*1 this cause to the circuit therefore remand tious and unreasonable. We and award to plaintiff for a determination County court of Williamson in defending prosecuting fee incurred attorney of a reasonable 143 Ill. (1986), Co. this See Hall v. Svea Mutual Insurance appeal. Fire 1102, 1105; v. State Farm Songer 493 N.E.2d 3d App. 435 N.E.2d 106 Ill. Casualty & Co. 952. court of reasons, of the circuit foregoing
For the remanded part reversed part, is affirmed County Williamson opinion. inconsistent with this proceedings for further pro- remanded for further part reversed in part; Affirmed ceedings. LEWIS, JJ., concur.
HARRISON and Plaintiff-Ap- Friend, Henry, Jane HENRY, Next by her Mother and ERICA Hospital et al., (St. John’s Defendants et pellee, v. ST. JOHN’S HOSPITAL al., Defendants-Appellants). 4 — 88—0491 District No. Fourth 13, 1989. 17, 1989. Rehearing April denied filed March Opinion *2 GREEN, J., dissenting. *3 Graham, Chicago, and Meyer, Pierce & Springfield,
Graham & III, Allen, Meyer, (Hugh Graham John Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Peoria Kendall, counsel), for appellants. Karen L. Gary Peplow, M. and Ltd., Cook, Shevlin, Ysursa, (Bruce Cook, of Belleville N. Keefe & counsel), appellee. opinion McCULLOUGH delivered
PRESIDING JUSTICE the court: John’s-Fitz- Fitzgerald (St. and Dr. Shari Hospital
St. John’s plaintiff them liable to finding a trial court order gerald) appeal compensa- is the of a $5,511,759, interest. This amount balance plus medical malpractice, from a combined damages resulting award tory after judg- settled brought plaintiff, who products liability action with of defendants. group ment one is contrary trial court’s ruling John’s-Fitzgerald argues: (1)
St. action; is con- (2) ruling in the personal injury to the verdict jury among relation to contribution of “An Act in trary purposes par. Stat. (111. Rev. Act) (Contribution tortfeasors” her waived seq.); (3) plaintiff 301 et Laboratories, Inc. Inc., Breon Drug, settling Sterling recover- from estoppel precludes (4) judicial
(Sterling-Breon); Sterling-Breon attributable ing the portion fixing erred trial court (5) St. John’s-Fitzgerald; determining setoff. interest and post-judgment amount of remand. We reverse the ad- result of as the during birth severely injured
Plaintiff was Plaintiff sued anesthetic, to her mother. Marcaine, an ministration of administered Fitzgerald negligently John’s-Fitzgerald alleging for fail- Sterling-Breon She also sued authority. drug proper without a failure to contra- alleging drug warn about the ure to properly plaintiff’s the time of prior for use in blocks paracervical indicate it St. John’s- against filed a claim contribution injury. Sterling-Breon in adminis- negligent was alleged Fitzgerald Fitzgerald, they all defendants returned a verdict drug. tering damages. It the compensatory their rata share of pro and assessed damages share of pro had a 93% rata found total of mil- It assessed a a 7% share. $10 and St. was for medical million of which damages, lion in compensatory $1.5 stated: form expenses. verdict following for the
“We, find jury, compensatory share of their rata pro defendants and determine following amounts: damages 46.5% Inc. Sterling Drug,
Ixl Laboratories, 46.5% Inc. Ixl Breon Ixl Hospital/ St. John’s 7 %
Dr. Fitzgerald Shari 100 % TOTAL $6,000,000.00 Disability $1,000,000.00 Disfigurement $1,500,000.00 Suffering Pain and $1,500,000.00” Medical Expenses the name *4 an “x” in box beside was told to The jury put court reduced the trial Subsequently, it found liable. defendant $11,759 against entered judgment to and expenses award for medical finding verdict also returned a $8,511,759. jury for all defendants damages. in punitive liable for million Sterling-Breon $7 mother, Plaintiff’s Jane an Henry, brought individual action defendants, all in which alleged she their actions constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jane action was Henry’s dismissed on the pleadings. St. and appealed the verdict for plaintiff. Jane Henry appealed the dis- missal of her individual action. 19, 1987,
On May while the appeals pending, were filed a petition for approval minor’s settlement and for a find- good-faith ing Act. The settlement stated:
“1. In consideration of the payment described and pro vided for in paragraphs 5(b) hereof, and 5(c) sufficiency which is hereby acknowledged, good other and valuable *** consideration, the undersigned hereby re unconditionally lease, acquit and forever Breon discharge Laboratories Inc. and *** Sterling Drug Inc. of and from and all obligations, claims, debts, demands, covenants, contracts, promises, agree ments, liabilities, controversies, costs, interest, expenses, attor *** fees, actions neys’ or causes of actions including but not limited to the claims matters set forth in the action enti HENRY, tled ERICA her friend, mother and next JANE HENRY ST. HOSPITAL, V. JOHN’S BREON LABORATO RIES, INC., DR. O’HERN, DRUG, THOMAS STERLING INC., AND DR. FITZGERALD, 83-L-395, SHARI No. Circuit Court Circuit, Sangamon Seventh Judicial Illinois County, (Judge Richard J. Cadigan presiding) (‘pending action’).”
