injury, occurring upon since a tort action for or death navi gable waters within the exclusive reach of maritime law. is. Plymouth, Magruder 20, 35, Grout, Wrongful 3 Wall. 36. See Admiralty Jurisdiction, Death Within The L. 35 Yale J. question presented case does not involve the that would be if This occurring territdry political entity conduct within the of one injury political entity. caused death within i different Cf. Eastern App. Air Lines Trust D. C. v. Union U. S. F. 2d 62.
319 . from “where death . . results a maritime com tort. navigable mitted on waters within State whose statutes give right of action on account of will, In act, admiralty courts per- entertain libel damages sonam for the sustained those whom such given.” Garcia, Fuel v. Western Co. 257 S.U. Hamilton, 233, 242. 398; See 207 S. La Bour U. gogne, 210 S. 95; Deupree, U. Levinson v. 345 S. 648; U. Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 S. 588; U. United Pilots Halecki, v. Assn. 613. 358 U. S. In such a case the mari time law enforces the state statute “as it would one originating jurisdiction.” foreign Levinson v. 648, 65 Deupree, 345 U. S. 2
This means
in an
state territorial waters the conduct
to give
said
rise to
liability is
admiralty’s
to measured not under
standards
of duty, but under the substantive standards of the state
Halecki,
United
law.
Pilots Assn.
613,
v.
615.
Cia.,
y
See also
v. A. Garcia
(C.
Death on the Seas 41 Stat. U. S. C. 761§ seq.; et Act, §688; the Jones 41 Stat. 46 U. C. S. Longshoremen's Compensation and Harbor Workers’ Act, Stat. seq. seq., 1424 et 33 U. S. C. 901 et no constitutional find we principle, this
Accepting *6 maritime by to application, impediment in a death Liability Law to Oregon’s Employers’ apply. by its terms otherwise statute would which the not adjudication, are with constitutional concerned We cases. What given reaching particular results with Skovgaard, Tungus v. deciding last Term was said controlling here: is ' Legislature a expressed by State “The policy merely not that a death statute enacting nor even recovery, a right to give death shall rise in death shall resulting conduct that tortious damages shall be recoverable but that actionable, in death. kind results particular when conduct of a policy enforcing a upon court is incumbent may pick or all; it it not choose.” enforce S., at 593. U. Jensen, Southern Co. v. which fathered
“Even Pacific concept, recognized uniformity 'uniformity’ by right given is not offended ‘the to recover death cases.’ 244 S. at 216. It would a anomaly may be an to hold that State create death, right may of action but that not cieter- (cid:127) right mine the circumstances under which that exists. power right includes of State create such power recovery determine necessity when permitted shall be and when it shall not. Cf. Cal Eckert, darola 332 U. 155.” 358 U. at 594. S., S. open question leave whether a state wrongful We provisions contain so might death act offensive to admiralty principles traditional of maritime law that the Oregon would decline to enforce them. The here statute presents problem. Indeed, issue no such as the peti- points out, Employers’ Liability tioner Law contains many provisions more in consonance with traditional prin- ciples general than the State’s wrongful death therefore, hold, We that the of action for statute. Oregon created Employers’ Lia- bility Law be invoked to for a recover maritime death in that State without constitutional inhibition.
