Henry appeals his conviction of child molestation.
1. Aрpellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. The testimony of the victim, together with medical evidence of molestation and other corroborating evidence, was sufficient to meet the standard of proof required by
Jackson v. Virginia,
*463 2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by finding the victim competent as a witness because she did not understand the meaning оf an oath.
At a hearing on the competency of the victim she testified that she believed in God, that she knew the difference between telling the truth and lying, and that she would be punished if she did not tell the truth. The witness testified that she knew what an oath was, and it meant that she had to tell the truth in court and if she did not tell the truth, she would go to jail.
It is not necessary that a child be able to define the meaning of an oath, but that she know and appreciate the fact that as a witness she assumes a solid and binding оbligation to tell the truth at trial.
Smallwood v. State,
3. Appellant contends it was error to allow the victim’s mother to testify as to what her daughtеr told her, because it was not part of the res gestae. In the instant case when the victim’s mother returned from shоpping, appellant (the victim’s grandfather), who had been babysitting, departed. The victim immediatеly told her mother that her granddaddy tried to do “some sex things” to her (the victim).
A trial judge’s determination that evidence offered as part of the
res gestae
is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant cоnsideration by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous.
Hutter v. State,
4. Appellant contends error in allowing a twelve-year-old girl to testify that she lived next door to appellant and in 1982, while the girl was swinging in her backyard, appellant wаs in a small shed in his backyard. His pants were down and appellant was holding his penis in his hand, beckoning the witness to come into the shed. The girl ran in the house and reported the incident to her father. Aрpellant’s contention that such testimony was not admissible to show his lustful disposition has been decided adversely to appellant.
Felts v. State,
Aрpellant also contends it was error to allow the same witness’ father to testify that his daughter “сame in and got me out of the house, saying that Mr. Henry had exposed —Appellant argues that suсh testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
OCGA § 24-3-3 provides: “Declarations accompanying an act, оr so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.” The admissibility of statements claimed to be within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound disсretion of the court.
Leonard v. State,
5. a. Appellant contends the trial court erred by charging the jury that they could infer that a person of sound mind and discrеtion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of his intentional acts. Appellant made no objection or exception to this charge when asked by the court if he had any exceptions to the charge or any error to point out. Thus, he has waived his right to enumerate error as to this charge.
White v. State,
b. Appellant also argues that it was errоr to charge the jury on similar transactions. We held in Division 4 that evidence of a similar offense was admitted properly to show the lustful disposition of appellant. Hence, the charge limiting thе jury’s consideration of such testimony to that purpose only was proper.
Teal v. State,
6. For the foregоing reasons it was not error to deny appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.