Reginald Henry appeals his convictions and sentences for multiple offenses arising from his attack on several correctional officers on March 24, 2000. We affirm Henry’s convictions, with the correction of a scrivener’s error, but we reverse the pris
Henry was convicted and sentenced as follows: for attempted second-degree murder with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony under sections 782.04(2), 777.04, and 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years in prison as a prison releasee reof-fender (PRR); for aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer, a first-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), thirty years as a PRR; for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, a second-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(e), fifteen years as a PRR; for battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony under section 784.07(2)(b), five years; and for possession of contraband in a state correctional facility, a second-degree felony under section 944.47(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), five years. All sentences were concurrent.
Henry argues that the trial court erred by reclassifying his conviction for attempted second-degree murder from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon. Section 775.087(1) precludes reclassification when the use of a weapon was an essential element of the offense. Henry argues that the use of a weapon is an essential element of the crime charged because it was alleged in the information. This argument overlooks the fact that the use of a weapon was not an element until section 775.087 was triggered. Nothing in the pertinent statutes for attempted second-degree murder refers to the use of a weapon as an element of the offense. See § 782.04(2) (defining second-degree murder); § 777.04 (defining attempt); see also Goutier v. State,
Although the attempted second-degree murder conviction was properly treated as a first-degree felony, the written judgment incorrectly noted it as a second-degree felony. On remand, this scrivener’s error should be corrected.
Henry makes essentially the same argument regarding reclassification of his conviction for aggravated battery from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon. But Henry overlooks the fact that this offense was not reclassified based on the use of a weapon; it was reclassified based on the fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer. See § 784.07(2)(d).
Henry next argues, and we agree, that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a PRR under the amendment to section 775.082(9)(a)(2), which made the statute applicable to a defendant who commits an offense while serving a prison sentence. As Henry argues, this court held that chapter 99-188, Laws of Florida, was an unconstitutional violation of the single subject rule, Taylor v. State,
As to Taylor, we certify conflict with State v. Franklin,
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for resentencing; conflicts certified.
