19 Haw. 302 | Haw. | 1909
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
Writs of execution in favor of the defendants Theo. H. Davies & Co. and Walter C. Shields upon judgments for $1236.-99 and $1966.75, obtained by them respectively against the defendant Ah Ping, having been issued to. the high sheriff, and his deputy having levied upon 900 bags of sugar in the plantation warehouse at Kipahulu, Maui, and removed the sugar to Honolulu, the sugar company gave notice to the officers that the sugar was its sole property and demanded its immediate surrender and delivery to its agent H. TTackfeld & Co. Thereupon the officers applied for interpleader and upon an order to file their claims or relinquishment of them the sugar company filed its claim, the judgment creditors filed their denial of it and Ah Ping his disclaimer. The judge heard the case without a jury and decided in favor of the judgment creditors, the sugar company excepting to his ruling excluding evidence and to the judgment entered upon the decision. By agreement the sugar was sold for $62 a ton and the proceeds' held by the high sheriff on deposit with Bishop & Co. to await final determination of the claimants’ right thereto or to any part thereof.
The claim filed by the Kipahulu Sugar Co. was that it is and for many years has been owner and lessee of certain lands at Kipahulu, Maui, with buildings, machinery, tools and livestock comprising the Kipahulu sugar plantation and mill and has operated the plantation and mill for cultivation of sugar cane and manufacture of the same into sugar; that in Decern
It is contended by the judgment creditors, Shields and Theo. H. Davies & Co., that since by the terms of the written agreement all growing crops upon the lands of the sugar company were to become the property of Ah Ping he became owner of the sugar made therefrom and that if the agreement required by implication its delivery by him to the company for $30 a ton this was merely a contractual obligation not enforceable otherwise than by an action for damages, the company having relied solely upon its confidence in his observance of the possibly implied agreement to deliver the sugar to it.
The sugar company denies that the legal effect of the agreement, taken as a whole, was to give Ah Ping the ownership of
Freeman v. Bartlett, 47 N. J. L. 33; Gill Mfg. Co. v. Hurd. 18 Fed. 673; Jennings v. Whitehead & Atherton Machine Co.. 138 Mass. 594, are cited in support of the exception to the refusal to admit this evidence.
The first case was an action on an agreement under which the defendant occupied the plaintiff’s hotel, which the plaintiff contended was completely expressed in a certain writing, while the defendant insisted that part of it was verbal and that the writing did not express the whole agreement. The court held that a certain writing, not signed by the parties, which was drawn by the plaintiff and handed to the defendant who interlined and returned it to the plaintiff, was admissible in evidence as “a transaction constituting part of the negotiation out of which the contract emerged. It was part of the res gestae.” It appeared, however, that all that the interlined paper contained “was not questioned at the trial” and was stated to the jury by the plaintiff with the paper before him as a memorandum, so that “there was no room for mistake.” The court said “upon the point decided, namely, whether this writing contained the entire agreement between the parties, it is obvious that the writing itself could have thrown no additional light. The rule is well settled that when the plaintiff in error has sustained no injury he cannot rely upon a technical mistake on the part of the court as a ground for reversing the judgment.” The case is not
The second case was an action for damages for non-acceptance of 100 box cars made for the defendant under contract to pay for each $580 on delivery. The defendant in his answer denied making the contract; averred that while there were, negotiations looking towards a possible contract if they could agree upon its terms they did not ripen into an agreement; that in the negotiations the defendant informed the plaintiff that if a contract were made he should require a warranty of the cars; that the warranty was never given, and that shortly after the negotiations and before the plaintiff had done 'any work the defendant gave him notice not to build any for him. The plaintiff denied that the defendant in the negotiations required the warranty. The court instructed the jury: “In determining what the contract was the rule is to consider the negotiations passing between the parties. Their conversation in relation to it before completed, if the same is understood by the parties, shall be incorporated in the contract even though such negotiations are not repeated at the time of its completion, and such previous understanding would constitute a part of it unless changed or executed at the time it may be so completed.” The case shows no contract other than resulted from the negotiations, hence it has no bearing upon the question now presented.
In Jennings v. Whitehead & Atherton Machine Co. the plaintiff had made a written contract with the firm of Whitehead & Atherton to give his undivided influence in favor of machinery made by the defendant who promised to pay him five per cent, on sales of machinery in Fall River. The plaintiff declared upon the contract and also upon an account annexed but relied upon an oral contract adopting the written agreement. The only change between the oral and the written contract was that the defendant corporation was substituted for the firm. The evidence of the adoption of the written contract was a conversa
The company further offered to explain the contract by evidence, which Avas refused, that “notwithstanding the recital in
" The company requested admission of certain facts, stated in substance as follows: That Ah Ping if present would testify that he is a resident of Kipahulu engaged in cultivating and manufacturing sugar on the lands of the company under an
It is fully agreed by the parties that words in an agreement which have an ordinary meaning free from ambiguity and are not technical cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence, the only dispute between them on the subject of excluded evidence being as to the existence of such words. Whatever uncertainty there may be in the minds of the parties as to the legal effect of the language in this agreement we see in it no words of ambiguous or doubtful meaning. The proposed evidence of the witness’ opinion, understanding or conclusions was of course inadmissible. The evidence was therefore correctly ruled oirt. It remains to consider the legal effect of the agreement as a whole.
