1 Blackf. 369 | Ind. | 1825
Case for slanderous words by Veatch against Henson, charging in the first count that — in a conversation concerning a certain trial in the Fayette Circuit Court, between Lyons plaintiff and Henson defendant, wherein Veatch was sworn and examined as a witness — the defendant said the plaintiff
On the trial, the Circuit Court refused the defendant liberty to prove that the words were true, in mitigation of damages; and according to almost all the modern cases they were correct. It is true a contrary doctrine formerly prevailed. Smithies v. Harrison, 1 Ld. Raym. 727. But since.the case of Underwood v. Parks, 2 Strange, 1200, the doctrine seems established, that the truth of the words cannot be given in evidence even in mitigation of damages, under the general issue. 2 Esp. N. P. 113. — 6 Bac. 253. — Peake’s Ev. 310. — 2 Phill. Ev. 107. — 2 Bos. & Pull. 225, note. — Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns. R. 234. The defendant also offered but was not allowed to prove that he had strong suspicions that the words were true. In Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. R. 251, which was an action for a libel, the defendant was permitted to prove that there was a general suspicion that the charge in the libel was true. And in Knobell v. Fuller, by C. J. Eyre, as cited in Peake’s Ev. 310, 2 Camp. R. 253, and 2 Esp. N. P. 112, the defendant, under the general issue, was permitted to prove such facts and circumstances as showed a ground of suspicion not amounting to actual proof of guilt. We have seen no case that goes further than these; and these will not support the defendant’s case. Proof of the plaintiff’s general character as to the offence charged against him, or of the facts and circumstances that excited suspicion, is very different from proof that the defendant himself had suspicions that the plaintiff was guilty. We think, with the Circuit Court, that-the evidence could not be admitted
The judgment is affirmed with costs.
The reason of this is, that to charge any person with being forsworn. flops not necessarily amount to a charge of perjury. So the term's villain,
In actions for oral slander or libel, the truth of the words or writing is a good justification; but it must be specially pleaded in order that the plaintiffmay be apprized of the defence relied on. So if the defendant would prove the truth of any part of the charge, he must plead a justification as to that part. Vessey v. Pike, 3 Carr. & Payne, 512. As to what proof in bar of the action, or in mitigation of damages, is admissible under the general issue, vide 2 Stark. Ev. 874 — 879.