Paragraph provided for the release of Jane action for Henry’s $350,000. Paragraph 3 of the release provided simultaneously with and as “material consideration for the execution of this Agree- ment” and as a condition precedent to the payment obligations by Sterling-Breon, plaintiff, mother, counsel for Sterling- Breon would execute and file a stipulation dismissing pending action with prejudice vacating judgment outstanding against Sterling-Breon.
Paragraph agreement stated that in consideration release, Sterling-Breon would make a cash payment Henry Jane Further, and Thomas in settlement of Henry Jane’s individual action. payment guard- million cash would be made to plaintiff’s $1.4 addition, ian. In an Sterling-Breon agreed purchase annuity from an insurance company agreement million. The specifically $1.6 parents pursue stated and her intended to their claim Plaintiff her John’s-Fitzgerald. parents agreed indemnify
563 on John’s-Fitzgerald claims St. brought by from Sterling-Breon any provided agreement The further including contribution. any theory monies recovering any succeeded in that if her parents escrow in an placed would be John’s-Fitzgerald, money from St. to re- all attempts St. had exhausted John’s-Fitzgerald account until re- John’s-Fitzgerald If St. Sterling-Breon. amount from cover would Sterling-Breon, the escrow account ceived a judgment against be applied obligation. However, filed to the settlement. objections
St. John’s-Fitzgerald good 27, 1987, trial court the settlement was on found May good-faith filed a from the appeal faith. St. notice This finding against Sterling-Breon. and dismissal of action plaintiff’s fi- a upon as based John’s-Fitzgerald’s appeal court dismissed St. 1987, origi- July 8, Sterling-Breon’s nal order. On this court dismissed 1987, 13, Sterling-Breon nal the trial court dismissed appeal. July On against them. judgment from action and vacated the following trial court entered the order: counsel for and having
“The Court been advised by plaintiffs Inc. Sterling Drug Breon-Laboratories Inc. and par- this has been that action settled as between the aforesaid terms ties, having and and condition this Court reviewed and stipulation the Release Settlement Agreement and dismissal; therefore, and the is,
It ordered that the within action be Labora- same as defendants Breon hereby is dismissed Inc., divisions, Drug tories and other subsidiaries Sterling Inc. on the and the and thereof with and merits affiliates prejudice Breon and entered in this action Laboratories is vacated.” Sterling hereby Inc. be and same Drug stipulated Plaintiff dismissal them. stated: judgment against They the vacation of
lawsuit and and and between the under- stipulated agreed “It hereby Drug Inc. Sterling for Breon Laboratories and signed counsel Inc., and on of Erica Henry, individually and for Jane behalf Drug Inc. Sterling that Breon Laboratories Inc. and Henry, are divisions, hereby affiliates thereof all other subsidiaries and with prejudice lawsuit above-captioned dismissed from the agreed hereby stipulated on the merits. It is further Laborato- Inc. and Breon Drug the judgment against Sterling form an- of the Court in the ries Inc. shall vacated order nexed hereto.” 725, Ill. Hospital (1987), v. Henry St. John’s 1044,
N.E.2d this court findings affirmed the to St. John’s- jury’s Fitzgerald. 11, 1988,
On March filed a citation to discover St. John’s 4, Hospital’s 1988, assets. On St. April John’s-Fitzgerald tendered $715,559.09 check plaintiff. This represented the 7% amount plus to that interest date. On May John’s-Fitzgerald filed a petition for on the entry verdict. Plaintiff objected. July
