79 Iowa 161 | Iowa | 1890
On the evening of the twentieth day of August, 1888, the plaintiff purchased a railroad ticket of the agent of the defendant at Cedar Rapids
In the original petition filed in the case the ground of recovery was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant in commanding him that “if plaintiff wanted to get off at Fairfax, he must jump off the train as it goes by; ” that the train would not stop at that station; that, after the train slowed up to some extent, he “ jumped,” as commanded by defendant. He alleged that, by reason of the movement of the train, he was thrown violently to the ground, “breaking his collar bone,” and otherwise injuring him. After the evidence was introduced, he filed an amended and substituted petition, in which he alleged that the conductor and brakeman ordered him to jump from the train; and, as he was mistaken in alleging that his collar bone was broken, he omitted that averment from his substituted petition.
It was conceded all through the trial, and the court instructed the jury, that, if the conductor did not direct nor consent that plaintiff should jump from the train while in motion, then the plaintiff, in jumping from the train, was guilty of a misdemeanor, and could not recover. This instruction is conceded to be correct, because by section 2, chapter 148, Laws, Sixteenth General Assembly, it would have been a misdemeanor for plaintiff to jump from the train while it was in motion, and under such a state of facts the law would conclusively presume that the injury was the result of his own negligence. After the evidence was introduced, it became apparent that the right of the plaintiff to demand further attention from the court and the jury to his case depended upon whether he jumped from the
It is claimed by counsel for appellant that the conductor not only did not order nor direct the plaintiff to jump from the train, but that he (the plaintiff) did so without the knowledge of the conductor. Counsel for appellee insists that this proposition is not true, or that there was sufficient evidence that the conductor ordered or consented to the act of jumping from the train to authorize the jury to make that finding. The evidence on this question does not appear to us to be doubtful. There is no controversy, as to the facts testified to by the witnesses. The cause was submitted to us upon the abstract of appellant, without amendment by appellee.
The plaintiff was examined as a witness in his own behalf. He testified that soon after the train started from the station at Cedar Rapids the conductor came upon the rear platform, and took up his ticket; that he did not see any persons on the car, but two persons, the conductor and brakeman; that he looked all over the car, from his position on the platform, and that no one but the two men were in the car. The examination of the
In his cross-examination he testified as follows: “Cross-Examination. Bought my ticket at the ticket
It will be observed that the plaintiff did not testify that it was the conductor who talked with him about getting off the train. On the contrary, he stated positively, and every time that his attention was called to it, that he did not know whether it was the conductor or not. The only answers tending to show that it was the conductor were put into the mouth of the witness by his examiner. On the other hand, the conductor testified in the most positive terms that he did not have any communication with the defendant, — no communication whatever; that he knew from his ticket that his destination was Fairfax; that he ordered the brakeman to stop the train; that the brakeman gave the signal to stop, set brakes, and the train slowed down; that he (the conductor) went on the rear platform of the caboose just as the caboose passed the depot, to call the number of the train to the operator; that he did not see the plaintiff on the platform; that soon after the caboose passed the depot he looked for plaintiff on the platform, and thought he was off, and directed the brakeman to let the train go on. The ■ brakeman testified that he spoke to plaintiff when nearing Fairfax, and told him that the train would stop for him to get off; that he did not tell him that he would have to jump off, or
It is contended by counsel for appellee that, as the conductor testified that he was on the rear platform when the train passed the depot, he must have seen the plaintiff before he jumped from the platform. But this does not tend to prove that the conductor ordered the plaintiff to jump off. The plaintiff testified that the order was given to him a quarter of a mile before reaching the depot. He testified upon that subject as follows: “When I jumped off the caboose, nobody else was standing on the platform when I jumped;” and “there was no person on the rear platform with me when the caboose passed the depot, or when it passed the east switch.” It is evident, therefore, that, if any importance was attached to the fact that the two men were on the platform at the same time, it was wholly without warrant; for the plaintiff himself does not claim that he was induced to jump by reason of • anything that occurred when the conductor was on the rear platform. For the purposes of this case, the fact of the two men being on the rear platform at the same time had no more significance than,if they had been one thousand miles from each other.
In addition to the general verdict for the plaintiff, the jury answered certain special interrogatories submitted to them by the court, which, with the answers thereto, are as follows: “(1) Did the plaintiff, in jumping from the car, act as a person of ordinary prudence and caution would have done under like circumstances 1 Answer (by jury). Yes. (2) How far from the station at Fairfax, and on which side of it, was the rear platform of the caboose when plaintiff jumped off ? A. (by jury). From one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet west of station. (3) Was the usual signal for stopping the train’ at Fairfax given the night of the accident ? A. (by jury). Yes. (4) Had the brakeman applied the
The answers to the third, fourth and fifth interrogatories are in full accord with the undisputed evidence. They show that the plaintiff was without excuse in jumping from the train. The answer to the sixth interrogatory could have been answered in a categorical manner, the same as those preceding it. For what reason a qualified answer w7as given we cannot tell. The answer was sufficient in form, it is true, but, in our opinion, there was no warrant in the evidence for any such finding. That this interrogatory ought to have been answered in the negative appears to be so well grounded as to amount to almost absolute demonstration. Reversed.