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Hernandez v. Johnson
248 F.3d 344
5th Cir.
2001
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*2 DENNIS, Cirсuit Judges. stead, assisted Garibay, Jesse brother-in-law, Hernandez took them to a HIGGINBOTHAM, PATRICK E. remote area where he them and robbed Circuit Judge: shot range, them close execution style. juryA 207th survived, Judicial District All but Cervan and two of them Texas, County, Sep- Comal against testified Hernandez at trial.1 The 25, 1985, tember convicted Rodolfo Baiza of Criminal affirmed Hernandez of capital murder of Victor on direct review and the Supreme Court State, 1. See v. (Tex.Crim.App.1990). 805 S.W.2d Hernandez 410-11 Taylor,5 the In Williams In 1991 certiorari.2 denied 2254(d)(1) follows: relief, explained and Court for habeas petition state filed a proposed filed master special 1993 a clause, a to” federal “contrary Under law. conclusions of fact findings *3 writ if may grant the court habeas the master’s adopted court trial The state oppo- aat conclusion arrives court state of all denial recommended proposals aon by this Court to that reached site Ap- of Criminal Court The relief. state court if the or of law question fact findings of determined peals than this differently a case decides denied the record and supported were materially indistin- on a has set Court re- declined Court Supreme The relief. the “unreason- facts. Under guishable petition federal a second time.3 view clause, a federal habeas application” able later the years one-half Two and followed. if the state the writ grant may court certifi- granted relief denied district le- governing correct court identifies now issues the two on appealability cate of decisions from this Court’s gal principle us. before principle unreasonably applies but case. prisoner’s of the the facts to II peti- federal filed his Hernandez Since Ill the effective relief after habeas tion for AEDPA, is con- petition date of counsel filed trial Hernandez’s Before most immediate act. Its by that trolled Pfeuffer, the Judge R.T. requesting motion authority of federal limits provision4 “qualified appoint to judge, state trial follows: as proceedings courts habeas County expense expert at disinterested habeas (d) for a writ of An application of the De- a mental examination conduct custody person aof corpus on behalf to the Defendant’s regard with fendant of a State judgment trial, pursuant file a written to stand competency respect with granted shall not days court within 30 this Court report in adjudicated on was any claim that Examination, re- to testify Order unless proceеdings court in State merits hearing upon trial or garding same claim— adjudication fur- that this ... [and] such issue (1) copies of said in a decision that resulted nish defense to, an unreason- available.” or involved it becomes contrary soon report of, money to “en- clearly established requested also application The motion able law, expert of to select an as determined Federal able the Defendant States; the Defendant of the United to examine choice his own to stand trial” competency to his or relative be notified Hernandez’s counsel and “that in a decision resulted of the examination place the time determina- unreasonable on an based attend, alternatively, allowed to and he be of the evi- light facts tion of the he taped and be video the examination State presented dence tape.” Signifi- copy be furnished proceeding. (2000). 2254(d) 960, Texas, § 4. 28 U.S.C. id.; U.S. 500 v. 2. See (1991). S.Ct. 114 L.Ed.2d726 111 412-13, 5. 529 U.S. Texas, 513 U.S. 3. Hernandez (2000). L.Ed.2d 389 (1995). L.Ed.2d cantly, the requested motion also that the danger society. Sparks expressed separate examiner file reports regarding the opinion that such conduct reflected an the examiner’s of whether Hernan- anti-social personality person and that a mentally dez was ill or retarded and with this history likely continue to required whether he treatment. The lat- be a danger society. The difficulties request ter plainly beyond questions looks began when defense counsel seized the competency to stand trial to the sen- opportunity develop on cross-examina- tencing phase of the trial. The motion tion a mitigation theory that rested on an requested also testify the examiner old diagnosis of chronic schizophrenia at a hearing issues. made of Hernandez during an pris- earlier *4 stay robbery. for presented He prison Judge granted Pfeuffer the motion in records to Dr. Sparks reflecting the diag- part, appointing Sparks Dr. in- John with nosis, eliciting testimony periods about struction to competency examine for remission and its responsiveness to drugs sanity stand trial and for at the time of the and therapy. Dr. Sparks acknowledged offense. He denied the request ap- for the differences in the illnesses pointment doctor, but main- “independent” of an tained that nonetheless his earlier request that counsel answers be notified and be response allowed to present, hypothetical “appear[ as well ] as the alter- to be closest to a request description native for videotaping. that is labeled the anti-social personalty.” He argued Dr. Sparks conducted examination. that such an person afflicted experi- can gave He required Hernandez the warnings periods ence of remission and with proper that his statements could be against used treatment a productive live life. trial, him at except, apparently, specific any caution that statements could be used On redirect the State demonstrated that sentencing phase of a trial. Dr. Sparks Dr. also had benefit of the Sparks gave counsel, no to defense notice examination of ordered by Hernandez and counsel was present not during the court at request; and that in month, examination. following The in Sep- concluding that Hernandez was competent tember, judge the trial trial, convened a compe- to stand Dr. Sparks had decided that tency hearing before at which both Hernandez had an anti-social personality. sides offered evidence and Dr. Sparks The tes- Texas Court of Criminal de- regarding tified competency. jury- The exchange scribed this at trial as follows: found that Hernandez was competent to [T]he State elicited testimony redirect stand trial. Defense made fur- no from Dr. Sparks concerning appellant’s ther requests for psychiatric assistance competency in response evaluation and did not attempt an insanity defense at appellant’s psychiatric introduction trial. evidence on By cross-examination. in- troducing appellant’s psychiatric TDC

Dr. Sparks made appearance no until records and soliciting Sparks’ Dr. opin- the punishment phase trial, when records, ion concerning appellant those the State called him as a The witness. “opened the door” to the State’s use of State’s direct examination made no men- the results of exam competency for tion by Dr. Sparks. examination purposes.... rebuttal Rather, proceeded by State asking a hypothetical narrative question as a By basis creating impression that appel- Sparks’ for Dr. opinion as to whether a lant may have suffering para- been person with a history similar abe noid schizophrenia, appellant paved the record reading this with agree We impres- that to rebut for the State

way least, it is both theAt court. testimony tending by the Texas psychiatric sion interpretation objectively suf- reasonable instead an aрpellant to show reasonable trial and personality relevant events anti-social an fering from of the decision application disorder.6 Kentucky.8 in Buchanan Dr. concluded court also Texas The regard- express did is that Sparks here contention primary The dangerousness, ing testimony Sparks’ Dr. the introduction instructed specifically trial court before Hernandez he had examined do so. he could not prosecutor Hernan hearing denied competency explained: the Sixth counsel secured right dez’s testimony began elicit the State When Amendment.9 ex- competency Dr. concerning Sparks’ the examination initiated object- immediately amination, appellant of mental and other competency hearing outside subsequent ed. At a full and had his counsel through illness ruled the trial court jury’s presence, Sparks to cross-examine *5 opportunity to his testify as could witness that the trial. hearing before competency whether not as to findings, but medical did that Hernandez suggestion There is no likely commit would appellant with to consult opportunity full not have a a constitute would violence that acts of the examina- scope of counsel about Dr. essence of society. The danger to demon- tion, regard to its use to with both was jury testimony before the ] Sparks’f possible develop and to competency strate personality of anti-social diagnosis his teach- As Buchanan evidence. mitigating disorder, along with a comment if he notice that es, on counsel was defense prison appellant’s informed of he been play, in to mental status attempted put records, diagnosis psychiatric in the examination upon draw might State paranoid finding primary of have been rebuttal. along with in remission schizophrenia trial on di- sentencing of phase At the per- of an anti-social secondary finding attorney, by the State’s rect examination while testimony, This sonality disorder. based opinion an expressed Sparks Dr. danger- of future to the relevant issue upon and not hypothetical question upon of an ousness, not direct assertion was lodged The defense prior examination. dan- concerning future expert the hypothetical, to the use of objection no gerousness.7 er, certainly that if ... State, on notice was 805 S.W.2d v. 6. Hernandez banc). de- (en status’ put a 'mental on (Tex.Crim.App.1990) he intended anticipate the use ... he would have fense n. 3. 7. Id. at 412 prosecution by the psychоlogical evidence rebuttal.”) in 424-25, 8. 483 U.S. (1987) (stating the focus of L.Ed.2d also suggestions these events 9.There are the use is the Sixth Amendment right to not incriminate violated Hernandez’s proper "the report and that the doctor's Amendment, although consulta under Fifth [is] this himself amendment concern counsel, made petitioner separate undoubt has not been contention tion which effective, consultation, contention, although to be edly Such Regardless, had. neither us. being doctrines, informed based on counsel's must be survive resting upon distinct can proceed scope nature about analysis oí Buchanan. Smith, howev- ing .... Given our decision recitation, from an error in the apart fense present counsel to be when Dr. promptly only which corrected. The Sparks conducted the ordered examination presentation from that deviation came on of Hernandez. Disclosure of the court- Sparks’ redirect examination where Dr. ordered examination came here only in prior examination was disclosed in a shor- response to defense counsel’s cross-exami- ing Sparks’ opinions regarding opened nation which door its re- play relative schizophrenia, remission here, ceipt. As applied this trial court and when treated drugs, compared as ruling was no application mechanical diagnosis of anti-social disorder. familiar “you opened Rather, the door.” find no violation the Fifth We or Sixth practical was a necessity to avoid the un- Amendment in this circumstance. fairness of tying prosecutor’s hands These events differ from those of White while leaving defense counsel free to at- Estelle,10 upon Hernandez’s reliance tack Dr. Sparks’ opinions lacking that, here, it misplaced. is It is true informed basis. examiner of White testified the sentenc-

ing phase response hypothetical ques- IV tions, but importance little else of is simi- lar. Defense objected counsel White Hernandez contends that the jury testimony, urging the trial court that could not give effect to evidence that he tailoring hypothetical was calcu- subjected to sustained child abuse and lated inform the of the earlier chronic mental argument disease. The examination ordered on a motion that the jury could not effect to these State, not the defendant.11 federal mitigating circumstances under the ques *6 trial habeas court later found that tions asked them as explained Penry v. examination “reasonably indicated that the Lynaugh.14, As by demonstrated defense psychiatric prognosis of White’s future counsel in closing argument, the evidence dangerousness influenced by and de- of chronic schizophrenia could be consid from the rived pretrial psy- court-ordered by ered jury answering question chiatric examinations.”12 This was not the of dangerousness, argument hypothetical case with the put to. carefully laid the support for Indeed, Estelle, Sparks. sensitive to in his Sparks. cross-examination of Dr. Judge Pfeuffer here prose- instructed the treatment, With medication and remission cutor that he was to not ask Dr. Sparks can be sustained. “whether likely [Hernandez] commit future acts of violence that We have repeatedly would consti- held that evidence danger alone, tute a for the of society,”13 reason child abuse unlinked to the of- Judge Pfeuffer fense, had not allowed de- is not mitigating.15 (5th Cir.1983). 10. 720 F.2d crime, 415 demonstrating any without link to the does not “constitutionally constitute relevant 11. See id. at 417 & n. 1. evidence”); Collins, mitigating Madden v. 18 304, (5th Cir.1994) (evidence F.3d 308 of Id. at 417. 12. troubled constitutionally childhood not rele- Hernandez, 805 S.W.2d at 412 n. 3. 13. mitigating vant evidence when not linked in crime); Collins, any way to the v. Barnard 302, 2934, 14. 492 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 106 L.Ed.2d 634, (5th Cir.1992) (reject- 958 F.2d 638-39 (1989). 256 ing Penry claim where crime not attributable proffered to the of troubled Scott, evidence child- See Davis v. F.3d 51 461-62 hood). (5th 1995) (evidence abuse, alone, Cir. of child 350 conflated its unconstitutionally else ever or

