78 Minn. 475 | Minn. | 1900
1. The plaintiffs seek by this action to recover from the defendant $2,096.27, the value of their special property and interest in 4,000 bushels of wheat, alleged to have been converted by him. The cause was tried by the district court of the county of Hennepin without a jury, and at the close of the evidence the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action. Thereupon the court, without making any findings of fact, granted the motion, and a judg
A trial court, whether the trial be with or without a jury, cannot rightly dismiss an action, without a verdict or findings of fact, on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action, unless the evidence is such that it would not sustain a verdict or finding for the plaintiff. It is not sufficient that the evidence would sustain a verdict or finding for the defendant. It must be such as to require, as a matter of law, a verdict or finding against the plaintiff. Tharalson v. Wyman, 58 Minn. 233, 59 N. W. 1009. It therefore follows that the court erred in so dismissing this action, unless the evidence, as a matter of law, required such a finding. The defendant here claims that such is this case. His claims, briefly stated, are: (a) The evidence shows that the plaintiffs never had any title to or interest in the wheat in question, (b) The evidence conclusively shows that the wheat, claimed by the plaintiffs was sold to the defendant with their consent and authority, and that they received the full purchase price thereof. Of these in order.
2. The evidence as to the plaintiffs’ title to the wheat tended to show these facts: The plaintiffs, here designated as the “bank,” were bankers doing business under the name of Eden Valley Bank, at Eden Valley, this state, and Messrs. Harris & Hukriede, here referred to as the “warehousemen,” were engaged at the same place,. during the times hereinafter stated, in operating a public warehouse or grain elevator. In August, 1897, they made an agreement with the bank, whereby the latter was to discount for them their drafts drawn by them on purchasers of wheat from them. They continued from this time until November 23, 1897, in the business of buying, storing, shipping, and selling grain, during which time they purchased wheat on their own account, storing it in their warehouse, and when they shipped it out they would draw drafts on the consignees, and place the drafts in the bank for collection. The drafts were placed to their credit, and they were allowed to check against such credits before it was known whether the drafts would be accepted or paid.
October 7 a draft of $1,000, so drawn and credited, was dishon
We are not prepared to hold that the evidence required a finding of all the foregoing facts, but do hold that, if the court had so found, the* eAddence would sustain it. Assuming, for the purposes of this appeal, the facts which the evidence tends to prove, the question for our decision is whether such facts establish the bank’s title to the wheat so shipped out of the warehouse, and sold to the
“The wheat described in these receipts had no' existence in the hands of the warehousemen at the time they were issued, and none afterwards came into their possession. These contracts, therefore, had no validity, and conveyed no title, because the pledgor had no such property to pledge. * * The proof shows, not only that defendant never received any such wheat as that pledged by the contract, but that such wheat never had any existence as the subject-matter of the contract.”
If it be true, as claimed, that the evidence shows that the ware-housemen in this case never had any such wheat as that pledged by them to the bank, it follows that the receipts were invalid, and conveyed no title to any wheat to the pledgee. But is it true that the warehousemen did not have in their warehouse the wheat pledged? The fact that when the wheat in the warehouse reached Minneapolis it did not grade No. 1 Northern, or that it was not, in fact, at any time or place, of such grade, does not justify a negative answer to the question, for the wheat in the warehouse when the receipts were given was the wheat pledged by the warehouse-men, and intended to be covered by the receipts. The bank’s rights, by virtue of its receipts, are precisely as if it had actually deposited the 4,000 bushels in the warehouse, and received the storage receipts therefor. National Ex. Bank v. Wilder. Now, if such had been this case, could it be claimed that the bank lost its title to the wheat, and that the warehousemen could sell it, and vest the title thereto in the purchaser, because they had mistakenly or otherwise misdescribed the grade of the wheat in the receipts? If so, depositors can be deprived of their wheat without any remedy, for it would only be necessary for the warehousemen to misdescribe the grade of the wheat in the storage receipt, and then sell all of the wheat in the warehouse to a third party. Such is not the law.
It follows that the order of the trial court dismissing this action cannot be sustained on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a finding that the plaintiffs had title to the wheat in question.
3. This brings us to the defendant’s second claim. The evidence is not conclusive that the bank consented to the shipment and sale to the defendant of the last 4,000 bushels of wheat covered by the storage receipts, or that the bank received the purchase price therefor. The bank held the wheat covered by the receipts as a continuing security for the payment of any overdrafts by the ware-housemen. Their account was overdrawn when they ceased to operate their warehouse and the receipts are still retained by the bank; hence there is no presumption that it consented to the sale of the wheat covered by the receipts. The burden, therefore, was upon the defendant to establish this alleged defense. It is true, as claimed, that the cashier; who had the exclusive management of the business of the bank, knew that wheat was being shipped from
Upon the whole record we hold that the trial court ought to have made findings as to the material issues in this case, and that it was error to dismiss the action without so doing.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.