*3 viewed plan compliance the site HATCHETT, Before DUBINA and requirements, technical CARNES, requesting after Judges. Circuit changes, several approval recommended to CARNES, Judge: Circuit City the City Council. The Council returned plan the site review, to the Board for further zoning This case involves dispute a be- again and the Board approval. recommended Lakes, City Florida, the tween of Lauderdale voting Before plan, on the City site the developer, a dispute generated a that has City Council Building and the Committee large litigation a volume of in state and fed- public hearings held at which residents of the during eral courts past years. the sixteen In neighborhoods adjoining proposed the devel- chapter, this latest the district court has opment strong voiced opposition plan, City’s found that the zoning actions violated primarily to the part mini-warehouse of it. developer’s the substantive process due After discussing the length matter at and, rights dismissing after the claims sides, hearing from City all the Council at a against members, City individual Council the July meeting adopted on first read- district court has damages against awarded ing two ordinances which affected the prop- City. developer appealed The has con- erty. The first ordinance eliminated mini- tending that the district court awarded insuf- permitted warehouses as a use within the damages ficient and should not have dis- classification, relevant zoning and the second missed the Council City members. The has changed one zoning on property to a cross-appealed liability on the issue. We more restrictive business classification. Un- hold that the district court erred in conclud- procedures, der Council those two ordinances City’s zoning actions violated finally were not enacted and did not become process, and we reverse on September effective until of 1977. At the basis, which develop- renders moot the July meeting, same and before the two appeal damages er’s of the calculations. We effect, ordinances took the Council voted also conclude that the district court in erred unanimously deny approval to of Corn’s site part dismissing in City Council members week, plan. The next adopted legislative immunity grounds and reverse ordinance, third this one imposed 150-day judgment its on that basis as well. city-wide against moratorium construction on property I. in applicable zoning INTRODUCTION classifica- permit tion in order to completion study of a property The involved in this case is an 8.5 on the propriety of commercial (“the parcel acre property”) that abuts a residential spawned areas. These actions highway, state a residential condominium litigation day. that continues to this complex, neighborhood and a single family dwellings. property, along The with a much Herman Corn filed lawsuit in a Florida larger tract of land of part, which it was a August challenging state court in of 1977 by was annexed in 1966 validity with the of the adopted three ordinances support Corn, developer, July Herman who- City’s plan. and the denial of his site sought to trial, increase the value of holdings. his After a the state court found that City originally The property zoned the to Corn’s reliance on the classification of permit subject commercial approval use it for preparing City. property lay years, idle for right vested to the devel- established Corn’s developed adjacent Corn by selling opment land estopped equitably condominium single-family units and denying plan. dwell- approval of the site The court ings invalid, citizens of Lauderdale Lakes. declared directed the the ordinances Lakes, approve the site and ordered a Lauderdale 904 F.2d 585 Cir.1990).

building be issued after the correc- The case was remanded to the permit to again, district plan. tion in the court this time for trial. of some technical defects judgment That was affirmed a Florida non-jury district court then held a appeals. dispute court of Then a arose over trial, findings after which it entered of fact comply insistence that Corn with a and conclusions of law. Com v. subsequently platting enacted ordinance. Lakes, F.Supp. Lauderdale litigation, After additional the state court (S.D.Fla.1991). The district court entered approve ordered the the site judgment for Corn on the substantive due despite comply Corn’s failure to with the claim, finding had acted time, platting ordinance. Since that March arbitrarily capriciously denying ap- right begin Corn has had the *4 proval of plan. Corn’s site The court re- property in the fashion judgment served on the Fifth Amendment originally develop- he intended. Instead of claim, just compensation because it consid- however, ing property, Corn filed this damages ered the calculation of under either seeking § lawsuit under U.S.C. dam- and, thus, count to be judgment identical on ages City’s delay for the in approving devel- process the substantive due claim served to opment property. of his damages make Corn whole. The court set in $727,875.02. the amount of complaint Corn’s stated four causes of ac- claim; equal protection tion: an a Fifth findings Corn filed a motion to amend the just claim; compensation Amendment a sub- of fact and conclusions of law. The court claim; process procedural stantive due and a motion, granted part, to make clear process due claim. Named as defendants the individual Council members had City were the and its Council members in legislative immunity been dismissed on capacities. their individual Corn later volun- grounds earlier. The district court denied tarily equal protection dismissed his pro- respects, motion in all other material claims, process cedural due and was left with findings, noting reaffirmed its that Corn’s just compensation a claim and a substantive largely motion improper attempt process due claim. take a “second bite apple.” at the Corn,

The district court first dismissed seeking apple, the entire filed this ripeness grounds. action on appeal This Court re challenging the district court’s calcu- versed that City determination. Corn damages v. lation of as well as the dismissal of (11th Lakes, Lauderdale 816 F.2d 1514 Cir. the individual Council City members. The 1987). remand, City On cross-appealed, renewed its arguing that the trial court motions to dismiss for failure to concluding state a claim erred in that the acted arbi- for summary judgment claiming trarily capriciously thereby violating by judicata, action was by barred res the Corn’s process rights. substantive due limitations, statute of and as to the individual also asks tous revisit our earlier deter- members, by legislative immuni mination that Corn’s process ty. The granted district court the motion to claim is by not barred the statute of limita- tions, dismiss the individual Council members arguing prior F.2d that that legislative on immunity grounds. holding The court is not the law the case. needWe grant refused to summary judgment contention, or a not address that because our 12(b)(6) dismissal based holding on the that the district court erred find- statute of judicata, limitations and res but a violation of substantive due appealable certified its denial as an interlocu renders the statute of limitations at- tory denial, order. This Court superfluous.1 affirmed the tack just Because Corn’s com- holding that by the action was not pensation barred res adjudicated claim remains to be on judicata remand, or the statute of limitations. Corn v. his contention that the district court position 1. The ripeness, also reiterates its that this 904 F.2d 816 F.2d but holdings Court erred in its clearly by that Corn’s entire those contentions are foreclosed grounds judicata, lawsuit is not barred on of res law of the case doctrine. dismissing erred in Council members about how decisionmaking is allocated be- legislative immunity grounds ad- must be tween a institution, democratic such as an dressed. We decide that district court council, elected city and the federal courts. erred dismissing ground, on that but It involves fundamental issues about the allo- insofar as denial of the site plan is concerned. rights cation of powers within our consti- system. tutional Those questions issues and ' II. STANDARD OF REVIEW have all been by answered controlling prece- dent, but contrary to way the district “[T]he ultimate of whether issue court answered them in this case. decision is capricious question of law to be by determined Although court. subsidiary proper facts are A. THE GENERAL LAW APPLICA- factfinder, ly for the the ultimate issue is for BLE TO LAND USE RESTRIC- Greenbriar, the court.” v. Ltd. Ala TIONS baster, Cir.1989). Rights do not Thus, exist a vacuum but facts determined are district court reciprocal defined in a relationship respected are to be other clearly unless rights. matters, In land use erroneous, example, but our review the district rights of developer are defined in application facts, relation court’s of law to those in *5 to the rights of the constituents of the cluding the munic- ultimate determination of wheth government ipal regulate and er control an the capricious, action is is development of land in community the for plenary. Jury See In re Subpoena, Grand greater the good as 807, (11th by majority. defined the Cir.1992); 957 F.2d 809 Stephens course, minority, Of the in this case Department v. the Servs., Health and Human of developer, wholly is not (11th dependent 1571, upon Cir.), 901 the denied, F.2d 1573 cert. tender majority mercies of the for the defini- 498 111 U.S. S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d 562 protection tion and (1990). the minority’s rights. of The same is legislative true of the To some minority’s extent the rights immunity are issue.