V Fifth and Sixth of the defendant’s analysis in this case argument heard have We clearly contrary to the rights, Amendment of opinions carefully considered by as determined Federal law established decided previously have courts States. United Supreme Court opin- a detailed including questions, these below, find no court ion district mistakenly relies majority opinion The writ dismissal of the affirm the We error. of Crim the Texas Court on the stay of dissolve corpus and habeas in Hernan appeal on direct Appeals inal execution. (Tex.Crim. State, S.W.2d 409 v. 805 dez AFFIRMED. findings the factual if it were as App.1990), with re court law of that rulings DENNIS, Judge, dissenting: Circuit Amendment Sixth spect are whether presented questions appeal, direct On corpus claim. habeas Amend Hernandez’s Sixth Baiza Rodolfo re Appeals of Criminal Texas Court counsel, in Estelle defined ment Amend Fifth only Hernandez’s viewed 68 Smith, 451 U.S. v. Amend his Sixth Regarding claim. ment violated; (1981), whether L.Ed.2d 359 claim, habeas the state state habeas ment in violation to death sentenced he was found master special and the trial court because the Amendment Eighth relating specifically facts аdditional consider that it could was not instructed But claim. Sixth mitigating effect ruling on clearly deferred by declining childhood of his abused present claim, question “the noting that required penalty, impose the death the decisions or not to whether ed as 302, 109 S.Ct. Penry Lynaugh, v. U.S. ... and Powell Estelle v. Smith (1989); and whether 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d L.Ed.2d U.S. [492 of the Texas Court Crimi judgment of coun presence require ] his death refusing to aside nal set mental health ex the state’s sel where to, involved an contrary sentence “was ‘not a assertion testimony is direct pert’s of, clearly application estab unreasonable *7 concerning future expert’s of an law, by the as determined lished Federal rather, other some but dangerousness’, States,” of the United Supreme Court diagnosis harmful of mental health form of 28 meaning U.S.C. within master special The case.” the defendant’s (1994 2254(d)(1) Because Supp.2000). § & not-as did trial court and the state habeas affir answered should questions these be expresses-recommend majority opinion as in of matively, negatively instead relief, that recommended of but the denial dissent. respectfully I majority opinion, Appeals Court of Criminal “the Texas closely to deter issue review this should I. requirement.” if there is such mine analysis is flawed majority opinion’s The Appeals, of Criminal Texas Court The recognize failure to that of its not review appeal, did on the state habeas ruling on no trial court made state habeas factual any additional or make claim; issue Amendment Hernandez’s Sixth court, That record. findings from the Appeals’s that the Texas Court Criminal merely issued argument, oral habe- without the state adopting curiam order per find- holding “[t]he that order per curiam “findings and conclusions” trial court’s master special ings [of and conclusions legal basis whatso- had no therefore either adopted by the trial court] are supported pretrial motion for a qualified disinterest- by the record upon such basis the ed expert to conduct a mental examina- sought relief is denied.” tion of the defendant regard to his competency to stand trial and his Accordingly, sanity the majority opinion of this at the time of the offense. court The mistakenly majority assumes that the full opinion then opinion of mischaracterizes the defense Texas Court of Criminal motion as containing a Appeals request on appeal, direct which “looks pertained beyond questions of only competency to Hernandez’s Fifth to stand Amendment ar- trial to the gument sentencing phase apрeal, on was that the trial. ruling court’s The motion also requested on Hernandez’s Sixth exam- habeas iner testify at course, claim. trial or Of at a hearing was not. On on the Hernan- Maj. issues.” dez’s at appeal, Op. habeas The Texas Court of defense motion, however, Criminal Appeals said it was contains no denying reference relief the sentencing based on phase but findings of is clearly fact aimed conclu- only at gaining sions of expert the habeas trial court. But assistance to be- evalu- ate cause whether the trial court competent did not any make ruling stand trial or or reach whether any conclusion, to advise the decision him to plead not guilty by the Texas Court of reason Criminal insanity. presently state habeas trial under review court made really has no fac- tangi- tual finding . legal ble basis. Hernandez’s counsel’s “request for appointment of an expert Only by a highly creative assumption was made solely for the purposes ex- can this read into the Texas amining the defendant relative to his Appeals’s Criminal terse per curiam order competency, filing a report, and testifying any kind of a disposition reasoned of Her- regarding competency trial or nandez’s Sixth Amendment habeas claim. hearing.” (internal (Emphasis original) The only reasonable creative assumption quotations omitted). And, brackets per be represents curiam contrary to the majority opinion’s charac- conflation of analysis Hernandez’s Fifth terization of the defense motion as a re- and Sixth Amendment claims and a con- quest for testimony at issues, clusion they can both rejected con- the defense specifically motion limited the stitutionally for the same reason. That request testimony on Hernandez’s decision, however, is one that is contrary competency to stand trial-not for testimo- to, of, unreasonable application ny the guilt or penalty phases of a clearly law, established Federal as deter- capital murder trial. mined by the Supreme Court of the Unit- *8 issue, ed States. This the reasons majority opinion The mischaracterizes that the majority opinion misappre- also the state trial court’s on the ruling defense hends Eighth Hernandez’s Amendment pretrial motion as “granting] the motion claim, are in addressed detail below. Be- part.” Maj. Op. court, at 347. The fore addressing major these legal issues fact, denied the defense counsel’s motion detail, however, more it is first necessary entirely and sponte sua entered an order to point out the majority’s errors mis- sharply objects inconsistent with the of the construing procedural the and factual con- motion. The state habeas trial court made text of case. this this clear when it found a fact the that

The majority opinion quotes small, a “trial court (Em- this den[ied] motion.” portion selected the of defense phasis counsel’s in original). Hernandez’s introduced counsel Defense that statement opinion’s majority The objec- any without records no medical prior made examination direct State’s “[t]he counsel Defense prosecution. Sparks by the Dr. tion by examination of

mention impeach to records these misleading. Dr. used properly atOp. ..Maj. Hernan- that Sparks of Dr. testimony qualifications his the in presenting Sparks, society as to dangerous- menace sociopathic a future dez in predicting expert into taken had that he he had criminals, told erroneous ness Hernan- ap- to respect diagnoses with the reliable and testified account examined charged schizophrenic. with paranoid persons chronic as a dez proximately to “dif- competency those aggravated their then prosecutor to evaluate crimes The time of at the his sanity their to rehabilitate attempting by stand ficulties” prosecutor, The Sparks Dr. asking offenses. alleged their on redirect witness a described question, “hypothetical” psychiatric examination his pretrial about in minute matching crime diagnosis and a criminal the doctor’s of Hernandez intro- the evidence Hernandez that detail time. mental condition Hernandez’s guilt phase at the him against duced basis or factual legal is no There reasonable that certain almost It is trial. sug- that, is no “There assertion majority’s Dr. that have understood jurors would full have a did not Hernandez gestion dangerous- prediction Sparks’s about counsel with to consult opportunity or someone to Hernandez referred ness examination, both scope of a committed had him who identical compe- demonstrate to its use regard highly also It is to his. crime identical mitigating possible develop and to tency jurors would reasonable probable burden 348. The Maj. Op. at evidence.” was one Hernandez inferred have its defense prove the State is on who crimes charged with persons claim-that Sixth Dr. psychiatrieally examined been had scope notice of had actual Hernandez Sparks. examination-not. psychiatric pretrial not present does majority lack of knowl- prove on Hernandez it when impartially objectively or the facts Randy HeRtz, edge. Liebman s. James & when began difficulties “[t]he states CoRpus and Pro- PRACTICE FedeRal Habeas opportunity seized defense (1998 Supp.2000) & 31.2, § at 1322 cedure mitigation on cross-examination develop of prov- (“[T]he ... bears burden state diagnosis of an old rested on theory that all preponderance ing by of Hernandez made schizophrenia chronic to establish necessary facts dispositive robbery.” stay for prison earlier during an which for a defense prerequisites understand easy to It is Maj. Op. Texas, see, relies.”); Satterwhite e.g., advocate this prosecution why the 1792, 100 486 U.S. began difficulties in truth the But view. argu- (rejecting State’s L.Ed.2d 284 Sparks, called prosecution when construc- may be defendant ment giv- without had examined who pretrial scope of tively notified counsel, enrolled defense to his ing notice examination). assertion Factually, of a doctor, guise under *9 suggestion” “no has been there Her- diagnose hypothetical, transparent opportunity given not Hernandez “antisocial having an person as a nandez possi- about his counsel to consult “there’s predict personality” examina- psychiatric pretrial bility that continue to that he high likelihood phase penalty encompass might society.” tion to danger are a acts that perform future dangerousness issue is also incor particular case upon which his opinion was rect. The Texas Court of Ap based; Criminal to Dr. Sparks’s testimony to peals found unequivocally “[t]he rec whether Hernandez will have a future ord does not demonstrate that Dr. Sparks mental state or condition because that is warned [Hernandez] that anything [he] an ultimate issue for the alone. said could be used against him at a sen In order to understand the significance tencing proceeding.” State, Hernandez v. legal errors the majority opinion 805 S.W.2d 411 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. uncorrected, leaves the factual proce- 1990) (en banc). And, recognized by dural background of Hernandez’s claims the federal district court proceed in these must be fully and accurately set forth. ings, “it is uncontested petitioner’s trial counsel w[ere] never advised Dr. II. Sparks’[s] competency evaluation would A. also address the petitioner’s issue of future dangerousness.” Memorandum Opinion May 15,1985, On Rodolfo Baiza Hernan- аnd Order at 103. dez charged by indictment with the 7, 1985, March murder Cervan, of Victor

Indeed, there was ample evidence that one of five Mexican nationals whom he had neither Hernandez nor his counsel were robbed, shot, and abandoned ain remote informed his statements could be used area of Comal County, Texas. On April by Dr. Sparks at capital penalty trial to 1985, the 207th Judicial District Court for predict his dangerousness. future County, Texas, Comal Braunfels, New court, state trial in its pretrial psychiatric appointed two attorneys in private practice order, examination did not Hernandez to represent him. At his arraignment, or his counsel such notice. Sparks pleaded Hernandez not guilty. The State testified that he did not give Hernandez announced its intention to seek the death prior notice psychiatric examination penalty. that the examination data could be used the doctor testify against him at the August On defense counsel for death penalty hearing. The state courts (1) Hernandez filed a motion alleging that never found that the defendant was not competent to stand ^counsel had notice pretrial that the psychiatric ex- inability due to understand the amination could encompass the future dan- proceedings or to rationally consult with issue, gerousness and it is error for (2) counsel; the defendant had been exam- majority to make such an inference from ined and treated for mental disorders from the record here. 1969 to experts medical United States Army, Depart- the Texas

The majority opinion also mischaracter- ment of (“TDC”), Corrections and Bexar ize the facts state proceedings when Texas; (3) County, it states that “[t]he lodged defense no ob- been able to determine present whether to jection to the use of the hypothetical, apart an insanity defense. from an error Maj. recitation.” Op. objected Defense counsel also The defense counsel’s motion requested hypothetical question grounds that the court appoint “qualified dis-

that it called Sparks for Dr. to express an expert interested at County expense to expert opinion on dangerousness conduct mental examination of the De- without first establishing the medical with regard fendant competency [his] knowledge, techniques, and data in trial,” stand and to file a report of written *10 report written his include to Sparks Dr. coun- and the court with examination

the pro- and examinations description and а funds counsel (2) defense sel; grant observations used, doctor’s the cedures to expert examine an to select permission to competence to findings pertaining competency to his and relative the defendant Her- as to trial, as doctor’s (3) the notify counsel trial; defense stand stand to retardation, and or the exami- illness time, of place mental date, and nandez’s the to needed obser- ex- the prescription to attend doctor’s counsel the to enable nation (6) treatment, hospitalization; that defense (4) vation, or amination; notice take and sub- any such objects complete to to Sparks Dr. “specifically ordering counsel are counsel defense Medical Examination unless a Certificate examination mit (7) present”; be order- Illness, necessary; to opportunity an if afforded for Mental examina- the entire exami- (5) alternatively, order a mental to conduct Sparks ing Dr. counsel’s for defense issue to the video-recorded tion of Hernandez nation ex- (6) medical benefit; order offense alleged use and time of the at the insanity report observa- regard to include aminer in this report written a and file Hernandez’s regarding findings a counsel, containing tions and and with court to trial, status stand to competence procedures, of the examination description retardation, re- and and illness mental findings pertaining and observations observation, treat- or recommended quired pre- a defense; (8) ordering that insanity (7) schedule and ment, hospitalization; or mental defendant’s hearing on the trial defen- whether to hearing determine a by trial be held to stand competency trial. stand competent to dant was 1985, 9, at the September on court Braun- Courthouse, ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍August New County on trial court state Comal (1) (9) defense the de- denying Texas; ordering that fels, an order and entered to notify with which the court for funds to requests permitted counsel’s fendant to ex- psychiatrist offer independent to an he intended employ whether and the State mental report on within insanity defense amine time advance notice capacity, the ex- receipt of after hours twenty-four examination, right location report. pert’s examination, attend An- San transported Hernandez (2) ap- expert; court-appointed select County Sher- Texas, tonio, by the Comal psychiatrist Sparks, Dr. C. John pointing where, August on Department, iffs Texas, County, the Bexar by employed psychiatrist a forensic Sparks, Dr. Floor, Bex- is 2nd courts, address “whose County the Bexar employed full-time Texas,” Antonio, Jail, San County ar custody courts, interviewed of Hernan- examination a mental conduct jail San Antonio County Bexar at the trial, to stand competency regarding dez conclud- minutes and eighty approximately court, and report a written file to stand trial. competent he ed that later no to defense copy furnish or review Her- obtain did not Sparks Dr. (3) 1985; ordering the August than psychiatric or TDC Army U.S. nandez’s Department County Sheriffs Comal coun- records, defense although medical Sparks’s Dr. office transport Hernandez Sparks Dr. put motion sel’s (4) Dr. examination; declaring that for obtained Sparks them. notice of by the court be advised Sparks Dr. Rich- report single and reviewed of Hernan- circumstances the facts Bexar Cameron, employee ard meaning of “and offense charged dez’s 2,1974, regard- courts, April dated County trial”; ordering to stand incompetency

