93 Neb. 278 | Neb. | 1913
Lead Opinion
This action was brought by the plaintiff, Mary Henze, against John Mitchell and George H. Henze to redeem her
The facts upon which the foreclosure is alleged to have been void as to the plaintiff are recited in the petition in the instant case: That on February 23, 1900, a petition was filed in the district court for Sheridan county, entitled “The County, of Sheridan, Plaintiff, v. .George H. Henze, and Mrs. Henze, his wife. Christian name unlmowii,
The plaintiff in the instant case stated in her petition that no summons was served upon her or delivered to her, and that she had not waived the same; that she did not have any knowledge of the facts until about August, 1907; that a purported sheriff’s deed was made to the said John Mitchell, who became the purchaser at said sale; that the said defendant John Mitchell had promised the defendant George H. Henze that, if he, the said George H. Henze, would not bid at the sheriff’s sale, then that he, the said John Mitchell, would convey the said tract by deed to the said defendant George H. Henze, but that said Mitchell failed to so convey said premises, and refused to permit a redemption thereof from said sale; that said defendant John Mitchell filed an answer in the instant case, which admits that the plaintiff, Mary Henze, had an inchoate-dower interest in the land in controversy as the wife- of the defendant George H. Henze, and denied that he had ever entered into any agreement with the said George H. Henze to purchase said land at sheriff’s sale and convey
The summons in the foreclosure case was apparently served upon Mrs. Henze by leaving an alleged certified copy at her usual place of residence. Her Christian name is not in the summons. She is not sued as Mary Henze, nor does the record disclose the fact that she is Mary Henze. This sort of service cannot be defended under the decisions of this court in the foreclosure of tax liens, and some other cases. Enewold v. Olsen, 39 Neb. 59; Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78; Herbage v. McKee, 82 Neb. 354. And where there is no service, or no sufficient service, the judgment against the person who should have been served is void, and such person may redeem from the sale made. Clarence v. Cunningham, 86 Neb. 434; Humphrey v. Hays, 85 Neb. 239; Smith v. Potter, 92 Neb. 39; Code, sec. 148.
In Enewold v. Olsen, supra, this court held that the name of a person consists of one given name and one surname, and, using the given name first and the surname last, constitute such person’s legal name, and that to be ignorant of either is to be ignorant of such person’s name, within the meaning of section 148 of the code; that the law requires that a defendant shall be sued by his true name, if the same is known or can be ascertained by the party
The plaintiff contends for the right to protect that which she alleges was her homestead. It is claimed by the defendant Mitchell that, at the time the decr.ee in favor of the plaintiff was set aside, the evidence fails to sustain the homestead claim. It is admitted by his answer that the plaintiff, Mary Henze, was the wife of the defendant George H. Henze, and that she had an inchoate right of dower in the premises at the time they were sold, because of the ownership of her husband. Blevins v. Smith, 104
When dower once attaches, the husband cannot, by any act or admission of his, defeat it, and no judgment rendered against him will prejudice the right and interest of the wife. Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172; Williams v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 587.
The right of dower, when marriage and seizin unite, is vested and absolute, and is as completely beyond legislative control as is the principle established. Russell v. Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362; Steele v. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39.
The power of the legislature to cut off the inchoate right of dower may well be doubted. Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336.
In Davis v. Green, 102 Mo. 170, 11 L. R. A. 90, it was held that the sheriff’s deed to the husband gave the plaintiff dower in the land, and that no act or declaration of the husband could divorce the same or impair it.
In Seibert v. Todd, 31 S. Car. 206, 4 L. R. A. 606, it was held that, where the seizin of the husband is accompanied at its inception with a lien, the inchoate right of dower of the wife attaches in subordination and subject to the lien.
In Bullard v. Bowers, 10 N. EL 500, the mortgage contained a condition that the mortgagor should provide a good and comfortable. home in the dwelling-house on the mortgaged premises, and a good bed for the use and benefit of Asahel Bullard during his natural lifetime, and also pay to him $300 when he might be in need of the same for his support by reason of old age; and it was held that, so long as the mortgagee had not demanded a performance of
In 1 Scribner, Dower (2d ed.), it is said in section 3, p. 481: “It was settled in the English courts of equity at an early day that as to all charges and incumbrances upon the husband’s land valid and effectual against the wife, which were in their nature redeemable, there was conferred upon her, by reason of her interest in the premises, a right of redemption.” Many English cases are cited in the note to this section, • among which are Hitchens v. Hitchens, 2 Vern. (Eng.) 403; Hamilton v. Mohun, 1 Will. P. (Eng.) 118; Squire v. Compton, 9 Vin. Abr. (Eng.) 227. It is said in the same section that, when in the United States the right of the widow to be endowed was extended to equities of redemption of mortgages in fee, it followed as an incident thereof that she was entitled to redeem. “And accordingly it is the general, if not the universal, American doctrine that the widow may redeem the husband’s lands from an existing incumbrance, and thus entitle herself to dower even as against the mortgagee.”
