*1 jury pursued to the criminal its as role and adversary to of the exclusion its role as Suttles, Bobby Individually R and in his trial.” United States v. just of a architect Capacity Official as former Sheriff of Jernigan, 1056-57 Haywood County; Doe, #1; John John 2007). In such circumstances—and in Doe, #2; Larry Bryson; David Mitch of conflicting and unresolved facts ell, Defendants. bearing materiality the Roberts No. 16-1294 materials—the district court should not Brady claim disposed Petitioner’s of Appeals, United States Court holding evidentiary without hearing. Fourth Circuit. VACATED, PART, IN RE- AND Argued: March MANDED Decided: November
Amended: November HENSLEY, Ann Teresa as relator ON
BEHALF OF the State of NORTH
CAROLINA, and as Administrator Hensley; Estate David Lee
H.H., minor, by through her friend;
parent and next Fer Rachelle
guson, Individually, and as relator Carolina,
behalf State of North
Plaintiffs-Appellees, PRICE, Individually Scott
Michael Capacity
in his Official as Lieutenant Haywood County Depart Sheriffs
ment; Beasley, Keith Allen Individu
ally Capacity his Official
Deputy Haywood County Sheriff of Department;
Sheriffs American West Company, Corporate
Insurance Sure
ty on the official bond the Sheriff Haywood County; The Ohio Casu
alty Company, Corporate Insurance
Surety on the official bond of the Haywood County,
Sheriff of Defen
dants-Appellants, *4 SHEDD, DUNCAN, AGEE,
Before Circuit Judges. published opinion. Judge
Affirmed Agee opinion, in wrote the which Judge n Duncan joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting opinion.
AGEE, Judge: Circuit Deputies Michael Price Keith Beas- ley (collectively, the “Deputies”)—both em- ployed by Haywood County, North Carolina, Department—shot Sheriffs killed David outside his home morning of August plain- tiffs—Hensley’s daugh- widow and two ters—brought against suit both their capacities individual and official under 42 U.S.C. Car- and North *5 olina law the United District States Court, for the Western District of North Deputies Carolina. The asserted federal qualified immunity and related state de- summary fenses in a motion for judgment, which the district For court denied. follow, reasons that we affirm the district judgment.1 court’s I.
A. interlocutory appeal raising On an qualified immunity, Court issue Houghton Patrick Flanagan, light CRAN- views facts in the most favorable FILL, HARTZOG, LLP, SUMNER & plaintiffs. Pegg Herrnberger, Charlotte, Carolina, Appellants. North for summa We McLean, III, Lyway Russell MCLEAN rize the facts viewed as fol FIRM, PA, lows, Waynesville, LAW North Car- recognizing the forecast olina, Appellees. for markedly contrary. evidence ed); Cochran, plaintiffs 1. The N.C.App. also American In- sued West White (2013) Casualty (noting surance Co. and The Ohio Insurance that the sheriff S.E.2d Co., parties appeal. surety joined which are only also to this The be "where the sued cases). companies collecting party”; insurance concede that as a Because we law, plaintiffs’ denying North Carolina claims affirm court's order the district suit, against them immunity rise and the claims fall with also affirm against Deputies. summaty judg- generally See Gen. N.C. denial court’s § (requiring Casualty. Stat. 162-8 sheriffs to be bond- ment to West American and Ohio and shot and ties vehicles exited their Deputies2 respond- August In killed at Hens- him. call disturbance to a domestic ed pair 6:15 a.m. When the ley’s home around B, cars in the front
arrived,
parked their
facing
vehicles
remained
yard and
Ann
plaintiffs—Teresa
July
thereafter,
Shortly
porch.
the home’s
wife),
capacity
in her
Hensley (Hensley’s
daughter,
Fer-
Rachelle
Hensley; his older
estate;
Fer-
as administrator
H.H.,
daughter,
minor
guson; and his
against
suit
guson;
H.H.—filed
porch
home and onto
out
walked
offi-
individual and
both- their
handgun.
together. Hensley held
court.
capacities
cial
the district
handgun,
but
noticed
Deputies'
claims
complaint
asserted
operative
action—-they
announced
neither
took no
for the violation
against
Hensley
drop
nor
presence
asked
right to be
Hensley’s Fourth Amendment
Instead,
as
gun.
watched
seizure, as en-
free from unreasonable
Ferguson and
briefly struggled with both
§
As relevant
U.S.C.
forced
handgun.
HS,
striking'Ferguson
with
supple-
here,
complaint also
asserted
ended,
After that altercation
law,
North Carolina
mental claims under
porch
off
walked
watched
(2)
(1) assault;
negligent inflic-
including:
yard
them.
into the
When
distress, (“NIED”); and
of emotional
tion
Hensley looked back at
yard,
reached
(3)
death,
to N.C. Gen.
wrongful
pursuant
According to
daughters
porch.
sought
plaintiffs,
28A-18-2.3 The
Stat.
pleadings
proffer of evi-
plaintiffs’
damages.
punitive
compensatory
both
dence,
handgun
still
held the
'
Deputies moved
discovery,
After
ground as he
pointed
it's
at the
muzzle
arguing
judgment,
summary
the"
stairs and
descended
walked
immunity
were entitled
Deputies.
toward the
*6
§ 1983
individual-capacity
plaintiffs’
the
events,
Throughout this series of
Hens-
rea-
acted
ground
on the
claims
acknowledge
ley
Deputies
and the
did
They also
using deadly
in
force.
sonably
each
presence.
other’s
never
public
entitled
contended
gun
Deputies
raised
un-
immunity
official
and related defenses
any overt
them. For
made
threats toward
plaintiffs’
on
North Carolina law
der
him
part,
their
never ordered
assault, NIED-, and
capacity
individual
any
drop
type
or issued
stop,
Finally,
Depu-
wrongful death claims.
of
that nei-
warning.
