Her v. Comm Social SecurityHer v. Comm Social Security
** The Honorable Sandra S. Beckwith, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
ARGUED: Timothy A. O‘Rourke, HAY & O‘ROURKE, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Kathryn A. Beverly, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REGION V, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy A. O‘Rourke, HAY & O‘ROURKE, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Kathryn A. Beverly, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REGION V, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.
OPINION
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. Administrative Law Judge Paula Zera denied plaintiff Yer Her‘s request for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, a decision which the Commissioner of Social Security аffirmed. After plaintiff‘s appeal to the District Court, that court also affirmed the decision finding that Yer Her was not disabled. For the reasons laid out below, we AFFIRM the decision of the District Court.
In reviewing the decision of the District Court, we must determine whether the Administrative Law Judge‘s decision was supported by substantial evidence, which is generally defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff-appellant Yer Her is presently 39 years old, and was 35 years old at the time of the ALJ‘s decision. She is
Plaintiff Her‘s sister also testified on her behalf. She indicated that when the sisters worked in the donut factory, plaintiff Her was unable to independently determine which donuts to glaze and which donuts to fill, and required the regular assistance of her sister in order to complete the job. In addition, Her‘s sister testified that although Her was able to care for her own grooming needs, she was unable to do housework, cook, or care for her children, and her sister daily undertook these tasks on her behalf.
The ALJ had before her a record replete with medical examinations and analyses of Her‘s hearing problem. Based on this and on the rest of the evidence, including Her‘s testimony, she concluded that Her‘s hearing impairment was severe in nature. The ALJ did not find, however, that Her‘s alleged mental and emotional impairments were severe. The only medical opinion in the record indicating that Her suffered from disabling mental and emotional impairments was the recommendation of Dr. Bradley that Her receive full disability. There were no other medical opinions in the record dealing with Her‘s mental and emotional state, aside from a
The ALJ determined that Dr. Bradley‘s examination was not wholly credible due to a number of factors. First, Her never cоmplained that she suffered from auditory or mental hallucinations in any other context, including her testimony before the ALJ. This evidence led the ALJ to believe that Bradley could have misunderstood somе of Her‘s responses. Second, the ALJ noted the opinion of psychological experts that psychological testing can never be fully accurate through an interpreter, because it involves many cultural and linguistic nuances that could easily be distorted through the language barrier. Third, the ALJ heard the testimony of a vocational expert who testified after first listening to both Yer Her‘s tеstimony and her sister‘s testimony. Considering all of the testimony, as well as Her‘s language difficulties, her hearing problems, and her small stature, the vocational expert still concluded that there were a numbеr of light, unskilled, repetitive jobs which Her could perform and which would be less taxing on her than her previous job at the donut factory. The vocational expert also called into question Dr. Bradlеy‘s assessment by noting that a Global Assessment of Functioning score under 40 indicates such severe impairment and lack of functioning that hospitalization, or at the very least further treatment, should have bеen recommended. In this case, the ALJ was startled by the juxtaposition of such an extremely low GAF score, absolutely no recommendation for future treatment or assessment, and Dr. Bradley‘s prominent request for reimbursement. All of these factors led the ALJ
Plaintiff Yеr Her further argues that the Commissioner did not meet his burden of proof once plaintiff proved that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. Specifically, Her argues that the Commissiоner should have had the burden of proving plaintiff‘s Residual Functional Capacity. Disability benefit claims are assessed using an established five-step analysis. As an initial matter, we note that the burden of prоof lies with the claimant at steps one through four of the process, culminating with a claimant‘s proof that she cannot perform her past relevant work. The burden of proof shifts to the Commissiоner only if the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can perform, is reached. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987); Walters v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 1997). The rationale behind this rule is simple. It is thought to be unfair to require а lay claimant to prove that there are no jobs available in the economy which he can perform because such a determination requires a level of expertise in vocational matters. On the other hand, it is not unfair to require a claimant to prove the extent of his impairments. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5 (“It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better position to рrovide information about his own medical condition, to do so.“)
Bearing in mind this rationale behind the shifting of the burden of proof in disability cases, we reject plaintiff‘s contention that once the burden оf proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, the Commissioner is then required to prove a claimant‘s Residual Functional Capacity. The determination of a claimant‘s Residual Functional Capacity is a determination based upon the severity of his medical and mental impairments. This determination is usually made at
Plaintiff argues that some ambiguous language in Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1990), demonstrates that the burden of proving RFC also shifts to the Commissioner at step five. The pertinent language states that “[a]t this point [step five], the Secretary bears the burden of demonstrating that, notwithstanding the claimant‘s impairment, he retains the residual functional capacity to perform specific jobs existing in the national economy.” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). The Abbott case, however, did not specifically address the issue before this court. Taken in context, the language was meant only to emphasize that the burden of рroof shifts at step five in order to prove the availability of jobs in the national economy, and should not be read to expand that requirement. To require the Commissioner to prove a сlaimant‘s RFC at step five is essentially to partially shift the burden of proof required of a claimant at step four to the Commissioner. For these reasons, we reject the argument that if Residual Functional Capacity is not proven by the claimant before step five, the burden of proving it shifts to the Commissioner.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the opinion of the District Court.