64 N.E.2d 519 | Ill. | 1945
The cases above entitled are before this court for a second time upon remandment from the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with that court's opinion in
In the Herb case the only point decided by this court was that the city court of Granite City had no jurisdiction of a cause of action arising outside of the territorial limits of the city under the Employers' Liability Act, (U.S.C.A. Title 45, sec. 56,) and, therefore, such a case transferred to the circuit court of Madison county under the statute on venue (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 146, par. 36,) was ineffective to show the action had been commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within two years, as required by the Employers' Liability Act. We expressly declined to pass upon other points raised by appellants in these cases now here for decision. The Belcher case upon parallel facts in effect adopted the opinion in the Herb case.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, that court held, as we understand it, that determining whether the action had been commenced within two years, as required by the Employers' Liability Act, involved a Federal question, but further expressed the view that sufficient did not appear in our opinion to enable them to tell whether we had decided no case waspending at the time of the transfer, or to determine whether our decision was based upon independent State law, and the cause was thereupon continued for the purpose of enabling counsel for plaintiff to apply to this court for an amendment or amplification of this court's opinion to show whether the judgment therein was intended to rest upon an adequate *141 independent State ground, or whether the decision of the Federal question was necessary to the judgment rendered.
Upon application of attorneys for plaintiff we made an amplification, or expansion of the original opinion in which we certified we had held the city court of Granite City had no jurisdiction of the cause of action under Illinois law, and that commencing an action meant starting it in a court which has power to decide the matter, to issue process, to bring the parties in the particular cause before it, and to render and enforce a judgment on the merits of said cause; that the city court of Granite City had no such power, and consequently, from December 22, 1937, when the case was filed, until June 27, 1942, when it was purportedly transferred to the circuit court, the action had never been commenced, and that the order of transfer did not have the effect of causing the time of commencement to relate back to the filing of the cause in the city court, and consequently the action was never commenced, as required by the Federal act, within two years of the date of the plaintiff's injury. (Announcement made March 21, 1945, post, p. 151.) Upon this certificate being filed in the Supreme Court of the United States, a second opinion was rendered, reported in
In the first consideration of the case the United States Supreme Court, among other things, said: "If the Illinois court means to hold that the city courts could not adjudge, transfer, or begin these cases and that no case is pending *142 in its courts at the present time, it is manifest that no view we might express of the Federal Act would require its courts to proceed to the trial of these actions." In the second opinion, among other things, the court said: "Clearly, however, when process has been adequate to bring in the parties and to start the case on a course of judicial handling which may lead to final judgment without issuance of new initial process, it is enough to commence the action within the Federal statute." In this opinion the court also stated it was not deciding whether the action would be barred if State law made new or supplemental process necessary to proceed in the circuit court of Madison county.
There is thus left undetermined by the Supreme Court of the United States two questions: (1) Whether under Illinois law city courts were incapable of transferring these cases to the circuit courts, so that at no time were the cases ever pending in the circuit courts; and (2) if such cases were pending, whether new or supplemental process must necessarily be issued out of the circuit courts.
Both of these questions were raised in the original appeal from the Madison county circuit court to this court, and neither of them decided by us, as we expressed in our former opinion, and if there is any language from which it may be inferred such questions were decided it is used solely with reference to the jurisdiction of the city court of Granite City, and not intended for any other purpose.
The question thus becomes comparatively narrow, and that is, whether the statute of the State of Illinois, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 146, par. 36,) which purports to authorize, upon motion, a change of venue, from any court of record, of a cause commenced in the wrong court or county, to the proper court or county, is unconstitutional to the extent of its application to city courts, as courts of limited territorial jurisdiction. The material part of this statute is as follows: "That whenever any suit or proceeding *143 shall hereafter be commenced, in any court of record in this state, and it shall appear to the court where the same is pending, that the same has been commenced in the wrong court or county, then upon motion of either or any of the parties to such suit or proceeding, the court shall change the venue of such suit or proceeding to the proper court or county, and the same when the venue shall be so changed, shall be then pending and triable in such court or county to which the same shall be so changed the same as in other cases of change of venue." The contention of appellees is that if such statute is given effect in the present case it would produce the unconstitutional effect of permitting the city court, while without jurisdiction of the cause of action, to transfer it to the circuit court, which has jurisdiction of such a cause of action; and the reason assigned is that the city court, not having jurisdiction of the cause of action, could not possibly have jurisdiction to transfer the cause of action.
This statute has been before this court on two occasions. InCentral Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Com.