The
concede
that,
their
if the court resolved
argued
ties
Hensley.
spoke
ther of them
ever
them, the
immunity
favorably
defenses
a
capacity claims failed as
plaintiffs’ official
Shortly
descended
.after
of
yard,
Depu- matter
law.
into the
and walked
jointly
complaint
also asserted
additional
Deputies'
The
conduct
2. We refer to the
constitution,
under the
Carolina
throughout
opinion
claims
North
here
because
law tort of intentional
well as for the state
plaintiffs
them as one
treat
actor.
The plaintiffs'
of emotional distress.
infliction
state constitu-
Voluntarily abandoned
original jurisdiction
3.' The district court
granted the
court
tional claims. The district
§
claim
28
plaintiffs'
1983
over the
plaintiffs’
summary judgment on the
jurisdic-
supplemental
§
U.S.C.
1331. It had
distress
infliction of emotional
law
intentional
plaintiffs’
tion
each of
state
over
appeal.
in this
at issue
§
Neither claim is
claim.1
claims under
U.S.C.
court
district
entered
order de-
A..
Deputies’
nying
summary
motion
This Court reviews the district
judgment on the issue of qualified immuni-
court’s
qualified
of
immunity
denial
de
ty, and concluded that:
novo, taking all
light
the facts
most
legal question. is
[T]he
whether
[the]
here,
favorable to the non-moving party,,
give
[plaintiffs’
can
forecast
evidence
plaintiffs. Pegg,
II. from-the-hip” position. Similarly, we Deputies arguments raise two accept not their contention that when First, appeal. the' contend that dis- Hensley stepped initially the onto he denying trict court erred in them pointed jury the at them. aWhile immunity plain- from suit allowing the by well could believe evidence forecast Second, § 1983 claim to proceed. tiffs’ Deputies, light in we take facts argue that court plaintiffs favorable to the to deter most denying erred in questions their mine application applicable of law and defenses, North state ignore any contrary Carolina law factual claims.4 See polar opposites. 4. We note the forecast most of relevant evidence in case is at 511, 528-29, viola Forsyth, who commit constitutional 472 U.S. officers v. Mitchell (1985) (ob- who, clearly 2806, tions estab but 86 L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. law, immunity reasonably believe that “question of lished serving that Henry were v. Pur underlying their actions lawful.” the merits of the separate (en 524, 2011) nell, interlocutory 652 F.3d [an for purposes action banc). doctrine] the collateral order appeal under con- reviewing must though a court
even set two-step process Under the allegations factual plaintiffs sider the v. Supreme by out Court Saucier issue”); immunity Pegg, 845 resolving Katz, 533 U.S. 121 S.Ct. at 117. F.3d (2001), may ask “whether L.Ed.2d 272 we Henry, III. a constitutional occurred.” violation at 531. If conclude that a F.3d we A. occurred, violation constitutional has Deputies’ qualified first turn We right violated then examine “whether plain- to the argument related immunity clearly right Id. A established.” claim. tiffs’ 1983 “clearly contours established” when “its offi sufficiently clear a reasonable
are cial that what is do would understand right.” Cooper, ing 1983 “creates cause violates that Section (internal who, quotation un any person acting at 158 alteration and against action omitted). law, right Although may exercise abridges of state marks color der determining or laws of our discretion which arising under Constitution first, Sheehan, Pearson Cooper prongs analyze 735 two the United States.” Callahan, 223, 236, 153, 158 In the case at U.S. (2009), bar, have plaintiffs alleged have 172 L.Ed.2d therefore, raise—and, Fourth violated failed waived—any argument right to from unrea free be Amendment not See though plain issue was established. Fed. seizures. Even sonable (“[T]he violation, 28(a)(8)(A) argument R. P. alleged App. tiffs have constitutional contain conten quali appellant’s are ... must ... “entitled to invoke them[.]”); mere tions Ed immunity, which is more reasons for fied than Goldsboro, liability; immunity City defense it is wards v. 1999) itself,” (noting requirements. 241 n.6 failure suit meet Id.; Mitchell, Rule abandon comply U.S. at 28 results see also “Qualified immunity appeal).5 we exam protects Consequently, ment S.Ct. 2806. Indeed, undisputed appellant parts which the if the evidence the record on 28(a)(8)(A) App. (emphasis Deputies, they likely be relies.” Fed. R. forecast would P. However, added). pigs, qualified immunity. Appellate "are like entitled to courts summary hunting the state of the record at the in briefs.” is not for truffles buried United *8 Dunkel, 955, (7th stage. judgment 927 956 Cir. States v. F.2d curiam). 1991) Similarly, job (per is not our through argu- disagrees analy- wade the record and make The dissent with our waiver "to Dissenting Op. City party.” the Rules for either Friedel v. sis. See II.B.l. But ments Madison, of (7th 1987). 965, quite 832 F.2d 969 Cir. Appellate “[a Procedure are clear: Here, argument opening contain ... the brief contains section] brief’s must by development required the appellant's reasons none of the rule. contentions and the [the] them, argument "clearly estab- no the for to the authorities and It contains on citations
581 only prong, ine the first Saucier That inquiry “whether asks: when view ing in the facts most favorable to a constitutional violation occurred.” plaintiffs, Deputies did the violate prong qualified immunity prong qualified lished” of the test. could raise the second remand, actually apply- It contains no citation to cases immunity again test on which ing "clearly prong construct, however, established” appeal. could then That qualified immunity test. And it contains no operation contravenes the of the mandate citations to record to indicate "specific applica- rule. The mandate rule is a Deputies preserved argument below. tion of law case doctrine” that tacitly acknowledges Depu- The dissent relitigation expressly "forecloses of issues point, only ties’ abdication on this as it can impliedly by appellate decided court” muster two instances in which Bell, 64, remand. United States v. 5 F.3d 66 prong qualified mention the second of the (4th 1993). sure, Deputies may