Hesch v. SeaveyHesch v. Seavey
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Keegan, J.), entered February 27, 1992 in Albany County, which denied a motion by defendants John R. Staats and Joseph D. Bottisti for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.
Defendants John R. Staats and Joseph D. Battisti (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants) were the owners of a four-unit apartment building in the City of Schenectady, Schenectady County, in which plaintiff was a tenant. Defendants entered into a written contract with Joseph E. Seavey, doing business as Seavey Enterprises (hereinafter Seavey), to install a furnace in the building.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this negligence action for damages for his personal injuries. Joseph Seavey was not named as a defendant. Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they were not liable, as a matter of law, for the acts of Seavey and that plaintiff had failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to whether a defect in the property existed. Supreme Court denied the motion, and this appeal by defendant ensued.
It is undisputed that Seavey was acting as an independent contractor at the time plaintiff was injured. As such, defendants would ordinarily not be liable for his acts (see, McDonald v Shell Oil Co.,
In the case at bar, plaintiff conceded in his deposition that he is not relying on a defect in the premises to establish defendants’ liability. Therefore, the focus is on the existence of a triable issue of fact on whether defendants either contracted for inherently dangerous work or negligently hired an incompetent contractor. First, although the question of whether an activity is inherently dangerous is normally one of fact (see, Rosenberg v Equitable Life Assur. Socy., supra, at 670), there was nothing exceptional involved in the installation of the furnace in defendants’ building, and the installation of a furnace is clearly not an activity in which there is danger inherent in the nature of the contract work. Additionally, defendants submitted evidence that they had hired Seavey on several prior occasions, and at no time did its work give any indication that it was incompetent. Therefore, the burden shifted to plaintiff to establish a triable issue of fact on these two exceptions to the general rule of nonliability (see, Zuckerman v City of New York,
Mercure, Mahoney, Casey and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, motion granted, summary judgment awarded to defendants John R. Staats and Joseph D. Bottisti and complaint dismissed against said defendants.
Notes
Plaintiff erroneously named George R. Seavey as a defendant, who is apparently since deceased.