Herr Estate
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
May 23, 1960
400 Pa. 90 | 161 A.2d 32
Argued November 23, 1959. Before JONES, C. J., BELL, MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, BOK and MCBRIDE, JJ.
We find no merit in any of plaintiff‘s contentions.
Order affirmed; costs to be paid by appellant.
Herr Estate.
Argued November 23, 1959. Before JONES, C. J., BELL, MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, BOK and MCBRIDE, JJ.
Carl G. Herr, for appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE BELL, May 23, 1960:
This case arose by a petition for a declaratory judgment. The question involved is narrow but difficult. Is the paper hereinafter quoted a contract or a will?
On August 11, 1933 Isaac R. Herr and his wife, Nora E. Herr, acquired title to premises No. 436 West Walnut Street as tenants by the entireties and resided therein until their respective deaths. The following typewritten instrument dated the 20th day of January, 1942, was duly executed by Isaac R. Herr and Nora E. Herr, his wife, and after the death of Nora E. Herr, who survived her husband, it was recorded in the Recorder of Deeds’ office in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania on March 17, 1958. The instrument is as follows:
“WHEREAS, ISAAC R. HERR and NORA E. HERR, husband and wife, are owners of a certain lot or piece of land, situate in the City and County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, with a 2 1/2 story brich (sic) dwelling house, No. 436 West Walnut Street, thereon erected;
“IT IS HEREBY MUTUALLY AGREED by and between the said Isaac R. Herr and Nora E. Herr, his wife, that upon the decease of the survivor, said above described real estate shall become the property of our nephew Walter A. Herr, his heirs and assigns, and we, each for ourselves, hereby devise and bequeath said real estate to the said Walter A. Herr, his heirs and assigns. Said devise to become operative upon the decease of the survivor. “Witness our hands and seals this 20th day of January, A. D. 1942.
Witness Present:
Isaac R. Herr (Seal)
Nora E. Herr (Seal)
State of Pennsylvania
County of Lancaster ss:
On the twenty-first Eleventh day of April May A. D. 1942, before me, a Notary Public in and for said County and State came the above named Isaac R. Herr and Nora E. Herr, and acknowledged the foregoing agreement to be their act and deed and desired the same to be recorded as such.
Witness my hand and Notarial seal the day and year aforesaid.
Mary A. Swarr
Notary Public
My commission expires Jan. 27, 1945.”
Who prepared the instrument, or at whose direction it was written does not appear. Isaac R. Herr was a lawyer in Lancaster and notwithstanding failing eyesight, which commenced in 1912 and ultimately resulted in blindness, continued to actively practice his profession until about April, 1944. Mr. Herr employed his nephew Walter in a capacity described as that of a clerk from 1925 until his death, on January 12, 1946. In his last will dated September 16, 1944 Isaac R. Herr
Walter A. Herr (Isaac‘s nephew) claims that the above quoted instrument dated January 20, 1942, was a contract between Isaac R. Herr and his wife to give or devise premises 436 West Walnut Street to him upon the decease of the survivor. Nora Herr‘s living nieces and nephews contend that the writing in question was a mutual will; that it was obviously testamentary; and that it was revoked by the wills of both Isaac and Nora Herr, although neither specifically referred to this property; and that the instrument is therefore null and void.
President Judge BOWMAN in an able opinion analyzed the written instrument and the contentions of the parties, as well as many cases pertaining to the questions involved, and concluded that the instrument was intended by Mr. and Mrs. Herr to be an agreement to give the premises 436 West Walnut Street to Walter A. Herr upon the decease of the survivor. From the decree of the lower Court, one of the nieces took this appeal.
It is obvious that the writing (a) partakes of the nature of an agreement and of a will and (b) that it is ambiguous and (c) that it is sui generis.
