53 P. 590 | Ariz. | 1898
The appellant brought this suit in the court below to obtain equitable relief upon the ground of fraud and
Howell, in accordance with his agreement, on the date of the execution thereof, paid to Mayer the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. Howell and his associates, Mayer, Bradshaw, and Shirley, and one L. J. Webber, organized the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company, whereupon Howell assigned all of his rights under said agreement to the company. Shirley was elected manager of the company, took possession of the mines, and began development-work and the construction of the mill. The latter was completed in December, 1893, and was operated by the company until January 4, 1894. During this time twenty-five thousand dollars, in addition to the cash payment, was paid, under the agreement to purchase, to Mayer, and about forty thousand dollars expended in the erection of the mill and in development work upon the mines. During the short time the mill was in operation prior to January 4th it was operated at a loss, and a debt of something like thirty-three thousand dollars was incurred. Early in January, 1894, Henry came to Prescott and arranged to pay the indebtedness on the property, bought out Howell’s interest in the company for ten thousand dollars, and also the interest owned by Shirley and Webber, and entered into an agreement with Mayer, modifying the first agreement in the respect that the balance of the purchase money then unpaid, which was the sum of fifty thousand dollars, should be paid to Mayer from the product of the workings of said property, as follows: One half of the gross product of said mines after milling was to be paid to Mayer until he should have received the full sum of fifty thousand dollars, and the said mines were to be worked and operated until he was fully paid. Palmer was to receive the entire
The grounds of relief charged in the complaint are: First. That the contract or agreement for the purchase of the mines, dated July 1, 1893, was procured by means of the false and misleading character of the report made by Ihne as to the condition and value of the mines; that at the time Ihne made his examination of the property he was the guest of Mayer and Palmer, who supplied him with liquors during his visit to and pretended examination 'of said mines to such an extent
No answer was put in by any of the defendants in the action with the exception of defendant Mayer, who denied specifically all the acts charged in the complaint to be of fraudulent nature and character, -and such acts as were charged which would entitle the appellant to the relief he sought. Upon the trial of the case the court submitted certain issues in the form of interrogatories to the jury against the objection of the appellant. These issues, as submitted, were all found by the jury against the appellant, and in favor of the appellees, with the exception that the jury found that all the money which had been paid in purchase of the mines, the erection of the mill, and in the working and operation of both had been paid by appellant. Following the verdict of the jury, the court found that appellant was not entitled to a rescission of the contract of purchase of the mines, as prayed for in his complaint; that the purchase price for the mining property mentioned was one hundred thousand dollars; that all of the purchase price paid and the money spent upon the property was advanced by appellant, George W. Henry, and that therefore said Henry should be subrogated to the rights of the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company under said agreement; that of the purchase price the sum of $60,475 had been paid, and the sum of $39,525 remained un
The first question presented by appellant in his brief for our consideration relates to the submission to a jury of the issues of fact raised by the pleadings. Appellant contends that as the action is one for equitable relief wholly, and in
With reference to the merits of the action, the issues of fraud raised by the pleadings are such as to necessitate a careful review of the testimony in the cause. The trial court found that Mayer was not guilty of any fraud or misconduct in the sale of the mines which affected his right as vendor to enforce in their entirety the terms of the sale as contained in the two contracts; and the decree was framed upon this finding, so as to secure to him all the fruits of his dealings with Henry and his associates. Under the decree, assuming that Mayer was entirely innocent of any misconduct in the sale, it is quite evident that he has profited by the failure of the purchasers to complete the contract. The court found that the purchase price for the whole property was one hundred thousand dollars; that Mayer had been paid in all the sum of $60,475; and that there was left a balance of said purchase price of $39,525. It is admitted, too, that at the time when the negotiations began for the purchase of the prop
Before one should in good conscience be permitted to reap where he has not sown, to profit by the misfortune, mistake, or undoing of another, or to enjoy the fruits of dishonesty and sharp practice, it should appear perfectly plain that he himself be free from any intentional wrong-doing and his skirts clean of any stain of fraud and deceit. It is evident that appellant has gotten the worst of the bargain and fared badly in his adventure. If, however, this be due to his own folly and shortsightedness, and not to any willful misconduct on the part of appellee Mayer or his agents, equity can afford him no relief not within the strict letter of the contract under which he seeks to be subrogated to the rights of the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company. But if, on the contrary, he be the victim of misrepresentations, fraud, and deceit practiced by and directly traceable to Mayer, or indirectly through any of his agents, then equity can and should afford him relief at the expense of Mayer. The findings of the trial court should be given great weight and be deemed conclusive on controverted questions of fact in equity as in actions at law, unless there be forcible reasons to warrant the inference that they are erroneous. Particularly should this rule be regarded when the right determination of the facts may have depended upon the judgment of the trial court as to the credibility of the various witnesses, and not merely upon reason and deduction as applied to a mass of facts and circumstances about which there may be little or no dispute. The gravamen of
