305 F.R.D. 132 | N.D. Cal. | 2015
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
(Re: Docket Nos. 48, 181)
On any given day, approximately 1000 adult men and women find themselves in the Monterey County Jail.
Plaintiffs are current or former inmates who allege that a variety of jail policies and practices regarding inmate safety, medical care, mental health care and disabilities expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm to which Defendants are deliberately indifferent. The inmates seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the alleged constitutional violations.
After reviewing the substantial record compiled by the parties, which includes four neutral expert reports, two outside expert reports commissioned at the County’s request, declarations from two experts retained by Plaintiffs and various inmates, the court finds that Plaintiffs meet the standard for class certification set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and as construed by the Ninth Circuit. It therefore certifies a class of inmates challenging jail safety and health care policies and practices, and a subclass of inmates challenging jail disability policies and practices.
The United States and California Constitutions require California’s counties to provide for the safety and well-being of inmates housed in county jails.
Since 1984, Monterey County has contracted with CFMG, a private health care provider, to provide medical, dental and mental-health care services to inmates. Under the terms of its contract, CFMG agreed to follow all County policies and to work with the County to implement additional policies governing such matters as health care staffing, aeeess to prescriptions, emergency care, and mental health services. Monterey County regularly monitors CFMG’s compliance with these policies.
Twenty-one current or former inmates brought this suit. Plaintiffs allege a variety of jail policies and practices “fail to keep [inmates] safe from violence, to deliver adequate medical and mental health care or to provide required assistance to [inmates] with disabilities.”
Plaintiffs also claim that inmates are routinely denied reasonable accommodation for
With respect to all these claims, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are aware of these constitutionally defective conditions and tolerate the resulting risk to which inmates are exposed. For example, Plaintiffs allege that in 2007, the County commissioned a third-party evaluation of the jail, which resulted in a June 19, 2007 report called “County of Monterey, Office of the Sheriff, Needs Assessment.” The 2007 report concluded that “[t]he current combination of insufficient beds, an inadequate detention facility and understaffing has resulted in an almost untenable situation. In 2011, the County asked the third-party consultant to update the 2007 report to reflect amendments to state law and changes within the Sheriffs Office and the jail population. This updated report, dated December 30, 2011, reached the exact same, word-for-word conclusion: “The current combination of insufficient beds, an inadequate detention facility and understaffing has resulted in an almost untenable situation.”
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants are violating federal and state law and an injunction compelling Defendants to provide inmates with adequate protection from violence from other inmates, to provide inmates with adequate medical and mental health care, and to provide reasonable accommodations to and cease discriminating against inmates with disabilities.
II.
Shortly after filing their second amended complaint,
In their responses, Defendants submit declarations from attorneys, jail staff and medical experts, news articles, depositions, declarations, grievance and medical records of Plaintiffs, board orders for improvements and a letter from Monterey County Public Defender James Egar praising CFMG’s work.
The 135-page second amended complaint in this case sets out detailed factual allegations concerning the existence of jail policies and practices impacting the safety, health and disability accommodations of all inmates. According to Plaintiffs, these policies and practices expose all jail inmates to a substantial risk of harm.
Regarding their safety claims, Plaintiffs allege the following policies and practices: (1) insufficient custody staffing; (2) inadequate inmate classification system; (3) dangerous and inadequate jail facilities that are difficult to safely monitor; (4) housing more inmates in the jail than the jail’s rated capacity and (5) inadequate training of custody staff.
Regarding their medical care claims, Plaintiffs allege the following policies and practices: (1) failure to provide timely access to health care; (2) insufficient custody staffing to ensure inmates receive necessary health care; (3) insufficient health care staff to ensure the timely and appropriate treatment of inmates’ serious medical needs; (4) failure to adequately supervise health care staff; (5) failure to provide adequate, clean and confidential clinical spaces;(6) inadequate or nonexistent written policies for intake health screening, health care requests, emergency response, continuity of medications, care for inmates with chronic illness, housing of inmates in segregation, care for developmentally disabled inmates, care for patients on dialysis, care for elderly patients, care for patients with dementia, care for patients requiring wheelchairs, care for inmates who have physical disabilities, housing for pregnant women, persons with communicable diseases, the mentally ill and the terminally ill; (7) failure to adequately identify inmates in need of health care, including inmates with chronic illness, during the intake process and thereafter; (8) use of inadequately trained custody staff to conduct intake health screening; (9) failure to provide adequate treatment to inmates with chronic diseases; (10) failure to provide adequate treatment to inmates with infectious diseases; (11) failure to provide timely and appropriately treatment by outside medical providers and specialists when necessary; (12) failure to provide timely and adequate treatment for inmates experiencing withdrawal; (13) failure to provide necessary medication and medical devices; (14) failure to timely and adequately respond to requests for health care; (15) failure to provide a confidential means for inmates to request health care; (16) failure to timely and adequately respond to health care emergencies; (17) failure to provide appropriate and timely post-operative and post-hospital discharge care; (18) failure to maintain adequate health care records; (17) failure to operate an adequate quality improvement program; (18) failure to adequately train medical and custody staff regarding the provision of health care to inmates and (19) failure to provide timely and appropriate dental care.
Regarding their mental health claims, Plaintiffs allege the following policies and practices: (1) failure to provide mentally ill inmates medically necessary mental health treatment such as psychotropic medication, therapy and inpatient treatment; (2) failure to provide inmates access to timely and appropriate inpatient mental health care; (3) inadequate suicide prevention policies and practices; (4) failure to provide suicidal and self-harming inmates adequate mental health care; (5) housing inmates with mental illness in administrative segregation because they have mental illnesses; (6) failure to provide a clean, safe and therapeutic location for the housing of inmates at risk for suicide; (7) inappropriate use of safety cells, restraints and restraint chairs; (8) failure to adequately monitor inmates at risk of suicide and (9) failure to eliminate suicide hazards in administrative segregation.