Whether terms, the statute its and as construed the Oregon Supreme Court, would extend to the present case, whether, and if the applicable, statute is the United States violated the standard care which it prescribes, questions are decide, we do undertake to upon which we intimate no view. The Court ¿District made, an alternative ruling the statute was inappli- cable as a matter of state law. The Court of Appeals did question. not reach the this has Although issue been argued here, disposition we its leave to a court more at *7 home with the law of Oregon.9
The judgment is set aside and the case remanded to the United States Court Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
So ordered. Mb. Justice Mr. Justice The Justice, Black, Chief Douglas- and Mr. Justice join opinion Brennan the Court, solely but under compulsion the Court’s in ruling Tungus Skovgaard, The v. 358 S. They U. believe long that as the as view of the law represented ruling prevails Court, it be applied should
9 contending applicable, In petitioner the statute is us refers Byers following Oregon Hardy, decisions, among others: 68 v. v. Holman 557, 806; Ore. Advance 337 Sheets P. 2d Drefs Transfer Co., 452, Rorvik v. North Lumber 505; 130 Ore. 280 P. Pacific Co., Corp. 58, C. D. Johnson Lumber 331, 163; 99 Ore. 190 P. 195 P. Hutchens, Supple Coomer v. 574; Investment v. 194 F. 2d 128 302; Myers Staub, 224, 663, 203; Ore. 274 P. v. 201 Ore. 272 P. 2d Sauset, Synnes, Tamm v. 868; Warner v. 292, 67 Ore. 135 P. 114 Commission, 362, Walters v. Dock 451, 305; 230 Ore. P. 235 P. 126 487, 1117, 634, States, Ore. 245 P. P. P. 778. The United asserting inapplicable, .many the statute cites of the same Oregon authorities. yiews of some those despite contrary
evenhandedly, of recov- is measure joining it that state law the originally Tungus, and is not defendant, as ery helps when it against it militates recovery when the measure of note their con- However, they it does here. as defendant Tungus, in The ruling disagreement with the tinued overruled, it should be as to whether position reserve their controversy application light in the particularly original See the among its subscribers. engendered has it in this and in Goett case separate opinions various p. 340. post, Corp., Union Carbide Harlan, whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter Mr. Justice dissenting. joins, Hamilton, 398, The it has been settled 207 U. S.
Since an death occur personam law that not available under maritime ring navigable waters, on brought under Harrisburg, S. Tungus In v. Skov death statute. state- decided last we held that such gaard, Term, with the an action could be maintained accordance only pre-' This case placed upon limitations law. Tungus, in The question, sents the further involved an action lies conduct namely, whether such when the rise to give liability said to is.measured under state law by greater substantive standards of than those which *8 governed would have the same conduct under maritime law death not occurred.1 had Court, if I its opinion aright, read holds that when of a
a victim a maritime tort dies as result of such con- Tungus only possible 1 The in The was Court concerned with by Jersey imposed limitations New on law the assertion of causes negligence, for of action unseaworthiness and both of which the Court, accepting Appeals, the views of the Court of were considered wrongful the embraced state death statute. case not did question enlarged present the might whether such a statute confer rights substantive not maritime afforded law.
.-323 duct the of law the State whose death statute wholly is governs liability.2 invoked At the same time the open question Court leaves a wrong- the whether state ful death act might contain so “provisions offensive to traditional admi- principles maritime law that ralty them,” would decline finding to enforce that this Oregon “presents statute no such problem.” (cid:127)
I agree cannot with the view that _ actions .growing out maritime are so pervasively torts or controlled state with the conclúsion that this provisions is, event, statute its'substantive I to maritime law. can offensive Nor subscribe ' that reserves question intimation which Court open is seriously to debate. Because of the importance of the issue, a fuller is than my justified statement views might appropriate general case of concern. lesser
I. surely beyond Oregon Employers’ is that dispute Liability Law, 654.305, imposes Ore. Rev. Stat. § stricter imposed by standard of than maritime- duty law. liability Under law the basis of in cases maritime like this is in light the failure use reasonable care is, attendant circumstances, negligence. See Generale, Kermarec Compagnie 625, 630, The state statute, hand, imposes oh the other to use—
“every device, prac- precaution care and protection safety ticable to use for the and of life limb, only by necessity and preserv- limited agree 2 I provision with the Court that the Federal Tort rendering Claims Act States with the United liabld accordance occurred,” “law place U. S. C. where the act omission (b)., into manifests no to convert a maritime tort intention falling tort, land this must be treated as one within case jurisdiction. p. maritime and note ante. See *9 324 and device, of . . . without efficiency
