44 So. 869 | Ala. | 1907
This action is detinue for the recovery of personal property, namely, one Monarch brick machine, and was brought against I. Walton. Walton in-terpleaded under the statute, making the required affidavit. Section 2634 of the Code of 1896. The claimants suggested by him appeared, made themselves parties defendant, and after much pleading which was wholly unnecessary, based upon a misconception of the proper procedure in this character of cases, there was a verdict and judgment for the claimants.
The trial court, as shown by the record, treated the claimants, who became by their interposition substituted defendants, as actors (plaintiffs) in the case, and directed by its ruling the issues to be made by the pleadings, and the trial to conform to this theory. This was clearly a mistake. ■ We doubt not that a claimant who appears and defends in the place of the original defendant should propound his claim to the property in writing with such degree of clearness, certainty, and full: ness as that the plaintiff may be informed of the character of his title and the court may be enabled to judge whether he has or has not a title to the property in controversy. But we apprehend that no stricter rule obtains with respect to the statement of his title, be it legal or equitable, than is required under the statute an-
No new right or remedy Avas created or conferred by the statute. It exitsed at common law in this class of •actions. In actions of detinue, even at an early period in the history of the common law, a defendant, claiming no interest in the property, Avas permitted to suggest the claimant, and could require him to intervene and defend the action, or else disclaim title to the property. Indeed, the remedy of interpleader by a defendant so situated, except by bill in equity, did not obtain in any personal action under the common law, except in’ actions of detinue. — 3 Beeves, History of English Law, pp. 448, 455; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 801.
The section of the Code of 1896 (section 2634) under which the remedy of interpleader was resorted to in this case, is unlike in this respect to the preceding section of the Code of 1896 (section 2633), in that the latter section not only created the right and remedy as well as the mode in which the remedy is to he invoked and pursued. It follows, therefore, that what is said in our
In consonance with the spirit and purpose of the statute, the proceedings in this class of cases should be, as far as practicable, assimilated to and conducted as are proceedings in the statutory trial of the right to property authorized by section 1484; and, where the proceeding is under that statute, “the plaintiff must allege that he has the legal title to the property, the subject of the ación, and the right of immediate possession. This is essential to support an action of detinue. The allegation is affirmative, and a negative of the truth of the claim of the claimant. As the plaintiff has the affirmative of the issue, the burden of proof will rest on him.” —Keyser v. Maas, 111 Ala. 394, 21 South. 346. This issue is one the law makes up between the plaintiff and the substituted defendant, and really the only pleading-necessary to a proper presentation of the disputed question of title to the property between them is the complaint and the statement of the substituted defendant’s claim. If this method of forming the issue is conformed to, the trial is simplified, and the jury will be enabled more readily and intelligently to comprehend the issue of fact they are to determine. Of course, the verdict and judgment must conform to the requirements prescribed by the statute in detinue, just as though the contest was between the plaintiff and the original defendant. — 41 South. 516.
There was a failure to prove value in this case. The only evidence offered was that showing the extent of detriment to the land and plant by the removal of the machine sued for, which was fixed at about $850, the price of the machine. If the price agreed to he paid for the machine in Indianapolis, Ind., where purchased, he conceded to he evidence of its value at the place where it was subsequently put in operation, it Avas clearly no evidence of that fact some íavo years later, after it had been operated for that length of time. Furthermore, the testimony tended to show that one of the arms of the machine was cracked Avhen the purchaser received it after shipment at the point of destination. How much this defect and the use of the machine for nearly two years would reduce its value from the original cost price is purely conjectural. In short, in the absence of some evidence of the value of the machine at the date of the bringing of the action in its then condition, the whole matter with respect of value was left at large and to the guess of the jury. — Gerson v. Norman, supra.
Affirmed.