After on trial hearing, court denied St. John’s- motion, Fitzgerald’s found they were severally liable for the verdict as of ac- January 1986. court stated interest crued as of that date. The court further found that after the settle- ment, $3,350,000. of recovery the amount was reduced St. John’s- *6 $5,511,759 Fitzgerald was liable to for plus interest accrued 29, to May ($1,528,743), accruing thereafter at a of rate $1,359 The per day. given court stated the amount to Jane Henry of her claim settlement individual was not a setoff the against amount due on judgment plaintiff’s claim. case, In the instant St. John’s-Fitzgerald argues the initially impo- sition of the the balance of is compensatory damage against award it verdict, court, to of contrary contrary this language contrary equitable principles Act, to behind the Contribution in effect, to change jury’s allows of assessment relative degrees of fault. St. next John’s-Fitzgerald argues that the settle- ment, if allows for shifting responsibilities, it a of is post-judgment good not in faith. is, essence,
Plaintiff contends St. in John’s-Fitzgerald contesting upheld has been in courts in liability, Illinois. Plaintiff John’s-Fitzgerald’s argues remedy should have been contribution claim timely Sterling-Breon. Secondly, plaintiff contends St. cannot at this good contest faith time. 2(a) of the or provides Section Contribution Act that where two more are to in to persons subject liability person arising tort the same out of there of injury, the same is a right among contribution them. (Ill. 1987, 70, par. Rev. Stat. ch. Section 302(a).) 2(b) Contribu tion Act states contribution exists in of only favor a tortfeasor who has than rata paid pro more his share the common The liability. is total he recovery pays tortfeasor’s limited amount in excess 1987, 70, of his 302(b). share. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. par. 2(c)of the
Section Contribution Act states: or a release covenant not to sue or not to enforce “When given good persons is faith one or more to liable death, or tort out of the same the same arising injury wrongful liability from tortfeasors of the other discharge any it does not provide so but its terms or death unless wrongful for the injury the others to any on claim recovery it reduces the covenant, or or the in the release any extent of amount stated it, which actually paid the consideration amount 1987, 70, 302(c).) ch. (Ill. par. is Rev. Stat. greater.” ever settles who tortfeasor provides The Act further all for contribution discharged liability is from 2(c) to section tort- nonsettling from a from contribution seeking and precluded 70, 302(d), Section 4 of 1987, pars. (e).) (111. feasor. Rev. Stat. Contribution Act states: recover A
“Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. more defend the full of his one or amount injury ants in tort for the same person subject death, not affected wrongful provi or for property, ch. 70 304. par. sions this Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. ascer of the court in statutes is to construing function legislature enacting
tain intention give effect (Dornfeld v. Julian Ill. 2d 472 N.E.2d (1984), statute. ascertaining intent, will the entire stat 432.) court look at render interpret ute. It will not the statute in a fashion which would it portions presumes void. court the General did Assembly v. Manor (Harris absurdity, injustice, intend or inconvenience. Healthcare The lan Corp. 111 Ill. 2d 489 N.E.2d guage ordinary meaning. a statute will be its given encourages It major purposes.