ing material cost of suitable regard to the additional safety appliance Stat. and devices.” Ore. Rev. [sic] §654.305. imposes statute recognized has this itself
Oregon Broadway v. care,” of higher degree “much Hoffman 11 Hazelwood, 519, 10 P. 524, 349, 351, 139 Ore. 2d P. generally required than that of defendants 814, 2d v. Camenzind Freeland Furniture accident cases. See P. Co., 174 much 158, 172-173, 139, 89 Ore. So deny. I not the Court to do understand indeed II. it is. injuries death, short of
Had this accident resulted could have been held clear that States United “duty standards except liable accordance with the of This from imposed by general maritime law. follows supremacy of federal in maritime constitutional doctrine from rule first unmis affairs, particularly and more v. Luckenbach S. takably announced Chelentis S. rejected “saving 247 372, S. the notion 1 77, Act Judiciary clause” of of the of Stat. § permitted application tort cases in.maritime derogation substantive rules That in. law.3 maritime supremacy of the While discussions current maritime doctrine Jensen, usually commence with Southern Co. U. S. Pacific appropriate beginning point the Chelentis seems a case more compensation in this instance. Jensen was course a workmen’s might thought .case, be have rested on the view that and remedy” preserved by “saving' “common law clause” did not wholly compensation remedy; “of-a character unknown embrace S., law.” 244 U. at 218. It remained for later cases the common principle. that Jensen reflected' a broader establish that, results and of its It should added' while the in Jensen some widely recognition progeny criticized, general there is have been validity premise. .put it, As its The Law of Gilmore Blank making Admiralty, 1-17: “If there sense at all maritime *10 case was a maritime tort brought action in a-state court by a seaman, seeking compensatory damages for injuries claimed to have been by caused the negligence of his employer. Historically, maritime law recognized no such shipowner cause of action. The of a injured to an only was for provide crewman his maintenance and cure, irrespective and that negligence; full indemnity was owing only for breach warranty of seaworthi- ness.4 held, first, The Court that § 20 of the Merchant Marine 1185,5 Act of 38 Stat. notwithstanding, such was still being so, the rule. This court was not free to apply any other rule to a tort: maritime we
“Plainly, think, saving under .the clause a right by sanctioned law be enforced maritime through appropriate remedy recognized at com- mon law; nothing but we find therein which reveals an give complaining party intention to an election to determine liability whether defendant’s' the. shall be measured by common-law standards rather than those of the maritime law. Under circumstances presented, here regard without to the court where he might petitioner’s ask relief, rights were those rec- ognized by Id., of the sea.” at 384. law This rule soon subsequent was reiterated in two cases. The first Packing Sandanger, was Carlisle Co. v. S.U. Chelentis, 255, which, like was -a state court action against crew member the shipowner. Injury was allegedly by mislabeling caused of a gasoline can of subject, law a power there must be some limit set then to the working.” of the states to interfere in the Stevens, field of its See also Tompkins Law, R. R. v. and the Uniform General Maritime Erie L. Harv. Rev. 246. 4The Osceola, classic is that found in The formulation 158, 175. 5 Providing having that “seamen command shall not be held to be authority.” felloW-sérvants with those under their preserver failure to stock a life on board. negligent A plaintiff the'ground was but on judgment affirmed, unseaworthy in the respects named; the vessel was action for negligence existence a causé of was general denied. “The rules of the apply maritime law whether the in an proceeding be instituted Id., common-law court.” at The second case was Dahl, Dry Robins Dock Co. v. S.U. where the action, again in a state negligence’, court for was an an employee independent against contractor his for a employer shipboard injury. Such a admiralty, Transport Imbrovek, existed in Atlantic Co. v. *11 52, 234 the question scope U. S. was as to the of the duty. defendant’s Here too the same principle of federal An supremacy upheld. was instruction permitting the jury to requirements consider the of a safety statute on negligence the issue of was held erroneous. . “The of,the rights and liabilities parties .arose out of and depended upon general maritime law and could not be enlarged impaired by the state S., statute.” 266 U. at 457
Largely owing the passage Act, Jones 46 688,6 S. U. C. which bound nonadmiralty as well as admiralty courts,7 the issue was-not again litiga-, raised tion here for several decades. Garrett v. Moore-McCo r mack S. 239, however, U. demonstrates 317 pervasive scope given to,the same principle of-federal supremacy application in the of that There a Act.. State power, by was denied characterizing “pro the matter as cedural,”.to its apply question own to the rules burden proof of fraud obtaining release from an injured seaman. Rather the state court was required to
6 op. cit., supra, Black, See account in Gilmore and 376-377. 7 Socony-Vacuum Smith, Co. 424; See v. Beadle v. 305 U. S. Spencer, Anelich, The Arizona v. 124; U. S. U. S.