355 ing a psychiatric examination Moreover, conducted contrary to the majority’s as- purposes for the sertion, of determining Hernan- Hernandez’s original counsel’s re- competency quest dez’s to stand trial for two for a report separate regarding men- tal aggravated robbery charges. Dr. illness or Camer- retardation did not in any report way on’s concluded indicate that they expected, that Hernandez giv- were notice, en agreed “present[ed] picture clinical dangerous- schizo- future phrenia, ness would within schizo-affective type, para- scope pretrial examination by In noid ideation.” a letter disinterested ex- trial pert that they requested. judge attached to his official Defense coun- report, Dr. sel’s motion cited its reported uncertainty Sparks about findings that Hernan- whether to pursue an insanity defense at mentally dez competent to stand trial trial, and made no mention of sentencing and probably had been since March issues; therefore, the record only 1985; supports that Hernandez was neither mental- reading request for a separate report ly ill mentally retarded; nor and that Her- on mental illness and prepa- retardation as nandez suffered from an person- antisocial ration of a mental trial, status defense at ality disorder. In the body the report and not as an anticipation of the sentenc- itself, Dr. Sparks observed that he “found ing issue of future dangerousness. By no evidences [siс] from []his examination reading anticipation such into the defense suggest the presence of psychosis motion, counsel’s the majority jumps to a 1974”; described but he did not other- conclusion that has no support in the rec- wise refer to or discuss Dr. Cameron’s Indeed, ord. the state habeas court’s diagnosis 1974 of Hernandez’s schizophre- fact-findings, to which we are bound to nia. The record reflects that Dr. Sparks’s accord a presumption correctness, report was mailed to defense counsel on 2254(e)(1) § U.S.C. (2000), state clearly 27,1985. August that the ‘'request for the appointment of Hernandez’s defense counsel were not an expert was made solely for pur- informed that scope psychiatric poses of examining the defendant relative examination of Hernandez Dr. Sparks his competency, filing report, 26, 1985, August would encompass testifying regarding competency at any tri- issue al or dangerous- hearing.” (in- future (Emphasis original) ness. The August quotations court’s ternal omitted). order and brackets not notify did defense counsel that Furthermore, Sparks testified that examination would include an inquiry into he did not warn Hernandez before the Hernandez’s future dangerousness. De- examination anything said he could be fense counsel’s motion had not asked for against used him at a sentencing phase. inquiry into future dangerousness, and State, See S.W.2d they had specifically objected exam- (en 411 n. banc) (Tex.Crim.App.1990) ination they unless were afforded notice (noting that deficiency record, in the and an opportunity to be present. The Powell, citing U.S. trial court denied the (in defense counsel’s 3146 turn citing Smith, Estelle v. su- entirely. Therefore, motion pretrial pra, precludes which psychiatric State’s psychiatric examination of Hernandez was examination a capital defendant encom- not the kind of examination his counsel passing the of his dangerous- issue requested. Instead, type of ness unless his counsel is notified ad- examination to which defense counsel had vance of scope of the examination and expressly objected. forewarned)). the defendant is also *12 Hernan- robberies; (3) testimony of armed tes- trial, Sparks Dr. competency At the Hernan- that officer parole former dez’s on Hernandez had examined he

tified that for sentence prison from his parole that, dez’s testified Sparks 26,1985. Dr. August had been robbery convictions armed per- antisocial an suffering from despite two possession for in mentally revokеd disorder, was Hernandez sonality of Dr. (4) testimony and handguns; report In the trial. stand to competent Sparks. into and introduced by Sparks Dr. filed hearing, he competency at the expert wit- as called was Sparks Dr. neither was Hernandez that concluded by psychiatry forensic the field of in ness The defense ill retarded. nor mentally he was testified He prosecution. introduction agreed counsel County, Bexar employed psychiatrist a competen- of [the purposes “for the report the Uni- graduated Texas; he incorrect- majority The only.” hearing cy] in Medicine College of Illinois versity of not ob- for counsel Hernandez’s ly faults residency a completed and testimony during Sparks’s to Dr.

jecting Insti- Psychiatrist at the Illinois psychiatry hearing was The hearing. competency in Mich- 1960; licensed he was tute to competency Hernandez’s to limited by the Ameri- certified and and Texas igan Sparks testified Dr. is all That trial. stand he had Psychiatry; Board can nothing about said hearing; he to at that for psychiatrist a military as in the worked dangerousness. Hernandez’s five past that for 'twenty years; and regard- testimony Therefore, Sparks’s Dr. courts for the state worked he had years examination psychiatric ing pretrial psychiatrist a County as forensic Bexar and objectionable, was not testifying examining and engaged in that that to reason believe had no counsel persons approximately respect improper- be used later examination com- their evaluate crimes charged with testi- phase penalty Sparks’s Dr. during ly sanity their to stand trial petency mony. offenses. alleged their time of competency September On defense not tendered Sparks Dr. competent Hernandez jury found quali- his on for cross-examination trial court rendered trial, stand reliability the relevance or on fications effect, signed which was to that judgment show the record does nor opinion; of his 16,1985. September on qualified him to found the court relevantly based reliably and opinion his B. expertise field of of his methodology on the trial, Her- three-day guilt-phase a After particular in the data the facts and capital jury of by a convicted nandez however, counsel, did not Defense case. 25,1985. September murder to Dr. objection threshold make sen- capital punishment At Hernandez’s testimony. Sparks’s 26, 1985, September hearing on tencing prosecution examination, the direct On evi- additional introduced prosecution “hypo- termed what it Sparks Dr. law en- asked (1) two testimony of dence: First, the prosecutor question. thetical” had a that Hernandez officers forcement as true to assume Sparks Dr. regard- asked community in the reputation bad capital murder of a description “pen detailed law-breaking; ing peace offender, as well “hypothetical” a so-called having- identifying packet” crimi- prior description of detailed as a separate two convicted been nal record of Second, that offender. objection overruled that also. Pursuant Sparks was asked express the trial court’s rulings, Dr. Sparks testi- to whether the offender that, would commit fied opinion, high “there’s a criminal acts of violence that would consti- likelihood that he would continue to per- tute a continuing threat to society. form acts that are danger to society.” *13 defense objected counsel that prosecu- the The prosecution’s question plainly re- tion had failed to an establish evidentiary ferred to particular the evidence that had or medical basis for such an opinion; that been presented against Hernandez in both the opinion would either be a baseless guilt the penalty and phases of the trial. conclusion or else would be on extra- based The criminal record Dr. Sparks was asked judicial evidence in violation of Hernan- to assume mirrored Hernandez’s “pen dez’s to confront the witnesses packet,” introduced into evidence at him; against and Sparks’s that Dr. answer penalty phase. The detailed description of would constitute an opinion upon the ulti- “hypothetical” so-called murder identi- mate issue of dangerousness future and cally matched the unique details and cir- thus an invasion province of the of the cumstances of the capital murder of which jury. After the trial court overruled the the jury had found Hernandez guilty.1 objection, defense counsel moved for a Consequently, jury must have under- mistrial on grounds that the jury would be stood that Dr. Sparks was referring to unfairly and unduly prejudiced by Dr. Hernandez or an offender identical to him Sparks’s opinion as to future dangerous- when he said “there’s a high that likelihood ness for which the prosecution had estab- he would perform continue to acts that are lished no basis, evidentiary but the court a danger to society.” Also, it is likely that prosecutor described the criminal con- at the ground!.] men on the Assume fur- duct hypothetical offender as follows: person ther that this and his brother-in-law then left all five men who had been serious- [P]lease following!;] assume the That on ly injured by gunfire 7, 1985, away[.] and drove March man this introduced himself Further assume that person this illegal Antonio, arrived at to five in San aliens that he upon mother’s house hearing and amade deal to take them to and Dallas that news of the shooting got illegal of the five he his brother-in-law out bed who crime, day aliens on the along person then he stated with this the five drove Reagan that President had called men to a and remote him area in northwest Comal him, that the County[.] President had told had called Assume further person that this personally him to his and house and got said that brother-in-law the five men out overpopulated the State was car and and gunpoint at asked him up walked them help get him rid small of some of hill[.] the aliens Assume further that walk- ing coming Antonio, that up them were over that here to San one of hill five men States, stumbled and United person began was that he shot this and then laughing, twirling gun Assume person stating back[.] that this and then he made was lay gun-slinger[.] all five men up[.] down face Assume further Assume that short- ly person further that person this this gunpoint then thereafter was with another demanded their man and possessions person that this property twirling was two hands, began guns and then systematically shooting with his hearing after and an- each of them[.] Assume other shooting that on broadcast about further least two of the illegal that gun person men five was no aliens this said he had more than two to four inches illegal killed one of the their aliens and shot the others, gun throats when he fired the into Reagan their that President had called body[.] Assume per- further that after this him and said that the United States is over- bullets, emptied son gun populated, first he went many people that so needed to to his exchanged guns time, brother-in-law and during killed a certain and was firing then returned gun once laughing more talking it. about in Hernan- present schizophrenia a psy- reasonably assumed jurors Also, asked when history. medical dez’s qualifica- Sparks’s Dr. possessing chiatrist psy- forensic whether counsel defense adequate basis an have tions must like mathe- science an exact support chiatry was knowledge to medical fact it was replied matics, Sparks See, Dr. e.g., Satterwhite opinion. such experience but 249, 259, exactly guesswork “[n]ot Texas, U.S. we’ve had contacts what (1988). use of .with L.Ed.2d have Thus, may person.” objection cross-examination, without On regard- Sparks's gathered intro- defense prosecution,

by the dangerousness Hernandez’s ing records medical TDC duced Hernandez. contacts actual based diagnosed had been he showing *14 para- for chronic prison, in examination, prosecutor while treated redirect On Hernandez’s that and schizophrenia; as to opinion noid his for Sparks Dr. asked antipsychotic included had prob- treatment behavioral “personality type Thorazine), electro- (Stelazine and drugs my in that described was the man of] lem!] treat- treatments, neurotone convulsive Dr. have?” ... would you hypothetical Further, de- ments, psychotherapy. and deal, great “Assuming a testified: Sparks Dr. testimony elicited counsel fense it him but describe not it did schizophre- paranoid that chronic Sparks life, the his in things certain described acuteness stages between fluctuates nia descrip- to a closest to be appears behavior a to be remission, considered but and personali- the antisocial is labeled that tion symptoms illness; that lifelong by Sparks, Dr. Thus, point, this ty.” controlled, how- or can be reversed disease not been that had a deal” “assuming great and medication, psychotherapy, ever, by evidence, psychiat- amade into introduced or unrealistic that changes; environmental offender “hypothetical” diagnosis ric hallucina- auditory and thinking illogical Ac- personality. an antisocial having hearing belief as, example, tions, to elab- invitation the prosecutor’s cepting an or instructions spoken commands relative compassion and “love on orate President, are as the such authority figure, added, “they individuals,” Sparks Dr. these disease; and symptoms common others. about concern very little have correctly diag- had been that, if Hernandez own their focused to be They tend schizo- paranoid having chronic nosed that consequences forget any and desires be- that he possible it phrenia, people.” on other the effect or might occur before, during, hallucinations sieged pros- with Further, agreed Dr. Sparks capital his after commission fair “be that would suggestion ecutor’s this With offenses. related murder and could person type this say then that dem- sought to evidence, defense whatsoever.” any problem kill without could opinion Sparks’s that Dr. onstrate examination, Sparks Dr. recross On assist relevantly reliably person defense counsel agreed with probability there was deciding whether have can schizophrenia paranoid with criminal commit would Hernandеz viola- love, legal marriage, problems constitute violence would acts and bizarre tions, people, of other fear society, because threat continuing request, counsel’s At defense behavior. had been Sparks Dr. forming his TDC examined Sparks crimi- the offender’s only asked assume Hernan- testified records medical to assume asked had not been acts nal confined have been appeared to paranoid dez chronic significant factor prison’s psychiatric treatment unit be- during the examination could be used September tween 10 and November against him at the penalty phase of the 1975; that Hernandez was on trial; medication and that “Mr. Hernandez read it during there; that, confinement through and he signed a form that have I “at that time diagnosis [ ][h]is was schizo- provided for that purpose indicating that phrenic, paranoid chronic, type, moderate- he understood what was on the form.” severe; ly prognosis ... was During these proceedings, the State did guarded, meaning that the doctor did not not offer evidence to show de- know whether he would continue to func- fense counsel been given notified or tion well or again have an illness as opportunity to confer with pri- severe as he had had.” or to Dr. Sparks’s psychiatric examination of him. examination, On redirect the prosecutor abruptly posture abandoned the of asking The court ruled that the witness would

hypothetical questions and immediately be allowed “to testify as to his medical asked Dr. if Sparks he had examined Her- findings, all of which have been opened up nandez in August 1985. When the doctor by questions presented by” defense coun- affirmative, answered prosecutor However, sel. the court that, also ruled asked: “Based on that examination what *15 because it had denied the defense counsel’s your was impression?” request to present be during the examina- tion, court interrupted and asked “this witness will not be allowed to to approach the bench. In testify the bench con- about any probabilities that Her- ference, the defense counsel stated that nandez he would be a continuing threat object would to “all of society this[.]” The prose- based upon the interview.” The argued cutor that the defense court noted counsel had that defense counsel had re- “opened the door” going urged objection “into his medi- and would have con- past cal which we didn’t tinuing bill touch.” The of exception.

