In 1954 appellant Hersel A. Willey was convicted in the Criminal Court of Mercer County, West Virginia, of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. After adequately exhausting state remediеs, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in District Court. In his petition for the writ, Willey alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in that his retained trial counsel:
1) failed to advise him of his right to appeal, and
2) refused to аppeal the conviction because of defendant’s lack of funds further to retain counsel and to pay for the production of the trial transcript, and furthermore, the attоrney did not advise him that as an indigent he was entitled to have appointed appellаte counsel and a free transcript.
Upon these allegations, the District Court ordered a hearing. In an oral opinion, the Judge resolved the disputed facts in petitioner’s favor. He found that Willey desired an appeal in 1954 and that his attorney “apparently felt strongly thаt there was some degree of unfairness in the trial which perhaps translated would mean thаt there were misjudgments and some reversible error.” Nevertheless, because of petitioner’s inability to finance an appeal, the attorney sought no review of the 1954 conviction.
These facts clearly establish that under today’s standards petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. An indigent has been held to have a right to a free transcript, Griffin v. Illinois,
But the District Court refused to apply retroactively these relatively recent statements of law to overturn petitioner’s 1954 conviction. Primarily cited against the retrospectivity of these chses was this circuit’s recent
en banc
decision in Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
While thе District Court was bound, as this panel is bound, to follow Shiflett in respect to the retroactivity of Nelsоn v. Peyton, we hold that, under the facts of this case, Shiflett does not govern. 1 We agree with petitioner Willey that Griffin and Douglas apply retroactively to entitle him tо a free transcript and court-appointed appellate counsel.
We have consistently applied
Griffin
and
Douglas
retroactively. Turner v. North Carolina,
If upon investigation it is found that Williams desired and sought an appeal, that he was refused by his lawyers because of his indigence and that he was not advised of his right to have the state provide counsel and the requisite transcript, then the District Court should order petitioner’s release unless the state’s appellate courts will grant a delayed appeal.392 F.2d at 213 .
In the instant case, precisely those findings were made by the District Judge, and upon such a factual determination, under Turner, Williams, Puckett, and Ma-gee, the writ should have been granted.
The
en banc
decision in Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
The usual form of relief in cases оf this nature is to allow a belated appeal. But from the District Judge’s opinion, it appеars that no transcript of petitioner’s 1954 trial exists and none can be produced. Under similаr circumstances, we have ordered that the petitioner be accorded a nеw trial if the state elects to retry him within a reasonable time as fixed by the District Court, and if no new triаl is sought, that petitioner be released from custody.
*527
Turner v. North Carolina,
Accordingly, a certificate of рrobable cause to appeal is granted and the District Court’s order denying habeas corpus relief is vacated. The case is remanded to the District Court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Notes
.
Shiflett
plays no part in this case. The District Judge found that Willey desired review of' his conviction, but was prevented from appealing by the state’s refusal to providе him appointed counsel and a free transcript on appeal. In
Shiflett
“the petitiоners * * * were represented at trial by retained counsel or appointed lawyers who stood ready to represent them further if requested. The state, on a showing of indigency and thе filing of a notice of appeal, was prepared to furnish to each of them an attorney and the incidents of an appeal at its expense.”