Regarding their disability accommodation claims, Plaintiffs allege the following policies and practices: (1) failure to identify and track inmates with disabilities; (2) failure to identify and track the accommodations that inmates with disabilities require; (3) failure to ensure that inmates with disabilities receive and retain needed assistive devices and auxiliary aids; (4) failure to ensure that inmates with disabilities that require accommodations in housing receive and retain appropriate housing assignments; (5) housing
For each of these alleged policies and practices, the second amended complaint sets out multiple paragraphs or pages of particularized factual allegations. For example, regarding Defendants’ alleged safety policies and practices, Plaintiffs allege roughly 150 separate instances of violence were reported from (presumably January) 2011 to September 2012, occurring in nearly every area of the jail, and most requiring medical attention at the jail or the local hospital. Weapons such as shanks and Tomahawks are “readily available” in the jail.
As another example, regarding the alleged medical care policies and practices, Plaintiffs claim that “[tjhough Defendants have a policy that all [inmates] are supposed to be seen by medical staff on the next available sick call day after submitting a sick call slip, in practice, Defendants use Licensed Vocational Nurses (LVNs) to screen the sick call slips and determine whether the [inmate] should actually be seen by medical or mental health care staff. No standardized protocols exist to guide LVNs’ exercise of discretion in determining when [inmates] should receive a face-to-face appointment with a nurse or other medical or mental health care clinician.”
Yet another example of Plaintiffs’ medical care claims concern Defendants’ alleged policies and practices for medical screening. Plaintiffs allege “Defendants fail to adequately train custody and medical staff in how to timely and appropriately identify medical problems during the screening and intake process. When [an inmate] is newly booked into the jail, medical staff may not even play a role in screening the [inmate].”
Regarding Defendants’ alleged mental health policies and practices, in addition to intake and tracking problems, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants sometimes place [inmates] who arrive at the jail and who are prescribed psychotropic medications on what Defendants call a detoxification treatment. The detoxification treatment involves refusing, for up to 90 days, to provide [inmates] with the psychotropic medications they were taking before they were booked into the Jail____ [Inmates] placed on the detoxification treatment and removed from psychotropic medications experience unnecessary pain and increases in psychiatric symptoms including paranoia, hallucinations, and suieid-ality____ They are also at heightened risk of failing to respond to medications once they are restarted.”
As another example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants house inmates with mental illness in administrative segregation units in such a way that inmates suffer substantial risk of serious harm.
Plaintiffs allege inmates with mental illnesses are punished and discriminated against. For example, after engaging in self-harming behavior, Plaintiff Mefford has been placed on suicide watch and put in an “unsanitary” rubber room at least five separate times for varying lengths of time since entering the jail. Mefford “was able to continue engaging in self-harming behavior inside the rubber room, by banging his head repeatedly against the door until he was bleeding.”
Regarding Defendants’ alleged disabilities accommodation policies and practices, Plaintiffs claim Defendants’ failures to accurately identify new inmates’ disabilities and needed accommodations during the intake process result in the denial of accommodations mandated by the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and California disability rights law, placing inmates at risk of discrimination, injury, and exploitation. For example, during booking into the jail in August 2012 and again in December 2012, custody staff completed Monterey County Sheriffs Office Intake Health Screening forms for Plaintiff Yancey. Despite Yancey’s complete hearing impairment, staff did not indicate on the forms that he had a hearing disability. Accordingly, staff throughout the jail were unable to identify Yancey as hearing impaired, and he received no accommodations for his disability.
Another inmate who was booked into the jail in January 2012 with a mobility impair
The sum total of all this is that Plaintiffs allege a variety of jail policies and practices applying to all inmates and staff dealing with safety, health care and disabilities, and that these policies and practices expose all members of the proposed class and subclass to a substantial risk of harm.
B.
Plaintiffs also support their motion for class certification with documents obtained by investigation and various requests pursuant to California’s Public Records Act. For example, they submit Sheriffs Office’s incident reports of the 2011 and 2012 incidents of violence between inmates alleged in the complaint.
C.
Plaintiffs submit a total of eight reports from different experts on the policies and practices in dispute. Four of these experts are independent of the parties, and were jointly retained by the parties in 2013. At the parties’ request, the court ordered “a process of mutually agreeing to experts who will review and analyze the conditions at the Monterey County Jail and issue reports”
The parties jointly retained Dr. Michael Puisis, D.O. as a neutral expert to evaluate “whether Defendants’ system for providing medical care at the jail is adequate.”
The parties jointly retained Dr. Richard Hayward, Ph.D. as a neutral expert to evaluate “whether Defendants’ system for providing mental health care in the jail is adequate.”
The parties jointly retained SZS Consulting as a neutral expert to evaluate Defendants’ compliance with the ADA and other disability rights laws.
TRG Consulting drafted the 2007 and 2011 reports at the County’s request.
Plaintiffs also retained expert Dr. Pablo Stewart, M.D., a psychiatrist with decades of experience evaluating correctional mental health care systems.
D.
Beyond the allegations in the second amended complaint, the investigation and public records documents, and the expert reports, Plaintiffs also submitted declarations describing their own experiences with jail policies and practices governing safety, medical care, mental health care and disabilities. Plaintiffs did not submit these declarations in support of individual constitutional and statutory claims, which they do not bring, but instead offer these declarations as evidence of the defendants’ unlawful policies and practices, and as examples of the serious harm to which all inmates in jail custody are allegedly exposed. For example, Plaintiff Dilley, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, describes how she cannot walk up the stairs to access the exercise yard without experiencing excruciating pain.