The Contribution Act has two it tortfeasors. provides among joint settlements and for contribution *7 (Lowe v. Co. 80, 463 Ry. & Western (1984), App. 124 Ill. 3d Norfolk expands Act codifies and 792.) principles N.E.2d The Contribution Package Machinery v. Division Reed-Prentice in Skinner first stated Co. Skinner 1, 437, The court 13, 70 Ill. 2d 374 N.E.2d 442. (1978), it pro stated that no reason for the continuation a rule saw valid tortfeasors. It noted with hibiting among joint approval contribution Dean in which he stated there was an obvious by statements Prosser to rule the of a loss permits lack of in a which entire burden justice whim, one upon plaintiff’s spite, be shouldered tortfeasor based 13, Skinner, Ill. 2d at 70 levy collusion or a successful execution. Prosser, 1971). ed. 442, citing §50, (4th at 307 374 N.E.2d at W. Torts be- eliminating in inequity of the Act purpose Contribution history legislative tween tortfeasors further established joint its pur- the statute noted discussing of the Act. Senator Berman in It al- situation. inequitable otherwise pose bring equity was to an 566
lowed everyone participate according to their fault accident. (81st Assem., 14, 1979, 111. Proceedings, Gen. Senate at 175-76 May (statements Berman) (Senate 308).) of Senator Bill Representative Daniels the bill damages stated allowed contribution of monetary that are for a people responsible negligent action. Those people lawsuit; however, would joined be that normally Daniels noted under the current law when a was it rendered was rendered against all of them and not out in exact spread precise amounts. Daniels stated: Bill
“What this does is allow for the re- contribution between parties as to sponsible varying degrees of judgment action or how much It’s a they may owe. codification the Skinner Supreme Court, versus decision out of the it Reed Illinois we think provisions adds other will make it more benefi- Assem., cial for 111. Proceedings, current law.” 81st Gen. House 14, 1979, June (statements at 18 of Representative Daniels) (Senate 308). Bill law,
At common
all
tortfeasors
joint
jointly
were
sever
ally liable
the whole of
Plaintiff
plaintiff’s damages.
could elect
Industries,
(Coney
v.
who he
J.L.G.
Inc.
would recover from.
(1983),
97
A
104,
Ill. 2d
454 N.E.2d
at
197.)
joint
release of one
tortfeasor
common
released all joint
generally Clear-Vu
(See
law
tortfeasors.
v.
Packaging, Inc. National Union Fire
Co.
Insurance
Ill.
(1982),
671,
3d
App.
434 N.E.2d
The rationale
behind
rule was that
Clear-Vu,
one
could
only
recovery
be had for a
See
single injury.
671,
Heimerdinger
Manthei v.
365,
Ill.
App.
citing
N.E.2d
(1947), 332
200-01, 363-64, court stated that one of the 461 N.E.2d pur poses behind the Contribution Act was to eliminate the rule that the release of one tortfeasor released all. The court noted that it be lieved 2(c) intended that release to section legislature Act lia Contribution would not tortfeasors from discharge joint were re bility plaintiff unless named they specifically lease. Alsup Implicit 2(c) court’s of section the Con analysis tribution is that rights Act settlement affects his plaintiff’s recover nonsettling tortfeasors. damages Act loss among
The Contribution also distributes the As a plaintiff’s predicate application tortfeasors for injury. Act, must liable to the for the (Ill. par. 302(a).) same Rev. Stat. Con injury. tribution Act to recover the full states
567 sub- more of the defendants one or any amount of his 111. Stat. the Act. Rev. not affected ject by to tort is liability 304. par. lia- of and several that doctrine Coney, the court held of adoption by not eliminated plaintiff’s injury for a was bility 4 of of section the language The court noted negligence. comparative 3 the Contribu- of section language Act and Contribution to retain intended its that the support legislature tion Act as view injuries liability many liability. Joint and several 1987, ch. (111. in Illinois. Rev. Stat. has eliminated statute by been the Contri- on statutory change The effect this par. 2— however, oc- litigated. statutory changes, Act has not bution been and, therefore, not be instant would curred after accrual of the case relevant to this appeal. settle- addressing post-judgment