Cir. To be immunity opening test in their brief. And even again qualified immunity appro- raise at an then, cursory reading a reveals do so trial, priate time at but the mandate rule only boilerplate applica- in a recitation of the prohibits summary judg- a "do-over” at the legal ble standard. Crooke, stage. Willingham ment See faulty its dissent cannot bolster waiver 553, (4th 2005) ("Thus, Cir. F.3d while analysis by referencing analyzing irrele purely legal question of whether the con- example, vant concerns. For the dissent issue stitutional at estab- points out that the referenced the always capable lished is decision at qualified immunity prong analy second of the summary judgment stage, question a genuine true, 28(j) sis in a Rule letter. While that does regarding of material fact whether the con- analysis. not alter our it. Under the Nor could allegedly right actually duct violative of the Procedure, Appellate Rules of is ana waiver (inter- trial.”) must be reserved occurred lyzed opening based on the content omitted); quotation nal alterations and marks brief; again, argument brief's ”[a section] Pelletier, 299, see also Behrens v. 516 U.S. appellant’s must ... [the] contain contentions 309, 834, (1996) L.Ed.2d 773 them, reasons for with citations to the (indicating government defendant parts authorities and of the record on which denied, qualified immunity, raise once at a appellant App. relies.” Fed. R. P. stage proceeding subsequent of a because 28(a)(8)(A). We held that this rule does legal governs). inquiry standard different preservation argument not allow for an where although Deputies may But be able reply is raised for the brief. See first time in a pursue immunity stage at a later Hand, Helping Cty., A LLC v. Balt. F.3d proceeding, the mandate rule "restricts (4th 2008). Cir. It follows all the authority the district court’s on remand” to letter, strongly 28(j) more filed that Rule summary judgment reconsider that issue in a brief, wholly inappro even reply after is a Chao, (4th motion. Doe v. 511 F.3d priate preserving means of an and ineffectual 2007). held; Cir. fact, argument appeal. we have so engenders is Any the waiver rule harshness litigant’s "We do not countenance a use of clarity: party offset must do more than its 28(j) argu Rule as new a means advance passing prop- at issue” to [an] shot "take[ ] supplemental ments couched as authorities.” erly appellate Grayson preserve it for review. Ashford, United States v. 718 F.3d LLC, Agadir 2013). O Co. v. Int'l 28(j) Were we to treat Rule 2017). actually party must "de- independently an sufficient means of advanc Belk, argument.” Meyer velop [its] Inc. ing argument an not raised in the briefs we Corp., 679 n.4 [issuing] improvi would run "the risk of Here, Deputies' of the ele- bare recitation opinion dent or ... on an un- ill-advised Thus, qualified immunity ments of a defense does Ashford, briefed issue.” They by failing preserve not clear that hurdle. failed to "take a open the issue in their brief, ing passing appellants, shot issue.” As No subse at the waived it. required quent filing to state “contentions can revive it. App. P. dissenting colleague the reasons for them.” Fed. R. Our also overstates the This, 28(a)(8)(A). perceived inefficiency finding Deputies utterly failed to waiver it, stage. As the dissent sees do. *9 582 hand, Ferguson in hit shortly to be
Hensley’s Fourth Amendment
that
seizures
coming
advancing
off the
free from unreasonable
when
before
against
them,
deadly
exercised
entire
of
force was
him?
toward
that the
series
deadly
force
Depu-
seizure sub
only
“The use
brief
events took
time.
.,;
Amendment,”
ject to-
the Fourth
Ten
posit
deadly
ties
that their
force
Garner,
1, 7, 105
nessee v.
U.S.
S.Ct.
against Hensley in such
was
circumstances
(1985). “A
First, assume, must, if sight; we line of nor we could they see him. Id. evidence, credibility plaintiffs’ Cooper When upon officers, came cannot say Hensley posed a threat “[reacting sight of Cooper his and physical harm to serious either the Dep shotgun, the [officers. drew service daughters uties or his at the time the weapons and firing commenced without Deputies fired the fatal shot. lawful warning.” at Id. possession by suspect a a firearm at his facts, On home, those more, we held without is an insufficient rea officers’ son use of justify deadly deadly force. use force violated Cooper’s (cid:127)Indeed, it is for an unreasonable officer to Fourth rights Amendment Cooper because believe suspect poses “that a a threat of never raised shotgun toward the offi- , harm, physical serious either [himself] cers possession and “the mere of a firearm to others,” merely suspect or because that by a suspect enough is not permit possesses a Cooper, firearm. 735 F.3d at deadly force.” Id. at 159. We rea- (internal quotation and alterations soned, “an officer possess does not omitted); Porter, marks see also Pena v. authority unfettered to shoot a member of 2009) 316 Fed.Appx. public simply person because that (“Absent any additional factors which carrying weapon.” Id. give would probable cause to fear [officers] safety for their or safety others, for the So too here. The responded to presence mere of weapon is not home, domestic at Hensley’s disturbance justify sufficient use of deadly but- no specific had information about the force.”). they arrived-shortly situation. When after facts, dawn, plaintiffs’ Under the version of the daughters stepped noteworthy case bears a resemblance out of onto porch. the home and Hens- to our in Cooper decision v. Sheehan— ley handgun, had a but it never raised another case where law enforcement used According toward the Deputies. to the against non-threatening sus- plaintiffs’ evidence, jury, believed There, pect. responded to the officers a Hensley threatening no made statements domestic Cooper’s disturbance home. anyone or actions the moments toward Cooper, 735 F.3d 155. Rather than an- immediately preceding shooting. In- nounce their presence, simply one officer stead, off Hensley stepped “tapped Cooper’s on the window .[of home] into yard, keeping handgun point- (internal flashlight.” with his quotation Id. at all ed times. Never- ground toward omitted). marks response, Cooper theless, immediately after he almost' “peered out the back door” and out “called stepped Deputies opened into yard, anyone himself,” yard identify in the fire on him Hensley and killed without but the respond. officers Id. did Faced warning. jury plaintiffs’ If a credited silence, with Cooper went outside to inves- facts, reasonably version of tigate brought the noise him Hensley never conclude that because twenty-gauge shotgun. Id. the butt “With officers, raised the to the' because firearm in his hand and its them, he never threatened otherwise pointed ground, muzzle Cooper Hensley simply shot because opened the took back door and two As possession of a firearm. held-in three steps porch.” to his darkened Id. (internal omitted). Cooper, violates the Fourth quotation By marks such conduct time, officers of Cooper’s were out Amendment. F.3d at 158-60. Cf. *11 event, if In the any even