apply the rule adopted by federal maritime law. The- case thus manifests the continued vitality of the suprem acy principle this area. 317 at S., n. 10. Talbot, Pope Inc., Hawn, remained for & S.U. 406, unmistakably to demonstrate the principle Chelentis, embodied Sandanger, and Dry Robins Dock decisions had not withered with time. There a shore-based carpenter, employed by an independent con tractor, sought recovery against a shipowner based on .a negligence8 and unseaworthiness. The Court held that under federal a right law of action was available on both grounds, and that under the maritime rule the effect of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was to diminish, but not wholly defeat, his recovery. This being so, a State was debarred from applying another rule.
Finally, when, only last Term, the Court came to con- sider, Kermarec v. Compagnie Generate, the scope of a shipowner’s duty of care toward a social guest of a crew member, it had no hesitation about the pr.oposition that federal law govern must an action within the jurisdiction of admiralty.
“The District Court was in error in ruling that the governing law in that, this case was of the State of New York. injured Kermarec was aboard a ship upon navigable waters. It was there that the con- *12 duct of which he complained occurred. The legal rights and liabilities arising from that conduct were therefore within the full reach of the admiralty juris- diction and measurable the standards of maritime law. ... If this action had been brought in a state court, reference to admiralty law would have been 8 The cause negligence of action-for did not of course rest on the Act, seaman, Jones since Hawn was not a but on the traditional imposing doctrine shipowner on a to use reasonable injuring See, g., Morris, care to avoid an invitee. e. The Max 137 U. 1. S.
necessary rights to determine the liabilities of parties. Packing Sandanger, Carlisle Co. v. 255, plaintiff right S. 259 exercises the Where by diversity citizenship conferred to choose a fed forum, eral the result is different, though no even he jury exercises further to a trial. Whatever may once doubt have existed on that score was effec Talbot, Inc., Hawn, tively laid to rest & Pope v. Id., 406, 346 U. S. 410-11.” at 628.
I think it is clear, then, supremacy principle established this line of shrugged be off cases as a relic of an earlier day.9 Indeed,' discredited disregard Court’s total of that principle present in the case is not grounded on view that it is longer gen- no erally viable. Rather, appears Court to consider it inapplicable in an action for wrongful death. For r.easons now to be I think discussed this is a mistaken view.
III. I myself What shall address point to at this is the rea- why son maritime law permits resort to state only statutes.10 For it is an through understanding 9 Nothing Eckert, 155, may in Caldarola properly v. 332 U. S. impinging upon vitality' taken as supremacy continued enunciated, principle as in the Chelentis ease and its successors. Stevens, Tompkins Cf. Erie R. R. v. and the Uniform General Mari Law, 246, time 64 Harv. L. Rev. 263. Nor has this doctrine otherwise suggested by become diluted as seems to be Wechsler, Hart and The System, Any Federal Courts and the Federal 482-483. doubts which might “effectively by Pope have existed on this score were laid to rest Talbot, Inc., Hawn, 406, & 410-411.” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generate, supra, at 628. Harrisburg, supra, Prior to the.decision in the Court had rejected claims that upon maritime tort actions in based courts “saving clause,” local death statute were not within the Steamboat Chase, Clause, Co. v. 16 Wall. or were offensive to the Commerce Alling, Subsequently, Sherlock v. U. S. 102-103. Ham-
329 pivotal of that reason that can be shed on the light issue in this case.
