122 P. 1074 | Cal. | 1912
This is a proceeding in mandamus by which petitioners seek to compel the Reclamation District through its officers to accept a certain registered warrant of the district in satisfaction of a judgment whereby an assessment against the land of petitioners was judicially found to be valid and a lien was declared against the said property. The sum due upon the warrant, with accrued interest, exceeds the amount of the judgment including costs of suit, but petitioners offered to pay the equivalent of the costs in money, and to waive the excess of the warrant and interest thereon over the tax as finally determined in the judgment.
The judgment against the petitioners here was entered February 23, 1908. No appeal was taken therefrom, but one was prosecuted to this court from the order denying a motion for a new trial. This was determined in favor of the Reclamation District September 8, 1911. (See Reclamation Dis't No. 730 v. Hershey,
Before applying for the writ of mandate petitioners had brought the matter before the superior court by appropriate motion. This was denied and petitioners properly object to seeking a writ of mandate from that court which, upon consideration of their motion has refused them the very relief which they seek by this proceeding. A suit in equity would be of doubtful efficacy, and the existence of such a remedy does not bar the right to a writ of mandate. (Holtum v. Greif,
They contend that, as the reclamation district is a state agency and as the legislature has the power to determine how assessments shall be payable, the district must accept payment as commanded by the legislature. With this view of the law we entirely agree. Long ago it was settled in California that in levee districts (which for purposes of taxation are exactly *404
similar to reclamation districts) the tax-collector must accept warrants of the districts in payment of taxes under a statute making such warrants legal tender for that purpose, notwithstanding another section of the same statute providing that all taxes levied by virtue of the act should be paid in gold or silver coin. The statute was interpreted to mean that the taxes were payable either in warrants or money, but that when paid with the latter a particular kind of money should be used.(Prescott v. McNamara,
We now come to the more serious questions concerning the applicability of section 3457 to the facts of this proceeding. The lien of the assessment had been declared by the judgment of the superior court before the amendment of section 3457 of the Political Code. Would not the application of that statute to an existing judgment be therefore retroactive? We think not. Long prior to the amendment to said section 3457 this court had declared that the actions authorized by sections 3466 and 3493 1/2 of the Political Code were part of the proceedings for the creation of an assessment. An action under one of these statutes determined as between the district and the landowner the validity of the assessment, awarding, as an incident to such determination if it were in favor of the district, an execution to procure satisfaction of the assessment. As was said in the opinion of this court in Reclamation District No. 531 v. Phillips,
Notwithstanding their tender of costs in cash and their waiver of their claim under the warrant for any sum in excess of the judgment, petitioners ask us to declare that both the costs and the amount found due under the assessment are payable by the warrant. The answer to this is that the very purpose of this proceeding is to enforce upon the district acceptance of the tender made by petitioners, and we are not required to indulge in speculation regarding our action if some different offer of payment had been made by them.
Let the writ issue as prayed.
Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., Shaw, J., and Angellotti, J., concurred.