protected majority by encroachment state law through III. enforced DISCUSSION OF THE LIABILITY state court system. case, In this ISSUE the developer has had resort to those to claim courts his state law The district holding, court’s that the protection. Having secured enforceable permit proceed refusal to Corn to state judgment law requiring the City to construction of a 900-unit mini-warehouse terms, him a building issue permit on his development in a residential area violated the developer has decided not to utilize that Due Process Clause of the United States judgment pursue development. In- Constitution, Corn v. Lauderdale of stead, pursued he money has a judgment for Lakes, F.Supp. (S.D.Fla.1991), is alleged infringement rights of his —not due to be reversed. The burden is on a rights law, his under state rights but his developer seeking to establish substantive under Constitution. process prove due claim govern body mental acted arbitrarily capricious adjustment Constitution’s or allocation ly in refusing permission the develop for reciprocal rights of developers of and the ment. The record shows Corn failed to community’s has majority been settled to a burden, carry that and it affirmatively also extent considerable in a number of court shows that did act arbitrarily Insofar as the decisions. Constitution is con- and capriciously. cerned, municipal may government control beyond district court’s error reaches jurisdiction the use of land within its community fisc one Florida and the perceives good, the common what merits of one case. Faithfulness to subject four restrictions. These four prior Court, teachings decisions this the limits of restrictions define constitutional precedent, thus to the rule of is' also at stake. rights and thus developer has constitu- broadly, More questions this case involves against may gov- make tional he claims entity has restricted claim. components ernmental his use to such a As this Court has said: land: right 1. the Fifth Amendment not to The current test this circuit as to wheth- just compensa- have his land without taken er there has been a violation of substantive (a claim); “just compensation” process tion § due in the context of 1983 is First, twofold. it must be determined right 2. the Due Process Clause not to whether deprivation there has been a of a the use infring- have and value of his land interest, constitutionally protected federal upon ed to such an extent that it is tanta- secondly, deprivation, whether the if having mount to taken been eminent any, govern- result of an abuse of (a claim); process takings” domain “due power mental sufficient to raise an ordi- 3. right Due Process Clause not to nary tort to the stature of a constitutional his have use of the land arbi- restricted violation. trarily capriciously, right which is a Rymer not to have his use of his Douglas County, land restricted v. 764 F.2d (11th Cir.1985), having Greenbriar, quoted for reasons no substantial relation Ltd. v. health, morals, Alabaster, safety, 881 F.2d (a Cir.1989). test, pro- Applying welfare “substantive due the district “arbitrary capricious cess” or pro- due court found that Corn had established both claim); cess” constitutionally protected compo interest nent and the government sufficient abuse of Equal right Protection Clause power component. components The two way not be treated in a that violates that conjunc test (an claim). “equal protection” clause tive, reviewing and a court finding an ab County, Eide v. Sarasota 720- sence component of one need not decide (11th Cir.1990), denied, cert. 498 U.S. *6 See, e.g„ whether other exists. Greenbr 1120, 1073, 111 S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 iar, (“In 881 light disposi F.2d at 1577 of our (1991); 100, Executive Inc. v. Martin Coun tion of this case on the basis of the second (11th 1536, Cir.), ty, 922 F.2d 1540 cert. test, prong of this we need not address the — -, 55, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 116 denied (footnote omitted). prong.”) first (1991). Subject 32 L.Ed.2d to those four need limitations, questions We not address about the the Constitution prevent does not component, first because the district court government a local restricting, from control in finding erred that Corn had ling, limiting or carried his of land to proving burden of component the second promote perceives of a general what to be the process substantive due claim. The welfare reason a community interests of the as a process substantive due claim is whole. also called “arbitrary an capricious process due B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS claim” showing govern- is because a LAW APPLICABLE TO LAND USE arbitrarily ment has acted capriciously RESTRICTIONS prerequisite a for such a claim. That is what In the district pressed court Corn two the component requires: second plaintiff claims, just compensation a claim and also a developer must gov- show that the defendant claim, process substantive due which he government ernment or pow- officials abused termed his “main claim.” The district court by acting er arbitrarily capriciously, granted judgment in favor of Corn on the which means that the action “does not bear a process substantive due claim and did not health, public substantial relation safe- just reach compensation claim. We have morals, Eide, ty, general or welfare.” 908 before us for review the district court’s hold- particular at 721. requirement, F.2d This restricting that in use of his land dispositive case, present which is of the violated Corn’s substantive due by this years discussed Court less than four rights. closely analogous in the ago Greenbriar case: settled, The law in this Circuit is long, It has been and the established that parties disagree, do not regulations there will are not be declared unconstitu- two

1375 Parker, 26, pro- 33, as violative of substantive due v. tional Berman 348 U.S. 75 S.Ct. (citation 98, 102-03, (1954) clearly unless “are 99 L.Ed. 27 cess omit- ted). unreasonable, having no rela- substantial health, morals, safety, tion permissible This Court has held that Euclid, general Village welfare.” Ohio of bases land use restrictions include con [394,] Co., 365, Realty

v. Ambler 272 U.S. proposed cern about the effect of the devel 121, (1926).... 114, 47 S.Ct. 71 303 L.Ed. traffic, opment on congestion, on on sur rounding values, property city on demand for deprivation ... a [C]ourts have held that services, aspects and on other of a is of constitutional interest Greenbriar, welfare. 881 F.2d at n. “ 1580 & if ‘for improp it is undertaken an stature 20; Zimmerman, Spence 256, v. 260 873 F.2d pretex er motive and means that were (11th Cir.1989) (Protection of surrounding tual, arbitrary capricious, and ... economic, neighborhoods environmen Spence without basis.’” v. rational tal, legitimate.); and aesthetic harm is Grosz Zimmerman, 256, 258 873 F.2d Cir. Beach, v. Miami 721 F.2d 738 of 1989) (quoting Hearn v. Gaines of (11th Cir.1983) (Restriction organized reli (11th Cir.1982)). ville, 688 1332 F.2d gious gatherings in residential areas serves traffic, noise, zoning interests of reduced changed at 1577. The law has not F.2d litter.), denied, cert. 469 U.S. decision, S.Ct. since our Greenbriar Corn does (1984). 83 L.Ed.2d 52 Other circuits argue that it has. recognized have also of “pub breadth law is certain also settled that inter See, concept. e.g., lic welfare” v. Pearson provide govern ests a rational basis for will Blanc, Grand of restricting mental action land use. The Su (6th Cir.1992) (“[C]oncerns about traffic and may preme Court has held that restrictions neighborhood the deterioration [as imposed protect “family in order to val of proposed zoning change result permit ues, values, youth blessings and the quiet food rationally restaurant] fast related Boraas, Village seclusion.” Belle Terre v. goals zoning.” opinion The Pearson 1, 9, 1536, 1541, 416 U.S. S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d circuit-by-circuit contains excellent sum (1974). Legitimate zoning interests also mary process zoning protection “ill include from the effects cases.); Rogin Township, v. Bensalem *7 urbanization,” Tiburon, Agins City v. 447 (3d Cir.1980) of 680, F.2d (holding 689-90 that 255, 261, 2138, 2142, U.S. 100 S.Ct. the “a township legitimate defendant (1980), industry L.Ed.2d 106 the exclusion of controlling in population growth interest areas, Village from residential v. Euclid of zoning density and the [at amendments issue Co., 365, Realty Ambler 272 U.S. 47 S.Ct. a rational and to were] reasonable means 114, (1926), regulation 71 L.Ed. 303 and the denied, accomplish purpose”), cert. traffic, Greene, City of Memphis v. 1029, 1737, of U.S. 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d 100, 126-29, 101 1584, 1600-01, U.S. S.Ct. 67 (1981); City Construction Indus. Assoc. v. of (1981), noise, Grayned L.Ed.2d 769 v. Petaluma, Cir. 905-09 City Rockford, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 1975) (Land may governed use be in to order (1972). 33 L.Ed.2d 222 The po exercise of preserve small town character and avoid power narrowly lice this area is not con problems associated uncontrolled strained, because denied, growth.), cert. 424 U.S. 96 S.Ct. (1976). 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 342 concept [t]he the welfare is broad represents broad, and inclusive. The values it are Although power it is the spiritual physical, as as well aesthetic as develop government to control land use monetary. well as It is power within the The four ment is not without limitation. legislature of the to determine that govern limit constitutional doctrines community be as already should beautiful as well power ment land use area clean, healthy, spacious as well as well- have This case concerns been mentioned. limitation, carefully patrolled. as well as balanced fourth doctrine, government complexes from which border prevents a these residential his which proposed site. reason, warehouse for an for no or restricting land use corruption, racial illegitimate reason such right prior approval Even with the re- illegitimate other prejudice, or ethnic City, early served to there were concerns Greenbriar, motivation. See F.2d at property. In about the of Corn’s 1970s, government required restrictions a was 1579 n. 18. The submit plan county. July master land use to the substantially be imposes on land use must while the was consider- not, If welfare. related.to Shiff, such a Michael a land use capri- governmental action is consultant the had hired to draft its process. of substantive due cious in violation plan, reported master use to the Council land posed by the question facts The way that it should not zone Corn’s land in a purposeful Council’s case is whether permit that would warehouses that close to a building a 900- prevent development. action to Corn residential Shiff recommended rezoned, property that Corn’s should be be- unit in a residential area was mini-warehouse develop- ie., cause C-l and C-1A commercial substantially rationally upon, was based (light usage), ment industrial should be to, general welfare interests such as related permitted spe- He next residential areas. development would have on the effect cifically reported: you “I don’t think want traffic, services, noise, city congestion, aesth- put you existing where warehouses have resi- etics, surrounding property values. The development.” City incorporated dential permit facts one correct answer record position into plan Shiff s the interim land use question. Because the facts deter- officials, adopted county and transmitted to appeal, mine this and because the district incorporated who in turn it into the interim them, clearly regard court erred we set county plan. did not move to re- Virtually out in considerable detail. facts time, property zone the at that because no undisputed and are drawn all of them development pending, and it was as- from official records admitted into evidence. problem sumed the would be of in taken care plan the final master land use that would out, eventually developed. As it turned C. THE FACTS TO THE RELEVANT plan adopted the final land use was not until DUE SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS IS- SUE plan Corn submitted first site his City agreed When the to annex Corn’s 1976; property of the give permissive and to it a details of it are not clear from the record. classification, was concerned about Although Planning Zoning Board property, Corn how would use and it approval recommended C-1A, zoning category, specifi- created a new Council, public opposition *8 to it at a cally property. for that The new hearing plan called to consider the caused category City right reserved for the the to Corn to withdraw it. property. control the use of Corn’s Herman 1977, January City In the Council and agree- admitted that Corn himself under his Planning Zoning the and Board conducted a City, “anything put