In Hugunin v. Cochrane, 51 Ill. 302, 2 Am. Rep. 303, it was held that where a husband purchased lands, giving his notes as security for the purchase price, and afterward, by his sole deed, reconveyed the lands to the vendor as a satisfaction of the notes, the wife’s right of dower did not attach.
In Williams v. Kinney, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 1, it was held that “the equitable dower of the widow was subject to the equitable lien existing in favor of Huntington (the vendor), but that she had an equitable claim to have the personal estate exhausted in discharge of the personal obligation of the husband under the contract of purchase.” The right to have the personal estate exhausted emphasizes the high regard of the court for the dower interest of the widow.
In McClure v. Harris, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 261, it is said that the widow was entitled to dower in all the land em
In Blair v. Thompson, 11 Grat. (Va.) 441, it was held that, where W. gave a bond and security for the purchase price, the vendor’s lien was not retained, and that his widow was entitled to dower in the land.
In Steuart v. Beard, 4 Md. Ch. 319, it was held that, where the husband had an equitable interest in the land conveyed by G. to S. subject to the payment of the sums secured by a deed, but not liable to the judgment so as to defeat the widow’s title to dower, judgment- having been recovered after the marriage, it was subordinate to the claim of dower, which commenced with the marriage and the purchase of the land by the husbandv
In Clements v. Bostwick, 38 Ga. 1, it was held that, when the husband of a married woman ,died seized and possessed of a tract of land to which he held the legal title, the widow was entitled to her dower therein, and that the vendor’s equitable lien for part of the unpaid purchase money, which was not enforced during the lifetime of the husband, would not override or defeat the widow’s legal right to her dower in the land.
In Meigs v. Dimock, 6 Conn. 458, it was held that the widow’s right of dower would be protected as against a sale by an administrator for the payment of the grantee’s debts, and against D. who had gone into possession of the premises and made repairs and improvements under a conveyance from C., who was the grantee of A.
Cameron, Law of Dower (p. 4), cites Blackstone, and says: “The right of a widow to dower did not originate from any legislative or other law, but, as Blackstone says, from that ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs called the Common Law, however compounded, or from whatever fountains derived which had subsisted immemorially.” He further says (p. 5) : “Dower was intended for the sustenance of the widow and the nurture and education of the children, and is paramount to the debts of the husband even owing to the Grown.”
“Marriage and seizin are essential to the existence of an inchoate right of dower, as has already been noticed in respect to a widow’s dower right.” 14 Cyc. 926, citing Price v. Hobbs, 47 Md. 359; Scott v. Howard, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 319.
“When it becomes necessary to determine the value of the wife’s inchoate dower interest in her husband’s lands, it is competent to show the age, health, and habits of both the husband and the wife, and also to consult mortality tables of recognized authority.” 14 Cyc. 926, citing Sedgwick v. Tucker, 90 Ind 271; Unger v. Leiter, 32 Ohio St. 210; Mandel v. McGlave, 46 Ohio St. 407, 15 Am. St. Rep. 627, 5 L. R. A. 519; Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557, 10 S. E. 574.
“An inchoate right of dower is a subject of judicial protection” 14 Cyc. 926, citing Buzick v. Buzick, 44 la. 259, 24 Am. Rep. 740; Atwood v. Arnold, 23 R. I. 609, 51 Atl. 216.
“It has been held, therefore, that the wife may sue in her oAvn name to set aside a deed or other instrument made by her husband in fraud of her dower.” 14 Cyc. 926, citing Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Ia. 259, 24 Am. Rep. 740; Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298. 13 Am. Rep. 523; McClurg v. Schwartz, 87 Pa. St. 521.
