Herbert Lee Brown, III v. State of Indiana
71A04-1603-CR-675
Court of Appeals of Indiana
October 14, 2016
Baker, Judge.
Pursuаnt to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Ernest P. Galos
Public Defender
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller
Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
I N T H E
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Herbert Lee Brown, III,
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 14, 2016
Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1603-CR-675
Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
The Honorable John M.
Marnocha, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D02-1501-F1-2
Baker, Judge.
Facts
[2] Around 3:40 a.m. on January 1, 2015, Brown went to a 7-Eleven in South Bend. The two clerks working that morning were Debra Pushee and Marcus Kraskowski. After Pushee sold a customer a pack of cigarettes, Brown tried to steal them. When the customer refused to give Brown the cigarettes, Brown pulled a handgun, pointed it at Pushee, and said, “Give me the money.” Tr. p. 58. Pushee stood back from the register and allowed him to take the money inside of it. Pushee thought that Brown was going to kill her and Kraskowski. Brown then held his gun to Kraskowski’s chest, head, and neck, and demanded that he open the register in front of him. Kraskowski complied, and Brown took the money from inside of that register as well. Brown walked to the front
[3] A minivan was parked outside of the 7-Eleven. Brown opened the door on the driver’s side of the vehicle and got in. C.J., whose boyfriend was inside the store, was resting in the passenger’s seat. When the door opened, she thought it was her boyfriend, but when she opened her eyes and saw Brown, who she did not know, she said, “Wait, dude, you’re in the wrong car.” Id. at 123. Brown told her to “shut up” and pointed his gun at her. Id. He drove away and eventually pulled the vehicle over and stopped.
[4] Brown asked C.J. to give him oral sex. She did not want to, but she did not believe that she had any options “because he had that gun.” Id. at 126. She urinated on herself. She performed oral sex on Brown, but he did not ejaculate. He told her that she was doing it wrong and ordered her to go to the back of the van and removе her pants. She complied. He followed and inserted his penis into her vagina. He still did not ejaculate, and demanded that she again perform oral sex. As she was performing oral sex a second time, he urinated in her mouth. She spit it out and wiped it up with her shirt. Brown wiped down everything in the vehicle that he had touched. C.J. asked him to take her back to the 7-Eleven, where her boyfriend was probably waiting for her. Brown eventually stopped the van and told C.J. to turn her head. She “thought he was going to shoot [her] in the back of [her] head.” Id. at 131. He exited the van, and she then jumped into the driver’s seat and drove away.
[6] Brown’s jury trial began on January 19, 2016. During preliminary jury instructions, the trial court cautioned the jury that the “fact that charges have been filed and the defendant arrested and brought to trial, is not to be considered by you as any evidence of guilt. The charging information is not evidence.” Id. at 19-20. Then, the court realized that the packet provided to the jury mistakenly included the original charge of criminal confinement that had been dismissed. The trial court told the jury that “page three of this next instruction wasn’t in any of our instructions, but it is[,] for some reason, in yours,” explaining that it wаs a scrivener’s error and asking the jurors to rip out page three. Id. at 21-22. After the jurors had removed page three, the trial court said, “[t]hat’s something from some other case that was left over, that wasn’t for some reason taken out of the ones that you have.” Id. at 22.
[7] The trial court started reading the charges, found a numbering error, and decided to take a recess to collect thе instructions and start over. At that point, Brown’s attorney requested a sidebar and asked for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. Next, the trial court asked of the jurors, “[d]oes anyone think that based upon what I’ve said, that they couldn’t continue to be a fair
[8] Brown testified at the trial, admitting that he had a gun with him and that he had sex with C.J. but insisting that it was consensual. C.J. also testified, as did the 7-Eleven clerks, a police officer, and the nurse who examined C.J. following the assault.
[9] On January 21, 2016, the jury found Brown guilty of two counts of Level 1 felony rape and two counts of Level 3 felony robbery. Brown’s sentencing heаring took place on February 24, 2016. As aggravators for the robberies, the trial court found that there were multiple victims and that Brown was on probation for assisting a criminal in murder when he committed the offenses in this case. As aggravators for the rapes, the trial court found that there were multiple acts, that Brown was on probation, and that the nature and circumstances of the offense wеre egregious, including the fact that he had urinated in C.J.’s mouth. The trial court did not find any mitigators. The trial
Discussion and Decision
I. Evidence of C.J.’s Prior Sexual History
[10] Brown first argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of C.J.’s prior sexual history. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[11] The trial court excluded the evidence of the DNA in C.J.’s thigh swab under Indiana Evidence Rule 412, which providеs, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s or witness’s sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduсt, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant‘s constitutional rights.
***
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) Motion. If a party intends to offer evidence under Rule 412(b), the party must:
(A) file a motion that specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for which it is to be offered;
(B) do so at least ten (10) days befоre trial unless the court, for good cause, sets a different time;
(C) serve the motion on all parties; and
(D) notify the victim or, when appropriate, the victim’s guardian or representative.
(2) Hearing. Before admitting evidence under this rule, the court must conduct an in camera hearing and give the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. Unless the court orders otherwise, the motion, related materials, and the record of the
In this case, the evidence excluded by the trial court was offered to prove that C.J. had engaged in other sexual behavior on the night in question; therefore, it was prohibited by Evidence Rule 412(a). Initially, we note that Brown did not comply with Rule 412(c)—he did not file a motion seeking to have the evidenсe admitted. Consequently, regardless of the substance of the evidence, he was not entitled to its admission.3
[12] Lack of a motion notwithstanding, we will briefly address the substance of the issue. The only way the evidence in question would be admissible is if it fell under an exception to the general prohibition.