III.
This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
IV.
Plaintiffs request that the court certify an inmate class of “all [inmates] who are now or will be in the future in the Jail” and an inmates with disabilities subclass of “all individuals who are now or will be in the future in the Jail and who have a disability, as defined by federal and California law.”
“An order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.”
“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”
In evaluating whether a party has met the requirements of Rule 23, “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.”
Rule 23(b)(1) allows a class action if “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.”
Rule 23(b)(2) allows a class action if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply general
In Parsons v. Ryan,
Because Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2), they need not show “that the issues common to the class satisfy a Rule 23(b)(3)-like predominance test.”
A.
As a preliminary matter, under the ascertainability doctrine, the class must be sufficiently definite so that it is feasible for the court to determine membership by reference to objective criteria.
Defendants dispute the breadth of Plaintiffs’ class and subclass definitions.
B.
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” The Rule ensures judicial economy
CFMG concedes and stipulates that Plaintiffs meet the numerosity element, and joinder of all class members would be impracticable.
C.
As to commonality, there must be “questions of law and fact common to the class,”
Dissimilarities between class members must be considered in determining whether a common question will generate a common answer because dissimilarities within the proposed class can “impede the generation of common answers.”
In civil rights cases, “commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.”
Post-Walr-Mart, courts continue to find the commonality requirement satisfied in cases challenging correctional facility conditions similar to those at issue here.
“Commonality cannot be determined without a precise understanding of the nature of the underlying claims.”
Here, a central question of injury is whether Defendants’ policies and practices reflect deliberate indifference as to Plaintiffs’ medical care, mental health care, and safety needs.
Defendants argue that what is reasonable treatment to one inmate may not be appropriate or reasonable treatment to another
But Plaintiffs have produced adequate evidence of specific system-wide policies and
In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court distinguished the kind of systemic, future-oriented constitutional and statutory claims at issue here from claims in which a past instance of mistreatment is alleged to have violated the Constitution:
Because plaintiffs do not base their ease on deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider whether these instances of delay—or any other particular deficiency in medical care complained of by the plaintiffs—would violate the Constitution under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104-105,97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), if considered in isolation. Plaintiffs rely on system-wide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill [inmates] in California to “substantial risk of serious harm” and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.150
Thus, “[individual claims for injunctive relief related to medical treatment are discrete from the claims for systemic reform addressed in Plata”
The court need only determine if it can answer the question “whether [Defendants’] staffing policies pose a risk of serious harm to ... the entire class ‘in one stroke.’ ”
Defendants’ proffered changes in intake health screening and the future hiring of more medical staff, even if successful, cannot defeat commonality.
Here, as in Parsons, Plaintiffs have met or exceeded Wal-Mart’s requirement of proof that there are “in fact ... common questions of law or fact.”
“A clear line of precedent, stretching back long before Wal-Mart and unquestionably continuing past it, firmly establishes that when inmates provide sufficient evidence of systemic and centralized policies or practices in a prison system that allegedly expose all inmates in that system to a substantial risk of serious future harm, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.”
D.
The question of typicality
While typicality and commonality occasionally merge,
To the County, the typical grievances and complaints named Plaintiffs make in this ease are adequacy or timely care, which Defendants believe are individual, unique issues, requiring individual, unique responses and assessments of specific inquiries on an individual level.
Here, the transitory putative class and subclass members are all inmates in the jail. Each named Plaintiff declares exposure, like all other members of the putative class and subclass, to a substantial risk of serious harm due to the challenged policies and practices. The named Plaintiffs allege “the same or [a] similar injury” as the rest of the putative class; they allege that this injury is a result of a course of conduct that is
E.
As to adequacy of representation,
The County argues that the named Plaintiffs are inadequate because, among other things, they request conflicting relief. For example, some Plaintiffs wish to see mentally ill inmates segregated from the rest of the inmates, and others admonish Defendants for failure to “ensure that inmates or detainees with disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individuals.”
F.
Counsel may be appointed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1) and (4) if they are adequate; that is, if counsel does not have “any conflicts of interest with other class members” and if they will “prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.”
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1) and (4), class counsel with experience with class action lawsuits, class action lawsuits regarding conditions in correctional facilities, criminal justice issues and commitment of resources are likely to adequately represent the class.
The County posits that the Rosen Bien firm may be financially interested in keeping inmates in jail, while the Office of the Public Defender’s incentives may aim to keep inmates out of jail.
Defendants’ arguments as to plaintiffs’ counsel’s conflicting incentives are unpersua
G.
Rule 23(b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Wal-Mart summarized Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements as follows:
the key to the (b)(2) class is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.209
These requirements unquestionably are satisfied when putative class members seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies or practices generally applicable to the class as a whole.
The primary role of this provision is the certification of civil rights class actions.
As in Parsons, here Plaintiffs “seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from policies or practices that are generally applicable to the class as a whole.”
The County argues Plaintiffs’ requests are too vague regarding constitutional adequacy and deficiency
V.
The court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), and appoints named Plaintiffs as class representatives. The court also designates as class counsel under Rule 23(g) Michael Bien and Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld of Rosen Bien Gal-van & Grunfeld LLP, Monterey County Public Defender James Egar, Alan Sehlosser of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and Eric Balaban of the American Civil Liberties Union-National Prison Project. The class and subclass are defined as follows: “all adult men and women who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in Monterey County Jail” and “all qualified individuals with a disability, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), and California Government Code § 12926(j) and (m), and who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in Monterey County Jail.”
SO ORDERED.
. Unless otherwise cited, all facts come from Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint at Docket No. 41.
. The court may take judicial notice of a "fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known” or "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid.