ment with the we in joint meeting to discuss the master land use by approved there first have to be the would plan being developed still that was for the property parcel Council.” The is a of land City. Scheingarten, an architect on Milton approximately 8.5 acres in area and bounded Board, Zoning had discov- Planning the and by highway on side. the a its east To west of property improperly was ered that Corn’s complex single a property family the lies zoned, elementary principles of land because by separated property homes from the a á buffer between resi- planning require use complex canal. A lies to the use, condominium an industrial such as dential and areas separated proper- also the north and is from Planning Zoning and The warehouses. ty by developer City a canal. Corn was the recommended the officially Board January meeting Council joint lic hearings. Corn’s son Stephen, who was that Corn’s property be rezoned to a more deeply proposed involved the development, classification, restrictive which would not attended these meetings and represented permit warehouses. Some discussion con- Corn’s interests. Concerned citizens also at- cerning property and whether tended meetings these and permitted were should be prohibit speak rezoned against for or mini-warehous- proposed the develop- ensued, es but the issue was ment. deferred until Most of the citizens spoke who later time. neighborhood the adjoining proper- ty, and they spoke against especial- April 1977, Corn submitted a new site ly the aspect mini-warehouse of it. Various plan City to the Council which included a City officials were questioned also at these development mini-warehouse as well as a meetings planned about the development and shopping City center. The Council referred problems it would create. The subjects plan the site the Planning Zoning by Stephen Corn, discussed citizens, various Board for a compliance review for with the City officials problems included of con- requirements City agencies. After Corn gestion, traffic, noise, services, strain city on some, all, had made but not changes aesthetics, the character of surrounding recommended City agencies, various neighborhood, and property values. May 12, Board on 1977 recommended to the City Council approve that it plan. the site May 1. The requested The Council the Board to consider Council Meeting plan again, apparently because of con- ; At meeting May cern about fire truck access proposed up Council took the Planning Zoning buildings mini-warehouse and property, and Board’s recommendation that Corn’s site the Board reconsidered the in meeting plan be approved. Council member Geréffi May held on 1977. day The next asked what protect would the residents of again Board recommended approval adjacent condominiums from the mini- plan. site The Board had five members but warehouses. He wanted to if they know voted; three members split was vote would looking at blank Questions walls. two one of recommending favor approv- were also raised about fire hazards and about al. whether the could mini-warehouses later be establish, Documents in the record and it . turned things into such as second-hand undisputed, that under local law three- stores. References were made to some 19th Planning member Zoning Board has no Street which warehouses had created traffic authority to make the ultimate decision con- parking problems. The Council cerning zoning adoption plans. of site In- decided to the proposal table until more in- stead, authority to make such decisions is put could be obtained from residents of the vested in Council. The Board City. recommendations, makes but those mere- ly advisory. The final decision about how H, June land should be zoned and particu- whether a Meeting Council lar comports with the At a meeting on Council June community

welfare is the decision of 1977, up again. the issue was taken Stephen power Council. to restrict the Corn present questions answered use of involves an exercise of the from the Expressing members. con- police power, the City Council alone has *9 mini-warehouses, cern about the Council authority the to determine gen- whether the member pointed out that there Gereffi eral welfare of community warrants exer- property, condominiums north Corn’s and power. cise big he be asked there would trucks whether investigate order to whether Corn’s going in of the warehouses at mid- and out proposed development compatible was with so, night, people living “these because if City, welfare going to these are have a condominiums Council held meetings pub- number and responded that the ware- headache.” Corn ent,

houses would be closed at certain time in further plan consideration of Corn’s evening. tabled. Council questioned member Gereffi also 3. The June Stephen directly Corn about the setback Meeting Council front of the canal between the condominiums The third meeting Council at which and the warehouses and whether that set- plan Corn’s site was considered was held on enough back was to insulate the residents of meeting, June 1977. At this Council going the condominiums from trucks back Stephen engaged member Gereffi and Corn and forth to the mini-warehouses. Council in a discussion about lane width fire and “Cypress member Gereffi referred to a truck access. Council member Cohan was Chase” incident where residents had been planned concerned that development kept awake noise either from air condi- might potential firetrap be a because of inad- tioning units on stores front of them or equate space in the parking. lanes and for refrigerator from on units trucks which were brought up subject refrig- Gereffi also left on while the trucks unloaded next door to again, erated trucks and he asked about a residential area. Council member Gereffi truck traffic at the warehouses: refrigerated coming asked if trucks would be got canal, you got You north of the warehouses, Stephen Corn said canal is going condominiums. You’re to that there would no be reason for them to do coming people have trucks in. These so. bought condominiums, these came down Council then discussed the reason quiet peace. here to live How much Scheingarten Planning that Mr. of the time, your and how often going is trucks ' Zoning Board had dissented from the running be to mini-warehouses. These Board’s recommendation that propos- people living City. are the that’s in this approved. Scheingarten al be Mr. dissented people satisfy. These are the we have to thought plan because he provided people going These are the who are parking space for insufficient fire truck before, have the headaches. As I said A different Planning access. member of the they get away came ghetto down to Board told the Council that the did not They areas. come down to live in a beauti- provide parking space for retail because it condominium, they ful come down to have was not intended development. to be a retail peace They of-mind. retired with that however, replied, member Greenwald Council Now, you intention. going are to have to commercial, was zoned satisfy people these on how the traffic possibility he raised that Corn could later forth, going running that’s to be back and convert the mini-warehouse units into stores. your within 60 or 80 feet of warehouses. Mayor said: people These are the going who are sitting up have to exactly taking notice happened [T]hat’s what 19th St. that, to look out the

They came in under the windows. warehouse rules. parking strips. The warehouse After Stephen Corn by giving answered the set- everything all up, they built turned backs that buildings would exist from the stores, them into retail instead of ware- canal, width, roadway, canal’s parking houses. And that’s the reason the larger so forth. He also said that at another is such incredible mess on 19th St. I’m he had mini-warehouse never seen more than suggesting you not that’s all in- what people fifteen there at a time. do, fact, tending to but that’s how during meeting, Several times got 19th St. to be like it is. With the having members criticized Corn for met Planning recommendation of the and Zon- adjoining neighbor- with the residents ing Board. their concerns them and hood to discuss Scheingarten, Planning Because Mr. his was not satisfy them property. Board member who had dissented from the He was re- going their to ruin *10 approval, pres- taxpayers recommendation of was not were people minded that those meeting, voters. At this per- citizens were for the residents who present. In do- speak mitted to to the Council so, about Corn’s he noted that the Planning Board had proposed development, and a number requested six months earlier that the Council speak opposition them did plan. out to the rezone from its very current Most spoke or all of those who were resi- permissive zoning status, but as it now stood neighborhood dents of the in which Corn Planning Zoning Board had to make wanted to build his mini-warehouses. One its recommendation about Corn’s under resident was concerned about noise and the currently ordinances applicable to the questioned whether there would be air condi- property. tioning units. expressed That resident also Many citizens made comments at concern about the aesthetics and how the meeting opposition to the mini-warehouse back of the warehouses would be landscaped. aspect planned development: She also vehicles, asked about recreational boats, 1. disputed like Mr. Zorban storage. Stephen and their statement that the Fire Department had said Another resident roadway asked about ac- that it would have no difficulty gaining access planned to the development, cess pointing development. questioned He the need out that it was narrow and could a cause for 900 awful, mini-warehouses: “It looks it “regular tie-up” said, if two cars met. He horrible, is if we look out [at] those buildings will be a spent “[i]t madhouse.... We a lot there nothing at, to look it would there be of money for those condominiums and it’s a barracks, like prison camp kind, of some damnable shame what’s happening there.” it’s looking. horrible we beautify Now could Yet expressed another resident fear it if we put half [in] the amount.” might someone units, rent several of the walls, knock down their internal up set 2. Mrs. Schneider complained about the manufacturing plant of some kind. num- A caused, noise increased that would be saying: people spoke ber out prob- about traffic “There people who face that area. lems fire hazards would be created going You’re to have trucks and everything by the mini-warehouses. coming in and out. That creates a noise problem too.” Fire Chief then asked about the plan, and he said happy that he was not with 3. questioned Another resident whether the lane space widths and the parking, pates their insurance go up fire would be- because left little room for fire trucks to cause proximity of the of the mini-warehous- maneuver. es. Finally, proposal was tabled and re- 4. George Hudson type asked about the Building ferred to the Committee of storage that would be permitted. A fol- understanding that meeting some be would lowup question by Council member Cohan arranged with all parties interested invited asked whether there would combustibles Although attend. membership exact warehouses, stored he was told unclear, that committee is does record that the landlord probably would not allow that one show or more Council members and that. or more one members the Planning and 5. Eileen Lefkowitz wanted know Zoning Board were on the committee. whether Corn believed he would be able to warehouse, and, not, rent 900 units of if July

