89 Minn. 132 | Minn. | 1903
This action was brought to recover damages caused by the death of plaintiff’s son and intestate, who was killed while working for defendant upon a dredgeboat operating upon the Mississippi river at the city of St. Paul.
Upon this dredgeboat was a cabin which inclosed a steam boiler, a main engine, a hoisting engine, a steam and a sand pump; the latter having two pipes — one, an intake, which received sand at the bottom of the river, and the other a discharge pipe, through which it was conveyed to the shore. The shafting which was used with the sand pump extended through the side of the cabin, about three feet from the floor of the deck, and upon the end of the shaft was what is known as a winch head or spool, about eight inches in diameter, which extended outside the cabin about a foot and three-quarters. Just beyond this winchhead, and in the deck
The plaintiff, a laborer, engaged as a general utility man about the outfit for six days, had to shovel coal, among other duties, from the fuel barge to the deck of the boat, at a point a few feet distant from the winchhead, and was engaged at this occupation during the morning of the accident, which occurred about 8:30. It was also his duty to coil up and keep in place loose ropes that might be about the boat. This included the coiling of the large rope before mentioned. It was necessary for him, in order to shovel coal from the barge to the proper place on the dredgeboat,
The sand pump had been running, and as a consequence the winchhead had been revolving rapidly, for more than an hour before the accident. Just how it occurred, no one could tell, for there were no witnesses who could state in what manner the deceased was brought in contact with the winchhead. One witness, Brown, who was about six hundred feet away, said that the man had been caught and was being thrown around the winchhead when he first saw him. This witness expressly refused to say that he saw the man with ropes in his hands, but he did say that both the larger and the small rope and the man were together when the latter was being hurled violently around the head. And it is evident that the ropes were around parts of his body when Brown first discovered that an accident had occurred. Then, in a single instant, the body was thrown to the deck of the boat; one leg and one arm having been torn off, and still hanging, with the ropes, to the winchhead.
That the deceased had been specifically told a day or two before not to attempt to place the large rope around the winchhead at any time was undisputed, so that, if he was attempting this, it was in violation of positive orders. If he was trying to place the small rope around it, he was attempting an act which any man of intelligence would or should know to be extremely dangerous and wholly unnecessary. It was alleged in the complaint that, when
• It must follow from what has been said that there was no testimony to support a finding by the jury that defendant’s negligence in maintaining this rapidly revolving winchhead in dangerous proximity to a point where the deceased might have to go in the proper discharge of his duties, was the proximate cause of his death. The testimony as to the manner in which this accident occurred was altogether too indefinite and uncertain on this point.
Again, if this .were not true, it must be held that the deceased assumed the risk of injury from the winchhead, as incidental to his employment. He was twenty-two years of age — a man of average intelligence. This winchhead contained no latent or concealed defects, and there were no dangers which he could not apprehend. It had been rapidly revolving in his immediate presence during working hours for six days prior to that on which the accident
Our attention has been called to G-. S. 1894, § 2248, and it is asserted by counsel for the plaintiff that this statute applies to the case, while, upon the other hand, it is contended that it has no application to machinery situated, as this was, upon a dredgeboat. Whether it applies or not is not material, because we have frequently held that this statute does not change the rules of law as to the assumption of risk. See Lally v. Crookston Lumber Co., 82 Minn. 407, 85 N. W. 157.
Order affirmed.