*1 336
Ins.,
(Minn. 1985);
v. All
Holman
Nation Ins.
We believe such a remedy likewise appropriate situation before us. In so we holding, refer to that of Act part 335 which the underinsured provides coverage required is to enable the insured to recover from the insurer the amount of damages for bodily injury to which the insured legally entitled from the operator another motor vehicle. Considering the facts and court, $17,500 before the trial stipulations we affirm its award of which is consistent with the that Shelter coverage should have offered and the losses he appellee sustained. above,
For the reasons we affirm. Willene HENRY and Rich Roth v. Mark Andrew
EBERHARD
91-255
Supreme delivered Opinion May [Rehearing denied June 1992.] *3 Debby Hurlbut, Nye, Chief and Bruce P. Counsel, Thetford Asst. Services, Chief Counsel of the of Human for Department *4 appellants.
No from response appellee. Miller,
Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by; Clint Senior Asst. Gen., for Att’y intervenor State of Arkansas.
David J. Manley, Arkansas, Legal Services of for amicus curiae Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families. Corbin,
Donald L. Justice. Willene Appellants, Roth, and Rich an order entered appeal by Judge Crabtree Benton County Chancery Court them both in criminal holding for contempt interfering with a order of that previous court. Both are of the employees Arkansas of Human Department (DHS). Services five They assign of error in the points proceed- ings below. We find no error and affirm. minor,
This revolves around appeal of a custody Eberhard. This case involves a set of There complex facts. were two actions originally separate going a divorce simultaneously, action in court and chancery dependent neglected action consolidated, juvenile court. The two cases were so that all issues were determined in the divorce action in court. chancery Appel- lants were held in eventually to this court. contempt appealed did not file a brief to Appellee response brief. We appellants’ allowed the state to intervene in the and the appeal Attorney filed General a brief on the state’s behalf. We also allowed the curiae, of a brief filing for amicus Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families.
Jeffrey Eberhard’s had parents hearing a divorce on Febru- 14, At the ary 1991. conclusion of hearing, which was conducted by Judge Huffman of the Benton County Chancery Court, the chancellor announced from the bench that he would defendant, grant Eberhard, Mark a divorce. Included in that oral ruling was an son, award of the couple’s Jeffrey, to Rebecca plaintiff, Eberhard. The chancellor announced that Mr. Eberhard’s weekend visitation rights could begin on the upcoming Saturday, 1991. February Because there was evidence at the divorce hearing that Mr. Eberhard had sexually abused Jeffrey, visitation was awarded subject third-party These supervision. verbal rulings were not written and filed of record with the clerk until March 1991. 29, 1991,
On January to the prior Eber hards’ divorce hearing, had appellant Henry filed a petition for court ordered supervision of Jeffrey to the pursuant dependent neglected of the provision Arkansas Juvenile Code. juvenile The judge, Crabtree, Judge issued an order on that same day restraining and Mr. enjoining Eberhard’s contact with his son.
In an effort to realize the visitation rights verbally granted to Mr. Eberhard in the divorce proceeding, Judge Huffman first consulted Judge Crabtree and then vacated the restraining order issued in the juvenile court proceeding. Judge Huffman then consolidated the juvenile case with the divorce case so that the *5 related issues of Jeffrey’s custody and visitation could be resolved.
Before Mr. Eberhard’s scheduled visitation with Jeffrey to begin 16,1991, on February appellant Henry in placed Jeffrey
341 hours pursuant for seventy-two of DHS the protective 1991). These actions 12-12-509(1987 &Supp. Ann. Ark. Code § his son as visiting permitted by from Mr. Eberhard prevented divorce proceeding. chancellor in the Judge in when began question The contempt proceedings Roth, and her Henry, supervisor an order for Huffman issued in his court and show McLaughlin, appear DHS Ron attorney for interfering not be held in contempt cause should why they for the weekend of rights visitation granting with the order 16, 17, Huffman then sua Judge sponte 1991. February Judge it to Crabtree. Judge recused from the case and transferred and, on the show cause orders after hearings Crabtree held orders, the final order of of intermediate issued issuing a couple 23, on 1991. contempt May 23,1991, found that both
The order entered May had of the verbal visitation order and that knowledge Roth order by taking protective custody both violated that willfully 16,1991. Mr. was not found to McLaughlin February in be in was sentenced contempt. Initially, Henry ninety days with the condition that she jail, eighty days suspended upon pay in costs fees incurred Mr. Eberhard attorney prosecuting her interference with the verbal visitation order. Roth’s sentence was taken under advisement. On motion for reconsid- appellant’s eration, the court issued another order which modified Henry’s sentence so that of the sentence was only sixty days suspended; addition, examination, she was to take a required psychological the results of which were to be to the court. The final reported 23, 1991, order issued on affirmed May sentence as Henry’s per order, $250.00, fined Roth and sentenced him to previous both of which were for one thirty days jail, suspended year conditioned on full with all orders the court. compliance
We note that none of the
has raised the issue of
parties
However,
of the sentence for
suspension
part
contempt.