Unfortunately such rationalization as has been made of problem wrongful .the in the death in cases this Court does very carry us Mr. in far. Justice Holmes The Hamil ton content to say permitting was no more than that to be produce “any. statutes used would not lamen lack uniformity” table 207 maritime law. U. S., at McReynolds 406. Mr. Justice Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 S. 233, simply U. observed that the use of logical prior such statutes was “the result of decisions,” subject is maritime and local character’” “[t]he and that the “will not work prejudice material innovation general the characteristic features of the maritime nor proper harmony interfere *with the and uniformity of law in its international and interstate relations.” Id., at 242.11
ilton, supra, was, difficulty, plaintiff with little held that a could grounded assert wrongful of action on a state Bourgogne, La death act. See also 95, recog 210 U. S. 138. Jensen cases, S., 216, nized the doctrine of 244 these at and in Western Garcia, post-Jensen Fuel Co. v. 257 expressly U. S. Court held that the of The displaced. rule Hamilton had not been See also Kierejewski, 479; Spencer Kellogg Great Lakes Co. v. 261 S.U. Co. v. Hicks, 512-513. significance early Ailing of such cases as in the Chase
history uniformity principle largely academic, now has become century developments. -in view of the twentieth n analysis unexplained This the- sense leaves irrespective death actions are local. That attribute obtains activities, although character of the décedent’s the “maritime -but generally exactly doctrine the- local” turned on nuances. Rohde, g., 469;
element. E. Grant Co. v. Smith-Porter S.U. 103; Larson, Robinson, Admiralty, Compen see Law of Workmen’s wrongfúl sation, way, 89.22. Put another action for an damages lived, would, his although, “local” had the victim activities, Thus, been reason of the of his not have “local.” nature permits 'it is itself which some characteristic death action n application of state law. *14 to subject rationalizations of the leave much Be Other application desired. It has been said that the of state a in permitted death statutes is to-“fill void” wrongful g., e. L. See, 251, 252; law. Va. Rev. maritime Tungus, The supra, B. at 592. 365, 366; U. L. Rev. cf. only But is a in the sense that there is an “void” there in such cases; admiralty absence of of action does subject. not on It has been suggested lack rule the also that permits application the Court of state death acts regards because it such statutes as wiser in this respect law, although than maritime it deems itself unable to g., e. alter the rule. See, Note, disfavored federal 73 Harv. Harrisburg L. if 84, 148, Rev. But the rule of n isso firmly legislation only established that is.the avail Tungus, cf. supra, able means of reform, 590, 599, at scarcely legitimate turn, very reason, it is to for that to state law.
(cid:127)I think the fault with such lies explanations .admiralty’s emphasis given endeavor to find state .to - supplement to its own shortcomings, something law power always fully has been competent to remedy internally on its own account. Instead, proper point departüfe I is, believe, recognize that in permitting wrongful admiralty use of death statutes endeavoring itself policies repre to accommodate to state sented such statutes. That appears to have' .'indeed approach Congress been the of * in enacting the Death-on The Tungus High Act, Seas for as was said legislative history of that Act “discloses á clear congres purpose sional 'unimpaired rights leave under State statutes as to deaths on waters within the territorial ” jurisdiction of the deep States’ and “reflects' concern power that the wrongful to create States actions n deathin way no be affected enactment of the federal S., law.” 358 at 593. At the same time there was suggestion Congress no contemplated that' supremacy admiralty yielded law should be to the id., in maritime death cases. Cf. at 607-608, Statés separate opinion. only say, to. has sometimes been things confuses as
loosely remarked, maritime death cases absorbs state have States systems maritime law. State embraced and maritime separately, even'though always law stand the two mutually exclusive, and when a the lat- conflict arises ter, yields only former of a superior face This, think, interest. I is what Justice McReynolds Mr. Garcia Bhat a had in when he stated in mind *15 subject a statute is both “maritime and local in The true inquiry character.” thus becomes one involving the nature interest .in a wrongful of statute, the extent to which such upon interest intrudes concerns, reasoning and the basis led Mr. in The Hamilton summarily Justice Holmes to state that resort to “any such statutes would not result in lam- entable lack of uniformity” maritime law. authority no in admiralty
What lesser matters than in The City Brown Judge many years ago Addison. said Norwalk, F. 98,12 is illuminating. gave He highly permitting these reasons a state apply death statute to to a maritime tort: a
