{¶ 2} On April 20, 2004, the plaintiff-appellee, G. Brent Herdman, filed a complaint for divorce. The decree of divorce, filed on November 15, 2004, incorporated a shared parenting plan for the parties' two minor children, 1 Jordan, d.o.b. 9/24/92, and Lauryn, d.o.b. 1/02/02. The parenting schedule agreed to by the parties was somewhat complicated and is best explained by use of the following demonstrative calendar:
Week Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
1 Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
with with with with with with with
Deborah Deborah Deborah; Deborah Deborah Deborah; Brent
Children Children
with with
Brent Brent
4:00- starting
9:00 at 4:00
p.m. p.m.
2 Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
with with with with with with with
Brent Deborah Deborah; Deborah Deborah; Deborah; Deborah
until Children Jordan Children
9:00 with with with
p.m. Brent Brent Brent
4:00- 5:00- 4:00-
9:00 9:00 10:00
p.m. p.m. p.m.
3 Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
with with with with with with with
Deborah Deborah Deborah; Deborah Deborah; Deborah; Brent
Children Lauryn Children
with with with
Brent Brent Brent
4:00- 5:00- 4:00
9:00 9:00 p.m.
p.m. p.m.
4 Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
with with with with with with with
Brent Deborah Deborah; Deborah Deborah Deborah; Deborah
until Children Children
9:00 with with
p.m. Brent Brent
4:00- 4:00-
9:00 10:00
p.m. p.m.
The parties agreed to a separate summer schedule, which allowed each parent a full week of parenting time starting on Friday at 4:00 p.m. and ending the following Friday at 4:00 p.m. The parent who was not exercising parenting time for the week spent time with the children on Tuesday night from 4:00-10:00 p.m.
{¶ 3} On April 18, 2006, the court modified the shared parenting plan pursuant to the parties' agreement. In particular, the Tuesday pick-up time was moved from 4:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., which required Brent to pick up Lauryn at *4 school instead of at Deborah's house after school. A few other times were adjusted as well, but the general schedule was left unchanged.
{¶ 4} On November 21, 2007, Deborah filed a motion to terminate the shared parenting plan. On December 18, 2007, Brent filed a proposed shared parenting plan suggesting a year-round "week-on/week-off" arrangement like the one already in place for summers. Brent filed a motion to modify the shared parenting plan on December 21, 2007, referencing his previously filed proposal. Deborah apparently agreed that modification, rather than termination, of the shared parenting plan was appropriate and filed a motion to modify on January 9, 2008.
{¶ 5} On January 28, 2008, the court referred the case to the family services coordinator, whose report was attached to the transcript of the June 18, 2008 hearing as Court Exhibit 1. The court also conducted an in-camera interview with the children on that date. At the hearing, Brent made two additional proposals, both of which were based on each party spending a "block" of time with the children. On June 26, 2008, the trial court filed its judgment entry adopting Brent's original proposal of a "week-on/week-off schedule. On an alternating basis, the children would reside with one parent from 4:00 p.m. on Friday until 4:00 p.m. on the following Friday. The parent who was "off for the week would spend time with the children on Tuesday from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 *5 p.m. Deborah appeals the judgment of the trial court and raises one assignment of error for our review.2
The lower court erred and abused its discretion in determining it was in the children's best interest to modify the parties' shared parenting plan to an alternating weekly schedule when there was insufficient, credible evidence supporting its findings and the same was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 6} Generally, "R.C.
In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of *6 a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child's wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(d) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section
2919.25 of *7 the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
{¶ 7} A trial court's custody determination will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Erwin, at ¶ 7, citing R.C.
The standard for abuse of discretion was laid out in the leading case of C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978),
, 54 Ohio St.2d 279 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , but applied to custody cases in Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 376 N.E.2d 578 , 49 Ohio St.3d 21 , syllabus: 550 N.E.2d 178 "Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, such an award will not be reversed as being against the weight of the evidence by a *8 reviewing court. (Trickey v. Trickey [1952], 158 Ohio St. 9,
47 O.O. 481 ,, approved and followed.)" 106 N.E.2d 772
Davis v. Flickinger (1997),
{¶ 8} In its judgment entry, the trial court set forth a summary of the evidence adduced at hearing and noted several subsections of R.C.
{¶ 9} The court indicated that it had conducted an in-camera interview with both children. Lauryn expressed her love for both parents but was unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and was hence unable to express her wishes as to parenting times. Jordan, who was 15 at the time of the hearing, stated that he was satisfied with the shared parenting plan and had good relationships with both parents. Similar statements were found in the report of the family service coordinator, who recommended slight modifications to the existing shared parenting plan.
{¶ 10} When the court took the matter under advisement, it was faced with similar testimony and concerns from two competent and loving parents, both of whom wanted the best resolution for the children. In considering R.C.
{¶ 11} Both parties and the trial court primarily sought to ease Lauryn's confusion as to her after-school transportation. Brent testified that the parents were called by the school two or three times over the winter of 2008 when Lauryn had a substitute teacher. Deborah testified that Lauryn needed daily reminders about whether she would ride the bus or not. The trial court apparently believed that spending a solid week with each parent would help to ease Lauryn's confusion and apparently believed that a daily reminder would be a minimal inconvenience to the parents. On this record, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 12} The judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court Family Division is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed PRESTON, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.