Plaintiffs first request that the court take judicial notice of 55 applications made by the Sheriff's Office to the Monterey Superior Court in an attempt to relieve overcrowding, and subsequent orders. See Docket No. 49-11, Ex. Z; Docket No. 54 at 1. The court takes judicial notice of these applications and orders because they were filed in state court. Second, Plaintiffs ask the court to take judicial notice of County charts documenting the jail's average daily population. See Docket No. 49-13, Ex. AA and BB; Docket No. 54 at 2. As the daily inmate population is verifiable and not in dispute, the court takes judicial notice. Third, Plaintiffs seek judicial notice of minutes of the Monterey County Board of Supervisors in which the Board approved legislation to "accept the Jail Facility Needs Assessment Report.” See Docket No. 49-16, Ex. FF; Docket No. 54 at 3. The court takes judicial notice of this legislative enactment. Fourth, Plaintiffs request judicial notice of the Monterey County Correction Facility Information Manual and certain sections of the Custody Operations Bureau's Policies and Procedures. See Docket Nos. 49-1, Ex. E; Docket No. 49-2; Ex. F; Docket No. 54 at 3-4. The court takes judicial notice of these agency manuals, rules and policies not subject to a reasonable dispute. Fifth, Plaintiffs ask for judicial notice of the United States Census Bureau Report on Americans with Disabilities. See Docket No. 49-17; Ex. II; Docket No. 54 at 4. The accuracy of these facts are verifiable and certain, and so the court again takes judicial notice.
The County first seeks judicial notice of Monte-rey County Board Orders: approving Amendment # 1 to Agreement A-1083, see Docket No. 140-1, Ex. A; Docket No. 133-1 at 2; designating the Monterey County Sheriff's Office as the authorized representative on Medi-Cal applications, see id., Ex. B; Docket No. 133-1 at 2; authorizing $4,032,778 in County funds to be used for the County of Monterey Jail Housing Addition, see id., Ex. C; Docket No. 133-1 at 2; authorizing an additional $4,867,222 in County funds to be used for the Jail Housing Addition Project, see id., Ex. D; Docket No. 133-1 at 2; and authorizing Sheriff Scott Miller to submit an application for a local adult detention facility construction grant and expenditure of $200,000. See id., Ex. E; Docket No. 133-1 at 2. The court takes judicial notice that these board orders occurred. Second, the County seeks judicial notice of affidavits and minute orders of conflict as to Glenda Hunter, Angel Perez, Ha Ngoc Tran, Dennis Guyot, Albert Key and Brandon Mefford. See id., Ex. H-N; Docket No. 133-1 at 3. The court takes judicial notice of the Public Defenders’ declarations of conflict.
CFMG requests the court take judicial notice of a judicial order at Exhibit G to the Bertling Declaration. See Docket Nos. 243, 184-2, Ex. G. The court does not do so because Exhibit G to the Bertling Declaration is actually a deposition.
. See U.S. Const, amend. VIII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; CA Const. art. I, § 7; CA Const. art. I, § 17.
. See, e.g. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701;Cal. Gov't Code § 11135.
. Docket No. 56 at 1. While Plaintiffs refer to jail residents as "prisoners,” the court will adhere to the alternative reference of "inmates.”
. Id. at 19.
. See Docket No. 41 at 3:9-22.
. See id. at 132-35.
. On September 29, 2014, the court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. See Docket No. 128.
. See Docket Nos. 133-179; 299, 369, 368.
. See, e.g., Docket No. 169 at 17, 19, 29; Docket No. 369 at 2-3.
. See Docket No. 41 at 36.
. See id. at 35-37.
. Id. at 44.
. Plaintiffs allege that during "Plaintiff Hernandez’s term of incarceration from April 28, 2012 to September 27, 2013, he required significant medical attention for his ileostomy and, after the ileostomy was removed, for his post-surgical care. On many occasions, Plaintiff Hernandez submitted sick call slips complaining of abdominal pain or other related symptoms. He frequently experienced significant delays before he was seen by medical staff. As one example, he submitted a sick call slip on October 2, 2012, complaining of not receiving certain medications for his stomach and was experiencing strong cramping pains; he was not fully evaluated by appropriate medical staff until October 26, 2012—24 days later.” Id. at 44:12-24. As another example, Plaintiff Hernandez submitted sick call slips related to pain in his abdomen on November 18, 25, and December 2, 2012. He was not evaluated by an appropriate provider prior to being transferred to the hospital on or around December 11, 2013 for his ileostomy reversal surgery, a period of 23 days.” Plaintiffs similarly allege that "[w]hen Plaintiff Sarabi complained about intense pain in his right
. See id. at 45.
. See id.
. See Docket No. 41 at 42.
. Id. at 42:6-14.
. Docket No. 41 at 69-70.
. See id. at 88.
. See id. at 90.
. See id. at 78.
. See id.
. See id. at 67-88.
. See Docket No. 41 at 99.
. See id. at 101.
. See Docket No. 52 at ¶¶ 4, 6-8, 11-13, 23.
. See Docket No. 41 at 103.
. See id. at 100.
. See Docket No. 49 at ¶¶ 45-47.
. See id. ¶ 47.
. See id.
. Docket Nos. 49-9, 49-10, 49-11, 49-12.
. Id.
. Id.
. See Docket No. 49-3 at ¶¶ 25-33; Docket Nos. 49-7, 49-8.
. See Docket No. 348 at 2-3; Docket No. 9 at 1 ; Docket No. 348-1 at ¶ 2; Docket No. 349 at ¶¶ 23.
. See Docket No. 349 at ¶ 2.
. See id.
. See Docket No. 348-1 at ¶¶ 3-4.
. See Docket No. 41 at ¶¶ 39-41; Docket Nos. 41-1, 41-2, 41-3, 41-4.
