delivered the opinion of the Court.
In March, 1929, Daylán and wife executed a note for borrowed money to the Hermitage Loan Company, the *505 note containing a power of attorney to confess judgment against tliem if they should default in payment of the notе. This power of attorney was enforceable in law at the time the note was executed. Shannon’s Code (all editions), sections 4705-4707.
Judgment was cоnfessed before a justice of the peace, pursuant to this power of attorney, in March, 1982, without service of process on Daykin and wife, and execution by garnishment on Daykin’s employer was issued and served. Therеupon, on the petition of Daykin, the Circuit Court of Shelby County, having issued writs of certiorari and supersedeas to thе justice of the peace, vacated the confessed judgment аs rendered in violation of section 8848 of the Code of 1932, enacted in 1931 аnd effective on January 1, 1932.
Section 8848 of the Code of 1932 is as follows:
“Any power of attorney or authority to cоnfess judgment which is given before an action is instituted and before the servicе of process in such action, is declared void; and any judgment based оn such power of attorney or authority is likewise declared void. This section shall not affect any power of attorney or authority given aftеr an action is instituted and after the service of process in such action. ’ ’
It is contended for plaintiff in error, Hermitage Loan Company, that fаmiliar constitutional limitations, restraining the state from impairing the obligations оf a contract, prevent the application of this section of the Code to the note in suit, which was executed prior to the enactment of the Code. Constitution of Tennessee, article I, section 20 ; Constitution of the United States, article I, section 10.
A power of attorney to confess judgment upon
*506
default, contained in a prоmissory note, is deemed irrevocable in law.
Clay
v.
Finance & Thrift Co.,
Conceding the general power of the legislature tо alter the remedial law at will, it was held in Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck), 1, 13-14, that remedies “must not, so fаr as regards antecedent contracts, be rendered less efficacious or more dilatory than those ordained by the law in being when the cоntract was made, if such alteration be the direct and special object of'the Legislature, apparent in an Act made for the purрose.”
This language was quoted with approval in Webster v. Rose (1871), 53 Tenn. (6 Heist.), 93, 102, and in McClain v. Easly (1874), 63 Tenn. (4 Bast.), 520, 522. In Webster v. Bose, the Court stated the limitation, on the power of the'legislature thus: “but then in no case can it by direct enactment for that purpose, nor even by indirection, where such is the purpose, render the remedy essentially less effective for enforcement of the obligation to which the рarty has bound himself by his agreement.”
It is not reasonably debatable but that the рower to confess judgment is a more speedy, and therefore morе efficacious, remedy than the usual procedure open to сreditors for the collection of their' debts. This power, incorporated in the evidence of indebtedness at the time the debt was created, is a part of the security contracted for, which the debtor could nоt revoke. The cases cited require that we hold the state powerless to deprive the creditor of this security, by subsequently enacted legislаtion, since to do so would impair the obligation of the *507 contract which was legal and enforceable when made.
This is in accord with rulings made elsewhere.
Second Ward Sav. Bank
v.
Schranck,
We hold only that sеction 8848 of the Code may not be given retrospective application to the contract in suit. If the debtor has just cause for complаint that .usury has been exacted from him, as intimated on his brief in this court, he may still litigate the question by bill in equity, as indicated in Clay v. Finance & Thrift Company, supra.
The judgment of the circuit court is accordingly reversed, and the writs of certiorari and supersedeas discharged, at the cost of the petitioner, Daykin.