Section 1 of article VI of the constitution defines where the judicial power is vested, and, among other courts, includes "such courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns." This part of section 1 of article VI has been interpreted to confine the power of city courts to cases arising within their territorial limits, for the simple reason that if their jurisdiction is wider than that, it would not be "in and for" a city. City courts have a limited territorial jurisdiction by reason of the statute (Laws of 1901, p. 136,) and such section of the constitution, but their powers are almost as extensive as those of *145 circuit courts, which have original jurisdiction of all cases in law and equity, only by reason of the express language of the constitution.
The jurisdiction of circuit courts, by reason of section 12 of article VI, is original and extends to all causes in law and equity, but the General Assembly has properly enacted laws pertaining to the venue of such courts. Section 18 of article VI provides for county courts, which are given certain jurisdiction and "such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law." Probate courts may be established under section 20 of article VI of the constitution, but their jurisdiction is limited to the matters set out in the constitution. First State Bank ofSteger v. Chicago Title and trust Co.
While it is commonly said the legislature derives its powers to create courts from article VI of the constitution, this statement is technically inaccurate, as under our system of government the General Assembly is vested with all legislative powers not withheld or limited. The constitution is not a grant of power to the legislature, but is a limitation upon its inherent powers, and it may legislate upon any subject not withdrawn from its authority. (City of Chicago v. County of Cook,
Jurisdiction is of two kinds — jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of the person, — and both must concur, or the judgment will be void in any case in which a court has assumed to act. (Rabbitt v. Weber Co.
Referring back to section 1 of article VI we find the constitution authorizes the General Assembly to create courts "in and for cities." The constitution limits its territory. There is no limit, under this section, of the jurisdiction that may be vested by the legislature in city courts within such territory. Therefore, while a city court has been denominated an inferior court, (Reid v. Morton,
In Reid v. Morton,
In Miller v. People,
In Gill v. Lynch,
As late as McFarlin v. McFarlin,
It seems, therefore, the want of jurisdiction in the first instance does not prevent the court from exercising the sole function of transferring the cause to another court. It is a special and limited jurisdiction given for this purpose, and must be exercised for that purpose and for no other purpose. We have said it applies to circuit courts and to county courts, and no reason has been pointed out why it does not apply to city courts. It is true the jurisdiction involved in the city court in this case is territorial, but the effect of such want of jurisdiction is the same as the want of jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person — that is, the court cannot proceed and render a valid judgment. Such would have been the effect in the two cases above had it not been for the venue statute.
There seems to be no question but that the jurisdiction of the city court within the territory may be controlled entirely by the General Assembly. Its jurisdiction is almost the equivalent of that of circuit courts. It is authorized and permitted to change the venue in cases over which it admittedly has jurisdiction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 37, par. 346.) Its practice and procedure is the same as that of circuit courts. (Chap. 37, par. 333.) Granting to city courts the power to transfer the venue of a case to another court does not extend their jurisdiction over any additional territory, and it is a judicial function; its purpose is a beneficent one in preventing the loss of rights through inadvertence or mistake. It constitutes a limited jurisdiction which the General Assembly could confer upon a city court without extending its territorial jurisdiction, the same as given circuit and county courts when they act beyond their respective jurisdictions.
The other point upon which it is claimed the statute has an unconstitutional effect, viz: that it does not require the issuance of new process, requires little attention. The matter of the issuance and service of process has always been within the province of the General Assembly, subject *150 to the provision that parties must be given due process of law. The venue statute provides that when the parties are found to be in the wrong court, upon transfer being made in accordance with the statute in question, the cause "shall be then pending and triable in such court or county to which the same shall be so changed the same as in other cases of change of venue." The general statute with respect to change of venue (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 146, pars. 15-16,) does not require new service of process, and since we have held the power granted for such changes of venue is a limited jurisdiction to transfer only, we cannot perceive why the effect of changing the venue under the statute in question should be different than in other changes of venue, where the only requirement to give jurisdiction to the transferee court is a transcript of the record and the docketing of the cause. Appellees have not pointed out any valid reason for the distinction.
Some comment is made in the briefs of the respective parties as to what was said in Herb v. Pitcairn,
Under substantially the same facts we reached the same result in the Belcher case, which was transferred from the city court of East St. Louis to the circuit court of St. Clair county.
In No. 27275, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison county is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the motion to quash the service and to set aside the order dismissing the case. In No. 27276, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair county is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the motion to quash service, and to set aside the order dismissing the case.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.