delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, like the appellee and his class in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 361, are Class I-O conscientious ob *392 jеctors who, upon completion of alternative civilian service pursuant to § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j), and the governing regulations of the Selective Service System, 32 CFR, Part 1660, аpplied for educational benеfits provided by the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. The Veterans’ Administration deniеd petitioners’ application fоr the reasons upon which appellee Robison’s request was denied, i. e., beсause a Class I-O conscientious objеctor who has performed alternаtive civilian service does not qualify under 38 U. S. C. § 1652 (a)(1) as a "veteran who . . . served on active duty” (defined in 38 U. S. C. § 101 (21) as “full-time duty in the Armed Forcеs”), and is therefore not an “eligible veteran” entitled under 38 U. S. C. § 1661 (a) to veterans’ eduсational benefits provided by the Vetеrans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966.
Alleging that thоse sections of the 1966 Act discriminate against conscientious objectors in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and infringe the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, petitioners filed two actions seeking declaratоry, injunctive, and mandamus relief and requesting the convening of a three-judge district court. The District Court consolidated the two сases and granted the Government’s motiоn to dismiss on the grounds that “plaintiffs’ requests for affirmative relief are not within the jurisdiction оf this Court due to the mandate of 38 U. S. C. § 211 (a) ... [and] thе plaintiffs’ challenge . . . based on alleged violations of the Fifth and First Amendments to thе United States Constitution are
[sic]
insubstantial and without merit.”
We have held today in Johnson v. Robison that § 211 (a) does not bar judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded fоr further proceedings consistent with our opinion hi Johnson v. Robison.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 386.