Moreover, admit although plaintiffs believed that Hens reasonably could have engaged Ferguson were Hensley and physical ley posed a threat serious porch, that altercation in a brief him—or to harm, their failure warn calculus. The change our fact does em drop gun—before him to order Hensley and Fer struggle between short an additional deadly force creates ploying whether Hens bearing on had little guson may an officer use impediment. Before to take the substantial prepared ley was if force, warning a deadly give he should disturbance escalating a step of domestic 11-12, Gamer, at 471 U.S. is feasible. See confrontation with deadly potentially into (“[I]f threatens suspect S.Ct. Thus, under the officers. two armed prob or there is weapon with a the officer facts, no reason version plaintiffs’ has commit to believe that he able cause that Hens officer could have believed able infliction or involving the ted a crime physical harm threat of serious ley posed a physical infliction of serious threatened time used Deputies at to the harm, used neces deadly force be per Nor are we against him. deadly force if, where sary escape, and prevent feasi Ferguson attack suaded (em ble, warning given.” has been some deadly force Deputies’ made added)). that a reasoned phasis We have from her serious protect imperative warning is not if “the hesitation feasible Deputies fired injury. When the physical warning readily in giving a involved with Fer Hensley, physical conflict his warning to [the officer’s] be cause such Hensley had ventured guson had ended. Karnes, 27 F.3d McLenagan last.” Ferguson, porch, away from and off the 1994); (noting also id. see v. Bat yard. out into See Waterman that, there, might easily warning “a have 2005) ton, life”); officer Elliott cost the his cf. 1996) (“[FJorce Leavitt, is not justified moment] one [in deadly (holding that an officer’s use justifica if the seconds later justified even reasonable handcuffed force was when has been tion for the initial force eliminat him pointed handgun a small suspect ed.”). Deputies could have Whether suspect drop the officer ordered Hensley’s alter deadly during force used ignored). suspect which the his weapon, Ferguson is not at issue here. cation with give a simply put, an officer should More assuming Deputies could But warning using deadly force unless before so, by Hensley made it down the time done danger. threatened is an immediate there “justifica steps yard, any and into the jury crediting plaintiffs’ initial been elimi Because ha[d] tion force of the facts could conclude version Id.6 nated.” against physical dissenting colleague that no serious harm 6. Our maintains occurred, put Nor do much shot him. but cites the time violation constitutional Hensley generalities in the dissent’s assertion only irrelevant stock and otherwise presence by [Deputies’] "responded support the[] In conclusion. cases like facts one, gun coming immediately retrieving out- we must evaluate all facts Dissenting Graham, Op. confront them.” 593. side to circumstances. 490 U.S. at Hensley While true that permitted to make retrieved We are not presence, response that fact credibility weigh compet- to the determinations above, at the time the fatal not known to them ing was evidence. As discussed in detail facts,- Consequently, irrel- that fact is shot was fired. viewed in most favorable to Greenidge, analysis. 927 F.2d at to our plaintiffs, suggest had walked evant away Ferguson not threaten did not in any immediate Likewise, dan- others.” Id. at 131. in Slattery, ger when weapons, fired Virginia police concluded that a officer failure to weighs warn justified also in using when a against them. the moments leading up suspect in passenger seat of stopped fatal'shooting, to the watched car repeatedly lowered hands toward steps descend the object view, out of the officer’s in viola into yard. They pause watched him tion officer’s commands. 939 F.2d at *12 look back and to the house. And Although object 214-17. the turned out to briefly watched as Hensley bottle, walked toward be a beer id. at this Court held them. played While scene out in front that “a reasonable officer [nevertheless] them, Deputies the concede never probable could have had cause to believe ordered to drop gun the plaintiff] that posed threat,” [the deadly a warned that shoot. would While we id. at 216-17. have no doubt the circumstances confront- cases, In both once the officer a issued ing Deputies the were tense and fast mov- command, verbal the character of the situ-
ing,
fact
not
alone does
Gar-
obviate
ation
If an
transformed.
officer
a
directs
n
ner warning
admonition.
suspect
stop,
to
to show his hands or the
like,
contend that none of the
the suspect’s
movement
continued
reasons noted above are a sufficient basis
likely will
in
raise
the
objec-
officer’s mind
upon
to
which
affirm the district
tively grave
court’s
suspicions
and serious
about
qualified
denial of
immunity.
support
To
suspect’s
the
intentions. Even when those
argument,
they direct us to
fact,
four
intentions turn out to be
in
harmless
cases in which
qualified
im
extended
as in
Slattery,
Anderson and
the officer
to
munity
deadly
officers who used
reasonably expect
force:
can
at
worst
Russell,
Anderson v.
split-second
Here,
F.3d
when
acts.