. See Docket No. 56 at 3.
. See Docket No. 49 at ¶ 8; Docket No. 49-1 Ex. B.
. CFMG’s motion to strike the report of Puisis is DENIED. Puisis is a neutral expert. Contrary to CFMG’s assertions, Puisis did not violate HIPAA or the federal privaicy rights of any person. In providing the names of the patients whose charts he reviewed to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Puisis acted under the protective order entered in this case. Finally, Puisis is a well-qualified expert in correctional medical services. Puisis used methodology and reasoning in support of his opinions that are scientifically valid, and his credentials and experience qualify him as an expert in this action. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Ralston v. Mortgage Investors Grop., Inc., Case No. 08-cv-536-JF, 2011 WL 6002640, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 30, 2011).
. Docket No. 49 at ¶ 9; Docket No. 49-1 Ex. C.
. Docket No. 49-7 Ex. M.
. Docket No. 49 at ¶ 10; Docket No. 49-1 Ex. D.
. See Docket Nos. 49-4, 49-5, 49-6 Ex. K.
. See id. at 98-691.
. See id.
. See id. at 7-10.
. See id. at 8, 9; see Docket No. 50 at ¶¶ 18-19; Docket No. 49-1, Ex. D at 49-56.
. See Docket No. 49-4 at 9.
. Id. at 9.
. See Docket No. 41-1 at ¶¶ 39-40, Ex. A; Docket No. 41-4 Ex. B; Docket No. 49 at ¶41.
. Docket No. 41-1, Ex. A, at EX. 1-2; Docket No. 41-4 Ex. B, at EX.2.
. See Docket No. 355 at 11.
. See Docket No. 52 at ¶¶ 6-7, 69, 72, 76.
. See Docket No. 355 at 11.
. Docket No. 52-7 at ¶ 4.
. Id. ¶ 12-13.
. See Docket No. 41 at 52.
. See, e.g., Docket No. 52-3 at ¶ 23; Docket No. 52-11 at ¶ 27; Docket No. 52-13 at ¶¶ 3-15; Docket No. 52-15 at ¶¶ 7-10; Docket No. 52-17 at ¶¶ 4—12, 14-17; Docket No. 52-21 at ¶ 23; Docket No. 52-23 at HV7-15, 17-20, 22-25, 28-37; Docket No. 52-27 at ¶ 28.
. See Docket Nos. 8, 34.
. See Docket No. 133 at 17; Docket No. 169 at 13-14.
. See Docket No. 128 at 14.
. See Docket No. 133 at 18.
. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Amchem Prods, v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ("Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints”); Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir.2012) ("no class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing").
. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (holding that "[i]n a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.”); see also Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (finding named plaintiffs need not show "that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 395, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring); Steams v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir.2011); Ar-nott v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 290 F.R.D. 579, 584 (C.D.Cal.2012) (explaining why Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir.2012), a case about damages, is not binding).
. See Docket No. 56 at 2. Claim arise under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution; the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and California Government Code § 11135.
. See Docket No. 48 at 2; 355-1 at 7.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(B); Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir.2006) ("[T]he text of the order or an incorporated opinion must include (1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis”).
. Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187.
. See Bradford v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., Case No. 05-cv-4075, 2007 WL 2893650, *8-9, 2007 LEXIS 72951, *25 (2007).
. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).
. Id. at 2551.
. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23); Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir.2013); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.2001).
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)-(b); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir.1998); Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512.
. Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.
. Id.
. E.g. Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542-543 (9th Cir.2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2551; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 588 ("Before certifying a class, the trial court must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether the party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23").
. See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., Case No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (N.D.Cal. March 18, 2014) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2551 ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. We recognized in Falcon that "sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question”); General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) ("[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable.”).
. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 688 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2)).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1).
. See Ashker v. Governor of State of Cal., Case No. 4:09-cv-5796-CW, 2014 WL 2465191, at *7 (N.D.Cal. June 2, 2014) (prison conditions case certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) for class actions that create a risk of inconsistent adjudications).
. See Docket No. 358-4, Ex. VV at 107-10; Gray v. County of Riverside, Case No. 13-cv-0444-VAP, Docket No. 131 at 107-10, 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, certifying jail conditions class action under both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B)).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
. Gray v. Golden Gate Nat'l Recreational Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 520 (N.D.Cal.2011) (quoting Baby Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir.1994)); see also Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir.2010); Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 345 (N.D.Cal.2008) ("Cases challenging an entity’s policies and practices regarding access for the disabled represent the mine run of disability rights class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).”).
. Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2557 (citation omitted).
. Id.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2)).
. See id. at 657.
. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 677 (citing Brown v. Plata, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1925 n. 3, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011)).
. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1925 n. 3.
. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868-69 (9th Cir.2001); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1218-23 (9th Cir.2008).
. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688.
. See Williams v. Oberon Media, Inc., 468 Fed.Appx. 768, 771 (9th Cir.2012) (class motion was properly denied because the proposed members are not "precise, objective or presently ascertainable”); Khalif L. v. City of Union City, Case No. 4:09-cv-2723-PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64567, *15 (N.D.Cal. May 8, 2012) (finding a class of students "subjected to violence or threats of violence, by 'Latino gangs’ ” cannot be ascertained).
. Velasquez v. HSBC Finance Corp., Case No. 3:08-4592, 2009 WL 112919, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 2009) (defining a "fail-safe class” as (by the merits of [the plaintiffs] legal claims, and [is] therefore unascertainable prior to a finding of liability in the plaintiffs’ favor.’’); Kamar v. Radio Shack Corp., 375 Fed.Appx. 734, 735 (9th Cir. 2010).
. Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D.Pa.2000).
