Lead Opinion
Hеrbert Ramirez appeals the denial of Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found him not disabled. He requested that the Appeals Council review his case, and submitted to that body, inter alia, an additional report from his treating psychologist. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it final. Ramirez appealed to the district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.
I.
We review the judgment of the district court de novo. Baxter v. Sullivan,
Claims of disability are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 et seq., 416.920 et seq. (1993). Ramirеz disputes the findings the ALJ made at the third step of the five-step process. That step determines whether a claimant is disabled by comparing the claimant’s impairment to impairments listed in an appendix to the regulations (“listed diagnoses”). See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925. Each listed diagnosis consists of clinical findings listed under paragraph A (“paragraph A criteria”) and functional limitations listed under paragraph B (“paragraph B criteria”). Together, the criteria define the severity of the impairment. Each listed diagnosis requires that a claimant exhibit a set number of both paragraph A аnd paragraph B criteria in order to be found disabled. The criteria may themselves require the claimant to exhibit a set number of characteristics. If a claimant’s impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent to the criteria of the diagnosis, Pitzer v. Sullivan,
II.
A.
The dispute in this case concerns listed diagnosis 12.04 (affective disorder) and 12.08 (personality disorder). The required level of severity for diagnosis 12.04 is met when the claimant’s impairment meets at least one paragraph A criterion and at least two paragraph B criteria. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 at 408. The required level of severity for diagnosis 12.08 is met whеn the claimant’s impairment reflects at least one paragraph A criterion and at least three paragraph B criteria. Id. at 409. The list of paragraph B criteria is the same for both diagnoses, although the list of paragraph A criteria differs.
Ramirez’s treating physician, Dr. Richard E. Townsend, diagnosed Ramirez as having dysthymia, an affective disorder. As stated above, аffective disorders fall within diagnosis 12.04.
B.
We consider, first, whether the failure to consider Ramirez for benefits under diagnosis 12.04 constituted error.
The classification of mental disorders is not an exact science. As thе American Psychiatric Association points out, “There is no assumption that each mental disorder is a discrete entity with sharp boundaries (discontinuity) between it and other mental disorders, or between it and no mental disorder.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders xxii (3d. ed. rev. 1987). A dysthymic disorder— Ramirez’s condition — is often associated with a personality disorder (diagnosis 12.08), and personality disorders are often seen during episodes of dysthymia. Id. at 232, 335. The fact that Ramirez suffered from a dysthymic disorder does not mean that he did not also suffer from a personality disorder. The two are not mutually exclusive.
In considering only diagnosis 12.08, the ALJ seemed implicitly to rely on the opinion of Dr. Sidney Bolter, a government physician. Dr. Bolter stated that Ramirez did not suffer from an affective disorder (the type of disorder considered under diagnosis 12.04) but rather from a personality disorder, covered under diagnosis 12.08. However, neither the ALJ nor Dr. Bolter gave any reason for disagreeing with Dr. Townsend’s opinion that Ramirez suffered from an affective disorder. Dr. Bolter did not dispute either Ramirez’s own account of his symptoms or Dr. Townsend’s findings. Moreover, he did not ever examine Ramirez; rather, he reviewed the record and saw Ramirez for the first time at the hearing.
In disability cases, greater weight is afforded to the opinion of a treating physician than to thаt of non-treating physician, because the treating physician “ ‘is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.’ ” Bates v. Sullivan,
We conclude that both the ALJ and the Appeals Council improperly disregarded Dr. Townsend’s opinion that Ramirez suffered from an affective disorder, classified under diagnosis 12.04.
C.
Ramirez contends that his condition meets the requirements of diagnosis 12.04. Thus, he contends that the inquiry should have been concludеd at the third step of the five-step process and that he should have been awarded the benefits he seeks. As noted above, there is no dispute that Ramirez meets the paragraph B criteria required by diagnosis 12.04.
Ramirez contends that he meets the following paragraph A criterion:
Medically documented persistence, either continuous or intermittent, of ... [djepressive syndrome characterizеd by at least four of the following:
a. Anhedonia or pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities; ...
e. Decreased energy; ...
f. Feelings of guilt or worthlessness;
g. Difficulty concentrating or thinking[.]