Depu-
he
2001);
Hill,
Sigman v. Town Chapel
gave
161 ties
Hensley no
stop,
command to
1998); Elliott,
F.3d 782
drop
gun,
F.3d
or raise his hands. Because
640;
Rizzo,
Slattery
and
they gave warning,
knife made life, obey the officer’s and did officer’s B. stop, Id. commands to Deputies’ argu- We next address Elliott, officers shot defendant claims. plaintiffs’ as to state law ments who, while suspect restrained killed a car, pointed handcuffs at, officers’ order ignored them See at 642-43. weapon. drop *13 argue first that here, most favor- The facts viewed when claim fails as mat plaintiffs’ assault ably also' bear no resem- plaintiffs, to law, argu relying principally ter of Elliott. Hensley nev- to of blancé the facts of support ments advanced nor pointed er immunity.defense.7 disagree. qualified We stop drop to or
received command gun. law, a North Carolina Under action plaintiff may maintain civil sum, we conclude district ac arising from an it is arrest if' assault requested grant correctly denied the court Myrick See by complished excessive force. to jury of If a immunity. Cooley, 91 492, v. 209, evidence, 371 N.C.App. S.E.2d plaintiffs’ it con- credit (1988).8 gun, “Although the officer has dis that Hensley raised the clude never 496 analysis summary of the assault claim 7. While the of because our district court's denial analysis Deputies’ judgment entirely on our of plaintiffs' is not turns assault claim defense,. qualified immunity Deputies’ ordinarily immediately appealable under doctrine, challenge "inextricably is inter claim we to that collateral orders nevertheless defense, twined” with jurisdiction exercise appellate under pendent jurisdiction, of appellate doctrine appellate jurisdiction judicially- public Pendent created, is "a We note that the issue of whether exception discretionary tort immunity to the final to apply intentional official claims, can claim, judgment Republic plaintiffs’ splits requirement. Rux v. like the assault of Sudan, 2006). 461, Compare, e.g,, 461 Haw- 475 North F.3d courts Carolina. 615, State, only exception This applies N.C.App. S.E.2d is "narrow” v. 117 453 kins “(1) 233, (1995) (holding public inextricably when is an issue intertwined 242 official question subject immunity apply with proper is does not to tort intentional (2) claims), Anderson, Campbell or 156 appeal”; immediate "when review v. with 371, 726, (2003) jurisdictionally N.C.App. is insufficient issue neces 576 S.E.2d 730 otherwise). sary meaningful de- (concluding unpublished to of an imme In an ensure review (internal cision, appealable diately quota public previously applied issue.” offi- Id. omitted). “inextricably immunity See marks Claims cial to intentional are tion tort claims. 197, question specific Wolfe, Fed.Appx. will 202 Ayala intertwined the same v. 546 . 2013), appealable non- underlie and the both the Because resolve assault [claims], appealable reasoning by that resolution claim same used such court, unnecessary question necessarily it is to address [both will resolve Stores, public immunity bar application of the claims] at official once.” Scott v. Fam. Dollar Here, Inc., 105, to this 733 as it F.3d 111 relates claim.
587 limits, cretion, to judge within reasonable official. See v. Catawba Cty., Messick 110 707, 489, degree .required N.C.App. (1983), 431 of force S.E.2d n circumstances, abrogated when by Boyd there substantial on other grounds force, Cty., jury N.C.App. is for the Robeson evidence unusual (2005). Thus, acted as a decide whether officer S.E.2d would person prudent public reasonable be entitled official immunity or.whether so (1) arbitrarily maliciously.” long not act he acted Id. did “outside the (internal omitted). (2) quotation official scope authority,” marks “The [their] with malice, (3) corrupt question whether an officer has used manner. Wilcox Asheville, City N.C.App. a standard of judged excessive force (2012). objective reasonableness.” Civil Jordan v. S.E.2d Bd., 153 N.C.App. Service 570 S.E.2d court, Before the district (2002) (internal alteration plaintiffs argued acted omitted), quotation marks immunity malice. Public official “is noted, previously
As the facts tak unavailable officers who violate light en in the most favorable 'the plain rights because an established officer acts tiffs show that the conduct was that, with malice when he which a does not objectively The evidence reasonable. -of intelligence man reasonable would know Dep viewed in indicates that the contrary duty.” Bailey, be his. uties shot under no imminent (internal quotation marks Thus, warning. threat and without the dis omitted). law, North Carolina Under a law *14 correctly plain trict court concluded that duty officer has a not to enforcement use tiffs’ assault claim as a mat could proceed deadly upon unless, person force another ter law. among it things, “reasonably is other nec
essary ...
or
[t]o defend himself
a third
person
from what he reasonable believes
deadly
be the use
use of
imminent
Deputies’
nextWe
address the
physical force
[t]o effect an-
[or]
arrest[.]”
that they
public
assertion
are entitled to
15A-401(d)(1)-(d)(2).
N.C. Gen. Stat.
immunity
official
under North Carolina
plaintiffs’
wrongful
on the
again,
law
NIED and
taking
Once
in the
evidence
claims, as well as on
issue of
plaintiffs,
death
most
favorable
whether
be
puni
would
able to seek
correctly
Deputies
district
denied the
court
damages
conjunction
tive
their
public
immunity
with
official
because
tort
state
claims.9Public
in North
deadly
officials
reasonably necessary
force was not
usually
Carolina
are
suit
from
the.
that
Under
circumstances.10
immun.e
evidence,
actions taken in
capacities.
their official-
view of
Deputies
the-
shot
Kaasa,
Grad v.
See
312 N.C.
321 Hensley, despite
posed
the fact that
no
he
(1984).
deputy
S.E.2d
A
sheriff
immediate
to.
threat
harm
serious
either
carrying
public
out his duties is
daughters.
such
them or
Hensley simply
his
too,
jurisdiction
Deputies'
have
over
Deputies
We
in-
10. Here
any
have waived
appeal
public
terlocutory
official immu-
argument
the violation at issue here was
nity issue under the collateral order doctrine
"clearly
not
established.”
because,
law, public
under North Carolina
immunity,
qualified immunity,
official
like
"is
immunity
Bailey,
suit.”
in.
[00]
(1985). Here,
into the
stairs and
district'
qualified immunity on
morning
6 a.m.
after
Just
plaintiffs’§ 1983 claim
state
assault
law
August
Shirley Ferguson, Hens-
claim,
public
immunity
official
as well
mother-in-law,
ley’s
report
called 911
NIED, wrongful
punitive
death and
possible domestic
disturbance
damages
brought
claims
under North Car
agitated
home.
over-
had been
The judgment
law.
of the district
olina
night, telling
daughter
Rachelle that
court
only
people
left
Earth
asking
Rachelle to
his wife and
call
AFFIRMED.
her come home from
work.
to die. When
also indicated
wanted
SHEDD,
Judge, dissenting:
Circuit
*15
Rachelle,
check
Shirley called to
Hens-
Fourth
Reasonableness
the
ley
“going to
answered and told her he was
per
“is
the
Amendment
evaluated from
kill
slam-
GDB
with a knife” before
[sic]
scene,
of the
not
spective
officer on the
ming
phone
Hensley’s
behavior
down,
leisurely
the more
of hind
through
lens
Shirley’s
during
phone
call prompted
Abney
Coe,
sight.”