moot,
because the
could
render this
we
suspension
possibly
appeal
address this
issue. It is well-settled that
preliminary
suspension
a sentence for
inis
effect a
remission of the
contempt
complete
Merritt,
79,
v.
contempt.
269 Ark.
When this rule we have applying indicated that when of the sentence the that part suspended, portion is remitted but the of suspended remaining the portion contempt James, 764, still exists. James v. 237 Ark. 375 S.W.2d 793 (1964).
This
is therefore not
appeal
rendered moot
the
by
of the
partial suspension
sentences.
of
Eighty days
appellant
remitted;
sentence were
Henry’s
and therefore
suspended
how
ever,
remaining
the
ten days
the issues
properly place
raised by
appellant
before us on
appeal. As
Roth’s
appellant
sentence
time,
was suspended conditionally for a
of
specificperiod
we conclude this
amounted to a
suspension
mere
postponement
Johnson,
rather than a remission. See
contempt
The trial court did not state whether it was holding However, civil or criminal contempt. the record that, reveals in addition to the purpose coercing appellants orders, with comply court previous sentences imposed were for the purpose punishing appellants’ deliberate interference Thus, with the court’s order. this was both a civil and a criminal contempt proceeding. State, See Fitzhugh 137, v. 296 Ark. 752 S.W.2d 275 (1988).
We
apply
standard of review for criminal con
it,
tempt because
as well as the burden of
proof,
stricter than
that for civil
In
contempt.
a criminal contempt proceeding, proof
of contempt must exist in the trial court
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
v.
Jolly
Jolly, 290 Ark.
Appellants’ first assignment of error is a claim essentially that there is insufficient evidence to support findings of contempt. Appellants specifically claim it was error to hold them in contempt because they had no direct knowledge of the order, visitation and the charge them, against did they willfully disobey order, visitation acted in good faith Jeffrey. Appel- overriding protect to an responsibility pursuant held in being he is immune from argues lant Roth further as DHS in his official capacity because he acted contempt (1987), Ann. 12-12-509 on Ark. Code He relies supervisor. § *7 Act in the Child Abuse Reporting custody protective provision and Roth acted. at the time Henry effect Judge of sixteen pages, In the final order which consists of fact and his findings explained Crabtree set forth detailed very were in con- for the conclusion that both reasoning had With to the issue of whether appellants tempt. respect order, chancellor knowledge of the verbal visitation found: assert a lack of In the Defendants pleadings Huffman’s Order. That knowledge Judge of the terms true. Willene Huffman’s Henry quoted Judge not simply Order in her Affidavit on completed Saturday, February 16, 1991, and attached to the Petition for Court Ordered oath, Supervision. She stated under “That on February 1991, Mr. Mark Eberhard was four hours visita- granted tion with Eberhard with a of his Jeffrey ‘supervisor ” original Affidavit). choice’ (quotations Throughout hearing Willene and Rich Roth contempt, Henry stated removed Eberhard from the they home because of the court-ordered visit and because she believed the visitation was to occur. going They both asserted they had no with the problem visitation but with who supervised be, i.e., supervisor going Craig McNew’s fifteen- year-old daughter.
