¶ 1 Hеrcules Incorporated appeals from an order dismissing its declaratory judgment action against the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. The trial сourt held that Hercules’ action was procedurally improper because it attempted to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to obtain judicial rеview of an interlocutory Tax Commission order issued in a pending adjudicative proceeding.
¶ 2 The facts are undisputed. Following an audit, the Auditing Division assessed corporate franchise tax deficiencies against Hercules for the years 1988 through 1992. Hercules disputed the deficiencies and commenced a formal adjudicative proceeding before the Tax Commission. In that proceeding, Hercules moved the Tax Commission for a protective order precluding the Auditing Division from conducting discovery. In support of this motion, Hercules cited this court’s decision in Beaver County v. State Tax Commission,
¶ 3 Shortly after the denial of its motion, Hercules filed this action in district court, seeking (1) a declaration that Utah Administrative Code R861-1A-6 does not contemplate discovery from the taxpayer and (2) an injunctiоn enjoining the Auditing Division from obtaining further discovery from Hercules in the proceeding pending before the Tax Commission. The Auditing Division responded by moving to dismiss Herculеs’ complaint. The court granted the motion. Hercules appeals.
¶ 4 The sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Hercules’ deсlaratory judgment action on the grounds that the action was an improper attempt to seek judicial review of an interlocutory Tax Commission order in a pending adjudicative proceeding. Hercules asserts that the trial court erred in that it, in effect, incorrectly
¶ 5 Our opinion in McRae & Deland v. Feltch,
“Generally, jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment actiоn will not be entertained if there is pending at the time of the commencement of the declaratory action another action or proсeeding to which the same persons are parties, in which are involved and may be adjudicated the identical issues that are involved in the declaratory action.”
Id. at 405 (quoting 1 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 209, at 447 (2d ed. 1951 & Supp.1959)); see also 22A Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 42 (1988). We further noted that the foregoing rule prevents the piecemeal litigation of legal issues in multiple suits. See McRae & Deland,
¶ 6 In the instant case, we likewise affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Hercules’ declaratory judgment action. At the tíme Hercules commenced this action, it and the Auditing Division were already parties to the adjudicative proceeding pending before the Tax Commission. Not only had an identical issue been raised in that proceeding, but the Tax Commission had already adjudicated that issue. Thus, by filing its declaratory judgment action, Hercules attempted to obtain judicial review of an interlocutory and otherwise unappealable Tax Commission order. As the trial court correctly noted, “[This] attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of th[e] court to seek review of an interlocutory order [was] procedurally improper.”
¶ 7 The Administrative Procedures Act provides specific procedures for seeking judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. Under the Act, judicial review is available by either this court or the court of appeals, depending on which court has appellate jurisdiction ovеr the particular matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Moreover, such review may only be sought from final agency action, meaning that the agency’s decision must have fully disposed of the case. See Sloan v. Board of Review,
¶ 8 Hercules contends, however, that if it had sought judicial review оf the Tax Commission’s order through the foregoing procedures, its alleged right to be free from the Auditing Division’s discovery would have already been invaded and “thе bell could not thereafter be un-rung.” Assuming this to be true, we note that the same would also be true in many other cases. For example, trial courts sometimеs err and require litigants to comply with improper discovery requests;
¶ 9 In closing, we point out that this case aptly demonstrates the rationale behind the rule precluding a separate declaratory judgment action when the same parties are already involved in a separate administrative action or proceeding involving identical issues. If, as Hercules attempted to do, a party could collaterally attack every interlocutory order issued in an adjudicative proceeding by simply filing a separate declaratory judgment action, thе litigation resulting from a single case could, in theory, multiply exponentially, going on forever, much like the fictional Jamdyce and Jamdyce ease.
¶ 10 We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Hercules’ complaint; we do not reach Hercules’ other argument that our decision in Beaver County precluded the Auditing Division from obtaining discovery from the taxpayer in an adjudicative proceeding.
¶ 11 Affirmed.
Notes
. See Charles Dickens, Bleak House 51-55 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).