was sent out. When jury returned, Sparks, Dr. on

Out presence of the jury, defense examination, redirect testified that he had counsel objected to the question on the examined Hernandez in August 1985 and grounds that Hernandez had made diagnosed state- “the type of personality type or ments prejudicial to his penalty phase de- of problem” had he as “301.70 antisocial during fense the examination without valid personality recross, disorder.” On he tes- waivers of rights Hernandez’s under the tified that he conducted a “mental status Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court examination” of Hernandez for min- eighty invited prosecutor utes; to examine the doc- that a mental status examination tor concerning the advice rights. Dr. does not cover any family history; that he Sparks that, testified prior to the examina- asked for but did not obtain or review tion, he reviewed with Hernandez an out- Hernandez’s TDC medical pur- records for line of the advice rights, it, had him read poses examination, of his report, com- and and Hernandez it. signed The doctor petency fur- hearing testimony; that he would ther testified the rights as he had like to have had them during the examina- them listed were silent, to remain tion they were important; that he to have his attorney present during the like would to have known if Hernandez examination, and to terminate the exami- taking a drug like Doxepin at that nation, but that rights not did include a time because that was important; warning that anything Hernandez said he did not examine physically Hernandez testified Sparks Dr. summary, In On on him. tests any medical perform for Hernandez examined previously had he that, if he testified

redirect, Sparks Dr. ex- and, on that based competency mental medical prison Hernandez’s reviewed had TDC medical and Hernandez’s amination examination, rather prior records hearing, penalty at the introduced records during penalty time first than (1) had ofwas diag- two made have would hearing, he (2) Hernandez personality; an antisocial diagnosis “The initial one: instead noses schizophrenia; paranoid chronic also schizophrenia paranoid been have a con- schizophrenia (3) paranoid chronic would be diagnosis remission, the second ill- mental fluctuating, incurable tinuing, re- On disorder.” personality antisocial antipsychot- be controlled that can ness that Hernan- cross, Sparks testified Dr. environmental medication, therapy, ic could schizophrenia paranoid chronic dez’s ais (4) personality an antisocial changes; than stage, rather acute in an been have cannot condition mental permanent crime remission, time at the (5) medication; treatment or by any cured redirect, the court On March compe- mental Sparks’s Dr. time at the objection counsel’s defense overruled chronic examination, Hernandez’s tency allowed predicate proper lack remission was in schizophrenia paranoid testimony following to elicit prosecutor by medi- being suppressed was not Sparks: Dr. it is crime (6) cation; time at the paranoid paranoid chronic [chronic have who People possible that active, than or- rather generally well ... schizophrenia are schizophrenia] could remission, Sparks intelli- reasonably although are generally ganized, having anyone which; and may be as to plans opine although gent, *16 Hernan- such as personality do make and an antisocial illness, they can of part from by Dr. dez’s, Sparks as determined free of they’re When plans. make in- and the of Hernandez examination his situa- a real deal with plans illness him Hernandez’s about supplied formation they frequently tion, the illness during a present would activity, probably criminal ideas. with delusional deal society. threat continuing given testified, description “In the also He penalty at the defense Hernandez’s In hypotheti- initial [prosecutor’s me in the testimony attorney elicited the hearing, his of indication no was there question,] cal family his cousin, lived with who had of his par- aof illness; indication there was that testified She a he child. while behavior, is the that and kind ticular severe victim of had been the Hernandez person in antisocial found type behavior between abuse mental and physical recross, doc- On final disorder.” [sic] The years. and thirteen ages of three with defense agreed tor Hernandez, indicated cousin his brunt child, paranoid received oldest [with for someone possible it’s abuse, in turn which physical or believe mother’s to think schizophrenia] physical continual her own right-hand Reagan’s stemmed President they’re cousin The testi- husband. heard her they have man, abuse gun-slinger, she incidents particular carry to two fied Reagan President voices was still Hernandez When to witnessed. be able and still plan [him] aout said, had beat- child, mother his she to be small seem would things that other do broom, the broom breaking awith en him suffering from ... normal lying him leaving head over handle schizophrenia. paranoid disease on the incident, floor. In another part she of this case you wherein were called testified, he upon had been taken into a guilt bed- determine the or innocence Defendant, room parents beaten and all of severely the evi- dence, if any, with admitted large-buckled you before belt. Defense coun- part second of the trial wherein you sel also are introduced drug records from the called upon to determine the answers to county jail, which showed that Hernandez Special hereby Issues you. submitted to had regularly signed receipts for doses of The Doxepin, jury tranquilizer not specifically and antidepressant, instructed it could for five consider or days prior give effect to his mental examina- “mitigating evidence.” tion by Dr. Sparks. unanimously “yes” answered In capital accord sentencing the two requisite questions, and, as re effect,2 statute then in Hernandez’s jury quired by law, the trial court sen

was instructed that it was to answer two tenced Hernandez to death. The Texas “special issues”: Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Her [1] Was the Defendant, conduct of the nandez’s conviction and death sentence. HERNANDEZ, RODOLFO BAIZA State, (Tex. Hernandez v. S.W.2d that caused the death deceased, (en banc). Crim.App.1990) On motion for VICTOR MANUEL SERRANO CER- rehearing, objected Hernandez VAN, committed deliberately and with court’s failure to address the issue of expectation reasonable the whether he had been deprived of his Sixth death of the deceased or another would counsel, although it result? arose from the same complained conduct

of in his Fifth Amendment claim based on Estelle v. Smith. The court of criminal [2] Is there a probability that the De appeals denied rehearing without com fendant, ment. The RODOLFO BAIZA United States Supreme Court HERNAN DEZ, denied petition would commit for a writ criminal acts of vio certiorari on June lence that constitute a continuing Texas, U.S. threat to society? *17 (1991). L.Ed.2d 726

The was also that instructed in determining each of these Special Is- III. you may sues take into consideration all A. of the evidence submitted you in the full case, is, trial of the that all of unsuccessfully After seeking a writ of you submitted to in the first corpus habeas in courts, the Texas state 37.071(b)(1) Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arL. issue, & finding special on each 2. answer: (2) (Vernon 1981). special The third "Whether, issue taking into consideration all of the by 37.071(b)(3) authorized article raised evidence, —"if including the circumstances of the evidence, by the whether the conduct of the offense, the defendant's character and back- killing defendant in the deceased was unreа- ground, personal and the culpability moral of response sonable in provocation, any, to the if defendant, is a mitigating there sufficient by the presented deceasedf]" not —was circumstance or circumstances to warrant jury. Hernandez's the State Neither nor Her- that sentence imprisonment of life rather than objected nandez to its omission. In imposed.” death sentence be Tex.Code Legislature substantially amended 37.071(e)(1) (Vernon Crim. Proc. Ann. art. alia, by, statute adding requirement inter 2000). jury, that the returning after an affirmative Also, a state-court 1495. 405, 120 S.Ct. petition the instant filed Hernandez Court’s contrary to the will be decision States in the United relief habeas federal the state if precedent clearly established Texas. of District Western District for are facts of set “confronts court on petition filed Because a deci- from indistinguishable materially by the governed case is April ar- nevertheless Court th[e] sion of the Antiter- by amended as statute habeas from [the different a result rives ofAct Penalty Death Effective rorism in “Accordingly, Id. precedent.” Court’s] Murphy, (“AEDPA”). Lindh scenarios, a federal two these of either 2059, 138 326-27, 117 S.Ct. U.S. 2254(d)(1) §by unconstrained be court will of the (1997). Section L.Ed.2d falls with- decision the state-court pro- part, now statute, pertinent habeas to’ clause.” ‘contrary provision’s in that vides: 406,120 S.Ct. 1495. Id. at habeas writ of (d) for a application An in- decision a state-court general, In custody a person behalf of on corpus of the application an unreasonable volves a State judgment pursuant “iden- state court if the precedent Court’s respect with granted not shall court rule from legal governing correct tifies the adjudicated was claim unreason- cases but Court’s] [Supreme unless proceedings court merits State particular the facts it to applies ably the claim— adjudication 407, 120 Id. at case.” prisoner’s state decision (1) in a resulted correctly identi- majority The an unreasonable to, or involved contrary to note standard, neglected but this fies Feder- of, clearly established application an involves also decision state-court that a Supreme by law, determined al Supreme application unreasonable States. United Court of either if state court precedent Court (1994 2254(d)(1) Supp.2000). & § 28 U.S.C. principle legal unreasonably extends ha- may federal obtain prisoner stateA where a context precedent adjudi- a claim respect to beas relief unreasonably refuses aрply or should categories merits two cated on where to a context principle to extend (d)(1): cases by subsection cases defined Id. apply. it should decision state-court relevant “the which making court habeas federal [A] es- clearly (1) ... contrary to either inquiry application” “unreasonable law, determined Federal tablished ap- court’s the state ask whether should States, the United Supreme federal established clearly plication application unreasonable involved unreasonable. objectively law was law, as Federal clearly established ... not trans- should habeas federal by the determined subjective one *18 a into inquiry the form Taylor, 529 v. Williams States.” on the instead United resting its determination 1495, 146 404-05, 362, 120 S.Ct. one of the Na- U.S. that at least fact simple J., (2000) (O’Connor, deliver- relevant the applied L.Ed.2d jurists has tion’s respect with the Court the opinion of the same manner ing in the law federal footnote)). as (except petitioner’s Part II the habeas court state did case. contrary be will A state-court decision The 409-10, Court 1495. 120 S.Ct. at clearly established Id. Court’s Supreme jurists” reasonable “all rule applies disapproved court if the state precedent habeas misleading federal set standard law governing that contradicts at Id. inquiry. subjective into Id. courts Court’s cases. Supreme in the forth

410, 2254(d)(l)’s 120 S.Ct. § 1495. “Under guaranteed Sixth Amendment application’ ‘unreasonable clause ... a fed- (1) counsel because the state court subject- eral may habeas court not issue the writ ed him to a custodial examination by a simply because that court concludes in its psychiatrist, state without advance notice independent judgment the relevant to his defense time, counsel of the place, state-court decision applied clearly estab- scope, or (2) nature of examination; lished law federal erroneously incorrect- psychiatrist state concluded ly. Rather, that application must also be examination that Hernandez had an antiso- 411, unreasonable.” Id. at 120 S.Ct. 1495. cial personality disorder and probably “[Cjlearly law, established Federal as would commit crimes of violence and be a determined by Supreme Court of the continuing threat to society; and United ] States [ refers to the holdings, as prosecution elicited testimony from the opposed dicta, to the of [the] Court’s deci- psychiatrist at the capital penalty hearing sions the time of the relevant state- (a) that he had examined Hernandez prior 412,120 decision.” Id. at S.Ct. 1495. trial, (b) had diagnosed Hernandez as Thus, the source clearly established law having an untreatable personali- antisocial 2254(d)(1) restricted section disorder, (c) ty and was of the opinion that Supreme jurisprudence. Court’s Id. Hernandez, or a sociopath who com- The majority’s recitation mitted the crimes Hernandez, ascribable to Williams standard of review is incom- probably would commit crimes of violence plete, in that it does not fully examine the abe continuing threat society. meaning “unreasonable application” prong 2254(d)(1), section nor does it The question threshold under the AED- emphasize the statute’s explicit instruc- PA is whether Hernandez seeks to apply tion law to applied to habeas rule of law that was clearly established petitioners’ claims be clearly limited to the time his state-court conviction became established precedent. Court final 3, on June 1991. That question is Moreover, after reciting the incomplete easily answered because the merits of his passages from prior Williams to analyz- claim are squarely governed by the Su- ing claims, majority fails preme Court’s holdings Smith, in Estelle v. body of its analysis of those claims U.S. 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d to incorporate the Williams standard of (1981); Satterwhite, supra; and Pow- review and examine its interplay Texas, ell v. U.S. particular facts and proceedings here. (1989).

106 L.Ed.2d 551 majority B. completely and erroneously ignores these controlling Supreme precedents.3 1. claim, In his first Hernandez contends The Court held Estelle v. Smith that he was denied his constitutionally formally charged capital ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍defendant’s Sixth limiting In its legal regarding locus precedent, Hernan precedent. not circuit court dez’s Sixth Second, Amendment claim to White v. Es Estelle Smith has been extended telle, (5th 1983), 720 F.2d 415 Cir. majori and clarified the intervening precedent of ty's analysis of that claim is flawed *19 several Satterwhite and Powell in 1988 and First, levels. we are mandated the AEDPA respectively, infra, as I discuss such the that and by Supreme the Court in Williams to majority’s analysis of the 1983 decision of analysis our restrict petitioners’ of habeas le largely White v. Estelle is irrelevant. The ma- gal application claims to the clearly indeed, jority, of estab does not even mention Powell lished federal law as Supreme established in Third, or analysis. Satterwhite its Hernán-