911 call.
however,
decision,
Today’s
began Henry
Haywood
Depu-
County
in
Two
continues
shift that
Sheriffs
Purnell,
2011) (en
ties,
Deputy
1. Like I refer "the Deputy Lieutenant Michael and David Price separate lying vehicles to the res- cover across the front drove marked seat. Lieu- radioed, Hensley’s As tenant Price approached gun! idence. “It’s Gotta home, gun!” elderly flagged up man down Lieu- and backed his car further (J.A. 633). Hensley driveway. him tenant Price to tell Lieutenant Price then kept neighborhood up night. taking all ready” exited his vehicle a “low dispatcher pro- position. also to called the Shirley 911 a update:
vide an had called point, At Hensley and Rachelle Hensley second time and indicated briefly gun. Hensley wrestled for the won granddaughters. As have hurt her struggle and struck Rachelle residence, Hensley’s approached gun. back of the head Rachelle Lieutenant Price was the car. lead Lieu- help and H.H. Dep- screamed Price, however, tenant the turn for missed uties, but neither officer issued verbal Hensley’s driveway; Beasley thus Deputy approached command or the house.3 After pulled began first down proceeding and striking gun, Rachelle Hensley with the let driveway. go porch of her and proceeded down the house, that, Hensley police steps. Inside the saw the Rachelle testified while she did bedroom, approaching, Hensley drop cars into his gun, ran see she lost sight his as gun porch. and reached under mattress retrieve he left the H.H. key gun opened gun to his safe. He then testified that the was not in hand, long-nose the safe and removed a revolver. that she could not see his buj; sister, H.H., attempted and her left hand. She also that his hands Rachelle testified stop Hensley, porch. but were unable do so. remained his side as he left the Hensley stepped All three then house onto the off porch, exited the Before porch and cars H.H. front saw two turned tell he loved her. driveway.2 into stepped left the and Beasley Price the front Deputy yard veering Lieutenant before off and walk- stopped ing directly Beasley’s front of the Deputy residence car. daughters spilled and his onto As Hensley leaving porch, Deputy out was porch. Hensley openly carrying Beasley, going was that he was afraid be house, car, both trapped open as he exited the in his his kicked vehicle door, vehicle, weapon. quickly saw him with the began exited the response seeing gun, moving position with a to a defensive the back Deputy Beasley immediately away oncoming himself of threw his car further car put Hensley. Beasley down across his front saw that Hens- Deputy seat Because, however, Deputy ley, away, reverse. feet who was about 30 *16 Beasley not be of walking gun could sure Lieutenant him with the in his toward Price’s Deputy Beasley location and was concerned about hand. fired three as shots Price, car injuring put Aoving away per- Lieutenant he his from the he continued time, park position roughly back into and in a At remained ceived threat. the same Hensley dispute being 2. There is no knew that the ine a trained officer if he that scared vehicles were cars. perceive facing did not that he was an ex- tremely dangerous Beasley Deputy situation. 3. Lieutenant Price he did testified that not lying was still in the of car down front seat his issue a command because were events unfold- Hensley's and did not see altercation with ing “so fast” and he found that he “couldn't Rachelle. say nothing” frightened by because he was so (J.A. 546). imag- the situation. It is difficult to 590 Price, Deputy immunity prongs qualified concerned that “both
Lieutenant vehicle, “(1) Beasley. inside his fired pinned analysis \vas because Defen satisfied” are. Hensley Hensley shots as headed two at dants violated decedent’s constitutional Beasley’s car.4 Deputy ... rights they unlawfully when seized him toward. single to the head. bullet by killed (2) was force, through the use excessive clearly at time the that it was established of Investi- Carolina State Bureau North seize, deputies not could decedent long-nosed re- Agents recovered gation they the manner Id. at did.” volver, description matched which which Deputies timely appealed. Deputies, by un- gun given an, in- Hensley’s body. Following derneath brought charges
vestigation, no were II. or Beas- Deputy Price against Lieutenant .facts, I would reverse.5 On these sum patrol com- log of the ley. The cars’ audio mary judgment is for Dep appropriate fifteen munications shows less than § 1983 claim did uties because from the time elapsed Lieutenant seconds Hensley’s rights. not violate constitutional stated, gun!” to gun! Price “It’s a Gotta “We review novo a district court’s deni (J.A. de 633). the time shots were fired. summary im judgment qualified al of (the Plaintiffs) Hensley’s family filed munity, light construing facts in all' action, raising of state variety this civil most favorable to nonmovant.” Orem v. .claims, including a and federal 42 U.S.C. 442, Rephann, 623 445 Following claim for excessive force. 2008). involving im qualified For appeals sum discovery, moved munity, by the facts as accept stated mary arguing judgment, “whether, the district and determine court immunity. entitled to facts, person based those reasonable Sut court denied the motion. in the be position defendant’s could have (W.D.N.C. tles, 167 F.Supp.3d con acting lieved that was he she that, explained accepting The court formity at established law events, Hensley was Plaintiffs’ version time.” Gray-Hopkins v. Prince holding his at exited side George’s Cty., Dep walking began 2002). “In reviewing a district courts deci that, uties and “[i]f defendant did rejecting sion a defendant’s assertion Beasley his his
point gun at as he made qualified immunity, apply analysis way across yard, as Plaintiffs’ the front by Supreme forth Court in Saucier set shows, no reason forecast then evidence Katz, U.S. S.Ct. officer conclud objectively able (2001), L.Ed.2d 272 as modified to the danger was a ed decedent later Court’s Calla [v. deputies’ safety warranting lives or decision Pearson Id, han, U.S. at force.” 763. Given conclusion, (2009)].” L.Ed.2d Danser v. the court then Stansber determined 4. The hands were testified at sides at both aiming, Beasley shooting, time of the weapon Deputy attempted or fan to cock the hammer shoot. my time decided conclusion that the revolver While, *17 provides summary judgment this information fuller context are entitled to on the ex- claim, Deputies' testimony, purposes to the force I would for cessive also reverse on review, by- accept court’s the two state our law claims addressed testimony majority. crediting of H.H. and Rachelle’s
591
2014).