“(1) general is law of personal rights, not specially directed to or navigation, commerce but alike on applying (2) sea it shore; or is within the police power; for it 'a protect is intended to statute (Huntington v. Attrill, .) 146 U. S. 675 . . life/ through one the most effectual of sanctions, all viz. on by imposing the offender a liability pay pecu- ground sub nom. The The decision affirmed as to was this No. 364, 367-368, F. certificate dismissed on motion Transfer McCullough York, sub nom. v. New N. & H. H. R. public,
niary indemnity; in the interest of while pauperism dependency also tends to avert support, by shifting their the burden of the survivors community part to the authors from the least, at scope wrong; (3) and interferes local its it is gen- uniformity way in the needful with no or interstate seas, or with international eral law of the Id., at 108. interests.” decision of a death, causes tortious conduct
Where provide right in favor of the victim’s of action State to response represents a to considera- estate or beneficiaries pro- competence: peculiarly traditional state tions within pauperism family, preventing viding for the victim’s public responsi- by shifting be a would otherwise what wrong. bility are mat- These to those who committed regu- intimately ters with the State’s concerned interest injury' lating relationships. where the .Moreover, familial predominant, under maritime this is the purpose In such if of the statute. sole, indeed not the legislating in is not order to affect instances the State federally by hypothesis im- since conduct, defendant’s duty already merely posed no federal exists. For because hardly say can death, lies for one there, negligence, through kill but there is no not to *16 duty injure. is the same is a not to .The tortious conduct wrongful under federal law. The state and case; either meaningful inroads on federal makes no statute therefore Judge quote from Brown: To further interests. cause of statute not create the “The state does right, a and lia- create new does, indeed, It action. single bility; a one of the ele- it not create but does (cid:127) up action, fundamental cause of ments that make the grounds All of the' demand. is, the essential independently statute, and of the elements exist these by it. It no more creates least affected are not the than it negli or the creates the wrong, damage, as in. gence death; it, pilotage or the nor does and wharfage cases, anything damages add to the dpuble no for except sustained. authorizes ‘the recovery pecuniary damages’ already existing. apparent, It is by Mr. that, suggested as Justice Clifford therefore, Chase, Steamboat Co. v. Wall. the statute operation does no than ‘take the case out more of the of the maxim that an for death common-law ” person.’ F., dies with the at 109. statute, absque “Before the the case was damnum injuria; became a tort in statute, at once and a marine tort réason legal sense, the full of its its its . . . place, nature, and circumstances .” Id., at 110.
Thus, duty where a act imposed is no death greater than' that already existing law, under federal application solely, nearly sp, statute is reac tion to strong, interests, localized state and there is no real encroachment on federal interests.13 reasoning This has found reflection maritime cases outside Chambers, realm of Just actions v. 312 U. S. 383, permitted application to maritime tort of a state statute providing against for survival an action a deceased tortfeasor.. Here, too, .which, decedent had breached a had he lived, he protect would have had to answer. The State’s decision plaintiffs way only interests, from loss in this reflected local made no encroachment on maritime interests.
Red Cross Line Atlantic Fruit contract action, question validity, applied involved the as to a maritime contract, making agreements specifi of- a state statute to arbitrate cally proceeded premise The decision from enforceable. obligations agreements arbitration were valid under maritime merely remedy specific and that the statute added the performance remedy damages. See, id., to the -traditional at 123-125. While enforcing agreements pecul there the state interest such was not as iarly eases, local as is true fact that *17 here, as purports, a State when
Far is the case different does person federal law duty under impose a which to hardly said that the State it can be Then not bear. juris- maritime within federal regulate conduct seeking to here like the one of a statute very purpose The diction. take the applies to to whom is to induce those invoked fact the case, mere it. In such required by precautions be duty the cannot imposes act that it is a death matter of “local” con- import the thought to render longer no given state interests only. expression cern The concern. within state predominantly peculiarly are those federally regulated into By token the intrusion the same minimal.. longer is no interests the course I find with justification, can no consistent here, Court, upholding power in adjudication this (cid:127) for an as need suggesting without so much even activity as to extent of interest inquiry federal question.14 IV. death cases on which Court
Nothing
involved,
for today’s holding.
