319 Mass. 428 | Mass. | 1946
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the action of the respondent in revoking certain hackney carriage licenses issued to the petitioner.. The judge ruled that no error of law appeared in the record. From a judgment dismissing the petition the petitioner appealed.
The respondent’s return shows the following: On August 9, 1945, the petitioner, who was .the licensee named in
The petitioner contends that the order of revocation was without authority of law. This question is properly raised by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Morley v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 261 Mass. 269, 279, and cases cited.
It cannot be doubted that under the statutes as they stood prior to 1930 the police commissioner could take the action he did. By St. 1906, c. 291, § 10, as amended by St. 1909, c. 221, it was provided, “He shall have all the powers of the board of police in regard to revoking licenses issued by him, and in addition may, in his discretion, for any cause deemed satisfactory to him and without a hearing,
The contention of the petitioner, however, is that the foregoing has ceased to be the law as a result of later enactments. By Res. 1929, c. 53, there was created a special unpaid commission to investigate the subject matter of pending legislation “relative to the regulation of hackney carriages and taxicabs in the city of Boston, including all rules and regulations relating to hackney carriages and taxicabs promulgated by the police commissioner” and others, and also to “investigate the conduct of the police commissioner in granting licenses, parking or stand privileges to taxicab companies or taxicab owners, and the compensation paid, if any, for the use of any part of a public street.” This was followed by the passage of St. 1930, c. 392, entitled,
Section 4 was amended by St. 1933, c. 306. As so amended, it was repealed and a new § 4 enacted by St. 1934, c. 280. In its present form § 4 provides for the annual granting of hackney licenses “provided, that, at any time within one year after the expiration of a license under this section, the holder thereof shall be entitled as of right, upon payment of the proper fee, to a renewal of such license, unless after a hearing before said commissioner it appears that he has good cause to refuse to issue the same.” It also is provided that licenses shall be assignable subject to the approval of the commissioner, and shall be subject to such other terms, conditions, and limitations, and to the payment of such fees as he may prescribe; and that he may fix the number of licenses within certain limits subject to the right of an applicant who is refused a license by reason of the fact that the maximum number of licenses has been
The petitioner contends that St. 1930, c. 392, as amended by St. 1934, c. 280, is the “sole law” governing taxicab licenses in the city of Boston, “together with” the “rules and orders” made under § 1 of St. 1930, c. 392, and the “terms, conditions and limitations” made under the new § 4. He, therefore, urges that his licenses have been revoked for reasons of which he had no knowledge, and which are not to be found in the statutes, or in the “rules and orders,” or in the “terms, conditions and regulations.” It is not argued by anyone that the revocations in the case at bar were for a cause specified in any rules, orders, terms, conditions or limitations.
The main question presented is whether St. 1930, c. 392, as amended by St. 1934, c. 280, repealed by implication St. 1906, c. 291, § 10, as amended by St. 1909, c. 221. “A statute is not to be deemed to supersede a prior statute in whole or in part in the absence of express words or clear implication.” Inspector of Buildings of Falmouth v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. Inc. 264 Mass. 85, 89. “Repeals by implication are not favored, and both "statutes must stand unless it plainly appears that the later was intended to be a complete substitute for the earlier one.” Commonwealth v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 238. Snell v. Bridgewater Cotton Gin Manuf. Co. 24 Pick. 296, 297-298. Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352. Dexter v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 316 Mass. 31, 51. The general repeal of inconsistent acts in St. 1930, c. 392, § 9, adds nothing. See Sutherland on Statutory Construction (3d ed.) § 2013, where many cases are cited. As was said in Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373, 377, “every statute is a repeal of all former ones by implication, so far as it is contrary and repugnant thereto, without a repealing clause.” But St. 1930, c. 392, § 10, calls for the continuation in effect of existing licenses “unless sooner revoked in accordance with law.” In that act there is no other reference to revocation of licenses. Obviously the phrase, “revoked in accordance with law,” could not refer
We think, therefore, that St. 1930, c. 392, § 10, indicates a legislative intent to preserve the existing power of revocation contained in St. 1906, c. 291, § 10, as amended by St. 1909, c. 221. It follows that this is not a case for the application of the principle that where “a statute has been enacted, apparently intended to cover the entire subject to which it relates, including a remedy for its infraction, other provisions of law are superseded,” as in Bellevue Hotel Co. v. Building Commissioner of Boston, 299 Mass. 73, 75, and similar cases. Nor do we need to consider the scope and effect of the rules and regulations prescribed by the commissioner.
We are of opinion that the provisions relative to renewal of licenses as of right, to be found in St. 1934, c. 280, have no bearing on the present situation. There is likewise no advantage to the petitioner in his suggestion, made without citation of authority, that he had been found to be a suitable person, because the licenses in question were issued February 5, 1945, whereas the petitioner’s written acknowledgment of violation of the Federal rationing regulation was made August 7, 1944. Compare Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 481-482.
This is the opinion of a majority of the court.
Judgment affirmed.