340,
ry,
Connor,
346
Pur
ness’
v.
490
standard.” Graham
Pearson,
386, 395,
1865,
suant
to Saucier
ask U.S.
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
(1989).
Hensley’s
whether
violated
objective,
standard
ask
and,
so,
if
rights
ing
constitutional
“whether
if a
officer
reasonable
in
same
.the
right
‘dearly
at
issue
established’
circumstances
would
concluded-that
existent,
question.”
at the time of
the events
Id.
justified
threat
-use
may
deciding
our
397,
We
use
“discretion
force. Id. at
“Qualified immunity
officers
1, (1985).
105 S.Ct.
85 L.Ed.2d
commit
who
constitutional violations-'but
who,
clearly
law,
established
standard,:
In applying
“[t]he
‘reason
reasonably
that their
actions
believe
ableness’ of particular
a.
of force must
Henry,
were lawful.”
While case luxury afforded the armchair reflection.” directly require point” Leavitt, case a Elliott established, “existing be placed the precedent must have statuto- or
ry
question beyond
A.
constitutional
de-
[—
bate.” Mullenix v. Luna
U.S.-]
Judging
from the perspective
the'facts
L.Ed.2d
[193
255]
scene,
of a
reasonable officer
words,
(2015).
immunity pro-
In other
did
violate
consti
incompetent
“all but
plainly
tects
using deadly
rights' by
tutional
force. The
knowingly
those who
violate the law.” Deputies
to a
responding
domestic
Id.
call,
out to be
disturbance
one
turned
— U.S.-,
Pauly,
137 S.Ct.
White
category
for that
of calls
extreme evein
(2017)
548, 551, 196
(emphasis
L.Ed.2d 463
involved, an
armed
because
individual
added).
acting irrationally
against
used force
who
Here,
allege
family
a close
Dep-
appeared
the Plaintiffs
what
mem
be
presence
police.
uties used excessive force. Excessive force
ber
“[T]he
analyzed
volatility
involving
claims
of situations
domestic
“should be
particularly danger
Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonable- violence makes them
*18
elapsed
than
seconds
to a domestic
Less
fifteen
respond
officers
ous. When
pulled
time the
into the drive-
officers
call,
violence
they
that
understand
abuse
fired.
way until the time the shots were
explode with little
lurking and
may be
time,
During that
officers took defen-
both
Indeed, more
are killed
warning.
officers
Deputy
positions
postures—like
sive
calls than
injured on domestic violence
or
Beasley
himself
on his
throwing
down
Agar
any
of call.” Mattos
type
other
front
consistent with
seat—that were
2011) (en
ano,
seriously
that
were
belief
omitted).
banc) (internal quotation marks
A
for their lives.
reason-
threat
afraid
residence,
Hensley’s
driving
While
Dep-
able officer would
believed
have
called
Shirley
had
Deputies learned
Beasley
threat of
uty
was under imminent
safety
concern for the
again
express
a
physical
Hensley began
harm:
serious
addition, neigh
In
a
grandchildren.
of her
pattern
aggressive
continuous
stopped
Price
Lieutenant
borhood resident
threatening
moment
behavior
Hensley
keeping
him that
had been
to tell
30 feet
officers arrived and was within
night.
neighborhood up the entire
gun—
Deputy Beasley and armed
awith
have
Thus,
officer would
a reasonable
slowing
no
that he
suggestion
with
was
highly
approaching a
known
were
attempting
with
down
communicate
agitated
an
individu
situation with
volatile
Deputies—at
time
victims.
potential
al and several
fired.7
residence,
Hensley’s
Upon arriving
Sheehan,
Cooper v.
lice car while Under these To begin, I disagree with majority’s facts, Deputies were “safe in as- assertion that Deputies waived the ar- sumption” that Hensley “pose[d] deadly gument that their actions not Elliott, did violate threat.” Id. See also F.3d at any (“No clearly rights. established Although expect citizen can to fairly draw a the Deputies could have gun police pre- been more risking tragic without conse- cise, in' quences.”). their brief note that “the 1) Court must determine two issues: did hindsight, Viewed without this 20/20 the Defendants violate constitu- case falls within the heartland cases 2) rights; so, tional if clearly and was it consistently granted which sum- established the timé the Defen- at mary judgment police using officers unconstitutional,” dants was [sic]"conduct See, e.g., force: Anderson v. Rus- Appellant’s 14, Br. at and that “[b]oth sell, 125, 2001) questions must be yes answered for the (“This consistently Circuit has held that an proceed,” Plaintiffs to Appellant’s Br. at officer does not a gun have wait until pointed at the officer before the officer is action.”). Sigman entitled take See also addition, In history of be- case Hill, (1998) Chapel 787-88 fore our Deputies court indicates the did (no constitutional violation for lethal force not argument. waive their After Depu- against, suspect may may who not have brief, ties opening filed their the Appellees had a suspect knife his hand when had moved appeal to dismiss the as interlocu- displayed earlier with the attacked tory. Appellees argue did not knife). making Rather than “allowance Deputies two, step but that the waived the fact officers are often Deputies arguing fact disputes about split-second forced make júdgments—in of legal questions. responding instead In tense, uncertain, circumstances that are motion, Deputies again made clear Graham, rapidly evolving,” 490 U.S. at “[a]s, Brief, argued in their even view- majority in- has ing the facts in most favorable to engaged in type stead of “armchair Appellees, the Defendant Officers did reflection,” Elliott, to decry, used not any violate constitutional 642. At the time descend- did, even was not estab- if advanced, ed the stairs Deputy Beas- lished Appellant’s Response at the time.”