4.The what 1977 Building plans them, his were. If he could rent Meeting Committee she feared he would tear the individual units 8, 1977, July On meeting Building down big build a warehouse like the one Committee was held and attended mem- on 19th She Street. said the mini-warehous- Board, Planning bers of the some Council “absolutely es were unnecessary” and not members, and a of local number citizens. appropriate in a area. residential meeting began presentation by with a Stephen proposal Corn of the for the A site. [last name unknown] Bob raised con- Planning Board member framed the issues cerns about added and the noise traffic *11 something other the lot rezoned to project, should be by this be caused would

hazard that than what commercial. concern about expressed and he also didn’t if the mini-warehouses Corn would do spoke about Council member Greenwald let Corn would that work. He was afraid family’s development of the how the Corn generally He was open up stores. people unfair, proceed- because it had area had been not just did that mini-warehouses concerned to of homes condomini- ed construction neighborhood. into the fit warehouses, to commercial ums and now Smith, fourth lived on the bought along who telling people 7. who Mrs. without condominium, that said adjacent plan. floor of an Greenwald rec- way the ultimate about landscaping think amount did not to she matter be forwarded ommended that the looking at the be help her. She would would way if was a City Attorney to see there ex- anyway. She also and 900 doors proceed roof next allowing project to to avoid this street the inevitable pressed concern about areas. to residential the warehous- be around lighting that would July would low- 5. The and said that es Meeting out that the pointed She property values. Council er not in knew of were she mini-warehouses meeting, July Council At a and that the neighborhoods, nice residential given to two ordi- lengthy consideration was to come and people cause development would property and to the relating nances to Corn’s Stephen hours. She noted go at all his site should question of whether neigh- moving out of the was Corn himself eliminated mini- approved. One ordinance live in a not want to he did borhood because some other uses from warehouses and opin- her She said that area.” “downtrodden property. to type applicable Corn’s by everyone who lived shared ions were changed the The other ordinance neighborhood. the affected to busi- property from commercial experi- that he had had 8. Mr. Lamb said ness, classification and one a more restrictive mini-warehouses, he had and that ence with permit mini-warehouses. which would also in a residential area. never seen one He adopted enacted or “on Both ordinances lots of different little that he had seen said meeting, although they reading” at this first businesses, shops, being repair like television September until of 1977. not become law did mini-warehouses, people run out of ordinances, on the two Corn Before the vote He ex- on their own. also do that would through attorney through heard his was proposed opinion that the devel- pressed his son, neighbor- of the affected his residents hazards, as fire create such opment would heard, Council members hood were hazards, belong in that it did not and that in- The discussion is spoke on the matter. area. at hand. structive to the issue although he George said that Pearle member Kaufman reviewed for Council “eminently within thought the builder was present July not been at the those who had it was rights,” question was whether his meeting Building Committee sales- right.” He stated “morally transpired there. He also said that what condominium had that had sold him his man Supreme decision in he had read the Court’s land to declare the planned the builder said Boraas, v. 416 U.S. Village Belle Terre building park be a or some- behind (1974), 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d that, bought not have thing and he would like it authorized the Council believed that Corn had he known that his condominium question in order to property rezone the develop attempt would air, secure family values and clean protect way. seclusion, keep blessing quiet place people for adjoining pleasant area a said that the area 10. Morris Davis use, Referring he had heard at the to what any type live. of commercial not suitable meeting, and to July Building Committee for Corn it was “unconscionable” considered, being ordinance complex so close to the first build a commercial condominiums, portion of member said: that the rear Kaufman *12 At meeting that that by was stated site and I it in have front of me. I people that live bought there. They think this put up should be on the board. there, condominiums in the area hopefully The whole plan, including site the shopping they place would they have a could center and mini plan. windows, look out to from their and have I fully realized that where these mini- views, pleasant and not to look out into warehouses, these 900 mini-warehouses something perhaps in opinion their going erected, are to be supposed to be detrimental way to their of life. erected, that that property is zoned C-l. I state the facts of this case because it C-l provides almost kind of pertains My conclusion, my this. per- commercial buildings, I understand. opinion, sonal reading case, after and this I There’s nothing in C-l when it was feel the ordinance that presented has been adopted in which calls for the erec- here, that, regard in justified is a ordi- tion of mini-warehouses. Because in nance. nobody by figment the wildest imagination member Greenwald then had the continued idea putting mini-warehouses, the discussion: which sizes run from feet wide feet, maybe To wide. meeting We had this on last Thursday [July quite 1977]. We had a gathering there, people we input had a lot of from All people will see 2nd floor public. when very And we listened to the spite 3rd in floor being put of trees carefully, upon it dawned me personally, up. At meeting this they discussing, were there something was unconscionable they put trees, will up high trees, olive about the fact that these mini-warehouses exits, we’ll exits, have this, more we’ll do going

were to be erected. we’ll do that. got When the people up there spoke, and But the is, crux you matter don’t pointed and they out reasons that ob- cesspool build a then build a tent around it. jected, and this was felt It unfair. dawned sayWe this. people That these who have me, upon although I had seen this site homes, bought these these condomini- previously, there something was ums have as much vested interest in their wrong builder, here. That this at this land as the builder. time, after single homes, he built the indi- spoken I’ve agents, to real estate subse- vidual dwellings, then he went to the con- quent this, me, they tell who in the dominiums, put up. condominiums going world is buy come in if until Wait he sold out single homes. condominium, want to sell a on the second Then went to the condominiums. Com- floor, and look down They at 900 doors. pleted his condominiums which that area say, will buying I’m a scene of doors. This became no longer single certain dwelling house, is a doorway a stock of doors. area. Finished his condominiums. Sold spoke I Brady Mr. Attorney] [the out his condominiums. this, on right after meeting, said, Then came in and I’d like to have a coincidence, this merely right after shopping center north 41st St. this meeting when we heard the input from You happened remember what on that. people, they pointed when out the fact that their Now, homes would be devalued. The he says, comes like to I’d have there, extra traffic that will come shopping another center on the left of 41st possibility of 900 going trucks to each indi- St. That’s enough. says he Now mini-warehouse, vidual loading and un- back of that shopping center 41st on St. to loading. saying I’m not South, day, all one but put he wants to up 900 mini- warehouses, 900 trucks. warehouses. 900 mini-warehouses. I this, When first learned about we asked Council member Greenwald also discussed person, you its sure history 900? Isn’t of the C-l zoning classification no, says 90? He I 900. So looked had, at the that then which would before, as a use. this has been said I concur. mini-warehouses While permitted have council, responsibility That the basic of this in 1973 came about That classification safeguard is to the best interests of the on the Coun- when there builders City. citizens of this original owner of the land cil. Corn was the council, urge making I their deci- been zoned commer- and had it before it had *13 mind, keep Thus, sion to that in as their means he had not contend that cial. he could of determination. zoning and that bought the land with a C-l deprive him of change to would A discussion between members of the when he obtained purchased value he had City Attorney Council and was followed land. by lengthy discussion setbacks under the being considered. ordinance concluded his member Greenwald Council then heard from a num- remarks as follows: citizens, adjoining in ber of all whom lived thing Bor- say I is unconscionable. neighborhoods very all of whom were rowing regarding recreational leas- a term opposed to the much mini-warehouse devel- wrong something in it. These es. There’s opment. planned A Mrs. Lefkowitz said the valuation, people going to lose their are not their development would devalue going jammed up, Oakland traffic is to be property Lakes but Lauderdale widened, Blvd ... will be and we’ll Park as She said that the mini-ware- a whole. got shopping You have more traffic. areas, houses she had seen were in slum then 900 mini-warehouses. centers and repeated complaint she a consistent of those beautifying City. talking our We about homes, condominiums, bought had who money for beautification. fix Spending We apartments from Corn in that area: entrances, up the with beautification. salespeople Mr. When Corn’s sold these City. coming into our Now we have this buyers apartments, they told the park. as a he was intended to be used But Brady City Attor- spoke [the So I to Mr. put anything writing. said, did not We there- way that the best ney], Brady Mr. hope this, property fore that we can have the change zoning. is to We went do rezoned, Corn, proud so that we can be of the Mr. to court once before with desire, area. city in their council desire, protect people who their gladly will sell the condos back to Mr. We them, put elected us on the council. put Corn if he cares to mini-warehouses say again, I throughout To see to their interest. And the entire Estates. Oakland add, nothing against thing, I have builders. I Another would like to would Corn, attorney Mr. Corn’s as well as Mr. council, thing say I to this do not table this like to live next to mini-warehouses? Vote, tonight. pass it. A Mr. Goldstein commented that the resi- heard from Corn’s Council also neighborhood already dents of his rejection attorney urged of the ordi- who enough problems shopping from another cen- plan. The approval nances and of the site ter that faced them. He also said: chang- theme of his remarks was that basic particularly I was interested in the com- refusing ing of the Corn, attorney ments of the for Mr. approve the site would violate Corn’s talking rights about the vested of the own- rights legal and lead to action. Council property. mentioning ers. Corn Never by characterizing the member Cohan reacted once, rights people living the vested attorney implied remarks of Corn’s there, he has sold the homes whom to. threats, saying: mentioned, speaker I previous And as the once mentioned to say say, I the action that is he never to this council that venture them, council, they purchased, that mini- approval of our before has when going to be built there. City Attorney. I believe we owe as And warehouses obligation. I them a moral respect opinions, for his as for think he owes much legal obligation. To attorney. If see perhaps other lifestyle live promised he under the then-existing ordinances. Even them, and I imagine cannot that he for one where existing permit ordinances such ap- say, minute would honesty in all that look- proval, the final decision in the hands mini-warehouses, out on constitutes Council. living. Florida Council member Kaufman was upon called A Mr. Greenstein and a Mr. also Landau to summarize the discussion of the site plan spoke in favor of the against ordinances and that had place taken at the July planned mini-warehouses. Mr. Lan- Building Committee meeting. He said that dau described how the development would people in the adjoining neighborhood ob- aggravate existing traffic problems, and he jected to mini-warehouses because they reminded the Council and Mayor who would be “an eyesore, not conducive to the *14 had elected them: esthetic value of what we are trying to retain time, At present if goI my out of in the City of Lauderdale Lakes.” He also apartment, it takes me about 10 minutes to said that the Building Committee had gone my apartment enter due to the heavy traf- over the plan entire site and into the ques- fic. I cannot area, cross to the recreation tion of whether the development would cre- taking my without my life in hands. Now ate fire safety hazards. suggested he another shopping area with Mayor The upon called the City Engineer Now, 900 warehouses. when is this non- to discuss whether or not Corn’s site plan going sense stop? . somebody When met engineering standards. The Engi- going get killed. Are going we stop neer said that he had submitted letters con- going then? It’s to be too late. Let’s take cerning aspects two plan which both- this under consideration. him “considerably..” ered problem One was I’d speak like to a word now to our distin- that plan site did not applicable meet guished mayor. council and the I remem- parking regulations that had been adopted ber every that one you came knocking at by Council. As laid out in the site our door to support you. We have done plan, the parking spaces would abut directly Today that. we are knocking your at against physical building structure, which doors, for the purpose, same to support us permitted was not regulations. under the If welfare, for our and for the welfare of the parking spaces put the minimum Lauderdale Lakes. distance from the building required under resident, Another Goldberg, Mr. character- regulations, some of the buildings on the ized Corn’s attitude as “the be plan site would have to be eliminated. The damned.” City Engineer continued, saying: After all of discussion, this the City Coun- objected We also in both letters, of our I’ll cil unanimously adopted or enacted on first read from one of those. In opinion our reading proposed ordinance eliminating layout of the presents mini-warehouses storage warehouses as a permitted use in serious difficulties relating protec- to fire property commercial, zoned such as Corn’s tion, jeopardize which could the life and land. The Council then discussed and property of occupants. its adopted or enacted on first reading the other proposed ordinance, cases, which both I rezoned feel prop- entry that one into erty B-3, from C—1 this center core dangerous. Now, area is more restrictive zoning classification it’s a little line, reserved out of engineering for business us- but I age. felt it pointed had to be out. I feel there should at least be two into any entrances though Even both ordinances were type of magnitude. structure adopted or enacted “on reading” first at this 12,1977 July meeting, they would not actual- Council member Cohan stated that the ly take effect September until Ap- 1977. Engineer’s objections confirmed two conten- reason, parently for that it was necessary for tions time, that he for had had some that the the City pass Council to proposed Corn’s parking wrong and that another roadway plan site which could have approved been was needed. Mayor pointed Board, The out that a number of merely which is advisory an commit- objections had been made to the tee. He also said “the heart of the given opportunity Corn had been issue” is whether the per- builder would be make corrections: mitted to build 900 mini-warehouses. For example, pointed our Fire Chief out discussion, After all of that Coun- sorely