We have found no Illinois cases case, In the ments to the Contribution Act. instant after damages against Sterling-Breon settled her claim compensatory damages Ster- judgment. compensatory value of claim $8,511,497 at the ling Breon was award time of the settle- 93% ment. award was Since the Additionally, punitive damages a vacated. release that the entire was extin- provided liability a guished specific liability and referenced cause number which was judgment, fixed should be reduced the full plaintiff’s recovery by proportional liability Sterling-Breon. effect, substance,
“Amount” defined as import, whole “[t]he result, or The sum of significance. principal (Black’s interest.” 1979).) ed. that can Dictionary (5th logical Law It is an amount stated or the use of such as “en- liability,” terms “all numerically claim,” claim,” tire “all A “partial liability.” “claim” is defined action, a cause of demand for money, payment, right payment, whether or or reduced to Black’s Law Dic- liquidated judgment. (5th 1979). ed. tionary agree comparative negligence concepts
We plaintiff’s “right” Act not affect a to hold do However, for his injuries. liable after severally certain has reduced verdict an amount by jury and elects to settle who is sat financially capable tortfeasor he por the entire his to enforce that isfying judgment, waives nonsettling tion of the judgment against tortfeasor. the plain- the release the instant case reduce
Interpreting Sterling- recovery damages tiff’s assessed already purpose in the trial with the of the Contribu- comports Breon action tion Act. The dollar claim amount released is established here and the specifically release includes a release of claim under the cause of action establishing judgment amount. If the amount of *9 the claim determinable, were as in a readily prejudgment settle- ment, the amount dollar stated the would control. release Coney,
In the court held comparative negligence did not require of joint abandonment and several a where liability, especially nonnegli gent plaintiff is involved. court protection plaintiffs noted of as a primary reason after of retaining doctrine the doc abrogation trine of It one contributory negligence. stated indivisible was injury involved, as and between an innocent and a plaintiff but in negligent tortfeasor, solvent joint joint of abandonment and several liability would force plaintiff to bear loss. court was concerned that elimination joint liability impair of and several would and in seriously jure plaintiffs compensation to recover for his in ability adequate (Coney, juries. 121-22, 97 205.) Ill. 2d at 454 at The effect of N.E.2d Coney, has been overruled 2—1118 of the partially by section Illinois Procedure, Code of provides Civil for joint and several liability a cases where defendant’s negligence is 25% or less than that as sessed to the other parties including 1987, Ill. Rev. Stat. plaintiff. 110, ch. 2—1118. par. 4 of the
Section Contribution Act a states specifically “rights” to amount judgment recover the full of his from one or more of the defendants not affected of the provisions 70, (Ill. Act. Stat. Several retain par. 304.) joint Rev. States and several liability, some have restructured eliminated legislatively Walt Disney it, and some have eliminated the doctrine. See judicially World Co. v. Wood (Fla. 1987), 515 So. 2d for a discussion treatment joint of the various States. liability by
Few a similar presented States have addressed situation to that however, Among have, instant case. those that one State has held limit the apportionment judgment applies judgment when (Pru- there joint is an active assertion a claim a tortfeasor. dential Insurance v. Moody Co. 1985), 503.) 696 In S.W.2d (Ky. Life Bartels v. City Williston (N.D. 276 the court 1979), N.W.2d Bartels, held that who settled with a tortfeasor released him, right remaining waived his to hold the the entire amount of the award. The Bartels court severally liable analyzed construing the laws of and Minnesota in effect Wisconsin of a should release of It held that the award be re- liability. liability duced who settled. proportionate person relinquishes A a a party intentionally waiver occurs when
569
an in
conduct inconsistent
or by
either
right,
expressly
known
2d
112 Ill.
v. Smith
(1986),
right. (Sexton
tent to enforce
3d
Ill. App.
Corp. (1988),
K mart
v.
Whalen
1284;
N.E.2d
Ill.
Inc.
Faultfinders,
(1981),
991, 994; Harris v.
343, 519 N.E.2d
in
doctrine
is an
equitable
Waiver
785, 431 N.E.2d
3d
App.
re
initially
party
whenever
justice
the interests
voked to further
52 Ill.
Stephany
Mollihan v.
right.