364 final, conviction became state-court dez’s precludes counsel right to Amendment that “dictated” precedent the Court’s psychiatriс him to subjecting from State apply Appeals Criminal of Court future of his yielding examination court enter- time that at the holdings those de notifying first without dangerousness Amendment Sixth Hernandez’s tained examina psychiatric that the counsel fense Williams, claim. habeas to counsel right their issue of encompass will tion (citing 1495 391, 120 S.Ct. Powell, at 529 U.S. See dangerousness. future client’s 301, 288, 109 Lane, U.S. 489 Teague v. (citing 3146 681, 109 S.Ct. at 492 U.S. (1989)). Her- 1060, 334 L.Ed.2d 103 461-69, 101 S.Ct. Smith, at U.S. 451 v. Estelle if the relief to entitled is therefore consistently nandez 1866). has The Court S.Ct. Criminal of Court the Texas defendant, of decision that, capital recognized Amendment his Sixth rejecting exami psychiatric to a to submit whether to, or “contrary was either claim habeas of the issue encompassing nation of,” application an unreasonable involved death a life literally “is dangerousness It was law. both. that established not be should which defendant matter’ hand ‘guiding face without to required ” 2. Es v. Smith (quoting Id. counsel.’ of tri- Cir.1979); proceedings, (5th state habeas In the 694, 708 telle, F.2d 602 defi- without 69, suggested, in effect 53 al court Alabama, U.S. 287 v. Powell the court that recommending, (1932)) nitely (citing Sat L.Ed. 158 77 S.Ct. already could, not if it had 1792). appeals criminal 254, 108 S.Ct. terwhite, at U.S. so, reject done implicitly Sixth Amendment when Consequently, claim right Amendment v. Sixth Estelle set out requirement notice rejected it had same reasons for the met, held the Court Smith ap- direct on claim Amendment his Fifth im improperly penalty death “the peal. examination psychiatric posed at testified psychiatrist] [the

on which trial court habeas Essentially, the state in violation proceeded phase penalty (1) “[p]etitioner’s and concluded found right Amendment Sixth Smith, 451 [defendant’s] v. Estelle under of error claim at U.S. counsel.” assistance 68 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. Powell, 492 1866; see also 471, 101 S.Ct. appeal” on rejected direct was raised Satterwhite, 3146; 686, 109 at S.Ct. State, U.S. S.W.2d v. (citing 255-56, 108 atU.S. must ... (2) Court 411-12); “[t]he Trial Sixth regard [the any ruling defer Smith in the Estelle v. forth rule set issue to counsel] “clearly cases Supreme line since Appeals, of Criminal Texas Court law, determined Federal established regard to issues with the related States.” the United were Petitioner evaluation Sparks’[s] 2254(d)(1). clear Because § 28 U.S.C. appeal”; rejected direct raised Hernan- occurred before establishment rights his Sixth Amendment whether issue White for the exclusively on rely does not dez Accordingly, majority's only citing it violated. argument, were of his thrust main best are thinly bringing up White veiled proposition that methods for the twice up dan- White as only the future It sets presentation hypothetical questionable. to remove not suffice effort further will in an gerousness issue tear down strawman v. Smith. of Estelle presented the strictures legal issues State Hernandez, avoid the confuse indeed, exten- argues more Satterwhite, much Smith, and Powell. by Estelle control Satterwhite sively Powell and

365 “the question presented as to whether or not the decisions of Estelle v. Smith On direct appeal, the Texas Court of ... and v. Powell require ... Criminal Appeals rejected had Hernan presence of counsel where state’s men- dez’s Fifth right Amendment against self- tal expert’s health testimony is ‘not a di- incrimination claim in a full opinion that

rect assertion of expert’s opinion con- was silent with respect his Sixth cerning dangerousness,’ rather, but right Amendment to counsel claim. Her some other form of mental diagno- health State, nandez v. (Tex.Crim. 805 S.W.2d 409 sis harmful to case”; the defendant’s (en (direct App.1990) banc) appeal). it could “find no case authority law in- court of criminal appeals dicating that there formulated the are Fifth or Sixth rule of Amendment law it rights applied attaching in reaching the con psychiatric opinions not clusion directly going to the Texas Hernandez’s Fifth Amend issues,’ ‘special but, right the trial ment court had believes not been violated fol that the Texas Court of Criminal lows. should review this closely issue to deter- First, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-

ifmine there is such a requirement.” peals observed that the Supreme Court in On appeal the state habeas trial Estelle v. Smith noted that some courts court’s findings conclusions, including had held that the Fifth Amendment does those concerning Hernandez’s Sixth not prevent a defendant who psychi- offers claim, Amendment the Texas Court of atric testimony an insanity defense from Criminal Appeals issued a per curiam or- being required to submit to a sanity exam- der stating that findings and conclu- ination by prosecution’s psychiatrist, sions the trial court “are supported by 805 at 412 (citing S.W.2d Smith, Estelle v. the record upon such basis the relief 451 U.S. 1866); 101 S.Ct. and fur- sought is denied.” Consequently, the Tex- ther noted that court appeals as Court of Appeals’s Criminal decision Estelle v. open Smith had left the possibili- rejecting Hernandez’s Sixth Amendment ty of a requirement similar for a defendant right to counsel habeas claim appeal who wishes to use psychiatric evidence adopted findings and conclusions of the on the defensively issue of future danger- court, viz., Texas habeas trial ousness, (citing Smith, id. Estelle v. court of criminal appeals’s rejection U.S. at n. in turn Hernandez’s Sixth right Amendment citing Estelle, 705). Smith v. 602 F.2d at justified claim could be an appli- Seсond, the Texas Court of Ap- Criminal cation or extension of its holding reject- peals noted ing Hernandez’s Fifth right Amendment Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. against self-incrimination claim on direct (1987), 97 L.Ed.2d 336 appeal. had held State, See the State did (en S.W.2d not violate banc) the Fifth (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (direct Amendment Therefore, introducing appeal). excerpts we must refer psychiatric evaluation of appeals’s criminal the defendant decision rebut the Hernandez’s appeal direct defendant’s affirmative “mental identify defense, the rule of law that status” the court criminal defense counsel appeals, by adopting joined state habeas trial the State’s motion to obtain court’s findings conclusions, applied evaluation had introduced evi- extended reject dence Sixth from it in support of the affirmative to counsel habeas claim. Buchanan, defense. (citing Id. 483 U.S.

366 (Tex.Crim. 769, 762 State, 767 S.W.2d v. Third, 2906). the Texas S.Ct. at of banc)). (en Court The Texas App.1989) from inferred Appeals of Criminal Court only Powell held that that, Appeals Criminal and Smith in Buchanan language

the the State’s to object to right psy- the TDC waived introducing [Hernandez]’s “[b]y psychia the state testimony of Dr. soliciting the and use records chiatric insanity his to rebut rec- concerning psychologist those and trist opinion Sparks’[s] right the the also waived defense, to he the that door’ but ‘opened ords, appellant testimo competen- of this his use the object results to State’s of the to use State’s Id. sentencing at purposes.” burden satisfy its for rebuttal ny exam cy Ap- dan Criminal of future Fourth, separate Court issue Texas the proving State, testimo- Sparks’s Dr. Powell (citing that Id. concluded peals gerousness. examination (Tex.Crim.App. psychiatric his on 357-58 based ny S.W.2d Her- prove, to, re i.e. banc)). tended Court 1987) (en Supreme The relevant that but dangerousness, future Court nandez’s of the judgment versed Sparks prevented had trial court state court because Appeals Criminal directly expert expressing from Amend and Sixth Fifth “conflated had future upon Hernandez’s specifically support no provided and analyses, ment all of Fifth, on based dangerousness. waived petitioner conclusion its circumstances, Texas Court these at Id. right[.]” Amendment Sixth Hernan- concluded Appeals Criminal 3146. S.Ct. against self- right Amendment Fifth dez’s empha Powell Court The violated. not been incrimination between distinction important sized Sixth Amendment and Fifth appropriate 4. dictum noted its The analyses. and of Powell issues legal facts and The defendant cоuld that a v. Smith Estelle Powell, very similar. are case present by as right Amendment Fifth waive his subjected to defendant, was capital intro- “and insanity defense serting the court-des by a examinations court-ordered testimony, psychiatric dueling] supporting psychologist psychiatrist ignated the State deprive may his silence [because] doctor, com to determine chosen contro it has of means only effective sanity at stand petency he has an issue that on verting proof Powell, at 492 U.S. offense. time 465, 101 case,” at 451 U.S. injected into coun and his Powell 681, 109 S.Ct. 3146. holding Buchanan its would that he not notified were sel defense whose a defendant dangerous future the issue of examined evalu psychiatric for a request ain joined 109 S.Ct. 3146. Id. ness. it evidence introduced then ation and testi psychologist psychiatrist State’s waived defense mental-status prove that Powell would phase penalty at the fied chal a Fifth Amendment raise violence acts commit use of other prosecution’s lenge society. threat continuing constitute to rebut evaluation from the same sentence, the his death affirming In Id. 422-23, 107 S.Ct. U.S. at defense. 483 held that of Criminal Texas Court Amendment Fifth Sixth Powell’s explained, But, the Powell .as he waived not violated rights were counsel, once right to tes Sixth psychiatric introducing rights those attached, Fifth Amendment unlike has insanity defense. of his support timony in by a be waived cannot right, Miranda (citing Powell 682-83, 109 S.Ct. Id. *22 capital defendant acting on his own with- ed psychiatric examination at issue guidance out the of counsel: contrast, In Buchanan. in this case waiver [T]he discussions contained in counsel did not know the [ exami- ] Smith and solely Buchanan deal [by nations the state psychiatrist and the Fifth right Amendment against self- psychologist] would involve the issue of Indeed, incrimination. both decisions future dangerousness. separately discuss Fifth Sixth Powell, 492 684-85, U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 3146

Amendment so issues as not to confuse (citations omitted). the distinct analyses that No apply. mention of waiver is contained in the Consequently, contrary to the majority’s portion of opinion either discussing the reading rebanee, erroneous misplaced Sixth right. Amendment This is for is distinguishable Buchanan and has no good reason. it may While be unfair to effect upon Supreme Court’s Sixth permit state to a defendant to use Powell, holdings Amendment Estelle v. psychiatric testimony without allowing Smith, and Satterwhite that govern Her- the state a means to rebut that testimo- nandez’s Sixth right Amendment to coun- ny, it certainly is not unfair to require cases, sel claim. State, Under those if the рrovide state to counsel with notice although exercising due diligence, had before examining the defendant concern- been genuinely surprised by the introduc- ing future dangerousness. Thus, if a tion of Hernandez’s medical records as defendant surprise were to prosecu- evidence of paranoid his chronic schizo- tion on the eve of trial by raising an phrenia, the trial might have been insanity defense to supported by be psy- justified in ordering a continuance and di- chiatric testimony, might the court be recting Hernandez to submit to examina- justified in ordering a continuance and by tion a state-appointed psychiatrist. directing that the defendant submit case, however, Even in such a the State by examination a state-appointed psychi- required the Sixth Amend- atrist. There would justification, be no right ment counsel to Hernandez’s however, for also directing that defense counsel notice of the examination and its counsel receive no notice of this exami- scope and adequate opportunity to con- nation. fer with and advise prior The distinction between the appropri- examination. The Court’s cases ate Fifth and analy- Sixth Amendment emphatically permit do not State ses was recognized the Buchanan introduce evidence of dangerous- future case, decision. In that the Court held ness derived from an ex- unconstitutional the defendant waived his Fifth amination of a capital through defendant Amendment privilege by raising a men- violation of his Sixth right Amendment conclusion, tal-status defense. This counsel, even when the State has been however, did not suffice to resolve the diligent can genuinely claim surprise. defendant’s separate Sixth Amendment Thus, claim. separate Consequently, in a under the actual section of circum- case, stances Court went on to ad- of Hernandez’s the denial issue, dress the Sixth Amendment Texas Court of con- Criminal cluding that on the facts of that case Hernandez’s Sixth Amendment claim was counsel knew the scope what markedly contrary the ex- to and in conflict with amination would be place. Powell, before it the Supreme took Court’s decisions Indeed, counsel request- Smith, defense himself Estelle v. and Satterwhite. The the Sixth charged, formally Bu- dant upon reliance in its exclusive majority, precludes to counsel The State error. chanan, this repeats psychiatric to a subjecting him State not and could case did of his yielding examination pen- for a ask justifiably surprise claim de- nоtifying first without dangerousness of the defendant. examination alty phase examina- psychiatric fense *23 placed Sparks Dr. were and the State Both (2) issue; and encompass that will tion knowledge of actual and had notice proceeds examination psychiatric the when treat- and diagnoses of prior Hernandez’s and the State’s right of that in violation schizophrenia paranoid chronic ment for defen- of the expert presents the coun- and at the TDC doctors by state the penalty dangerousness future dant’s In their Dr. Cameron. ty psychiatrist, examination, re- the on the based phase employ a de- funds to motion pretrial im- improperly penalty sulting death counsel expert, defense psychiatric fense be reversed. and must posed of Hernan- State notified the and psychiatric prior and the Texas Court illness dez’s mental decision The habeas military. contrary and the in the TDC Appeals treatment of Criminal phase Smith, Powell, penalty in his and Satterwhite Dr. admitted v. Sparks Estelle TDC right was aware of testimony that he the Sixth Amendment definition of his it held prior counsel, records the extent medical psychiatric v. Dr. Estelle and of Hernandez. in Buchanan language examination pretrial the rule of Dr. knowledge exception his revealed Smith created Sparks viz., cases, when of Hernandez’s diagnosis Supreme Court prior Cameron’s evi- psychiatric re- pretrial in his schizophrenia introduces the defendant paranoid it to testimony. hearing phase uses penalty at the competency dence port and he expert, of the Furthermore, was aware the State’s Sparks Dr. cross-examine use of involving Hernandez’s door” to the State’s “opens the case facts of of the dangerousness conduct and bizarre future hallucinations evidence of auditory viola- schizophrenia obtained in paranoid that had been indicating active defendant right later to coun- testimony. And Amendment began he tion of Sixth before not acknowledged sel, expert does testimony Sparks long so state in his de- directly upon the expertise any opinion Hernandez’s express his field of that in man- based on dangerousness with a classic was consistent fendant’s behavior schizophrenia. examination defendant. paranoid ifestation exception Amendment The Sixth Texas Court by the applied waiver rule deciding criminal in by the court of adjudication The Criminal Supreme repeated with the case conflicts present appeal in the habeas appeals conflating and dictum in made in Powell Buchanan error Court’s decision Smith, analyses, well as Sixth Amendment in Estelle v. the Fifth Sixth contrary as defined to counsel right in a decision resulting Amendment Smith, applica- Estelle v. to, holdings unreasonable involved an the Court’s clearly Powell, estab- of, Supreme Court’s Satterwhite. tion precedents. lished Powell, First, clear as the Court made Smith, contained discussions those “waiver Estelle solely with and Buchanan deal Smith clearly established Powell, and Satterwhite self-in- right against Fifth Amendment defen- a capital once law federal crimination.... No mention of waiver is the guilt stage of trial.” 492 U.S. at 685 n. contained in portion of either opinion 3, 109 S.Ct. 3146. The suggested, discussing the Sixth right.” Amendment without that a holding, capital defendant 684-85, 492 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. 3146. Sec- who introduces future dangerousness evi ond, unlike the defendants in Estelle v. dence defensively in the penalty phase Smith, Powell, Satterwhite, case, this may required to submit to examination defendant Buchanan was not de- by a state-appointed psychiatrist. Even in prived of his Sixth right Amendment case, however, such a opinions Court’s joined because his defense counsel indicate that the defendant does waive in requesting psychiatric evaluation his Sixth to counsel that and presumably consulted with the defen- requires the State to afford advance notice dant about the scope nature and to defense counsel of the examination and *24 proceeding Third, beforehand. scope the scope its and an opportunity pre- for a pretrial the in examination the non- examination consultation between the de capital case Buchanan could not have en- fendant and his counsel. Consequently, compassed the issue of future dangerous- the opinions Court’s clearly indicate that a ness, which the Court had been concerned capital defendant who introduces such evi with in the Estelle v. Smith line of cases as dence at the penalty phase not does waive issue, literal life-or-death and the Bu- rights and remedies with respect chanan decision therefore cannot be read State’s introduction of evidence obtained reasonably modifying right the to be by prior breach of his Sixth Amendment informed of scope pretrial the of a exami- right Powell, to counsel. See 492 U.S. at nation that encompass would the death 3, 686, 3146; 685 & n. 109 S.Ct. Satter penalty dangerousness future issue. white, 1792; at U.S. Fourth, Supreme the Court has never held Smith, Estelle v. 451 U.S. at 466 n. or suggested that capital defendant who 101 S.Ct. 1866. introduces mitigating psychiatric evidence at phase the penalty waives his right to The Texas Appeals’s Court Criminal counsel at any stage critical prose- decision in Hernandez’s state ap- habeas cution “opens or the door” to the State’s peal also involved an applica- unreasonable introduction the fruits of a violation of tion of the United Supreme States his Sixth Amendment to counsel. Smith, cases of Buchanan Estelle v. Fifth, the Supreme Court never has held by unreasonably formulating and extend- suggested or that a state can circumvent ing legal principles precedents those the Sixth Amendment in holdings Estelle to a new they context where should not Smith, Powell, by Satterwhite sim- apply. The that, Court in held Buchanan ply having expert avoid expressing its a when joins defense counsel in the State direct upon the defendant’s future submitting psychiatric the defendant to a dangerousness giving while testimony that evaluation, consulting after the with defen- is indirectly, highly, but probative of the dant about its nature and then scope, defendant’s future dangerousness. psychiatric introduces in evidence a non-