that he was concerned about the cil unanimously approve voted not to possibility getting of even a fire truck in plan. site alleys and out of those little in there. I July have not seen sort of recommended changes proposed Meeting developer that’s plan. been done on the site July meeting At a Coun- times, parking A number of situation cil enacted a moratorium on building permits out, pointed has been it’s zoned comple- commercial until limited, perhaps it’s insufficient. But study. tion of study was to be done fact, according that in just to the codes it Planning Board, Zoning conjunc- does not meet the point- law. That’s been tion with the Office of the Consulting ed out a number of times. Planner, about the scheme of Lauder- pointed We’ve out that may there well Lakes, particular dale and in about commer- *15 opportunity for a number of flammable cially property adjacent zoned to residential- dangerous or otherwise materials to be ly property. zoned The charged Board was thing, stored in the City and the does not preparing report concerning whether any way properly have to police what is property residential would' suffer adverse ef- stored in all those warehouses. That in fects being as a result of situated next to a might generate fact it safety a substantial zoning C—1 district. hazard. 7. Planning Results and of The Council attorney heard Corn’s Zoning Study Board’s Stephen meeting. and from Corn at Planning Planning Zoning Both of them said that The and Board and conducted study Zoning approved commercially Board its the site but zoned them, Mayor saying City reported corrected that within the and City to the Planning Zoning and Board Council on report made rec- December 1977. That ommendations to the Council and noted that there lacked were two areas of land power approve anything. to Mayor within the that were zoned commercial (one pointed study also out that the vote at the time of the Board was ordered split had been property). plots two one. He which was Corn’s reiterated his Both parking concern adjacent about and if land were noted that residential areas. The City Engineer is Board reported orderly correct also planning should allow for a buffer zone between resi- parked cars cannot be that close areas, dential areas and commercial an inter- building they then must be moved 5 mediate area where the more restricted busi-

feet building, out from the then will zoning proper. ness is The lack of such a streets, blocking those you and won’t be great buffer was found to be a detriment to through able to drive cars there. You persons living adjacent in the residential area certainly will not be able to drive the fire to a commercial zone. The Planning and streets, any truck down one those if that Zoning Board recommended that all commer- plan very be the case. Then the site obvi- cially adjacent zoned areas to residential ar- ously completely totally has to be re- districts, eas be rezoned business so that case, certainly vised. If that be the there the business district could serve as a buffer way approved no it can be at this hour between the commercial area and the resi- stipulation. with that dential area. pointed Council member Greenwald out that consultant, Shiff, Council had on numerous occasions Mr. land use disagreed Planning Zoning Planning reported Zoning with the Board that, according county zoning regula- All municipal land use officials gave who tions adopted by City, commercial an opinion at during time the municipal zoning is repair “[intended for certain or agreed at trial that what Corn services, other wholesale, storage and ware- wanted to do defied a fundamental precept of house uses and sales of large heavy ma- good land use policy: industrial uses such as chinery equipment.” Mr. Shiff observed warehouses permitted should not be immedi- “[tjhis category highly is a permissive ately contiguous to a residential area. The zoning requires district which a buffer be- evidence was overwhelming and virtually un- tween itself and residential areas.” disputed With permitting Corn to build his specific reference to property, huge he con- project warehouse would have an ad- cluded that the old relationship “with- verse effect on residential property values. proper out a stepdown categories

may have an adverse [sic] affect on the sur- D. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ERRO- rounding properties.” ,.also residential He NEOUS ANALYSIS recommended that the rezone each of its The heart of the district holding court’s commercial lots to use. business Mr. Shiff is violated Corn’s substantive due the same land use who consultant had recom- process rights is contained in the following mended 1975 that the not zone Corn’s paragraph from its opinion: land in way permit that would construction Nonetheless, Court, upon an inde of warehouses so close to a residential area. pendent evidence, review of the holds that the CITY acted arbitrarily capricious Stephen Corn’s Concession and the ly. expressed concern Opinions Unanimous All traffic, noise, increased and other ad Land Use Experts Officials verse allegedly effects created mini- *16 undisputed It is that no other mini-ware- prior warehouses. Yet July 12,1977, no complex house anyone knew of had ever was effort made to investigate mini-ware been built area, next to a residential as the Moreover, houses. Council tar Corns wanted build this one. Stephen geted only the mini-warehouse use for Corn, in being addition to the developer’s elimination, leaving a number of uses that son, person was the- responsible most for arguably traffic, cause noise, more and air planning the mini-warehouse development. pollution; no comparison between mini- testifying In on the damages issue of at the warehouses and the remaining permitted trial, 1991 explained he why this mini-ware- uses was ever conducted. See Kis project house would have been different from Ellis, 283, (Fla. v. simmee 431 So.2d 285 any other project mini-warehouse he had 5th Dist.Ct.App.1983) (city prohibit cannot ever seen or heard of: proposed use that is no more obnoxious Well, I know I felt unique use). this was a permitted than The moratorium location for mini-warehouse project. nothing seems than attempt more an at built, Most of time, them were even at the post hoc rationalization. See 11126 Balti . were in more They commercial areas. more Boulevard v. Prince George’s Coun residential, weren’t in areas that and, 1415, 1425(4th ty, Cir.1989) 886 F.2d (sup generally speaking, you not prop- did have porting evidence must exist when decision erty correctly for made). zoned use in good short, as In Council was a location. any Whether prop- there was solely motivated irrational desire to erty this, just zoned like I have no idea. plans. thwart CORN’S Thus, very project reason this Lakes, would Corn v. Lauderdale have been valuable to so the Corns is that no F.Supp. quoted at 1569. The paragraph municipality other permitted would have the district analysis, summarizes court’s them to project build a mini-warehouse in a clearly which contains a erroneous factfind- residential That area. alone ing fact establishes as errors of law. The well errors that the City’s arbitrary decision not requirement law include creation of that a capricious. investigation formal precede a land use deci-

sion, scrutiny F.Supp. of a strict standard rationalization.” 771 at application 1569. It is review, deferential and mis- why instead of more timing study understandable application controlling precedent. will We might utility justification undermine its as a discuss each of these errors in turn. However, City’s for earlier actions. illogical would be to treat the fact that such a Clearly Finding The Erroneous study was ordered as prior evidence that the City’s About the Motivation arbitrary. action had been Governmental ac- argues may done,