“It has also been held that, where lands are sold on foreclosure and a surplus remains after' satisfying the mortgage debt, the Avife’s. portion thereof may be invested for her benefit free from the claims of creditors, judgment or otherwise, the income thereof to be paid to the husband during their joint lives, and to her during her oavu life if
“The proceeds of a married woman’s sale of her inchoate dower interest in her husband’s land, although invested in other land, are a part of her separate estate, and not subject to execution for her husband’s debts.” 14 Cyc. 927, note, citing Beals’ Fx’r v. Storm, 26 N. J. Eq. 372.
“In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, when the wife’s inchoate dower right has once attached, it cannot be divested, except by some act of her own, done according to the forms and in the manner prescribed by statute.” 14 Cyc. 929, and cases cited.
As a rule, the wife will not be precluded by judgments in actions to which she is not a party. Herrington v. Colburn, 108 Ill. 613; Wilkinson v. Parish, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) *653; Foster v. Hickox, 38 Wis. 408; Greiner v. Klein. 28 Mich. 12.
There must be a strict compliance by the tax sale purchaser or his assignee with each condition imposed by the statute, or the sale is void, the deed void, and redemption should be permitted. Peck v. Garfield County, 88 Neb. 635. In that case Judge Faavoett, delivering the opinion of this court, said that the unsAVorn return of the man who was sheriff was not the kind of proof required by the statute (which was an affidavit), and that it was, therefore, not competent evidence; that a tax deed issued upon such a certificate was void, and the court erred in refusing to permit the plaintiff to redeem. Also, in Thomsen v. Dickey, 42 Neb. 314, this court construed section 3, art. IX of the constitution, and section 123, art. I, ch. 77, Comp. St. 1893, and, reaffirming Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, said the notice to redeem must be served upon the very party designated by the statute, and must contain the precise information required, and that the statements required were as-jurisdictional as the service of the notice. When by its terms it is obvious that a tax deed does not convey a title, “it fails utterly to affect the rights of the original
The foregoing authorities show a most jealous regard by the courts for the wife’s inchoate right of dower and a continuous effort to preserve it. It would seem that an action to foreclose a tax lien against the owner of the fee is a personal action.
In Clarence v. Cunningham, 86 Neb. 434, this court said in the syllabus: “In a personal action to foreclose a tax lien against the owner of the fee, who is a resident’ of the state upon whom personal service can be made within the state, service by publication only is void.” This point in the syllabus treats an action brought against the owner of the fee to foreclose a tax lien as a personal action. It then follows up this statement by a conclusion emphasizing the former statement, and which is that service by publication in such case, where personal service can be made within the state, is void.
In Humphrey v. Hays, supra, Mr. Justice Barnes, delivering the opinion of this court, cited, with approval, Payne v. Anderson, 80 Neb. 216, and said that it was held in that case “that a judgment or decree affecting the title to land owned by a resident of this state, where the only notice is by publication, is void, where no appearance- was made by or for such resident; that, in an action to quiet title as against a sale for taxes made under a void decree of the court, an offer to pay such sum as the court may find due defendants on account of any lien for taxes paid is a sufficient offer to do equity and a sufficient tender of any taxes due the defendant. The petition in this case contained such an offer, and it follows that our former rulings upon the question involved in this suit require us to affirm the judgment of the district court.” In that case
In the instant case the plaintiff is a resident of the state, and was such resident at the time of the attempted service. It therefore follows, for all the reasons given, that the original judgment against her is void. WTiatever the interest is that she may have in the premises, she is entitled to protect it. Her interest is admitted to have been the dower interest of a wife in lands owned by her husband. The uniform procedure of the courts for a long period of years is to protect the inchoate right of dower held by the
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter a decree allowing plaintiff to redeem, and finding and fixing her interest in the property.
Reveksed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
If Mrs. Henze had endeavored, to redeem her husband’s land from the tax lien within the statutory two years after the sale, -she would have been entitled to do so, having a sufficient interest in the property to extend to her his right of redemption. There is no requirement in the statute that the wife of a landowner be made a party to tax foreclosure proceedings. In a few states, such as Missouri and Illinois, in which either the statutes as to the nature of the tax upon real estate and the lien created thereby, or the statute of dower, are very different from those of this state, it is held that the foreclosure of a tax lien does not bar an inchoate dower interest. In states such as Nebraska, in which there is no personal liability on the part of the landowner to pay the tax, in which the lien attaches to the land itself, whether assessed in the name of the owner or in that of some other person, or as unknown, in which the land is not listed by the owner but by the assessor, and in which the land itself is sold to pay delin