Case Information
*1 Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: [*]
Larry Leonard Herron, Texas prisoner # 00715927, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(1). Herron’s
motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Herron acknowledges
that the Supreme Court has ruled that the retroactive application
of “Megan’s laws” requiring sexual offender registration and
notification do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
Smith v. Doe,
However, Herron contends that the law still violates the Due Process Clause because it discriminates against him. Herron states that he was convicted in cause no. 916850 on February 12, 2003, for failure to comply as a sex offender. He states that his failure to comply charge is now on appeal due to the fact that his plea was coerced and involuntary. He also attacks his guilty plea to the original sexual offense.
Herron’s brief, with its continued references to alleged
constitutional violations in connection with his convictions
for the original sexual offense requiring his registration, a
previous firearms offense, DWI, and failure to comply with the
sexual offender registration law, shows that the district court
was correct to interpret Herron’s complaint as a challenge to a
pending state criminal proceeding or a habeas petition. Herron
makes no argument challenging the district court’s reasons for
dismissing his complaint in this regard. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Herron’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint as frivolous. Siglar v. Hightower,
(5th Cir. 1997). Herron’s appeal is without arguable merit and
is frivolous. See Howard v. King,
Herron is hereby informed that the dismissal of this appeal
as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),
in addition to the strike for the district court’s dismissal.
See Adepegba v. Hammons,
APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.