relies
None of them
calls
law
here,
as
the assertion of
local rules of substantive
beyond those
under federal standards.15
going
applicable
validity
acknowledged
contracts,
of arbitration' clauses
recognized
them,
up
live
-into
rendered the'intrusion
justify
result.
federal interests' so minimal as to
14 may
overriding
be
an
existence of
interest
maritime,
solely
is not to be inferred
from the fact
tort is
jurisdiction
it.
has
over
Cases
be
sense
put in
with maritime activities is so remote
which the connection
readily
accepted by admiralty
law should
or fortuitous that state
purport
applicable. The Court does not
it is otherwise
.where
any such basis.
treat this case on
Harrisburg, supra, (“negligence”
See, in this
under
Court:
Hamilton,
statutes);
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts and
statute);
supra (“negligence” under Delaware
West-
*18
failing
The
essential
the Court’s use of these
is
cases
rights
that,
its view
because
asserted
a
under
state death
rights
manifestly
statute are
created
State,
no
federal element is
involved
their assertion. The truth
is, however, that, where the tort is
maritime
brought
“saving
action is
under the
clause,” state-created
rights may
only by
permission.
be asserted
That
premise
offspring,
is
Hamilton,
on which The
and its
proceeded
right
plaintiff
When such a
is asserted, the
give
must, however, show more than that a State can
Garcia,
ern
supra (“negligence”
Fuel v.
wrongful
under California
statute);
Bourgogne,
(“fault”
death
La
358 U.
613
New
statute as in The
See, in
y
the lower
Cia.,
federal courts:
v. A.
Curtis
Garcia
241
(“unlawful
F. 2d 30
negligence”
or
Pennsylvania
violence
under
wrongful
statute);
S., Inc.,
death
The H.
No.
130 F.
341
2d
(“wrongful act, neglect
Jersey wrongful
or default” under New
death
statute); Klingseisen
Transp. Co.,
(same
v. Costanzo
101 F.
902
2d
Pennsylvania wrongful
case);
death statute as in the Curtis
Graham
Lusi, Ltd.,
v.
(“wrongful
A.
F.
act, negligence,
206
2d 223
carelessness
wrongful
statute);
or default”
Florida
death
Truelson v.
undfer
Whitney
Shipping Co.,
(“wrongful act,
& Bodden
him must also right to he show that has- provide done so. if a has chosen to a Thus,, State not sue right of action to one who does within stated Fuel v. period, Harrisburg, supra; Western Co. Garcia, 651- supra; Deupree, Levinson v. S.U. relationship 652; to one who does not have stated id., 651; negli at one whose decedent, decedent’s Assn, United Pilots gence injury, contributed to fatal Halecki, 613, 615; v. S. or to one whose 358 U. uniquely breach maritime based on seaworthy Tungus Skovgaard, provide ship, *19 right recovery, for supra, there can be no of neither asking state it.16 nor affords For this when reason, law has a cause under plaintiff whether made out of action act, approaches a state death the Court the statute “as Levinson foreign jurisdiction,” it would originating one in an deter supra, v “endeavor to Deupree, at mine the law of accordance with substantive issueá\in State,” S., v. Moor e-McCormack 317 U. Garrett 245. This, having right, at Pecause the State created the one must to state law to “determine the circum look Tungus, stances exists.” The that.right under which at supra,
But apposite question none of these cases is when the federally is not of action permitted right whether by State, in fact conferred whether fed- has been but S., Inc., 72, supra, recovery also rested on See The H. No. where appellate decision that the State whose court’s sought recovery imposed liability statute was to be made the basis of defendant, presented, upon the in the there circumstances for tort employee. suggestion application its was no substan of There of tive federal martime would have led a different result. standards to Court, remaining by relied on lower cases court supra, to referred in note involved same issues as those presented Tungus in the Halecki and cases. permits
eral maritime law the State to create an asserted right surely of It action. is that, fallacious reason principle supremacy because the federal maritime right law has been held to bar a of action for death pre- caused defendant’s failure to take reasonable exposing cautions to avoid those to whom the prin- owed an risk harm, undue it follows that such ciple does not bar a death caused every precaution failure device, care and to(“use practicable it is to use,” Ore. Rev. Stat. 654.305. When Court, Hamilton and its held successors, supremacy principle prevent the federal did not a State giving any right''of from action for death caused thereby a maritime it did not tort, eschew forever Sll obligations federal limits on the content substantive appearing bearing “wrongful in statutes the label act.” go be that the Court does not intend to so far. afterthought,