known
linquishes a
1034,
Here, the as Sterling-Breon. By stipulation court her known release, gave up the settlement and entering attributable the verdict part to enforce that defendants. nonsettling several Bartels, found that the court could injured party existed to benefit stated in its statute re- tortfeasor, which to a joint release gave general Bartels waived. action. The Bartels court contribution tortfeasor leased the stated: *10 10—07, in following language conclude that §9
“We also — however, shall remain NDCC, jointly that each ‘provided, the in- is for the benefit of for the award’ liable whole severally and can be waived. jured party general a constituted given Hackney release general future, including all his present
release for of liabilities construction, as a set- either specifically contributions from further any is as a party tort-feasor he excluded tling tort-feasors. remaining nonsettling of the action nonsettling from the tort-feasors (plaintiff’s) recovery Bartels’ re- negligence attributable percentage is limited to determined tort-feasors as maining nonsettling may the case be. jury, may court or the as Bartels, the re- instance, through the plaintiff, In this John lease, following language underscored waived §9—10— 07, NDCC: liable, jointly two or more who are persons
‘When there are the percent- be in proportion to awards shall contributions how- provided, each; age negligence of the attributable ever, liable severally that each shall remain ” Bartels court.) the whole award.’ added (Emphasis at (Bartels, 276 N.W.2d for the provides the Contribution Act
Section retention We find benefitting the plaintiff. is a liability, the right to enforce jointly and under the Contri- severally bution Act is aby waived who to cause vacatur of a acts to a primarily liable to a tortfeasor settle- ment.
St. John’s-Fitzgerald next argues that principles judi cial should instant estoppel apply preclude case to plaintiff from different she assuming a than position held trial court. The doc trine of judicial states that when estoppel a assumes one party posi tion in legal proceeding, that is from party estopped assuming in a contrary position legal subsequent proceeding. (Department of Transportation 509-10, v. Coe 112 Ill. N.E.2d 507-08.) This case, doctrine instant inapplicable which involves supplemental proceedings. John’s-Fitzgerald
St. next argues trial court erred in assessing interest. our post-judgment light finding the re lease plaintiff’s reduced recovery by amount of the compensatory damages award against Sterling-Breon, agree. recoverable we We need John’s-Fitzgerald’s note, not address St. contentions. We how ever, that does support record St. John’s-Fitzgerald’s argu ment concerning Henry setoff. Jane filed a separate lawsuit and Sterling-Breon. The appeal dismissal of that was pending settlement, suit at the time of the which clearly delineated the two Henry’s lawsuits involved. Jane settlement was distinct would, No thus, settlement. setoff be available in plaintiff’s action. reasons,
For above we reverse and remand.
Reversed remanded. J.,
SPITZ, concurs. GREEN, dissenting:
JUSTICE I agree majority well-expressed their statement *11 1987, 70, the ch. (111. Contribution Act Stat. purposes par. Rev. I which 302(a)). judgment also share their concern arises because the on not with appeal purposes is consistent the Contribution Act. However, I must dissent decision of the in majority because at- be fair St. tempting John’s-Fitzgerald to to and consistent with the Act, is to purposes (1) plaintiff; Contribution the decision unfair (2) the Act; (3) violates terms of the is express con- trary precedent binding upon us.
The the act in settling Sterling- treat majority as waiver of pending appeal any liability Breon after judgment the amount of the owed St. 7% of by beyond compensatory entered on the verdict for jury The damages by majority correctly as modified the circuit court. points 2(c) out that section of the Contribution Act states *** “[wjhen it given good [joint tortfeasor], a release in faith to one discharge any does not of the other tortfeasors” unless so stated but reduces others recovery against by paid. (111. amount Rev. Stat. 1987, 70, par. 302(c).) ch. The not does maintain the settle- majority ment good was not in faith nor does majority position take the that the settlement released as would have fully John’s-Fitzgerald, Act, been the case prior might the Contribution well be the case if the settlement was not in faith. good Rather, the relies on the cases of majority City Bartels v. Wil- (N.D. 1979), 113,
liston 276 N.W.2d and Prudential Insurance Life Co. v. Moody (Ky. 503, in 1985), support S.W.2d of their theory. court contribution, Bartels construed a statute concerning very ours, similar to in the context of a statute on comparative negligence which in provided tort cases for the to render separate verdicts defendant, as to each fixing damages proportion to fault of that defendant, but liability also stated the of the defendants was joint and several. court concluded that based upon the construction given to the comparative negligence by statute the State from it which was adopted, cases where one of the tortfeasors has settled with the plaintiff, the amount of reduced, eventually awarded is by amount of the settlement but percentage of fault found trier of fact to be settling attributable tortfeasor. That rule was to prevail held over a provision legislation regarding stated, compensation which as does 2(c) section of the Contribution Act, that the judgment is reduced the amount obtained from the release. Prudential the operation comparative concerned of a negli- gence statute limited joint liability joint tortfeasors to that for costs. to the Subject provisions 1117, of sections and 2— 2— 2—
1118 of the (Ill. Civil Practice Law Rev. Stat. 2—pars. 1118), which were not in force at times pertinent 2— 2— here and facts, would not applicable to these format statutory cases, in Illinois is spread fault in most tort proportionately among tortfeasors through indirectly third-party action and cross-complaints under the Contribution Act rather than through apportioning directly of each tortfeasor to injured All tortfeasors re party. main severally injured party. (Coney liable v. J.L.G.