First. Was the sale of the mines to Howell and his associates procured by means of fraud, participated in by Mayer, or acquiesced in by him with a knowledge of the facts? For the right solution of this question it is necessary that the true relations between Shirley, Palmer, and Mayer be ascertained and understood, as those relations existed prior to and during the negotiations which led to the contract of purchase. As we have before stated, the record discloses that Mayer, at the time of the contract of July 1, 1893, was but a part owner in the premises sold. Prior to that time he had given, together with his associates, an option to Palmer to purchase' his interest. It is quite apparent that this option or bond was nothing more than an authorization to Palmer to find a purchaser, and for his services he was to receive a commission on the amount of the purchase money. Palmer was therefore the mere agent of Mayer and his associates in effecting the sale. It will also be remembered that Shirley obtained an option or bond from Palmer, and upon the strength of this began his negotiations with Howell, Henry, and their associate, which ultimately led to a sale of the property. The connection between Mayer, Palmer, and Shirley was close and intimate, and that between Mayer and Palmer continued to be of a confidential character after Palmer’s option had expired, and during the subsequent negotiations between Mayer and Howell, and indeed so long as Palmer had anything to do with the property. It was admitted by both Palmer and Mayer that the former was to receive a commission of twenty-five per cent upon the purchase money derived from the sale; and it appeared, further, that he received this commission upon the amount received by Mayer in the purchase of the
The foregoing constitutes, in effect, the evidence bearing upon the fraudulent nature of Ihne’s report, and to what extent Mayer or any of his agents were concerned in the fraud, if any there was. There is enough to justify a suspicion, at any rate, that Ihne was deceived in some way in the value of the ores in the mines.- It is also apparent that there was abundant opportunity on the part of either Shirley, Palmer, or Slack to have substituted rich ores in place of those actually taken from the stopes. We cannot say, however, from this evidence, that such a ease is made out as would •warrant us in holding contrary to the findings of the trial court upon this point, and in saying that Mayer or his agent, Palmer, participated in the fraud, if any there was, or had a knowledge that the same was perpetrated. The record :s silent upon the question as to whether Mayer or Palmer knew of the results of the mill test, or had any knowledge as to the character of Ihne’s report to Howell and his associates.
Third. The nominal parties to the contract of. January 4, 1894, were Mayer, Howell, and the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company. The real contracting parties were Mayer and Henry. Howell after the organization of the company became its president and general manager. Henry, as found by the court, and as shown by the evidence, furnished all the money used by the company from his individual resources, and at the time of the execution of the contract owned practically all of the stock of the company. In December, 1893, Henry visited Prescott and found that the affairs of the company were in a bad way, with debts to the amount of thirty-three thousand dollars ehai’geable against it. Palmer urged him to pay off this indebtedness and get rid of Howell, as the latter was unpopular with the creditors of the company and unsatisfactory in his relations with the company, and promised, should Henry dp this, to use his own language, to “pull off his coat and go to work, and pull Henry out of the hole.” Palmer also represented that the property could be made to pay sufficiently to clear off the balance of the purchase money due to Mayer. In accordance with Palmer’s advice, Henry bought out Howell as well as Shirley and Webber, and arranged to pay the thirty-three thousand dollars indebtedness. He then began negotiations with Mayer, through Palmer, to arrange for an extension of time for the payment of the unpaid purchase money, and, as a result of these negotiations and the representations made by Palmer, the contract of January 4th was entered into. Palmer then went into the possession of the property and began work. Under his management the property was operated at a loss from the start. Notwithstanding this, Palmer kept Henry in ignorance of the true condition of affairs, and, it is quite evident, purposely deceived him until the debts had accumulated to such an extent that further concealment was impossible. He further exhibited bad faith in turning the property over to Mayer without notifying the company or Henry of his intention to do so. Mayer during this time had full opportunity and full right under the agreement to know just what was being done by Palmer. The confidential relations existing between Palmer and Mayer render improbable the as
Fourth. Again, we think the decree is erroneous in holding that Mayer was entitled to the possession under his contract of the mill and machinery which the evidence shows to have been constructed by the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company on property which was never owned by Mayer or his associates, but which had been located by the company after the contract of July 1, 1893. By no principle of law that we are aware of can real estate be forfeited to another which the other has never owned and to which he has no title because of a failure to pay for property which the vendor did own and to which he did have title. Forfeitures are not enforced in equity and are not favored in law. - Notwithstand
We conclude from a review of the facts and circumstances proven in the case that the findings of the trial court should be modified in these respects: 1. That the true purchase price of the property, instead of being one hundred thousand dollars, as found by the trial court, was the sum of eighty thousand dollars; and 2. That there was due at the time of the rendition of the decree the sum of $19,525, instead of the sum of $39,525, as was found by the trial court. We have reached the further conclusion that the trial court should have found that the taking possession of the property by Mayer was not warranted, but that the appellant, George W. Henry, as the subrogee of Spooner R. Howell, the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company, James Shirley, L. J. Webber, and Frank M. Bradshaw, was and is entitled to the immediate possession of the same, and that the appellee Mayer -has acquired no right, title, or interest in and to the mill and other property not included within the contract of sale of July 1, 1893. We conclude, further, that a decree should be entered adjudging and decreeing that appellant, George W. Henry, be subrogated to all the rights of Spooner R. Howell, the Henrietta Mining and Milling Company, James Shirley, L. J. Webber, and Frank M. Bradshaw, under and by virtue of the contracts set forth in the complaint in the action for the purchase of the American Flag, Yankee Girl, Invincible, Silverton, and Germania mining claims, situated in the Big Bug Mining District, Yavapai County, Arizona; and that the
Street, C. J., Doan, J.-, and Davis, J., concur.