Moreover, capital guilt in in support the Court Powell conclud- of an affirma- Smith, ed “[njothing defense, any tive mental prosecu- other status Court, decision of this tion’s that a suggests excerpts introduction from the defendant opens report the door to pretrial psychiatric the admission evaluator psychiatric evidence on danger- future rebuttal not does constitute violation by raising ousness an insanity defense of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. The instruc jury’s reasonably cannot precedent Buchanan case, full consider it to not allow capital tions did extended by made clear mitigating itself and effect to ation the Buchanan Estelle v. Smith: The threshold it with contrasting childhood. his abused is again counsel whether Smith’s the AEDPA unclear under question [I]t psy- about informed been a rule had even to apply seeks whether [I]n examination.... chiatric clearly established that was of law was not aware event, counsel defense final on June conviction became time his include examination merits of Hernandez’s Because dangerous- into Smith’s inquiry directly gov claim are Eighth Amendment view, Thus, in our Smith ness. decision Supreme Court’s erned to discuss opportunity received 302, 109 S.Ct. 492 U.S. Lynaugh, Penry v. scope. or its examination his counsel answer 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d contrast, Here, petitioner’s counsel Therefore, the ma yes. question evalu- psychiatric requested himself duty to upon its jority opinion defaults ... аssumed .... It can be ation law, Federal clearly established apply petition- consulted with defense Court’s as determined this examination. the nature of er about own by applying its Penry, decision *25 424, 2906. Buchanan, at 107 S.Ct. 483 U.S. by resolv law and of federal interpretation the same unreasonably ignoring Only by claim Amendment Eighth ing Hernandez’s Fifth between crucial dissonance to the opposite resolution in a manner and decision Buchanan Amendment by the claim Penry’s Eighth Amendment could claim Amendment Hernandez’s Sixth Court. Supreme pur- Appeals of Criminal Texas Court ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍case into to shoehorn Hernandez’s port For the same holding. narrow Buchanan 2. another, does reason, v. Smith Estelle and Supreme Lynaugh, Penry In v. by application support the reasonably not (1) Penry’s the time “at held of a of Criminal the Texas Court final, clear from it was became conviction waiver rule exception or opening” “door 586, Ohio, 98 S.Ct. 438 U.S. v. [Lockett Amendment

reject Hernandez’s Sixth (1978) [Eddings and 2954, ] 57 L.Ed.2d language only was the Smith claim. Not 869, Oklahoma, 102 S.Ct. 455 U.S. and habeas trial by the Texas relied (1982) could that a ] State 71 L.Ed.2d waiver addressed appellate courts Four- not, Eighth consistent with right against self- Amendment the Fifth Amendments, the sentenc- prevent teenth incrimination, the more indis- rather than effect to giving considering er from coun- right to pensable Sixth back- the defendant’s relevant dicta, sel, opposed it was also but circum- decision, or to the ground character Court’s holding, of against mitigate “clearly es- the offense part not stances and therefore 2254(d)(1). at 492 U.S. penalty[,]” imposing law” under section death tablished (2) Williams, 2934; Penry 1495. 318, at S.Ct. rule “[t]he 529 U.S. 109 S.Ct. evi- mitigating such when [sought]—that C. retardation his mental [of dence ju- Texas presented, childhood] abused jury given ... instructions must be ries that he sen- also claims give possible for them that make Eighth to death violation tenced to that mitigating effect evidence in deter all of Penry’s mitigating evidence in an- mining penalty swering whether the death the three special should issues. Id. imposed not a ‘new rule’ under —-is issue, special The first which asked Teague because it is dictated Eddings whether the defendant acted “deliberately [,]” 318-19, and Lockett id. at 109 S.Ct. and with the expectation reasonable (3) 2934; “[underlying Lockett Ed- the death of the deceased ... would re- dings is principle that punishment sult,” impermissibly jury’s limited the directly should be related to personal function because the term “deliberately” defendant!,]” culpability of the criminal id. had not been defined Legis- 319, 109 (4) 2934; enough S.Ct. “it is not lature, the Texas Ap- Court of Criminal simply to allow present the defendant to peals, or the trial court’s instructions. Id. mitigating evidence to the sentencer[-][t]he 2934. Assuming that the sentencer must also be able to consider jurors ‘deliberately’ “understood mean and-give effect to that evidence in impos- something more ... than ‘intentionally’ id.; (5) sentence!,]” ing murder, “[i]n order to en- committing jurors those may still sure reliability in the have been give determination that unable to Penry’s effect to appropriate mitigating death is the evidence in punishment answering in a the first case, special Id. The specific issue.” Court concluded jury must be able to that the could jury give full effect to give consider and any mitigating effect to Penry’s evidence under the first special evidence relevant to a defendant’s back- issue “deliberately” was not de- ground and character or the circumstances fined “in way that would clearly direct crime!,]” 2934; id. at fully Penry’s consider mitigat- therefore, “in the absence in- ing evidence as it bears personal on his informing structions the jury that it could culpability.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 2934. consider and effect to the mitigating *26 Thus, the beyond evidence had relevance Penry’s evidence mental and retardation scope the special of the first issue. at Id. abused background by [childhood] declin- 322, 109 2934. The Court S.Ct. made it ing to impose penalty, the death ... the Penry’s clear that mental both retardation jury provided was not with a vehicle for and' history of abused childhood consti- expressing its response reasoned moral to tuted relevant mitigating evidence: “Be- that evidence in rendering its sentencing mentally cause Penry retarded ... decision!,]” 328, (In- id. at 109 S.Ct. 2934. and thus less able than a normal adult to omitted). quotations ternal and citations impulses control his or to evaluate the Thus, the Pem°y Court in consequences conduct, of his and because agreed Penry’s argument “that his abuse, history of his of childhood that mitigating evidence of mental retardation juror same Penry [who concluded that act- and childhood abuse has relevance to his ‘deliberately,’] ed could also conclude that culpability beyond moral the scope of the Penry morally was less culpable than de- issues, special and jury that the was un- fendants have no who such Id. excuse!.]” able to express its reasoned moral re- concluded, the Consequently, unless sponse to that evidence in determining “jury there are defining instructions ‘delib- whether death was the appropriate punish- erately’ way in a clearly that would direct ment.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 2934. The jury fully the Penry’s to consider mitigat- explained why in detail rejected it ing personal evidence as it bears on his contrary argument the State’s culpability, cannot sure that jury we be jury was give able to give consider and effect to was able to mitigating effect to the issues] special the Texas under sentence retardation Penry’s mental evidence miti- allow questions whether turns on the first answering in abuse history of considered only to be not factors gating 2934. Id. S.Ct. at issue.” special answering course, in (and, effect given jury’s “Thus, sure we cannot be effect given be but to also questions), issue reflected special to the first answer ways that including ways, Penry’s miti- possible to in all response moral reasoned at (internal Id. do not quotation questions permit.” Id. evidence.” gating (Scalia, J., dissenting omitted). S.Ct. 2934 Or, concurring part). part and issue, asked which special The second of in- concluded, the absence “in majority probability there is a “whether it could jury that informing the structions acts of criminal commit defendant mitigating to give effect consider continuing that would constitute violence Penry’s retardation mental jury to society,” permitted threat to declining impose background abused Penry’s mental give effect consider and jury ... penalty, the death as “rele childhood abuse retardation its expressing a vehicle provided with Id. factor[.]” aggravating only as vant to that evidence response’ moral ‘reasoned inade was not issue special But second 328, 109 Id. at rendering its sentence.” only gave effect it simply because quate S.Ct. 2934. factor; aggravating as an Penry’s evidence did not dysfunctional because it was rejected expressly in Penry The Court Penry’s full effect to jury to allow the in the argument that defect the State’s 109 S.Ct. evidence. Id. mitigating be disregarded should jury instructions issue, there special second 2934. “The able to counsel was Penry’s defense cause fore, a vehicle for provide did not Penry, who believed that jurors argue that evi Penry’s give mitigative effect of men mitigating evidence of his childhood of mental retardation dence abuse, did and childhood tal retardation 324, 109 Id. at abuse.” vote death should sentence not deserve regardless issues special “no” on one issue, asked which special The third answer. proof of the State’s defendant the conduct “whether 2934. The Court Id. unreasonable deceased was killing the coun prosecution pointed out “the any, by if response provocation, *27 jurors had that by stressing tered deceased,” a vehi- providе not likewise did law, and that follow the to taken oath fully consider jury to cle for the they were the instruction they must follow by spar- mitigation effect Id. answering special issues.” given in per- of his diminished ing his life because argument, and prosecutor’s light “In “Thus, juror who be- culpability. sonal jury instruc appropriate in the absence culpability moral Penry lacked the lieved concluded, tions,” “a reasonable express not to could to be sentenced death there believed that well have juror could special the third answering in that view expressing for view no vehicle Penry’s was if she also concluded issue to to be sentenced Penry did not deserve to response action was reasonable mitigating upon evidence.” death based 324-25, 109 S.Ct. Id. at provocation.” 326, 109 2934. Id. 2934. rejected the Penry Finally, the Court in part dissented justices

As who jury that “to instruct majority argument State’s Penry Penry acknowledged, grant discretionary render a that it could constitutionality a death [of held “that mercy, say penalty, ‘no’ the death and give effect to mitigating evi- evidence, Penry’s mitigating based on dence relevant to a defendant’s back- would be to return to the sort of unbridled ground and character or the circum- discretion that v. Georgia." led Furman stances of the crime. 238, (citing