Industries, no Inc. (1983), 197.) 97 Ill. 2d 454 N.E.2d There is in Bartels to that statutory or common law rule similar provision plaintiff of of each defendant to the whereby proportion directly determined. Act, ultimate indirectly, proportionate
The Contribution achieves joint post-judgment unless a tortfeasor is insolvent. The responsibility settlement is not what here. pending appeal destroyed proportionality could satis majority dispute sought does not that have faction its for from St. judgment compensatory damages of entire them and the latter could not have from John’s-Fitzgerald prevented contribu doing John’s-Fitzgerald any so nor could St. have obtained tion from financial Sterling-Breon. Proportionate responsibil ultimate because, John’s-Fitzgerald was defeated here St. ity unfortunately, 1984, the supreme failed to file a claim for contribution. In late timely held in Laue v. court Ill. 473 N.E.2d 2d Leifheit seeking if contribu brought, alleged that a tort action is tortfeasors tion others their claims for contribution in the tort join must In span action. This was done the short time always previously. here, St. filing involved a claim for contribution was overlooked had John’s-Fitzgerald presented until after the evidence been was un request trial on the merits and the circuit court ruled Had made such a John’s-Fitzgerald timely and denied it. St. timely claim, it to the ex it could have to reimburse required Sterling-Breon than tent St. had more St. John’s-Fitz paid plaintiff share of the gerald’s proportionate joint judgment. several our attention to the confusion John’s-Fitzgerald rightfully St. calls The form of the verdict could be in the record here. ambiguity were taken amounts separate judgments separate to indicate In our modified opinion, entered as to the several defendants. being case, we con- rehearing underlying for upon petition denial the following cluded with statement:
“Therefore, the court-ordered we affirm the verdict less affirm St. John’s-Fitz expenses remittitur as to medical v. John’s (Henry St. for thereof.” gerald’s responsibility 7% 725, 735, Ill. 512 N.E.2d Hospital (1987), 159 the judgment This also taken to indicate we affirmed could be of the amount of to the extent of 7% John’s-Fitzgerald only in view of However, foregoing, damages. despite compensatory and several lia- joint continued existence of the rule undisputed here, there was no contention to the situation where bility applied con- can foregoing only negligence plaintiff, attributable strued consist of the award of a same.
compensatory damages as modified and an affirmance of the cross-complaints against had filed St. John’s-Fitzgerald contribution, fault fixing degrees among the various defendants can be to those claims. attributed I (1) conclude: under law the lia- summary, precedent, common several could bility all was and she rendered; look one of (2) them for satisfaction of the *13 2(c) Act, under any good-faith section the Contribution settlement with one more of the other defendants reduces settlement; to her only in the amount of the neither (3) case precedent changes foregoing statute nor law operation because the was made an principles pending appeal settlement existing judgment; (4) any fairness John’s-Fitzgerald, awarded them because of their majority unfortunate predica- ment, results unfairness corresponding plaintiff, who was enti- tled on rely existing law settling Sterling-Breon. Accord- ingly, I affirm the would circuit court. ILLINOIS,
THE PEOPLE OF THE OF Plaintiff-Appellee, STATE v. MATTINGLY, Defendant-Appellant. GEORGE W.
Fourth District No. 4 — 88—0379 14, 1989. Opinion 23, 1989. Rehearing April filed March denied