The Court in interpreting a will or a contract can always consider the surrounding circumstances in order to ascertain the intention and the meaning of
Furthermore, it is well established that an agreement to make a will, or to make mutual wills, or to devise one‘s property to a particular person, or for a particular purpose, is binding and irrevocable when supported by a valid consideration, and in such a case the promise, as well as the consideration, may be proved by parol evidence, but such evidence must be clear, precise and convincing, or, as it is sometimes expressed, clear, direct and positive. Liggins Estate, 393 Pa. 500, 143 A. 2d 349; McGinley‘s Estate, 257 Pa. 478, 101 A. 807; King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 126 A. 2d 463; Gredler Estate, 361 Pa. 384, 65 A. 2d 404. In Liggins Estate, 393 Pa., supra, Mr. and Mrs. Oldham were the owners of premises 1346 Solomon Street. Mr. Liggins was living with them. He had no work and was despondent, and in order to give him an interest in life they orally agreed to convey to him a one-half interest in this property which was an apartment house, provided that they would all make reciprocal wills devising the real estate to the survivors. This agreement they faithfully carried out by reciprocal wills in 1951.
After Mrs. Oldham‘s death in 1952, Oldham and Liggins, in pursuance of the original agreement made
It starts out with a WHEREAS clause, stating that they are the owners of property 436 West Walnut Street. This is indicative of an agreement rather than a will. It then recites “It is hereby mutually agreed by and between the said Isaac R. Herr and Nora E. Herr, his wife, that upon the decease of the survivor, said above described real estate shall become the property of our nephew, Walter A. Herr, his heirs and assigns. . . .” This language is also indicative of an agreement rather than a will. However, the agreement further provides “and we . . . hereby devise and
Parol evidence was offered and the trial judge found, based upon the testimony of a disinterested witness, that Isaac and Nora Herr agreed to draw up a piece of paper to the effect that Walter A. Herr was to get the property at 436 West Walnut Street upon the death of both of them, because of Walter‘s promise to stay in Isaac‘s office. The witness also testified that during Mrs. Herr‘s confinement in the hospital, when she asked her about this property, Mrs. Herr said “it was not hers to give.”
The Statute of Frauds applies to and renders unenforceable an oral promise or agreement to will real estate. However, a written agreement to leave at one‘s death, or to give by will all or a particular piece of real estate complies with and satisfies the Statute of Frauds; indeed the statute is satisfied if claimant relies upon an oral promise or contract to leave him by will certain real estate if the will or any other writing is connected with and supports the parol contract. Liggins Estate, 393 Pa., supra; Gredler Estate, 361 Pa. 384, 65 A. 2d 404; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54 A. 24. Cf. Cramer v. McKinney, 355 Pa. 202, 49 A. 2d 374.
The typewritten instrument dated January 20, 1942 is so unusual and unique as to be sui generis. We believe the Court below correctly interpreted this written instrument to be an irrevocable contract which by its terms gave premises 436 West Walnut Street to Walter A. Herr upon the decease of the survivor of Isaac R. Herr and Nora E. Herr, his wife. There was therefore no necessity for the executor of Nora E. Herr to file an account for the purpose of including therein premises 436 West Walnut Street.
Decree as modified affirmed, each party to pay their respective costs.
CONCURRING OPINION BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JONES:
The opinion for the court recognizes that the instrument executed by Isaac R. Herr and his wife, Nora, on January 20, 1942, partakes of the characteristics of both a will and a contract and assumes that the instrument cannot function as both but must be construed exclusively as either a will or a contract. With that assumption, I do not agree.
The instrument in question is a joint and mutual will. It is joint because it is one instrument containing wills of two persons; and it is mutual because the wills were made pursuant to an agreement whereby each testament served as the consideration for the other. It is the element of reciprocity which distinguishes mutual wills from ordinary wills. But, there is no rule of law or logic which requires that the contractual element exist aliunde the wills, or that it be not contained in the same instrument or instruments as the wills. Indeed, convenience of establishing mutuality is greatly enhanced if the wills and the reciprocal agreement both appear in the same instrument.
Mr. Justice BENJAMIN R. JONES joins in this concurring opinion.