Id. 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 327-28, (internal Id. at 107 S.Ct. 1756 cita- (1972)). L.Ed.2d 346 we made clear “[A]s omitted). quotations tions and 153, 197-99, in [Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. ], 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 859 so

long as the subject class of murders Penry first raised his claim narrowed, capital punishment is there is no in his application post-conviction for state infirmity procedure constitutional in a observed, relief. IAs supra, the Texas jury allows a mercy recommend based Court of Criminal Appeals denied Hernan- mitigating evidence introduced application dez’s for post-conviction relief defendant.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 2934 in per a brief curiam order stating, (also quoting opinion Justice White’s con- pertinent part, “The trial court has en- curring in the judgment Gregg, 428 U.S. findings tered of fact and conclusions of (“The Georgia legisla- S.Ct. 2909 law. We have examined the record. The plainly ture has guide made an effort to findings and supported by conclusions are jury discretion, in the exercise of its upon the record and such basis the relief while at the same time permitting the sought Therefore, is denied.” we should dispense mercy on the basis of factors consider findings and conclusions of statute, too intangible to write into a I the state habeas trial court to determine cannot accept the naked assertion that the whether the denial оf relief the court of fail.”)). Further, effort is bound to criminal appeals contrary to or an Court reaffirmed quoted its application unreasonable clearly estab- “ McCleskey v. ‘In Kemp: contrast to the lished jurisprudence. carefully defined standards that must nar- In connection with Eighth row a sentencer’s discretion to impose the claim, Amendment Penry the state habeas sentence, death the Constitution limits a court, in the 207th District Court of ability State’s to narrow a sentencer’s dis- Texas, County, Comal found following cretion to consider relevant evidence that facts: might cause it to decline impose Mendiola, Judy a San Antonio Park death (quoting sentence.’” Id. 481 U.S. Petitioner’s, Ranger, and cousin of testi- 279, 304, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 child, fied that when young she was a (1987)). Consequently, the Court conclud- she together and Petitioner had lived ed: period approximately years, Indeed, it precisely because the pun- time, during Petitioner’s father *28 directly ishment should be related to the alcoholic, was an who beat Petitioner’s personal culpability of the defendant mother, which resulted Petitioner’s that jury must be allowed to consid- causing physical mother abuse Peti- er and effect to mitigating evidence tioner, (2513-2516); relevant to a defendant’s character or record or the Witness Mendiola circumstances of the of- indicated that after fense .... In prison, order to ensure Petitioner’s release from she reliability in the determination that asked him to seek “psychiatric help” death is the and appropriate punishment specific also indicated only that Petitioner had case, must able to consider received a fifth grade or sixth education long time was a that Petitioner dence” by school

(2518), was corroborated which schizophrenia,” “paranoid of may sufferer that Petitioner indicating records suffering been could have he the sev- which through education received have crime, of this (2519-2522)[.] time of the commission grade enth any fur- defer must the trial court then omitted; ci- record (Internal enumeration ultimate law to the of conclusions ther included). tations of Court Crimi- of the Texas judgment claim, Penry to Hernandez’s regard In and Appeals, nal adopted the court habeas trial the state recom- However, court does the trial of law: conclusions following pertinent of Criminal Court Texas mend is some there finds This Court for sub- set” this case “file and Appeals abuse jury of child evidence before further for Court before the mission over a 10 Petitioner against perpetrated regard arguments with and briefs testimony of Defense See year period. Penry claim as Petitioner’s merits of Mendiola; witness * * * the evidence. herein under raised of Court regard With interpretation of Appeals’ Criminal emphases (Paragraph enumeration that, decision, appears Penry omitted). required a generally Court has past, the however, appeal, habeas On Hernandez’s mental retardation before showing of disregarded appeals of criminal the court entitled to a defendant is holding recommenda- court’s habeas trial the state State, instruction, v. Ramirez Penry see the case it “file and set” tions McGee, 636; Parte Ex 815 S.W.2d re- arguments submission briefs State, 77; 846 S.W.2d Rios v. S.W.2d In- Penry claim. garding McPherson, 310; 851 S.W.2d v. State noted, crimi- stead, court of have as I 279; State, 846; v. 842 S.W.2d Richard sought the relief simply nal denied appeals Goodman, 383; 816 S.W.2d Ex Parte findings and conclusions on the based re- however, granted also the Court has court, determining they after the trial Penry doctrine where lief under Therefore, by the record. supported were evidence of cumulative “troubled there is habeas decision review the we should and emo- childhood, mental abnormal adopting appeals criminal court condition, and sexual aberrations.” tional trial the state habeas incorporating 65; State, v. 808 S.W.2d See Gribble and conclusions. findings court’s law. is still valid Penry The decision Texas, 350, 113 U.S. [509 Johnson v. See (1993)]; 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d findings Court

The United States court’s trial state habeas The certiorari, conclusions, vacated state granted which the upon and re- Appeals judgments, per its appeals based Criminal criminal of Criminal to the Texas Court relief to Hernan- manded curiam denial habeas cases for reconsid- dez, at least and inconclusive. five were ambivalent Texas, not, as the light Johnson court did eration habeas trial state are, pend- asserts, still presumably, mistakenly cases recommend majority those of Criminal ing state habeas before of relief. The denial *29 (1) evi- “there is some Appeals; found that court perpe- child jury abuse before “some dence the trial has found court Since year over a Petitioner abuse, against and “some evi- trated of child evidence” (2) period[]”; that “the Penry Penry’s concluded from history of maltreatment. (3) ]”; decision is still valid law[ concluded The Supreme Court concluded such a that the state of criminal had appeals background of abused childhood was relе- “generally required a showing mental vant mitigating evidence that jury retardation ... a defendant before is enti- must be instructed it may fully consider instruction, Penry tled to a ... [but] has effect in deciding whether to granted also relief under Penry doc- impose a sentence less than death. Conse- trine where there cumulative quently, by denying claim, childhood, ‘troubled abnormal mental and by the decision Texas Court of Crimi- condition, emotional and sexual aberra- ” nal Appeals was contrary to clearly estab- (emphasis original); tions[ ]’ lished federal law as determined that, concluded it had found some Supreme Williams, Court. 529 U.S. at evidence that Hernandez suffered from (“A 120 S.Ct. 1495 state-court decision both an abused childhood and paranoid will contrary also be clearly this Court’s schizophrenia, “to which he could have precedent been established suffering at the time of if the state court commis- crime,” sion of this it must defer fur- confronts set of facts that are materially ther conclusions of law to the ultimate indistinguishable from a decision of this judgment of the state court of criminal Court and nevertheless arrives at a result appeals. precedent.”). different from our As a consequence, the state court of Hernandez was beaten regularly be- criminal appeals’s denial of Hernandez’s ages tween the of three and thirteen. He Penry claim based such ambivalent and received most of his continual beatings indeterminate conclusions is contrary both from his mother after she had been beaten to and an unreasonable application of Pen- husband, her alcoholic Hernandez’s fa- ry several respects. The state-court ther. contrary decision was On least one occasion his mother Supreme clearly Court’s precedent handle, established be- had beaten him with a broom may cause it be read either as reaching a breaking over his head leaving him different result precedent from that after lying on the floor. On at least one other confronting a set facts materially indis- occasion, joined Hernandez’s father had tinguishable precedent’s from the facts or his in beating mother him viciously with a applying rule that contradicts the large belt and belt buckle. governing law set forth in Penry’s mother frequently hand, Court’s beaten cases. On the other him state-court decision over the head with a may interpreted belt when he was involving an application unreasonable a child. He regularly was also lockеd in a precedent the Court’s because it either bedroom without access a toilet long identified the correct governing legal rule periods. He was out of state from the Court’s cases but unreasonably hospitals, schools and until his father re- applied it to the facts of Hernandez’s case moved him state when he schools or it unreasonably refused to extend Penry, twelve. 492 U.S. at principle Penry to a context where it 2934. apply. should issue,

Regarding the first special Her- a. case, nandez’s as in Penry, provided Hernandez’s evidence of an term abused definition childhood was materially indistinguishable “deliberately” given any instruction that *30 376 from indistinguishable materially were regard jury could that the would indicate Court Supreme the which upon those of abused childhood history Hernandez’s Consequently, result. a different reached it to decline might cause that as evidence of Criminal by the the denial Therefore, sentence. the death impose to con- relief was state habeas of that, of the absence “[i]n Penry dictates Supreme clearly established to trary in a ‘deliberately’ defining

jury instructions precedent. jury to the clearly direct would that way ev mitigating fully [Hernandez’s] consider b. culpabili personal on his as it bears idence court, in habeas Because the state was jury that the be sure we ty, cannot conclusions, of to some referred its evi mitigating to the effect able to give criminal court of by the state decisions history ... [Hernandez’s] dence of men- showing of holding as appeals special the first issue.” answering in abuse Penry to a prerequisite retardation is tal 323, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Id. at that the court instruction, arguable it is mitigat- Also, Penry, in Hernandez’s as in a rule such appeals applied criminal rele- was abuse of childhood ing evidence so, If its deci- relief. denying Hernandez only as an special issue second vant to the unreasonable to and an contrary sion was to appears it factor because aggravating clearly Court’s application behavioral of future possibility increase the Pen- Penry. The precedent established im- More dangerousness. problems Penry’s argument agreed with ry Court however, is- special second portantly, mental evidence mitigating “his full jury from giving prevented sue rele- abuse had and childhood retardation Her- the evidence of to mitigative effect culpability beyond moral vance to his childhood; even if abused nandez’s issues, that the special scope of that he did deserve jury found its reasoned express to jury was unable his the effects of penalty death in deter- evidence response to that moral early childhood reduced maltreatment the appropriate whether death mining still jury would culpability, personal 109 Id. at S.Ct. punishment.” “yes” to the second to answer be bound throughout Penry Court its he if it found issue also special Penry’s abused that it considered indicated to and a threat dangerous be probably childhood, mental retarda- well as society. mitigat- tion, relevant independently be second special the first nor the Neither have jury should ing evidence issue, therefore, a vehicle provided for could consider been instructed that to Hernan- determining effect whether to jury mitigating give give effect mitigating evidence Id. at penalty. death impose dez’s relevant spe- (listing separate third evidence childhood abuse. Because S.Ct. issue, culpabil- acted personal defendant whether reduced Penry’s possible cial retardation, emo- provocation, response mental arrested unreasonably ity “his and abused back- jury, development, the State tional presented was not a vehi- also id. at provided that it see ground”); not contend does for the Lockett full mitigative (approvingly quoting cle “ must ‘not a sentencer premise effect mitigat- considering, as a Thus, precluded the state court abused childhood. factor, defendant’s aspect con- ing appeals Hernandez of criminal ”) U.S. (quoting or record’ character of abused childhood fronted facts

377 2954) 604, added); Penry id. will be (emphasis contrary 98 S.Ct. if applies it 318, at (approvingly quoting 109 S.Ct. 2934 rule that Supreme contradicts the Court’s “ Eddings ‘[j]ust may as the State not holding by requiring such only instructions by preclude statute the sentencer from in involving cases evidence of mental retar- factor, considering any mitigating neither dation.

may consider, the sentencer refuse to as a law, any

matter of relevant mitigating evi- c. ”) 113-14, dence.’ (quoting 455 U.S. at 102 Finally, reasons, foregoing if the 869) id. at added); 322, (emphasis S.Ct. decision of the state court ap- of criminal 2934 (holding jury that the must peals is read as identifying the correct be able give effect to “all” of the defen- governing legal rule by adopting iso- evidence). mitigating dant’s The Court lation the state trial habeas court’s conclu- did not hold or suggest that either the Penry sion that “[t]he decision is still valid factor of mental retardation or childhood law,” its decision amounts simply by abuse itself would fail to constitute Penry application unreasonable mitigating relevant jury evidence that ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍the facts Alternatively, Hernandez’s case. must give be able to consider and effect to reasons, for the same foregoing if the deciding Moreover, Penry’s fate. state-court decision is read as refusal to repeatedly emphasized that “a sen- Penry principle extend the to Hernan- may tencer precluded not be from consid- dez’s case because it involves relevant miti- consider, any ering, may not refuse childhood, gating evidence of an abused relevant mitigating by evidence offered retardation, and not evidence of mental defendant as the basis for a sentence less would constitute an unreasonable refusal id. at death[,]” 318, than 109 S.Ct. 2934 to apply or extend that principle to a con- added); (emphasis and that “the must case, text where it should apply. In either be able to give consider and effect to the state-court decision would involve an mitigating evidence relevant to a defen- application unreasonable clearly es- background dant’s and character or the tablished law of Penry. crime[,]” id. 328, circumstances of the added). (emphasis S.Ct. 2934 d. Penry “clearly constitutes established cases, Supreme The more recent law, Federal by determined the Su- relevant, they to the extent are are not to preme Court of the United States” Collins, See Graham v. contrary. capital penalty phase the sentencer U.S. 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 260 may precluded not be considering, Texas, (1993), and Johnson v. 509 U.S. may consider, not refuse to any consti- (1993). 125 L.Ed.2d 290 tutionally evidence; relevant mitigating AEDPA, Under the required we are that evidence of mental retardation or an childhood, determine whether the decision of the Tex- abused individually or combi- nation, qualifies contrary Court of Criminal as constitutionally rele- evidence; to or an application clearly vant unreasonable mitigating and that when mitigating Supreme evidence established Court precedent of mental retardation or an abused the time presented, childhood is Hernandez’s conviction became juries must final. given instructions that al- became final conviction low them to effect to with the mitigating denial of writ of certiorari in determining whether to impose Court on direct review on penalty. death A state-court Consequently, decision June the 1993 relevance, any, has also if Graham’s are and Johnson cases of Graham abroga- the AEDPA’s been attenuated casе. present directly applicable *32 jurist” standard “reasonable the tion of in John- Moreover, Graham the Court Williams, 529 case. See in that applied mitigat- the distinguished specifically son (interpreting 410, 1495 120 S.Ct. at U.S. at youth defendant’s of the ing evidence the disapproving expressly AEDPA as the in those cases the offense the time of in Gra- jurist” standard used “reasonable child- abused of evidence mitigating the 751, Johnson, F.3d ham, 97 Drinkard presented retardation and mental hood cases; hold- (5th Cir.1997), and other 769 Penry. requires the AEDPA that the ing instead that Pen- reaffirmed Court The Graham unreasonable” “objective of an application that, when requiring law ry was still valid standard). ev mitigating presents capital defendant Pen- also reaffirmed Court The Johnson mental retardation of either idence evi- mitigating the distinguished ry, but under phase penalty in a childhood abused youth Johnson’s capital of defendant dence issues, jury must the special the Texas the abused offense from time of the at the ef give it to that allow given instructions mental retardation childhood and in deter evidence mitigating fect to that evidence type of a different Penry being penal death impose whether mining mitigative give could full which a 473-75, Graham, 113 S.Ct. 506 U.S. ty. special issues. the Texas under effect (“Because give impossible it was 892 369, Johnson, S.Ct. 113 509 U.S. Penry’s ev effect mitigating meaningful answering special by way idence IV. Penry