With to the issue respect of whether appellants willfully order, violated the visitation the chancellor found: Affidavit, In her Henry stated that Rebecca Eberhard coúld no longer the child because the protect Court had ordered visitation and that she could be found possibly and incarcerated for contempt refusing follow the Court Order. Rebecca Eberhard Surely, could her child if protect the occasion arose that The required protection. Depart- ment alleged, has never in the affidavit of except February 16, 1991, that Rebecca Eberhard could not care properly for the child or the child. The protect has Department never asked the Court to child remove the from Rebecca custody
Eberhard’s him in foster care. it place Again, agents wasn’t visit that of the supervised Department with, disagreed but who was to the visit. Accord- supervise Jordan, to the of Officer ing testimony Willene Henry stated she and Roth agents DHS) as (presumably did Judge’s not like the decision and were going to take addition, Jeffrey into In custody. Willene tele- Henry Mark phoned Eberhard and stated he could not visit with the child because she had taken him into foster care and if he wanted visitation to call her morning, as if the Tuesday final decision was hers and Court’s. Henry Roth took Jeffery Eberhard into him in placed foster care to circumvent the Order issued by Judge Huffman. It is clear that and Roth intentionally 14, 1991, violated Judge Huffman’s February Order. There is substantial evidence in the record to these support *8 fact, findings. In we need look no further than the testimonies of during the appellants to find contempt hearing the supporting evidence. At two different points during her testimony, Henry admitted that on 16,1991, of evening February she was aware that Mr. Eberhard was to planning 16, visit on Jeffrey February 1991, and that this visit was the result of an order Judge issued by Huffman. She testified further that she and Roth made appellant a joint decision to take Jeffrey into protective custody.
Roth testified that the afternoon by of Friday, February 1991, he was aware that Judge Huffman had issued an order on the day before granting Mr. Eberhard visitation with He Jeffrey. stated that he and were concerned for welfare Jeffrey’s due to the upcoming visitation, court-ordered and confirmed Henry’s that the testimony two of them made a joint decision to take protective custody Jeffrey 1991. February
Appellants’ testimonies regarding the willfulness of their actions taken in violation of the visitation order are corroborated by Bentonville Police Officer Kenneth Jordan. Officer Jordan Roth to accompanied Mrs. Eberhard’s house to take custody and Jeffrey testified that he overheard to Henry say Mrs. Eberhard that “they didn’t agree Court, with the decision of the Eberhard, that Mr. or father, or step-father, had unsupervised rights visitation to the child.” [sic] to evidence with substantial overflowing is
The record
knew of the
that both appellants
findings
chancellor’s
support
order
violated that
deliberately
willfully
order and
visitation
to take
initiating
proceedings
disobeying process
by
he
say
we cannot
Accordingly,
custody.
Jeffrey
protective
into
for the
contempt
criminal
in
both
holding
appellants
in
erred
order.
with the visitation
deliberate interference
obviously
error,
claim
appellants
first assignment
of their
In support
acted
they
because
contempt
been held in
should not have
they
to
an overriding responsibility
protect
good
pursuant
faith
that,
as
argue
law. Appellants
under Arkansas
children
facts,
victim of sexual abuse
was a
Jeffrey
previous
viewed the
They
in a
of imminent peril.
to be
situation
placed
was about
upcoming
because of the
he
in imminent peril
believed
was
Eberhard,
be
which
was to
allege
Mr.
by
visitation
of a friend of Mr. Eber-
teen-aged daughter
by
supervised
in a
Thus,
in their professional opinion,
hard.
their
actions.
claim
Appellants
situation which warranted their
were consistent
into
taking Jeffrey
protective
actions in
They
and DHS policy.
Child Abuse
Act
Reporting
with the
on DHS
placed
the “duties and responsibilities
further claim that
to act
are
and that “the authority
children
protect
paramount”
deemed
a DHS
by
remove a child from a situation
immediately
peril
carry
be
the child in imminent
must
officialto
one which
existing
Appellants’
to override
court orders.”
weight
greater
follows, “Likewise, it is
their brief as
view summarized in
a DHS official would be
duty
tempered
inconceivable that
be
with
the existence of court order which
in conflict
might
*9
of a child from a
situation.”
dangerous
the removal
of the
between the
relationship
view
Appellants’
Act,
Abuse
DHS
and the trial courts of
Policy,
Child
Reporting
First,
skewed.
no evidence in the record
this state is
there
simply
allegation
teen-aged
going
a
was
support
girl
the
that
Thus,
was no
Mr. Eberhard’s visit with
there
supervise
Jeffrey.
justified
“imminent
that would have
actions.
peril”
appellants’
Second,
DHS
claim their actions were consistent with
appellants
fact,
DHS
when in
their actions were inconsistent with
policy,
him
facing
placed
If a situation similar to the one
Jeffrey
policy.
Huffman
duty
notify Judge
in imminent
had
peril, appellants
Henry testified
during
hearing. Appellant
of that fact
the divorce
hearing.