ley was trapped his car and Lieutenant added). (emphasis ECF With No. already Price had witnessed explanation, a'panel benefit of that as a weapon against Rachelle. this court motion to dismiss. denied the every There was reason believe that Deputy Beasley timely was Finally, imminent threat. filed a letter of Appellate Federal Rule Proce
B. dure 28(j) Supreme after the Court issued — erroneously concluding After its Pauly, decision in White U.S. -, Hensley’s right violated to' be 137 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Moreover, did (2017). letter, 28(j) even argument waive the the law explained: established, -clearly I would still reach plaintiff has failed relevant White *20 speaks majority issue. of waiver ‘clearly point to to established law’ but, judi is waiver absolute terms because violated, factually a similar with was created, cially possess “we the discretion v. Plaintiff on Pena Porter case. relies to appropriate circumstances disre which, very different circum- describes gard United parties’ inattention.” looking for a officers were stances—the (4th Holness, 579, 706 States v. F.3d Pena, to not went was suspect 2013).- Cir. we Factors examine deter night in the middle home Pena’s to in mining use this whether discretion sleeping; he came to the and saw him sufficiently clude record whether knocks, a holding to response door developed to permit to us examine immediately shot and shotgun, and addressing issue and the issue whether not a him. The officers did receive killed efficiency deci- “enhanc[e] would Pena, witness hit 911 call him regarding and; sionmaking “judicial conserve process” a daughter gun in the with head Although Id. resources.” never gun. on officers with a advance “party may truly waiv decided waive if a er,” our to have used discretion excuse at Appellant’s Supplemental Authorities a waiver ar “supposed waiver” when the EOF No. 37. gument untimely in an is raised fashion. sufficiently put the issue These actions Ashford, United States clearly was estab- whether 2013) (internal quotation majority con- lished before court. this omitted). all, marks alterations After then, hoping otherwise, to avoid cludes at two-way street.” Id. “waiver must be practical problem the Deputies Here, argued not the Plaintiffs have again qualified immunity imme- could raise two, step waived diately on remand and file another inter- judgment summary record adequate Pelletier, appeal, see locutory Behrens issue, ruling would decide the and a U.S. L.Ed.2d proceedings by, explained streamline (1996) (holding that defendant below,'correcting the court’s erro district bring interlocutory more than appeal one of the neous and application recitation immunity), proclaims qualified based on qualified immunity standard. precludes Depu- that the mandate rule clear, sponte To raising step again majority “an be is sua ties two until trial,” appropriate time at because the that the waived concluding “ argument. mandate rule ‘restricts The Plaintiffs did raise not contrary, their authority’ court’s brief. To reconsider that issue waiver summary judgment points whether proceeding.” Ma- brief at several discusses Chao, Hensley’s right jority Op. (quoting at 580 n.5 Doe v. was established. 2007)). (“An See, objec- Appellees’ not Br. e.g., I do tively operates believe the rule re- officer know mandate reasonable should raising qualified shooting carrying strict the who was a man remand, ground on his -own immunity again immediately pointing down but, laws, majority open-carry in a property, the extent the other- State holds wise, (and raising threatening I it in manner agree that the Deputies can should) immunity The sec- the Fourth pursue at trial. violates Amendment. the, (1985). prong qualified immunity analy- ond Therefore, L.Ed.2d 1] fore requires the Court to examine cast sis evidence support jury whether would Deputies] finding a clearly deputies’ violated estab- [the use of -' right.”)- unreasonable, -' lished then both prongs the pertinent test have been view, my the Plaintiffs waived the met. Deputies’ alleged “by addressing waiver Hensley, 167 (empha 761-62 claim on the merits F.Supp.3d without also mak added). sis ing argument.” Norwood v. waiver Vance, 1062, 1068 words, . In other the court found that the reaching Instead this common sense Plaintiffs only prove that the Depu- *21 conclusion, majority choosing is af force, ties used excessive pro- because the ground firm party “on that neither” “had against using hibition force is excessive any might dispose” reason believe clearly Supreme established. The Court Deputies’ qualified immunity argument, consistently has explained the error in this LLC, Rohan Presentations Networks approach; 2004) (Shedd, 288 repeatedly We have told not to courts J., dissenting). Their actions represent, define clearly high law at a established I of the waiver re harshest rule can of generality. dispositive level ques- The during my member time court. tion is whether- violative nature of
¡particular
is clearly
conduct
established.
,
This inquiry must be
in light
undertaken
.
n
case,
specific
context of the
not as
majority’s faulty
ruling
waiver
is
general proposition.
broad
speci-
Such
fact,
more troubling by
made
the simple
is
ficity
especially important
in the
court,
view,
my
erred in
context,
Fourth Amendment
where the
analyzing whether
at issue was
n
recognized
has
Court
some-
is
accepted
established. The court
times
for an
difficult
officer
determine
Gamer as the clearly established law and
doctrine,
legal
how the relevant
here
collapsed qualified immunity’s
then
two
force,
excessive
apply
factual
will
steps:
the officer
situation
confronts.
The Plaintiffs asserts
De
[sic]
Mullenix,
(internal
ally On Other Behalf Employees, Plaintiffs-Appel Situated III. lants, ... includes the interest public “The safety of concern for the public
substantial carrying out the lawfully law police officers COMPANY, BAKING SCHMIDT v. Sa United States enforcement effort.” INC., Defendant-Appellee. 164, kyi, No. 16-2213 yet step in takes another Today, this court concern continues its minimizing that of Appeals, United States Court precedent “significant departure Circuit. Fourth Supreme Court.” Court Argued: September (Shedd, Henry, at 553 Circuit Decided: November juris Collectively, our Judge, dissenting). specter to raise
prudence continues *22 conduct, chilling effect officers to enforcement
“prompting law risking in order to avoid
choose inaction Id. Before liability.” today, when
personal person by armed who
confronted an violent crime and was
just committed a them, officer was
advancing towards under
entitled believe however, Now,
imminent threat. under rule, unless and until the officer
majority’s warning or waited
has either issued weapon, to aim his
the armed individual the risk of officer compounding
further
harm, pause must before officers tak § Because
ing liability. action or face from our nor the
neither Court caselaw liability in supports
Supreme Court circumstances,
such I dissent.9 proper con- new framework assess officer Cooper, case was after the but that decided provide scrutiny, cannot events here and from this we are duct could evolve requires. Court established law the currently propounded by bound law as Supreme Court. Although police confron- I understand that scrutiny, are increased and a tations