Corn the district tions be undone as well as conclusion that the court’s -was nothing prevent there was solely by motivated an irrational desire to reconsidering study its actions had the development plans factfinding his is a thwart contrary reached a conclusion. Even if we only for clear which we can review error. study assume that the moratorium and which Assuming, deciding, without the state City’s confirmed the wisdom of the action question factfinding, ment in is a we have no solely anticipation was done of litigation, clearly doubt that it is erroneous. Clear not evidence that the earlier court, reviewing error exists when after capricious. actions were evidence, examining all of the is left with a willing most we are to conclude is that the definite firm conviction that a mistake wash, study moratorium and constitute a it is See, e.g., Pipe has been made. Concrete neither evidence of arbitrariness nor evi- California, Products Inc. v. Construction event, dence of the lack of it. In it does —Trust, -, -, Lab. U.S. Pens. appear that the district court treated the 2264, 2279, (1993); S.Ct. 124 L.Ed.2d 539 study moratorium. and as affirmative evi- City, Anderson v. Bessemer 470 U.S. not, dence of arbitrariness. We do either. 1504, 1511, 105 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Gyp United States v. United States counts What is not the motivation for the Co., 364, 395, 525, 542, U.S, 68 S.Ct. sum study, moratorium and but the motivation (1948); Roy, 92 L.Ed. 746 United States v. adopting the earlier action rezoning ordi- Cir.), denied, cert. denying nances plan. respect the site 110 S.Ct. 107 L.Ed.2d 38 U.S. actions, to those the evidence is overwhelm- (1989). evidence, which we have set out Indeed, undisputed. most of it length, at leaves us with the definite and firm *17 records, public comes from the minutes of that the district court conviction was mistak meetings official which were admitted at the en not to find that the actions were objection. trial -without That evidence uni- substantially and motivated related to formly overwhelmingly establishes that general congestion, welfare concerns about opposition to Corn’s 900-unit mini-ware- noise, traffic, aesthetics, safety, property val project general house was based on welfare ues, and the There no like. is evidence that City concerns of motive; officials and citizens alike. City any bad had there is no general The evidence shows how evidence that it acted without a those wel- motive. expressed fare City concerns were to the earlier, As discussed one week after the Council in a public hearings series of at City Council had decided to enact the rezon- which both sides were heard. The evidence deny approval ordinances and to City also establishes that the Council mem- passed Corn’s site it a moratorium on project bers became convinced that the building permits commercially for zoned ar- incompatible general with the best welfare stay eas to completion effect until of a City interests of the accordingly and acted study by Planning Zoning Board a rational The manner. evidence is not sub- about commercial and industrial uses ject plausible explanation. other The contiguous to residential areas. com- When contrary factfinding clearly district court’s is pleted, study that confirmed the wisdom of City erroneous. now to the the action the We turn two errors of had taken. The district study dismissed the law that moratorium as also underlie district court’s court “nothing attempt more than an post holding. at hoc a 1569. Holding

2. The Formal There could be circumstances Erroneous in which Investigation Required city’s Land residents a development wanted for reasons, illegitimate Use Decisions blocked for such as ra- prejudice. cial But that is not this case. holding The district court’s is based Merely may because citizen input not be a upon govern assumption erroneous sufficient government basis a rational ment cannot act land use matters based every land use decision instance does not upon gathered hearings, facts at but mean it can never sufficient basis for must instead conduct a more formal investi most, such a In it decision. cases will be. gation acting. before The acknowl court Greenbriar, Where, See 881 F.2d at 1579. as edged City expressed that the Council had here, consistently citizens come before their concern for welfare interests and the city council in public meetings a number that a adverse effects 900-unit mini-ware present individual, of occasions and their project upon those house would have inter fact-based rationally concerns that are relat- impor The then ests. court dismissed legitimate general concerns, ed to welfare it because, fact, said, City tant it before is not arbitrary capricious city for a 12, 1977, July acted on “no effort was made council to decide without a more formal in- investigate mini-warehouses.” vestigation that those concerns are valid and F.Supp. at record shows without proposed development should not be dispute meeting, that at its June permitted. investigated by ques Council the matter tioning particu Corn Stephen concerning conclusively The record demonstrates that development proposed of the lars of the presented Council members were warehouses, matter discussed the information, sides, with abundant all Planning member of the Board. At its projects. about mini-warehouse the finest meeting, June Council dis participatory government, tradition of length, questioned again cussed the matter at investigated matter was and resolved in a Stephen proposed develop Corn about public meetings series of at Corn which ment, to a and listened number citizens presented interested citizens information and presented why development who reasons opinions governmental decisionmak- 8,1977 permitted. July should not be At the ers—the of the members Council. joint meeting Building Committee and officials, such the Fire Chief members, ten some Council at citizens least Engineer, ques- offered advice and were spoke about im how would participants upon tioned. Various drew their City. pact neighborhood their and the experience developments with similar reported proceedings meeting of that problems developments those had those Council members who been occurs, caused. As often some misinforma- July present. At the presented, tion was some information was *18 itself, meeting any taken, was before action corrected, some and was contradicted and City presentations the Council heard from disputed; is the of but that nature democrat- Stephen Corn, attorney, City the Corn’s At decisionmaking. ic The information and torney, and number of During a citizens. presented govern- views citizens to their meetings, City these inquired Council meetings ment officials these at involved the City officials, the opinions about heard of general that the same welfare concerns Su- City Engineer, Depart such as the the Fire repeatedly this preme Court and Court have Chief, Only ment and others. the City after permissible held are rational bases for investigated length Council had at matter noise, traffic, conges- land use restrictions: during meetings any did it these take action. aesthetics, tion, of safety, adjoining valuation land, city on services. and effect rejected court properly district argument if City blindly prior that the time Council It is that to undisputed July of op City followed the will its constituents who its decision at Council made the, posed project, its public mini-warehouse action had four 1977 been meeting, there meetings hearings automatically F.Supp. valid. 771 at on the nature in the Corn, officials, City and oth- Stephen standard of issue. review instead of the deferential presented had information and er citizens require. review that our decisions In con- municipal opinions decisionmakers. to cluding City that had arbitrarily acted holding City The district court’s capriciously, the district court reasoned capricious Council’s action was targeted only that “the 12,1977, because, “prior July no effort was elimination, mini-warehouse use for leaving a investigate made mini-warehouses” arguably number of uses that cause more per municipality amounts to a se rule no traffic, noise, pollution; compari- air no rationally can act on basis information son between mini-warehouses and the re- gathered meetings, at but instead maining permitted uses was ever conducted.” investigations. must conduct more formal F.Supp. at scrutiny 1569. That strict There is no in the Constitution for basis such place standard has no in substantive due requirement, a which would be antithetical to process land use doctrine. government. our form of democratic only authority the district court cites Court, argued Corn before this heightened for such court, standard of review is a apparently convinced the district appellate investigation insufficient was conducted Florida court be- decision that did not Mayor cause the admitted at trial that he process. City even mention substantive due personally neither visited other Ellis, Kissimmee v. 431 So.2d of (Fla. project mini-warehouse at the time the Dist.Ct.App.1983). 5th if Even acted, anyone nor had he sent else from the state appellate intermediate court decision existing inspect mini-warehouse directly point, had been the district court City. located three miles from the should applied holdings instead have argument point factually is off the both and Greenbriar, Alabaster, Ltd. v. legally. Factually, the record that the shows (11th Cir.1989), F.2d 1570 prece- and other Mayor did not vote on the ordinances or the dent of this Circuit which limits inquiry prove site and Corn failed to to whether the action had a rational five Council members who did vote on it relationship legitimate to a general welfare had never project. visited a mini-warehouse concern. No decision this Court has ever fundamentally, More the Constitution does held that the Due prevents Process Clause require inspections predicate not on-site as a government restricting land use pro- for land use decisions. See Federal Commu- general mote the welfare it contempo- unless nications Commission v. Beach Communica- raneously juris- restricts all land uses in its — tions, Inc., -, -, U.S. 113 S.Ct. diction “arguably which cause” the same or (1993) 2096, 2102, (“[A] leg- L.Ed.2d greater general adverse effect on the wel- subject islative choice is not to courtroom fare. We decline to extend the due fact-finding may be based on rational manner, clause in such a which would hobble speculation unsupported evidence or em- data.”). power government pirical promote local sug- It would be absurd to gest, for example, city through that a welfare council could land use control. not rationally decide to forbid construction of The district court’s criticism of the facility nuclear waste near a residential “targeting” leaving mini-warehouses and oth- area person- unless the council members had “arguably er uses that problems cause” more ally inspected facility similar before application reflects of the wrong voted. Before the Council took action in standard, legal it also has little or no case, factual its members learned about mini- *19 basis in this case. The record is devoid of warehouses in planned Corn’s stop in evidence that when it acted to particular. The Constitution requires investigation project no more than Council before it that. requests “arguably other uses permit to

3. The Erroneous Constitutional problems as the cause” the same mini-ware- Standard to build. The houses Corn wanted re- The district by ap disapprove any court also erred right tained to future use plying scrutiny actions a strict problems. might same Munic- cause

1389 to deal ipal governments, people, like act the level scrutiny of constitutional point to a problems they are con- judgment with with which where it substituted its for that of fronted. is the City There no basis the Constitu- Council. holding