If she was so convinced that Mrs. Eberhard could
at
Eberhard,
adequately
not
from Mr.
should
protect
record to
nothing
have so testified. She did not. There
in the
court
ever notified of
chancery
any
indicate
was
substantiated
Furthermore,
of
of
reports
sexual abuse
there is no
Jeffrey.
of
with
evidence
the DHS
notifica
compliance
policy requiring
of
tion
law enforcement officials a
prosecuting attorney
report indicating sexual abuse
a child. This failure to present
this evidence to the
and other
chancery court
authorities is in
direct violation of
law and
statutory
DHS
See Ark. Code
Policy.
(1987);
Crider,
120,
Ann.
12-12-507(b)
§
Cundiff v.
DHS,
(1990);
The Child Abuse Reporting Act and DHS are policies designed state, to work with the trial courts this not against courts, as claim. It is appellants inconceivable to this court that would view appellants their determinations of a child’s need for protection chancellor, as above and beyond any order of a when the especially chancellor was given benefit of DHS’s knowledge of the substantiated as reports abuse required DHS policy.
The evidence reveals that Henry started appellant her investigation of Jeffrey’s case in October 1990. She did not file petition Mr. requesting Eberhard’s restraint from Jeffrey until 29, January 1991. Mr. McLaughlin testified such a delay unusual. The evidence further reveals that once aware of the visitation order issued February for the weekend of 17, 1991, February 16 and appellant Henry again delayed her actions. She made no effort to contact Judge Huffman about her concern for the scheduled visitation. She most certainly could have received his attention by filing another or petition motion for reconsideration. She did nothing except initiate protective proceedings a willful violation of the visitation order.
The record reveals that were appellants aware of the lower court’s visitation order and that they willfully interfered with it. After witnesses, evaluating the of the credibility Judge Crabtree specifically found that were not acting good faith when took Jeffrey into This is not a custody. case in which DHS were employees unaware of the completely civil
347 juvenile with the simultaneously being conducted proceedings sexual abuse the alleged were aware of Appellants proceedings. filed kind never They any proceeding. the divorce months before his be from removed Jeffrey should that alleging of action 1991, However, February appellant home. mother’s went Mrs. Eberhard’s to Roth’s Henry, approval, with appellant officer, and removed home, Jeffrey aby police accompanied in these actions They for took days. in foster care three him placed trauma, his or resulting of disregard any complete of a finding support is evidence to There substantial family. of faith. lack good DHS were acted as officials of argue they
Appellants to Ark. being held in contempt pursuant therefore immune from of is (1987). argument immunity 12-12-510 This Code Ann. § merit. without as officialswhen agree
We that acted DHS appellants agree of We also Jeffrey. initiated taking protective 12-12-510, statute, Ark. Code Ann. that current section faith of DHS 1991), (Supp. presumes good 12-12-517 § civil criminal liability from or grants immunity officials and them child reporting in abuse. investigating for their actions However, from grant immunity section 12-12-510 does of is granted because the contempt contempt proceedings, power our in Constitution and cannot be courts the Arkansas See v. Yar abridged Assembly. Yarbrough General by 211, 748 (1988). Ark. S.W.2d 123 To extend section brough, 295 civil grant immunity contempt 12-12-510 to from and criminal for power punish would be an the court’s abridgement such We process; abridgement prohibited. disobedience an conclude, therefore, that are not immune from a appellants no and there was error committed proceeding by contempt them court. holding contempt both assignment second of error that Appellants’ conducting chancellors acted with bias and prejudice right to the extent that their constitutional to present proceedings In error merely alleging a defense was violated. addition to occurred, must has demonstrate the caused appellants prejudice State, error. v. S.W.2d alleged Smith Here, have not met their burden (1991). *11 that occurred. showing prejudice argue Judge predis that Huffman was
Appellants the sexual of and DHS’s regarding Jeffrey pending abuse posed reason, in For be juvenile allega court. whatever it the petition tions of Mr. Eberhard’s abuse of without Jeffrey any sexual reports something entirely substantiated from DHS or else different, Judge Huffman felt to that Mr. compelled require Eberhard’s be aby visitation of third supervised person. he regarding alleged Had been Mr. Eberhard’s abuse predisposed safeguard of he would not have the Jeffrey, provided supervi sion when he visitation. The granted supervisory safeguard convincing evidence that was Judge Huffman one predisposed or way regarding the other the abuse. alleged sexual argue Judge also that Huffman’s
Appellants consoli dation of divorce case and the juvenile case evidence of his bias and prejudice. nothing The consolidation was more than an expression Judge Huffman’s concern that all issues be resolved There was bias consistently. prejudice no or in the consolidation of two cases. that We note once the show cause issued, Judge orders were Huffman recused from correctly case in an to effort avoid the appearance of impropriety. We he conclude did not act with bias or prejudice. Crabtree,
With to respect Judge he appellants argue them from a prevented defense to presenting the contempt charge because he called their a counsel as witness. It is true that counsel however, witness, was called as a were still appellants allowed to rebut the charge contempt. They hearing had in which the trial judge received evidence and heard their defense. Contempt ais unique proceeding where the judge acts as both trier and Judge finder of fact. Crabtree did not act with bias or prejudice calling counsel as a witness.