. See Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1089 (N.D.Cal.2011) ("Ascer-tainability is needed for properly enforcing the preclusive effect of final judgment. The class definition must be clear in its applicability so that it will be clear later on whose rights are merged into the judgment, that is, who gets the benefit of any relief and who gets the burden of any loss. If the definition is not clear in its applicability, then satellite litigation will be invited over who was in the class in the first place’’); 1 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:1 (5th ed.).
. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (holding that notice of right to opt-out of suit for money damages is required by the Due Process Clause); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating that in contrast to certification of a subdivision (b)(3) class, "notice to the members of a(b)(2) class is not required and the actual membership of the class need not therefore be precisely delimited.”). Manageability is not as important a concern for injunctive classes as for damages classes. See Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1229 (9th Cir.1977) ("by its terms. Rule 23 makes manageability an issue important only in determining the propriety of certifying an action as a(b)(3), not a(b)(2), class action.”), aff'd in pertinent part sub nom. Califano, 442 U.S. at 701, 99 S.Ct. 2545.
. See Docket No. 133 at 9.
. See id. at 34; Docket No. 169 at 17.
. See, e.g., Parsons, 754 F.3d at 672 (class of "[a]ll [inmates] who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical, mental health, and dental care policies and practices” in Arizona prisons); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 856-57 (certifying class of "all present and future California state [inmates] and parolees with mobility, sight, hearing, learning, developmental and kidney disabilities that substantially limit one or more of their major life activities”) (quotation marks omitted); Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1118 ("the inclusion of future class members in a class is not itself unusual or objectionable”).
. Lyon v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 300 F.R.D. 628, 635-36 (N.D.Cal. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
. See Docket No. 355 at 5.
. See 1 Rubenstein, supra, §§ 1:12; 3:11.
. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965; 7A Charles Alan Wright, et al.,
. 1 William Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12, at 198 (5th ed.2011); see also Ran-nis v. Recchia, 380 Fed.Appx. 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010); Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).
. See Nat'l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 111 F.R.D. 595, 599 (N.D.Cal. 1986).
. See Docket No. 169 at 15.
. See Docket No. 133 at 19-21; Docket No. 355 at 6.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2).
. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2551.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 675; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 588 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551) (internal alteration omitted).
. Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Ass., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2013) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original)).
. Id. at 2551, 2556.
. Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1021.
. Amgen, 133 S.Ct. at 1194-95; Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011).
. Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2556); see also Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589 (9th Cir.2012) (noting that "commonality only requires a single significant question of law or fact”).
. Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir.2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 868.
. Id.
. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2553; Stockwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1111-13 (9th Cir.2014).
. See Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 516-23 (D.Ariz.2013) (commonality in case challenging medical and mental healthcare provided to 33,-000 inmates in Arizona); Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 465-66 (E.D.La.2013) (commonality for claims by pre- and post-trial detainees regarding failures to protect inmates from violence and inadequacies in medical and mental health care at jails in New Orleans Parish); Butler v. Suffolk County, 289 F.R.D. 80, 97-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (commonality for claims that unsanitary conditions in jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 511 (M.D.Ala.2012) (commonality for ADA claims challenging Alabama prison policy of segregating HIV positive inmates from general prison population); Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 410-12 (N.D.Ind.2012) (commonality for class claims regarding, among other things, constitutionality of jail mail policy); Hughes v. Judd, Case No. 8:12-cv-568-MAP, 2013 WL 1821077, at *23-24 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) (commonality for claims regarding constitutionality of jail’s policies for protecting juvenile inmates from violence) (report and recommendation adopted as modified, 8:12-cv-568-SDM, 2013 WL 1810806, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Apr. 30, 2013)).
. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 662, 683.
. Id. at 675 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. at 678 (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551) ("What all members of the putative class and subclass have in common is their alleged exposure, as a result of specified statewide ADC policies and practices that govern the overall conditions of health care services and confinement, to a substantial risk of serious future harm to which the defendants are allegedly deliberately indifferent____ [Although a presently existing risk may ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates—ranging from no harm at all to death—every inmate suffers exactly the same constitutional injury when he is exposed to a single statewide ... policy or practice that creates a substantial risk of serious harm”); id. at 678-79 (holding that since "every inmate ... is necessarily subject to the same medical, mental health, and dental care policies and practices" and because “any one of them could easily fall ill, be injured, need to fill a prescription, require emergency or specialist care, crack a tooth, or require mental health treatment ... [,] every single ADC inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm if ADC policies and practices provide constitutionally deficient care for treatment”); Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1940 ("[Inmates] who are not sick or mentally ill do not yet have a claim that they have been subjected to care that violates the Eighth Amendment, but in no sense are they remote bystanders in California’s medical care system. They are that system’s next potential victims”).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 678.
. Id. at 679.
. Id. at 676; see Amgen Inc., 133 S.Ct. at 1194-95 ("Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” (citation omitted)); Ellis, 657 F.3d at 981 (”[T]he merits of the class members’ substantive claims are often highly relevant when determining whether to certify a class.”).
. Stockwell, 749 F.3d at 1114, (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551).
. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (constitutional violation occurs where deprivation was "sufficiently serious” and the official has acted with "deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (deliberate indifference to inmates’ safety from "violence at the hands of other [inmates]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious mental health care needs); Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955, 970 n. 24 (E.D.Cal.2013) (elements of a constitutional correctional mental health system).
. Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.
. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (holding that prison officials may not "ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff establishes deliberate indifference by showing that a public entity "(1) had a policy that posed a substantial risk of serious harm ...; and (2) kn[ew] that its policy posed this risk.” In class actions challenging a jail facility’s healthcare systems or safety practices, liability may also be premised on a showing of "systematic or gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment or procedures.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1925 n. 3; (upholding, in case against California prison system, sweeping injunctive relief to remedy "system-wide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill [inmates] in California to [a] substantial risk of serious harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1256 (N.D.Cal. 1995) ("In class actions challenging the entire system of mental or medical health care, courts have traditionally held that deliberate indifference can be shown by proving either a pattern of negligent acts or serious systemic deficiencies in the prison’s health care program.”).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 676.
. See Docket No. 21-22.
. See Docket No. 133 at 17.
. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 870; Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2010); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359-60, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (stressing, regarding inmate access to a law library, that a system wide injunction can only be issued upon proof of system wide, not isolated, problems); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977) ("Instead of tailoring a remedy commensurate with the three specific violations, the Court of Appeals imposed a system wide remedy going beyond their scope”); id., at 420, 97 S.Ct. 2766 ("Only if there has been a system wide impact may there be a system wide remedy”); Califano, 442 U.S. at 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545 (“The scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.”).
. See Docket No. 133 at 30; Docket No. 169 at 9-10, 16-17.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(B); Parsons, 754 F.3d at 683; Docket No. 355 at 8-21.
. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475.
. Id. at 33, 34, 113 S.Ct. 2475; see also id. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475 ("We have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to an inmate's current health problems but may ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year.”).
. Id.
. 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
. See, e.g., Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir.2010) (substantial risk of harm from exposure of pretrial detainees on psychotropic medication to extreme heat); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.1995) (substantial risk of harm from sustained exposure to asbestos). See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 n. 5 (9th Cir.2010) (“In its order, the district court erroneously considers whether the prison officials were aware that Thomas was 'suffering serious harm from the deprivation’ of exercise. The correct issue for consideration is, however, whether the prison officials were subjectively aware of a 'serious risk of substantial harm.'” (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Helling, 509 U.S. at 32, 113 S.Ct. 2475)).
. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1925 n. 3.
. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir.2013).
. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475 (unsafe drinking water); Graves, 623 F.3d at 1049 (heat exposure); Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1076 (asbestos); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir.1985) (substandard fire prevention).
. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 678.
. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475; cf. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1923 ("For years the medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed to meet [inmates’] basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well-documented result.”).
. 131 S.Ct. at 1940.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 679 (citing Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551).
. See id. at 678.
. See id. at 680; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir.2013).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 680; see Docket No. 356 at ¶ 53.
. See Docket No. 355 at 16-17.
. See Docket No. 3 71.
. A public entity must take steps, including altering existing or constructing new facilities, to accommodate inmates with disabilities unless to do so would fundamentally alter a program or create an undue financial or administrative burden. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150, 35.152. Whether a facility was constructed prior to 1992 only determines whether the structure itself must comply fully with the ADA's architectural guidelines. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a) & (b). That the jail was constructed prior to 1992 does not vitiate Defendants’ obligation to accommodate inmates with disabilities or alter the reasonableness of an accommodation in any way.
. See also, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 849.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 680; see, e.g., Chief Goes Out v. Missoula Cnty., Case No. 12-cv-155-DWM, 2013 WL 139938, at *5 (D.Mont. Jan. 10, 2013) ("[C]ourts have long recognized that, in prison condition cases like this one, the injury is the [deprivation] itself, not just the negative effects resulting from the [deprivation]____ [O]ther courts have certified classes of inmates claiming unconstitutional deprivation of outdoor exercise, and scores of courts have certified classes of [inmates] claiming other unconstitutional prison conditions.”); Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 98 ("Whether the County was aware of and deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the [prison] is a common question subject to class-wide resolution.”); Hughes, 2013 WL 1821077, at *23 ("Plaintiffs' claims related to these [prison] conditions are capable of class-wide resolution: Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive and declaratory relief that would enjoin allegedly unconstitutional behavior as applied to the entire class. Importantly, the questions of law are applicable in the same manner to each potential class member.... Each class member, if proceeding separately against Defendants, would need to meet the same test under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to prevail.”); Rosas v. Baca, Case No. 12-CV-428-DDP, 2012 WL 2061694, at *3 (C.D.Cal. June 7, 2012) ("In a civil rights suit such as this one ... commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members. Under such circumstances, individual factual differences among class members pose no obstacle to commonality.”); Indiana Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Indiana Dep't of Correction, Case No. 08-CV-1317-TWP, 2012 WL 6738517, at *18 (S.D.Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) ("The mentally ill [inmates] here, have demonstrated through a wealth of evidence, that the class is united by the common question of whether the lack of treatment and isolated living conditions in IDOC facilities violate the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 868.
. 131 S.Ct. at 2551; see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,-U.S.--, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013) (noting that "it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question” (quotation marks and citations omitted)); DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126 (D.C.Cir.2013) (concluding that commonality had not been shown where the plaintiffs in a putative IDEA class action had not identified a "single or uniform policy or practice that bridges all their claims”); M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 844 (5th Cir.2012) (cautioning that “mere allegations of systemic violations of the law ... will not automatically satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
. Compare M.D., 675 F.3d at 844 (noting that commonality is not shown when plaintiffs allege an amorphous claim of undefined and unspecified systemic misconduct).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 684.
. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551-52.
. See, e.g., Parsons, 754 F.3d at 684-86.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 869.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3); Parsons, 754 F.3d at 686 ("Rule 23(a)(3) requires only that their claims be 'typical' of the class, not that they be identically positioned to each other or to every class member.”); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 869; Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (typicality analysis "refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
. Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508.
. Id.
. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 n. 5; Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 868-69.
. 7A Wright, § 1764 (emphasis added).
. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 869.
. See Docket No. 133 at 24.
. See id.
. See Docket No. 355 at 25; Docket Nos. 52-3 to 52-30.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d at 869.