tion or in common that a sense Application 4. The Precedent of government problem cannot solve a with which it is confronted unless its solution holding plainly district court’s in- problems may solves all future arise as consistent Court’s Greenbriar deci- Municipal governments pow- well. have the In sion. that case there was no formal inves- independently problems er to deal with the of tigation, city’s and the decision was based basis; cities on their an as-needed the Con- upon “political pressure” from citizen voters require stitution does not address who out oppose turned as a crowd to all-encompassing every in one action conceiv- Greenbriar, development. 881 F.2d at 1579. problem able that could arise. Despite that apparent fact and the lack of any investigation other than public meetings, By applying a level scrutiny of that is far in Greenbriar this Court city’s held that the strict, appears too the district court to have denying permission action in for the develop- put place itself Council and ment was capricious. In made a de review of novo whether it would so, doing quoted adopted we “apt” as taken the same action the have following analysis “political pressure” about scrutiny impinges upon right did. Such as a basis for such decisions: authority municipalities of to make land [Njothing is zoning more common in dis- use decisions and would alter the allocation putes opposition than selfish zoning municipal governments of functions between changes. The Constitution does not forbid and the federal courts. This Court has ad- government yield opposition; such monished district usurp courts not to the role does not outlaw the opera- characteristic city zoning of councils and boards: government, tions democratic ... opera- We stress that federal do courts not sit permeated by tions which are pressure zoning as boards of review and should be interests_ special The fact “that circumspect in determining most that con- town officials are parochial motivated rights stitutional quarrels are violated in views of local against interests which work zoning over decisions. Raskiewicz v. plaintiffs’ plan may and which contravene Boston, 38, (1st Town New 754 F.2d state subdivision laws” ... does not state a Cir.1985) (“federal courts do not sit as a claim of denial of process. super zoning zoning board or board of appeals”); Albery Reddig, v. (quoting Corp. Village 718 F.2d 245 Id. Coniston v. (federal (7th Cir.1983) Estates, (7th appeals 461, court should 844 F.2d Hoffman Cir.1988) not become Environments, accustomed to idea that consti- (quoting Creative rights implicated quarrel Estabrook, 822, (1st tutional Inc. v. 680 F.2d rules); zoning Cir.), denied, 989, over Scott v. Greenville cert. 459 U.S. 103 S.Ct. (4th Cir.1983) County, (not- 345, (1982))). 716 F.2d 1409 74 L.Ed.2d 385 ing reluctance of federal courts to sit as decision, distinguish To the Greenbriar appeal). boards of upon district court relied v. Wheeler Zimmerman, 256, (5th Spence Grove, v. 873 F.2d 262 Pleasant 664 F.2d 99 Cir. Unit B (11th Cir.1989); (“Wheeler 1981) I”), denied, see also Construction Indus. cert. 456 U.S. Petaluma, 973, 2236, (1982), Assoc. v. 102 S.Ct. 72 L.Ed.2d 847 (9th Cir.1975) (“Being super legisla neither a Profiles, and A.A. Inc. v. Ft. Lauder dale, Cir.1988), ture nor a appeal, board of a federal 850 F.2d 1483 cert. denied, authority weigh reap court is without 490 U.S. 109 S.Ct. (1989).

praise the ignored by appel factors considered or L.Ed.2d 180 It said that “the legislative body passing challenged late court in both I and A.A. Wheeler Profiles denied, zoning regulation.”), accept outcry against cert. U.S. refused to (1976). 96 S.Ct. project evincing legitimate 47 L.Ed.2d 342 state inter *20 case, However, by raising F.Supp. court erred district est.” 771 at 1569. there idenees, townhouses, structures, those accessory are clear distinctions between two hand, and both this case and the retail and cases on the one commercial businesses of a community shopping our decision on district. more recent Greenbriar 881 F.2d at other public hearings hand. 1571-72. One or two were planning zoning held before the commis- municipality's Wheeler I involved a deci- sion, ultimately which deadlocked on pro- prevent sion apartment complex posal. holding public After hearing its own being city built in a after a referendum proposal, city rejected on the council it. overwhelming showed resistance to it. Un- Greenbriar, Id. at 1572. the would-be devel- case, present city’s in that like the case the oper, claiming sued a violation of substantive relationship decision “bore no substantial process. jury due Id. A returned a verdict health, legitimate safety, concerns for wel- finding mayor city council had fare, general well-being or the of the commu- capricious reaching been I, nity.” 664 F.2d at 100. In Wheeler there deny decision to PDD zoning Greenbriar’s by here plebiscite; was decision there was application. The judg- district court entered case, not. In this relevant information and developer ment for the in accordance with legitimate concerns of citizens and officials that verdict. Id. at 1572-73. This Court discussed, expressed, weighed alike were began reversed. We our discussion of the by municipal process decisionmakers legal issues involved a substantive due developer input. allowed full process by noting: claim A.A. did not even involve a sub- Profiles long It has been established that issue, process stantive due so that decision regulations will not be declared unconstitu- controlling. cannot procedural It was a tional pro- as violative substantive due case, process just compensation due clearly arbitrary cess unless “are 1485, inquiries F.2d at two that differ from a unreasonable, having no substantial rela- analysis. AA. Pro- health, safety, morals, tion to the or distinguishable is also from this case files general Village Euclid, welfare.” Ohio city proffered because there the as a basis Co., Realty 365, [394,] v. Ambler 272 U.S. by for its action “threats of violence area 114, 121, (1926). 47 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed. 303 certainly residents.” Id. at 1488. There continued, 881 F.2d at 1577. This Court no attempts threats violence or at stating: case; physical coercion in this all that was question The relevant for consideration is public input political into a involved was deci- whether there existed a rational basis for sion. City’s rejection of Greenbriar’s inapplicability of Wheeler I and A.A. or, alternative, phrased in the whether the to this case is shown the more Profiles City’s action bore no substantial relation to recent decision of this Court in Greenbriar. welfare. holdings various of that While decision have Id. previously, been referred to it warrants more Greenbriar, developer, argued detailed discussion because is a “red cow” before Greenbriar, city proposal case.2 In council re- this Court that “its for PDD status change developer’s fused to of a was well-suited to the needs of the surround- communities,” single-family city land from residential and that officials had (“PDD”), Development ‘solely partisan political “Planned District” “acted on reasons permitted multi-family plaintiffs’ propos- which would have res- unrelated to the merits of legal conveyed by any following "spotted 2. The term "red cow” is used in some terms: Florida, circles, horse,” horse,” particularly dog,” "spotted to describe a case "white "white directly point, commanding prece pony,” "goose” that is case. See v. Ysleta Jefferson Dist., 303, See, (5th e.g., Kopituk, Indep. States v. School 817 F.2d dent. United n. Cir.1982), denied, Cir.1987). cert. 461 U.S. We choose “red cow” from the meta- menagerie phorical 300 and because this is a Florida case 103 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d cert. denied, one, metaphor strongest 463 U.S. 103 S.Ct. and because that is the (1983). states, being more difficult to than the L.Ed.2d 1391 In other same red cow overlook closely fitting notion of a authoritative decision is animals. other *21 (quoting al....’” Id. at 1579 Greenbriar’s Greenbriar has failed to demonstrate brief). pointed Greenbriar also to evidence that local officials did not rationally con- in the record that council members had been clude that proposal the PDD was not in subjected “political pressure” and that the best interest of community. some of them were even “scared of the Greenbriar proposal contends its crowd.” Id. responded This Court as fol- PDD status was compatible with the traf- lows: fic, public health and other neigh- needs of planning [A] commission or a Council areas, boring plan was modi- forum; judicial is not a legislative it is a fied to incorporate, for, account and/or body held democratically accountable each of suggestions objections through precisely the political forms of City officials and surrounding property suasion to which objects. Greenbriar See However, owners. review of the record Blaker, [585,] De 652 F.2d at 590 Couf v. indicates that several members of the (5th Cir.1981) (“Our opinions repeatedly simply Council disagreed with Greenbriar’s characterize local decisions ‘leg as assessment of the plan’s compatibility with nature”); islative’ in South Gwinnett Ven area, the surrounding that there existed a Pruitt, [5,] ture v. at 7 rational basis for disagreement, such Cir.1974) (“local zoning quasi-legisla is a that modifications to failed to procedure, tive subject not jurid to federal alleviate their concerns. ical consideration in the absence of arbi (footnote action”). omitted).

trary Id. members who eval concerns that expressed uate a proposal light of been by their city constitu council preferences ents’ do necessarily not members Greenbriar were over concerns about look what Greenbriar contends to be the the effect of the proposed development on particular “merits” zoning plan. the surrounding neighborhoods, including the Here, there is no indication that Council effect it would have value members’ attention to citizens’ concerns property in neighborhoods those and on the assessing Greenbriar’s plan de Again, levels of traffic. following para- prived their decision of a rational basis. graph with which this Court ended its discus- sion of the process due (footnote substantive claim omitted). 881 F.2d at 1579 This just Greenbriar case said, easily could Court have “it is of some relevance” that at been written for case: hearings representa- “all of the neighborhood tives of spoke associations that sum, review of the record indicates opposed granting to the of PDD status neighborhood representatives offered property.” Id. at n. 17. Exactly several reasons opposition for their the same is true in this case. This Court proposed development, and that Council went on to hold in Greenbriar the Con- properly members took those views into stitution does forbid government from in undertaking account their own evalua- yielding political pressure that is charac- tions of the proposal. Greenbriar has teristic of government, democratic and the failed show that Council members acted municipal fact that officials are motivated irrationally or arbitrarily in rejecting the parochial of local views interest does not PDD rezoning plan. To the contrary, we state a claim denial of substantive due conclude that the clearly record reflects a process, even if parochial those views contra- rational basis for decision not to vene state laws. Id. at 1579. subject property. rezone the How closely the Greenbriar decision fits (footnote omitted). Id. at this case can seen following from the Wheeler I paragraph of opinion, which, our and A.A. distinguishable Greenbriar Profiles minor this case. modifications for the Greenbriar is not. It names controls this parties specific and the proposal being requires case that we reverse the district considered, could well have been holding written for court’s that there was a substantive this case: due violation.