It asserts, albeit as an almost that some might 'constitutionally inapplicable state doctrines notwithstanding they maritime torts, are embodied summarily possible in a death statute.17 It then finds the inapplicable ground reservation in this instance on the *20 provisions Oregon Employers’ Liability that other of the admiralty Law, not here involved, resemble some doc- trines, with which also arewe not now concerned, more comparable provisions general" than do in the State’s presumably statute, can be consti- tutionally applied ato maritime tort. With all deference, say I must that the total irrelevance of that fact seems plain. reviewing general constitutionality are not We the case, course, In only such of not “the would . . . enforce,” ante, p. 320, challenged decline to the provision, but federal would court, federal, law inhibit a applying common-law state or from it to a maritime tort action. Liability only we are concerned Law; the Employers’
of provi- constitutionality the of the standard-of-care with an employee to an of inde- applied sions of that as navigable on waters and seek- injured pendent contractor of a operator the owner and ing impose liability upon that, find the interest dam. Court does so mini- of the dam owner is regulating conduct situs of dam by reason of the fixed mal —whether supremacy prin- the federal ground on some other —that reasonably found Neither does inapplicable. be ciple may do assert, scarcely so, for it could the Court signifi- statute is not required standard of care this cantly greater imposed by Thus, than that federal law. maritime, supremacy if law calls principle ajesult empty nod, more than an calls for anything .for today. contrary reached n contrary láek “even- It is that a decision will suggested reason since those handedness,” apparently that, dea,th statutes must sometimes invoking state bear the it is comparatively provisions, only burden unfavorable they that, provisions obtain, fair when more favorable be enjoy But, able to the benefits of such rules. as the Court out, adju points concerned with constitutional are “[w]e reaching particular given not with results in dication, there cases.” unevenhandedness as this S.uch consequence Harrisburg, of The area rule steadfastly nearly which this Court has adhered for years,18 Congress, and which when it enacted the Death on High Act, change only saw fit to a limited way. Seas Tungus, at 592-593. supra, See When federal law application permits acts, those on whom the state statute confers a action may escape harsh consequences of rule. Those whom the state cited, 15, supra. See cases note *21 they law as has declined to benefit are left were. Cer- tainly not, “evenhandedness,” we should the name of permit a State to exceed constitutional limitations merely n because may some instances it have chosen not to do might it all under the Constitution.19 I would affirm.
Memorandum of Mr. Justice Whittaker., Except,for its if implication, may or conclusion it intended to be such, that maritime torts committed on the navigable waters State which result death are governed by the general substantive tort law of the by State —not general federal maritime law as reme dially by the supplemented only Wrongful State’s Death Act-^-which conflicts with my expressed my views as dissent in Goett Union Carbide Corp., today, decided post, p. join my Brother Harlan’s dissent. 345, I
19 ought necessary say explicitly not to have been to that this opinion upon rests application evenhanded of a rule of constitutional permits law which enforcement state-afforded substantive rights under wrongful only long state rights death statutes so such as by do offend those established the maritime law. Faithful'adher to ence that rule of course to lead different results in different situations, depending upon rights 'given by the extent of the Tungus, rights law. In permitted accorded state law were prevail they recognized because were not offensive those maritime law. Here prevail the state-created cannot because flatly opposed éxisting short, under maritime law. In opposite these results are not attributable to differences in the applicable constitutional rule two cases—a .rule which remains the same in all death cases—but to differences in the char rights acter of substantive afforded two statutes involved.