. See Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689 n. 35 (rejecting Shook v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir.2008)).
. Id.; see also Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1940; Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 869.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 686; see Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 n. 9 ("Differing factual scenarios resulting in a claim of the same nature as other class members does not defeat typicality.”).
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4).
. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.
. See Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., 753 F.Supp.2d 996, 1015 (N.D.Cal.2010)); Feske v. MHC Thousand Trails L.P., Case No. 5:11-cv-4124-PSG, 2013 WL 1120816, *12-14, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37232, *36-41(N.D.Cal.2013).
. Harris, 753 F.Supp.2d at 1015.
. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Feske, 2013 WL 1120816, at *13.
. See Docket No. 133 at 27.
. See Docket No. 169 at 18, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357, 116 S.Ct. 2174; Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc. 741 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.2014).
. See Docket No. 169 at 18-19.
. See id. at 21-22, 24-25, 26-29.
. See Docket No. 355 at 29-30.
. Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 346, 357 (E.D.N.Y.1997) aff'd, 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.1998).
. See Ingles v. City of New York, Case No. 01-cv-8279-DC, 2003 WL 402565, at *1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) (ruling that class representative who was currently on psychiatric medication and had a "psychiatric condition” was an adequate class representative); Hill v. Priority Fin. Servs., Inc., Case No. 98-cv-1319-SEB, 2000 WL 1876582, at *1 (S.D.Ind. Dec. 22, 2000) (noting that even if the class representative were "currently undergoing treatment for mental illness,” that would not disqualify him if it did not "affect his understanding of the case, his processing of information, or his ability to perform his duties as class representative”).
. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv); Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(4).
. See Docket No. 133 at 27.
. See id. at 4.
. Reich v. Club Universe, 125 Cal.App.3d 965, 970-972, 178 Cal.Rptr. 473 (1981) ("The reasons for the rule prohibiting such a dual role by an attorney-potential witness are (1) an attorney who attempts to be both advocate and witness impairs his credibility as a witness and diminishes his effectiveness as an advocate, and (2) such conduct may diminish the public’s respect and confidence toward the profession”); see also Si-cinski v. Reliance Funding Corp., 82 F.R.D. 730, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("As stated in Ethical Consideration 5-9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, '(t)he roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively;'); Arthur v. Zearley, 320 Ark. 273, 279-82, 895 S.W.2d 928 (1995) (finding attorney for plaintiffs in prospective class action who testified at class certification hearing improperly testified and acted as advocate in same proceeding).
. See Docket No. 169 at 1-2.
. See Docket No. 128 at 13-16.
. See Docket No. 355 at 32; Docket No. 358 at ¶ 2; Docket No 358-1, Ex. A.
. See also State v. Lucas, 123 Ariz. 39, 41, 597 P.2d 192 (1979) (no conflict between prosecutor prosecuting man while simultaneously defending the county against the man’s civil lawsuit).
. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3-100(C).
. See Colyer v. Smith, 50 F.Supp.2d 966, 974 (C.D.Cal.1999) (finding that attorneys are not necessarily disqualified even if they are compelled to be fact witnesses at trial); cf. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 5-210 (allowing attorneys to act as witnesses in jury trials under certain circumstances); Yagman v. Galipo, Case No. 12-cv-7908-GW, 2014 WL 2566129, at *3 (C.D.Cal. June 3, 2014); McLellan v. McLellan, 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 360, 100 Cal.Rptr. 258 (1972) (allowing attorney declaration).
. 131 S.Ct. at 2557 (citation omitted).
. See Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688 (citing Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125; Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998)).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
. See Amchem Products, Inc., 521 U.S. at 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231 ("Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where ‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.’ Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples.” (citations omitted)); Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047 ("Rule 23(b)(2) was adopted in order to permit the prosecution of civil rights actions.”); Baby Neal for & by Ranter, 43 F.3d at 63 ("The writers of Rule 23 intended that subsection (b)(2) foster institutional reform by facilitating suits that challenge widespread rights violations of people who are individually unable to vindicate their own rights.” (citations omitted)); Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (3d ed.) ("[Sjubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 in part to make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought as class actions ... [T]he class suit is a uniquely appropriate procedure in
. Id. at § 1776.1 "[I]t should be noted that a common use of Rule 23(b)(2) is in [inmate] actions brought to challenge various practices or rules in the prisons on the ground that they violate the constitution. For example, Rule 23(b)(2) class actions have been utilized to challenge prison policies or procedures alleged to ... violate the [inmates’] Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” see also, e.g., Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 101 (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class of inmates alleging systemic Eighth Amendment violations); Hughes, 2013 WL 1821077, at *20 (same); Rosas, 2012 WL 2061694, at *5 (same); Indiana Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n, 2012 WL 6738517 at *18 (same).
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2)).
. See Docket No. 41 at 132-35.
. See Docket No. 133 at 33-34.
. Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
. Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125; Parsons, 754 F.3d at 688.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689.
. Docket No. 41 at ¶¶ 410-17.
. See Docket No. 355 at 33; Docket No. 41 at ¶¶ 410-17; Docket No. 108-2 at 2-5; see Parsons, 754 F.3d at 687.
. See Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1125-26; Walters, 145 F.3d at 1047.
. Parsons, 754 F.3d at 689.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs also claim the class and subclass can also be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B). See Docket No. 355 at 35; Ashker, 2014 WL 2465191 at *7 (prison conditions case certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) for class actions that create a risk of inconsistent adjudications); Docket No. 358-4, Ex. W at 107-10; Gray v. County of Riverside, Case No. 13-cv-0444-VAP, Docket No. 131 at 107-10, 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, certifying jail conditions class action under both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B)). Because the court has found for certification appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), the court does not address whether Plaintiffs also satisfy Rule 23(b)(1).