1392 holding Summary We review the as clarified and con-

5. only partially clude that it is correct. (1) summarize, we hold that: To City factfinding legisla that “the This Court has extended absolute The district court’s by immunity desire 42 Council was motivated an irrational tive suit under U.S.C. erroneous; § plans” clearly purely legislators to thwart Corn’s is 1983 to local in land use (2) require not that a cases. The Constitution does Brown v. Coun Crawford 1002, (11th Cir.1992); investigation ty, particular type of be conducted 960 F.2d 1011-12 made, Baytree of Inverrary Realty City before a land use decision is and reli v. Partners (11th Lauderhill, 1407, upon opinions presented at 873 F.2d 1409 Cir. ance facts of 1989); meetings Lafayette, not render the actions Hernandez v. 643 does of (5th May municipal decisionmakers and F.2d 1193-94 Cir. Unit A of 1981), denied, process pur due cert. 455 U.S. capricious for substantive 102 S.Ct. (1982). (3) However, proper pro due poses; substantive L.Ed.2d relating by legislators to land use standard restric all actions taken local are sub cess argu ject immunity. determining tions is not whether all land uses that to absolute In ably greater legislators protect the same or detriment to which actions of local are cause by general legislative interests were restricted or ed the doctrine of absolute welfare eliminated, immunity, there this but instead “whether exist Court has drawn the line be [action], or, City’s legislative ed a rational basis for the tween actions and administrative alternative, phrased City’s in the whether the legislative immunity actions: “Absolute ‘ex sphere no substantial relation to the tends to actions taken within action bore ” welfare,” Greenbriar, Brown, legitimate legislative activity.’ 881 F.2d of general at (4) 1577; (quoting Because there was a rational 960 F.2d at 1011 Finch v. Vernon, (11th Cir.1989)). City’s rezoning basis for the ordinances and 877 F.2d rejection phrased site its We have held that actions taken in connec differently, action promulgating zoning because tion with ordinances welfare, classifications, substantially general related to the even the decision about applied its actions did not violate Corn’s substantive which classification should land, process rights. specific parcel legislative to a due are legislators actions for which local are abso lutely Baytree, THE DISCUSSION OF IMMUNITY immune. 873 F.2d at IV. cases). (collecting ISSUE We have also held that taken in actions connection with the enact reversal of Our district general ment development moratoriums on holding court’s violated Corn’s permits subject legislative immunity process rights renders moot Brown, as well. 960 F.2d at 1012. There Corn’s contentions that the district court fore, Council members are absolute calculating damages. erred Because we claim, ly remaining immune from Corn’s in proceedings concerning remand for further attempts impose sofar as that claim liabili claim, remaining just compensation how ty because of actions the Council mem ever, Corn’s contention that the district court rezoning bers took connection with the erroneously dismissed Council mem construction moratorium ordinances. The legislative immunity grounds bers on is not concerning same is not true their actions opinion, published moot. In its the district relating plan. to denial of the site judgment court entered favor of the indi vidual grounds members on the This Court has held that a land use deci prosecute by legislators Corn had failed to his action sion local “applica which is an against F.Supp. policy specific party” them. 771 at In tion of to a is not unpublished ruling protected immunity. later on by legislative Crymes Corn’s motion to judgment, alter or County, amend the the court clari v. DeKalb 1991). holding previ county fied its Crymes, stated that it had Cir. we held that ously approval dismissed the Council members had denied for a commissioners who solely grounds legislative immunity. protected by permit were not legislative immunity, because the decision to hope litigation, We which has out- application deny permit plans land, involved of a develop lasted is near- policy specific party spe- to a under began end. What four has claims 1485. The cific facts. Id. at actions been years one, whittled over the just county denying commissioners in approval compensation claim, and it no means *23 Crymes’ development permit impossible are certain that claim will survive the that.one distinguish, legislative insofar immunity as Regardless outcome, remand.3 of the it is in concerned, is City from the actions of the the best interests of all concerned that the denying approval Council members in of outcome be reached sooner rather than later. plan. that, Crymes end, site thus decision Toward may district court wish holding mandates a Council to consider the remaining whether claim can absolutely members this case are not im- adjudicated be on the basis of the evidentiary mune from suit for their actions in connec- already record that exists. The district court rejection tion plan. of Corn’s site position in the best to decide that in its before, For the they reasons we have stated sound discretion. are, however, legislative entitled to absolute We REVERSE the district holding court’s immunity for their actions in connection with that the violated Corn’s substantive due the three ordinances. process rights. We also REVERSE its hold- Before he can just reach the merits that the Council members are enti- compensation against claim legislative tled to immunity, absolute insofar members, distinguished as City, from the involving as their actions denial of the site Corn still has another substantial burden to concerned, plan are but we AFFIRM its qualified overcome: the doctrine of immuni holding are entitled to absolute “[Gjovernment ty. officials performing dis legislative immunity insofar as their actions cretionary generally functions shielded involving adoption of the ordinances are con- liability for damages civil insofar as cerned. We REMAND the case to the dis- clearly their not conduct does violate estab trict court further proceedings just on the statutory or rights lished constitutional compensation claim. person

which a reasonable would have 800, Fitzgerald, known.” Harlow v. U.S. 457 HATCHETT, Judge, Circuit concurring 2727, 2738, 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 396 specially. (1982); Dollar, Rich v. 841 accord F.2d (11th Cir.1988). In order to overcome majority I concur opinion, but write qualified Council members’ immuni separately emphasize nothing in the defense, ty Corn will have to carry bur opinion be interpreted creating should as proving den of that their denial his site new rule of developers always law that will plan violated federal law that clearly stating unsuccessful established when that action was taken on process large claim when a number of citi- Scherer, July 1977. Davis v. 468 U.S. oppose proposal. zens a land use is not This 183, 197, 3012, 3020-21, 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d city a case where council members voted on a (1984). Because the district court has zoning proposal merely counting after issue, opportunity not had address that opposed number of citizens proposal who we leave it to be determined on remand. without consideration of the merits proposal. contrary, To the we expressly

y: CONCLUSION recognize properly that “the district court parties rejected have been over litigating argument that if Coun- years. use of 8.5 acres of land for blindly sixteen cil followed the will of its constituents 3. We it to the rights commonly leave district court determine his sticks in the "bundle of ’ just compensation the effect on the of its claim property.” ... characterized This determi- response October 1991 order to Corn’s necessarily nation means that the CITY not judgment, motion to amend the the court where ‘gone property, too far’ taken CORN’s thus that, portion "as concluded Property, to the front requiring just compensation.” 4, 1978, July regained '[o]n CORN all its opposed project,

who mini-warehouse whenever their decision follows automatically Majority op. meetings action was valid.” express general where citizens wel- p. (citing concerns, at Corn v. Lauderdale fare we that in this conclude case (S.D.Fla. Lakes, city’s F.Supp. proposal denial Corn’s land use 1991)). was' capricious because the record reflects a rational basis for the ex- ruling Our reversal of the district court’s pressed general welfare concerns. city arbitrarily capricious acted ly, particular is based on the facts of this

case which are set forth in considerable de reviewing

tail. After the evidence under the

controlling principles articulated in Greenbr *24 Alabaster,

iar v. we are convinced city members in this council case did plan

evaluate the “merits” of Corn’s site legitimate general

addition to the welfare

concerns of their See constituents. Greenbr Alabaster,

iar v. (11th Cir.1989) (holding that “Council mem proposal light

bers who evaluate a of their preferences constituents’ do not necessarily Quintin ELSTON, Augustus Elston, a/k/a overlook what .process [a substantive due Elston; Elston, Cardella Rhonda a/k/a plaintiff] contends to be the ‘merits’ of a Augustus Elston, Cardella a/k/a a/k/a particular zoning This is plan.”). not the Elston; Elston, Augustus Tiffanie a/k/a city rejected case where members council Elston, Elston; Cardella Loretta a/k/a proposal following land use one or more Beavers, Dorothy Beavers; Leco a/k/a public hearings orchestrated large where a rey Beavers, Beavers; Ronnie Deli a/k/a up number of citizens showed and mouthed Beavers, Dorothy Beavers; cia Ki a/k/a “noise,” “traffic,” magic “conges words Ball, Gwynethe Ball; erston Dari a/k/a tion,” “aesthetics,” “safety,” “valuation of ad Ball, Gwynethe Ball; us Roslyn a/k/a land,” joining city and “effect on services.” Cochran, Cochran; Johnnie Jerrk a/k/a Instead, city the record reflects that council Evans, Evans; Kate Damien Gar a/k/a deny members plan voted to Corn’s site after rett, Garrett; Althea Gar Vernon a/k/a finding a rational basis wel rett, Garrett; Kereyell Estella Glo a/k/a fare expressed concerns that citizens during ver, Glover; Stephanie Delilah Y. a/k/a Greenbriar, meetings. See Hill, Connally Hill; Ernest Jack a/k/a (concluding F.2d at 1579-80 developer that a son, Jackson, Rollen Helen a/k/a a/k/a failed to city show council members Jackson; Rayven Jackson, Rollen a/k/a irrationally arbitrarily acted in rejecting Jackson, Jackson; Helen Carla a/k/a land use where council members under Jones, Jones, Willie Bertha a/k/a a/k/a took proposal their own evaluation Jones; Jones, Danielle Donald a/k/a the record a rational basis for citi indicated Jones; Jones, Jones, Paul Willie a/k/a zens’ concerns the effect on about surround Jones; Morris, Bertha Datrea a/k/a a/k/a ing neighborhoods and for their concerns Morris; Jeffery Morris, Robert a/k/a Moreover, problems). about traffic as in Morris; Quintin Morris, Lela Rob a/k/a Greenbriar, we find no indication that Quinedell Morris; Mosley, Qui ert a/k/a city council members’ attention to citizens’ Quinton Mosley; Morris, nell Willie evaluating concerns in Corn’s site de Morris, Tonya Shepard, Mary Alice a/k/a prived their of a rational decision basis. See Jemison; Donyae Swain, Gwendo a/k/a Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1579. Swain; lyn Swain, Kedrick Gwen a/k/a Therefore, though Swain; even dolyn Terry Swain, we do not hold Gwen a/k/a governments that local always prevail Swain; Swain, will dolyn Tiffani Gwen a/k/a defending Swain; dolyn Tuck, claims Cora Louise a/k/a