3 Pa. Super. 582 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1897
Opinion by
It is not material whether the injury set forth in this action was a malicious prosecution or a false imprisonment. In practice, the distinction between these torts has related to the form of the action, and this distinction is abolished by the procedure act of 1887.
The liability of the defendant for the wrong here complained of is to be tested by certain well settled principles. At common law, the husband was liable for the torts of his wife, whether committed before or during coverture. For a tort in which the' wife took an independent part, the husband and wife were jointly liable. For a tort which she committed hy his direction, he alone was liable. The wife being sub pot-estate viri, if she committed a tort in the husband’s presence it was presumptively in obedience to his direction; and unless it appeared that she acted wholly of her own will he alone was liable: 2 Kent, 149 ; Quick v. Miller, 103 Pa. 67; Franklin’s Appeal, 115 Pa. 534 ; Mfg. Co. v. Hiel, 115 Pa. 487.
These principles remain without statutory modification. The Act of April 11, 1848, sec. 6, P. L. 536, preserved to the wife the ownership of her property as fully after marriage as before,
Thus there has been no statutory change in the common law liability of husband and wife for the torts of the wife, and no change in the common law remedy except the provision of the act of 1848 directing execution first against the property of the wife. The case before us is therefore to be governed by the common law principles respecting liability for the torts of a married woman.
The evidence shows without contradiction, that the husband
The judgment against the defendant Victoria R. Heft is reversed.