- The first exception—evidence of specific instances of C.J.’s sexual behavior, offered to рrove that someone other than Brown was the source of semen or other physical evidence—does not apply because Brown admitted that he did, in fact, have sex with C.J. on the night in question. The only contested issue was consent, not the identity of the person providing the semen in the van and semen and/or urine on C.J.’s shirt.
- The second exception—evidence of specific instances of C.J.’s sexual behavior with respect to Brown, if offered by Brown to prove consent—does not apply because the evidence relates to C.J.’s sexual behavior with other individuals, not with Brown, and in no way tends to prove consent.
The final exception—evidence whose exclusion would violate Brown’s constitutional rights—does not apply. Brown argues that excluding the evidencе denied him a fair trial because he could not impeach C.J.’s version of the events on the night in question. Brown had assumed that C.J. would testify that she had not had sex with anyone before he raped her, and that he would then impeach her with the thigh swab evidence. But she did not testify about her sexual behavior before the rape, so there was no testimony for him to impeach.
In sum, the evidence was clearly prohibited and did not fall under any of the delineated exceptions to the general rule. Therefore, the trial court did not err by excluding it.
II. Mistrial
[13] Next, Brown argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial when the dismissed criminal confinement charge was mistakenly included in the instructions provided to the jury before trial began. A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other measures are insufficiеnt to rectify the situation. Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001). Brown has the burden of establishing that the questioned conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Id.
[14] In this case, as soon as the trial court realized that the dismissed charge was included in the jurors’ packets, it asked the jurors to remove the page and explained that it contained a scrivener’s error. The trial court stated that it was “something from some other case that was left over,” and not related to Brown’s case. Tr. p. 22. The trial court asked of the jurors, “[d]oes anyone
[15] Initially, we note that we must presume that jurors follow a trial court’s instructions and admonishments. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 481 (Ind. 2015); see also Lucio v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Ind. 2009) (emphasizing the “strong presumptions that juries follow courts’ instructions and that an admonition cures any error”). We find this Court’s opinion in Strowmatt v. State to be instructive. 686 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). In Strowmatt, the judge began reading the wrong child molesting charge, with a different victim’s name, during voir dire. The judge twice apologized to the potential jurors and explained that he had misread the charge. He asked if the misreading was a problem, and none of the jurors responded. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied, and this Court affirmed. We found that the trial court had eliminated any possible prejudice by asking the jurors if they
[16] In this case, as in Strowmatt, the trial court explained what had happened to the jury more than once. The trial court also asked, twice, whether the jurors would have difficulty being fair and impartial as a result, and all of the jurors said no. Furthermore, the instructions cautioned the jurors that, in any event, criminal charges are not to be considered as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Given all of these facts, and given that this sequence of events occurred before the trial began and the wrong charge was not entered into evidence, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial.
III. Sufficiency
[17] Brown argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting his two rаpe convictions.4 When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the conviction. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). We will affirm if, based on the evidence and inferences, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).
[19] In this case, C.J. testified thаt Brown forced her to perform oral sex on him and to have sexual intercourse with him while he was armed with a gun. She was scared and believed she had to comply because of the weapon. She testified at length and with specificity. Her uncorroborated testimony, alone, is sufficient evidence to support the rape convictions. Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And in this case, her testimony was not uncorroborated. Pushee, Kraskowski, and another individual testified that after Brown left 7-Eleven he got into a van. The nurse who examined C.J. and two police officers who interviewed C.J. corroborated the details of the rapes that she provided in her testimony. Finally, Brown himself corroborated much of C.J.’s testimony, admitting that he was armed and that they had oral sex and intercourse in her van. This evidence is more than sufficient to support the rape convictions, and his arguments to the contrary amount to requests that we reweigh evidence and assess witness credibility—requests we decline.
[20] Finally, Brown argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may revise a sentenсe if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013)) (internal citations omitted).
[21] Brown was сonvicted of two Level 1 felonies and two Level 3 felonies. For the Level 1 felonies, Brown faced a sentence of twenty to forty years, with an advisory term of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). He received concurrent forty-year terms for the Level 1 felony convictions. For the Level 3 felonies, Brown faced a sentence of three to sixteen years, with an advisory term of nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). He reсeived concurrent sixteen-year terms for the Level 3 felony convictions. While Brown received the maximum terms for each of his four convictions, because the trial court elected to order that the two Level 1 terms be served concurrently and the two Level 3 terms be served concurrently, his aggregate sentence was 56 years rather than the maximum possible aggregate term of 112 years.
[23] As for the nature of the rapes, he hijacked a vehicle with a passenger inside. He ordered C.J. to shut up, pointing his gun at her, and drove her to another location. He forced C.J. to perform oral sex on him twice and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. C.J. was so scared that she urinated on herself. When Brown was unable to ejaculate, he urinated in C.J.’s mouth.5 She was terrified and believed that he was going to kill her. We do not find that the nature of these offenses aids Brown’s sentencing argument.
[24] As for Brown’s character, we note that at the time he committed these crimes, he was only twenty years old. At that young age, he had been adjudiсated delinquent for an alcohol violation and possessing marijuana. He was put on probation for the latter adjudication and violated it for receiving three school suspensions. In his brief adulthood, he was convicted of class C felony assisting
[25] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.