The agreement, after reciting the ownership by the company of the plantation property, that negotiations have been pending between it and the planter, as Ah Ping is termed, by which he is to be given an opportunity to engage in the enterprise of raising sugar cane and manufacturing the same into sugar, and that an agreement has been reached as to the terms under which he should engage therein on the lands of the company, declares as follows:
. “I. The 'Planter’ shall have the free use of all the lands owned in fee simple by the 'Company’ except as herein specifi*311 cally excepted; the ‘Planter’ shall have the use of all lands now under lease by the ‘Company’ subject to the payment of all rents and other charges which may become due upon such leasehold property during the continuance of this agreement and subject to the terms and conditions of the leases under which said lands may he held, all growing crops now upon said lands to become the property of the ‘Planter;’ the ‘Planter’ shall have the free use of all buildings, machinery, flumes, tanks, tools, carts, wagons, harnesses and other appurtenances now belonging to the ‘Company’ free of all charge saving and excepting that said ‘Planter’ shall keep all said property in good repair and a.t his own expense and shall also construct at his own expense all improvements which he may deem necessary, and at the termination of this agreement he will deliver the same according to inventory attached hereto and made a part of this agreement together with all new improvements and additions thereto, in good condition, ordinary wear and tear alone excepted; the ‘Planter’ shall also have the right to use the live-stock now belonging to the ‘Company’, he to pay all cost and maintenance and to take proper care of all such animals and to replace all live-stock which may die by reason of any neglect on his pax-t.
“II. All merchandise in stox-e will be delivered to the ‘Planter’ by the ‘Coxnpaxxy’ at cost price, further purchases to replenish stock are to be íxxade from or through the ‘Agent’, for which the ‘Planter’ is to pay sixty days from the last of each moxxtlx ixx which such pxxrchases slxall Ixave been xxxade.
“III. The ‘Company’ will pay the ‘Planter’ for each and evex-y ton of sugar 2000 poxxnds delivered F. O. B. vessel or steamer at the wharf of the ‘Company’ in Kipahulu as follows, to wit: $20 per toxx of ex-op, Season of 1907. $30 per ton of crop, Seasoxx of 1908. $50 per ton of crop, Season of 1909, delivered by the' ‘Planter’ free of charge to the ‘Compaxxy’ in Honolulu.
“IV. The ‘Plantex*’ shall be allowed for his own personal use the sum of One Hxxndred ($100.00) Dollars per month, this amount to be a part of the advance account to be made xxnder this agreement axxd to be x-epaid by the ‘Planter’ ixx like xnamxer as other advances.”
The agreement goes on to state that “it is mutually agreed as follows:” then come fourteen articles referring to payment by the company to December 10 of employes who refuse to go on with the planter and for the planter paying the laborers for wages due after that date; for delivery to the company, to be charged to his account, of all cash then on hand; that the agent should be agent of the planter and that all advances be drawn on or through the agent; interest to be charged to the planter at six per cent, per annum on overdrafts and allowed on credits;-the planter to be considered the contractor only and to have no power to represent the company or act as its agent; tax returns and other documents to be drawn by the company only; accounts to be kept by the agent between the company and the planter, entitled “Ah Ping, Advance Account with the Plantation Department,” and his “Merchandise Account with the Merchandise Department,” the first to con
It is apparent from this agreement that in order to secure the requisite laborers to be engaged and superintended by Ah Ping, except that the company and its agent control the selection of the sugar boiler, engineer and bookkeeper, the company gave Ah Ping for the purpose of cultivating cane and making sugar the use of its plantation outfit charging nothing except rents payable on the leasehold, and giving him the standing crops, the purpose of the agreement being to secure crops of not less than 1400 tons for 1901 and 1500 tons for 1908. The difference between sugar at 1 ct. a pound taken off in 1901, 1-J ct. a pound in 1908 and 2-|- cts. a pound from the crop in the season of 1908, and the usual market prices which the company obtained for its sale would be-expected to recoup the company and its agent for advances, give them reasonable profit and possibly allowing a reasonable profit to Ah Ping for his services.
The agreement contains no provision for securing its per
Exceptions overruled.