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 at 408 (emphasis added). Dr. Townsend submitted a report to the ALJ in which he briefly summarized his two-year treatment of Ramirez. There, he stated that Ramirez suffers from dysthymia, an affective disorder, that his prognosis is poor, аnd that his illness has caused a “loss of interest” in most activities. In addition, in the report Dr. Townsend submitted to the Appeals Council after the hearing before the ALJ, he stated that Ramirez suffers from dysthymia; that, due to his disorder, he experiences “1) low energy and fatigue, 2) low self-esteem, [and] 3) poor concentration and difficulty making decisions;” and that these symptoms had persisted for about two years at the time of the hearing. The supplemental report, when read along with the original, is sufficient to show that Ramirez exhibits the four characteristics necessary to meet the рaragraph A criterion set out above.
Because Dr. Townsend found that Ramirez suffers from dysthymia, an affective disorder, and because the record establishes that Ramirez meets both the paragraph A and paragraph B criteria for diagnosis 12.04, which covers that disorder, we сonclude that Ramirez’s condition meets the requirements of diagnosis 12.04. Accordingly, we find that the Appeals Council erred in failing to find that Ramirez met the requirements for diagnosis 12.04. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526(a), 404.-1528, 416.926, 416.928; see Bernal v. Bowen,
III.
It may be true that Ramirez suffers from both an affective disorder (diagnosis 12.04) and a personality disorder (diagnosis 12.08). It may also bе true that his personality disor
The Appeals Council could have remanded for a further hearing so that the ALJ could consider Ramirez’s eligibility for benefits under diagnosis 12.04, or so that he could take further evidence. It chose not to do so. Instead, it treated the record as complete. We agreе. Ordinarily, we may either “ ‘remand [a] case for additional evidence or simply ... award benefits.’ ” Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR THE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS.
Notes
. This appeal сoncerns Ramirez's contentions regarding his emotional disorder. He initially based his application on certain physical complaints as well, but does not challenge the ALJ’s resolution of those complaints here.
. Following receipt of the mandate, the district court shall remand to the Secretary with instructions to award Ramirez the benefits he seeks.
. Dr. Townsend also diagnosed Ramirez as suffering from a dependent personality disorder, which is covered under diagnosis 12.08. However, Ramirez does not contend on appeal that he suffers from a dependеnt personality disorder or any other disorder covered by diagnosis 12.08.
.In the fourth and fifth steps of the process, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment prevents him from performing work he performed in the past, and, if not, whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.-920(e) — (f). Here, the ALJ found that Ramirez could not perform his past work but could perform substantial gainful activity of at least a light level of exertion, and that such activity was available to a significant degree in both the local and national economy.
. Indeed, Dr. Townsend, Ramirez’s own physician, diagnosed him as suffering from both.
. Although he did not examine Ramirez or administer any psychological tests to him, he did ask Ramirez a few questions at the hearing. They focussed on whether Ramirez had a criminal record (Rаmirez said he does not), whether he abuses alcohol or other drugs (Ramirez said he does not), and whether he had trouble with school authorities as a student (he said that he had, but only once).
. After concluding that Ramirez’s condition should be evaluated under diagnosis 12.08, the ALJ considered his eligibility for bеnefits under that diagnosis. For that reason, we do not further consider the ALJ's decision.
. Two state agency doctors also assessed Ramirez's mental condition. Their assessments tended to show that Ramirez did not meet the requirements for disability under any 12.00 mental disorder diagnosis. However, the ALJ did not base his evaluation on these assessments, and the Appeals Council did not consider them. Furthermore, because these assessments were made by non-treating physicians, we afford them less weight than we do Dr. Townsend’s assessment. Bates v. Sullivan,
.Ramirez has stipulated to the finding of the ALJ that he meets two of the threе paragraph B criteria required by diagnosis 12.08. Because the paragraph B criteria are the same for diagnosis 12.04, he also meets the two paragraph B criteria required under that diagnosis.
. But see supra note 8.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I would affirm because there is no evidence that Ramirez’s “dysthymic disorder” precluded him from returning to suitable work or was so severe as to bе disabling. See Perez Torres v. Secretary of HHS,