issues, concluded Court A. in further entitled to constitutionally it jury that could informing the structions Court Texas The decisions evi Penry’s give effect to consider and regarding Criminal the death declining impose ... claims were dence Eighth Sixth (internal citations, to, quotations, involved an unreasonable “contrary penalty.”) omitted). of, Federal clearly established application But and brackets Supreme law, by the as determined the effect distinguished Graham 2254(d)(1). § The next Court,” 28 ability U.S.C. jury’s upon issues special analysis is required in the step appropriate to Graham’s effect to consider what extent and to to determine whether Id. at 475- youth. mitigating evidence applicable to rule is any harmless error (“Even if evi Graham’s 113 892 S.Ct. state- each underlying error constitutional dence, be Penry’s, significance had like decision. issue, it special of the first yond scope evidence—un apparent Fulminante, is Graham’s U.S. In Arizona v. relevance Penry’s mitigating like 307-08, 113 L.Ed.2d —had concerning his issue special (1991), two recognized the second the Supreme violations, Whereas dangerousness. likely future constitutional categories an affirmаtive error” Penry’s compelled as “trial evidence which it characterized mitigat “oeeur[s] its Trial error inquiry, despite defects.” answer to that “structural case to quite during presentation Graham’s ing significance, amenable to harmless-error jury,” and is negative readily supported have could quantita- ... be “may it answer.”). analysis because Cir.1999). tively assessed the context of other evi Eighth noted, The Circuit has however, that, presented dence order to even [the determine wake of the Williams, Court’s decision in effect it trial].” Id. Structural “not convinced that the AEDPA defects “in did the constitution of the trial abrogate requirement that federal ha- mechanism, defy which analysis by ‘harm beas courts conduct a harmless error anal- standards!,]” less-error’ id. at ysis Kemna, under Brecht.” Whitmore v. 1246, “require! ] automatic reversal (8th Cir.2000). 213 F.3d conviction they infect the *33 Tenth Circuit recognized has the possible process.” entire trial Brecht v. Abraham tension between Brecht-O’Neal stan- son, 619, 629-30, 1710, 507 U.S. 113 S.Ct. AEDPA, dard and the but has expressly 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (citing Fulmi declined to determine application whether nante, 309, 1246). 499 U.S. at 111 S.Ct. of Brecht-O’Neal in an AEDPA is case AEDPA, to the in Prior reviewing peti- Cowan, erroneous. See Anderson v. 227 tions for habeas relief with to con- respect (10th 893, Cir.2000); F.3d 898 n. 3 Thomas errors, stitutional “trial” we determined Gibson, (10th 1213, v. 218 F.3d 1226 n. 12 whether constitutional violation was Cir.2000); Ward, 1193, Bryson v. 187 F.3d by asking harmless error whether the er- (10th Cir.1999). 1206 n. 10 ror “‘had injurious substantial and effect Though Supreme Court Williams in determining influence jury’s ver- expressly does not confront the tension ” Brecht, 623, dict.’ 507 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. between Brecht-O’Neal and the AEDPA States, 1710 (quoting v. Kotteakos United analysis its of the effects of the AEDPA on 750, 776, 1239, 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. scheme, the federal habeas it does appear (1946)). standard, 1557 Under this howev- to implicitly recognize vitality: Brecht’s er, “where record so evenly [was] bal- is, course, “It well settled that the fact anced that judge a conscientious is that constitutional error occurred grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the proceedings that led to a state-court con- error,” petitioner would prevail. may viction not alone be sufficient reason McAninch, 432, 436, v. O’Neal 513 U.S. for concluding prisoner that a is entitled to 992, (1995). 115 130 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 947 Williams, of habeas.” remedy 529 recognize[d] 375, “We ... that if Brecht, our minds are U.S. at 120 (citing S.Ct. 1495 ‘in equipoise supra). virtual as to the harmless ness,’ standard, under the Brecht possible The issue of a Brecht-ONeal- error, then we must conclude that it was AEDPA tension or conflict not present Johnson,

harmful.” Woods v. 75 F.3d however, case, this because the State’s (5th Cir.1996) 1017, 1026-27 O’Neal, (citing violation of Hernandеz’s Eighth Amend- 992, 513 U.S. 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d right ment is a structural defect that re- (1995)). 947 quires reversal, automatic and the State’s violation of his Amendment Sixth among There is division circuits as to harmless, regarded counsel cannot be whether the Brecht-O’Neal standard sur- even under the most state-friendly Brecht vived the AEDPA. The Sixth Circuit has standard. held that “the test set out the Supreme Court in explicitly Kotteakos and reiterat- B. ed in quite precisely Brecht captures Con- gress’s intent expressed in the AEDPA

and, therefore, applicable.” continues to be A Penry violation ais structural defect (6th Killinger, Nevers v. 169 F.3d 371 defying analysis by harmless error stan- [that conclusion “[o]ur of Satterwhite reversal automatic requires dards does error] v. an Estelle Smith there is it infected death sentence all constitu- because not inquiry end the phase. penalty entire er- to reversible capital in a amount violations Court, finding that tional upon 257-58, Penry- 108 S.Ct. by a at 486 U.S. precluded ror.” case murder analysis penal- error in the constitution that a harmless (holding type defect being able violations mechanism to Sixth ty applies mitigat- relevant admis- constitutionally is limited effect to the “violation when Eighth trial.”). evidence, In in violation ing particular sion of de- Amendment, subjected the never has violation whether a similar determining See, e.g., analysis. error fect to a harmless standard Chapman under was harmful 2934; Penry, 492 U.S. review, the Satterwhite errors on direct Carolina, 1, 8-9, 476 U.S. v. Skipper South factors, rejecting employed several (1986); Ed L.Ed.2d which appeals, approach 116-17, Oklahoma, 455 U.S. ings *34 to deter- the record examined simply had (1982); 869, 1 Lockett 71 L.Ed.2d evi- admitted properly the mine whether 608-09, Ohio, 98 438 U.S. jury’s the support to sufficient dence (1978); generally see L.Ed.2d 973 57 258-59, 108 S.Ct. at 486 U.S. verdict. Randy HeRtz, Feder S. LiebmaN & James the instead considered 1792. Corpus and Procedure Practice al Habeas rel evidence psychiatric admitted properly ed.1998). (3d This 32.3, n. 43 § at &1345 the dangerousness; future to evant Penry of the in the nature inheres result placed prosecution weight amount Eighth Amend itself. When the violation who psychiatrist of the expertise on the' un- cruel and against proscription ment’s punish testified impermissibly had a is violated because punishment usual weight amount phase; ment impose whether jury must determine ad improperly placed on prosecution fully being able without death sentence closing in the evidence psychiatric mitted evidence, mitigating relevant give effect to nature unequivocal and the argument; sentencing trial mech- the structure testi psychiatric admitted improperly vio- constitutional creates the anism itself 259-60, 108 S.Ct. 1792. Id. at mony. is not defect Consequently, lation. the Sixth I examined Although have be- analysis harmless-error amenable to case in violation Hernandez’s Amendment quantitatively be assessed cause it cannot standard, under Brecht-O’Neal presented in of other evidence the context ex- Supreme Court that the same factors permits system in a constitutional re- Chapman in its in Satterwhite amined mitigat- relevant full effect to well. relevant here as appear view Thus, violation is Penry ing evidence. Dr. First, solely relied prosecution er- harmless that defies structural defect expert testimony for Sparks’s automatic analysis requires rever- ror elicit- dangerousness, penalty it infects the entire sal psychia- testimony from other ing no process. trial psychologist. trist or Second, Sparks’s Dr. testimo- eliciting in prose- closing argument, its ny precedents, Supreme Court’s Under the exper- his emphasis on placed great cution however, Hernandez’s Sixth pages tise. For two-and-a-half harmless subject to a error violation record, on his back- Sparks elaborated Dr. observed analysis. The ground expertise, discussing his twen- 108 S.Ct. 1792 (quoting the District ty-five years psychiatrist, years as a Attorney’s closing argument about Dr. justice system, work the criminal and Grigson’s testimony: “‘[Satterwhite is a] psychiatrist his examination as a forensic [s]evere sociopath. Extremely dangerous. than people of more accused of A continuing threat our society. Can it previous years. crimes five Well, id. be cured? it’s not a disease. It’s Cf. (finding 108 S.Ct. 1792 significant not an illness. That’s personality.”). Grigsoris Dr. testimony that he taught had Sparks was unequivocal in his testi- psychiatry in a medical school and Dallas mony regarding Hernandez’s future dan- practiced psychiatry years). for twelve gerousness. He stated that an offender In closing argument, its prosecution who had committed a crime identical in emphasized credentials, these expert stat- every detail with Hernandez’s offense had ing, “Here’s a man psy- trained forensic an antisocial personality disorder and was chiatry, here’s man who has examined therefore a continuing society. threat over 1500 people and testified in court over that, He revealed based on his examination times, a man average who’s not the Hernandez, Hernandez had an antisocial psychiatrist who sits behind a desk and personality disorder. Even when con- talks about our phobias problems, аnd our fronted with might records that have indi- but a man who has seen the inner mind of cated that Hernandez’s behavior was at- primitive man.” id. at Cf. paranoid tributable to schizophrenia, he S.Ct. 1792 (finding significant that “[t]he adhered to his original conclusion based on *35 District Attorney highlighted Grigson’s Dr. his examination of Hernandez that Her- ... closing credentials in his argument.”). nandez’s behavior attributable was Sparks’s That Dr. expertise empha- disorder, antisocial personality conceding sized has direct bearing question on the of only that he would have altered diagno- whether testimony was a substantial paranoid sis to reflect schizophrenia in re- influence jury’s on the verdict. id. at mission, Cf. per- addition the antisocial (“[Dr. 259, 108 Grigson’s] testi- sonality disorder. mony stands out his qualifica- because of all Taking of the foregoing relevant fac- tions as a medical doctor specializing account, tors into viewing the Penry psychiatry....”). violation within the context the entire Further, prosecution placed great record, I believe we should conclude that deal of weight on Dr. Sparks’s testimony Sparks’s Dr. testimony in violation of Her- closing argument: its nandez’s Sixth had a “Yes, Sparks] you, yes, [Dr. told he does injurious substantial and influence on the

constitute a continuing threat to soci- jury’s determination of the issue of future ety.” Doctor, your impression, “What is dangerousness, and was therefore not a your relative to diagnosis?” “He’s anti- harmless error under Brecht.

social, sociopath, he’s a he’s what we Conclusion used to call psychopathic.” “What does mean, “Well, Doctor?” that means assigned, For the reasons the decision of love, he cannot he compassion, has no he the Texas Court of Criminal re- can kill indiscriminately.” jecting Eighth Sixth and detailing After Sparks’s this section of Dr. contrary Amendment claims to and an testimony, prosecution elaborated on application clearly unreasonable estab- implications Sparks’s diagnosis lished Federal law as determined of Hernandez a sociopath. Court; id. at decisions of the and the Cf. court is error this majority opinion of the district decision reversing the this remanding case in not of writ the issuance for

that court corpus.

habeas (Aizen) MARROGI, J.

Aizenhawar

Plaintiff-Appellant, Ray

Ray Howard & HOWARD Inc.,

Associates, Defendants- Appellees. (argued), Breaz- Jeffrey Vaughan Collin Orleans, LA, No. 00-30786. Wilson, eale, New & Sachse Plaintiff-Appellant. for Appeals, States Court United Datz, Fifth Circuit. Ja- Wright (argued), B. Kenneth Jacksonville, cobson, Wright, Lembcke & 12, 2001. April Orleans, Dunbar, FL, New Anthony Paul LA, Defendants-Appellees. *36 BARKSDALE, WIENER, Before GARZA, Judges. M. Circuit EMILIO WIENER, Judge: Circuit THE UNITED FROM CERTIFICATE OF APPEALS COURT STATES TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FOR OF LOUI- THE SUPREME COURT SIANA, XII TO RULE ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍PURSUANT THE LOUISIANA SUPREME OF SUPREME TO THE COURT AND THE OF LOUISIANA COURT THERE- JUSTICES HONORABLE OF: THE CASE I. STYLE OF in which style of the certi case (Aizen) made is J. fication is Azenhawar

Case Details

Case Name: Hernandez v. Johnson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 11, 2001
Citation: 248 F.3d 344
Docket Number: 98-50908
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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