In their attempt articulate their second assignment of error, make numerous accusations of the lower courts which are disrespectful. Appellants state that a concise picture what happened Benton cannot be County to this presented court because they believe a “sincerely spark ignited that turned into a blaze for reasons other than the administration of justice.” Appellants accuse the trial court of an “pursuing independent agenda” and characterize its conduct as “calculated of the Department of the officials humiliation to the public lead Services.” of Human brief is from language appellants’
The above-quoted intervenor, Attorney it so offensive prompted from the briefs. be stricken General, language that the request Elliot, McLemore v. R. Sup. to Ark. Ct. Pursuant *12 motion intervenor’s conclude the 306, 614 (1981), we S.W.2d Ark. McLemore, violating Sup. sanction for as a In well-taken. that was containing language the 6, we struck the briefs Ct. R. of this court. The from the records to the trial court disrespectful and inflammatory is far more in the case present used language in Accordingly, the used McLemore. language than disrespectful 462-67 of to strike request pages we the intervenor’s grant brief from our records. appellants’ is that the of error assignment third
Appellants’
vacating
and
erroneously
court acted
chancery
arbitrarily
visiting
order
Mr. Eberhard from
his
juvenile
restraining
court’s
us on this
son,
appeal.
This
is not
before
properly
issue
Jeffrey.
in the
restraining
juvenile
The
order in
issued
question
DHS, as
to appellants,
in a
where
opposed
court
proceeding
Thus,
DHS,
it is
the court for
petitioned
Jeffrey.
supervision
error in
by any
not
that would have been prejudiced
appellants,
However,
dissolution of the
order.
final
restraining
appellants’
from their
does
list
appeal
contempt proceedings
notice of
DHS is not a
to this
this
party
appeal,
DHS as an
As
appellant.
3(e),
See Ark. R.
P.
and
App.
issue is
barred.
procedurally
Arkansas
Servs. v.
25 Ark.
Shipman,
App.
Human
Dep’t of
(1988).
We note that DHS have encountered may by prejudice when DHS restraining the dissolution of order was remedied Jeffrey’s concerning and the Eberhards reached a settlement neglected as a child. This settlement dependent status Mr. with for thirty days Eberhard’s visitation suspended Thus, DHS’s for visitation thereafter. provided supervised achieved interest in from sexual abuse was protecting Jeffrey no DHS suffered prejudice. error, their claim assignment
As fourth erred in violation their entering gag the trial court order claim rights. gag constitutional order violated Appellants to discussion of the an rights their a free issues and a review in a fair open Although forum ensure trial. appellants expressed court, general their order to the trial objection gag never asserted that of their constitutional would be any rights by violated of the order. entry gag They never certainly argued to the trial court that their constitutional rights association, expression, and fair trial were violated the gag consistently order. We have held in argu criminal appeals ments, ones, even constitutional not presented to the trial court State, will 67, 822 not be addressed on v. Ussery appeal. (1991). S.W.2d 848
Appellants’ assignment fifth of error is that the trial court placed Henry in double appellant jeopardy by increasing her jail for contempt. sentence The record does reveal that Henry’s sentence for was increased imprisonment when the trial judge modified the of her suspension sentence from an eighty-day suspension However, a sixty-day suspension. the record also *13 reveals that did not make an objection to the modified sentence on grounds former at jeopardy the time the sentence was modified. Objections State, must be timely, Lewis v. 260, 819 S.W.2d (1991), and even objections constitutional are waived unless made to the trial court. Ussery, supra.
Affirmed.
Hays, J., dissents. Hays, Justice, Steele dissenting. The effect of today’s holding is that when an employee of the of Human Department undertakes, Services (DHS) to pursuant Ark. Code Ann. 12- § 12-509 (1987), to take a child into temporary protective custody prevent to abuse, imminent danger child thereby interfering with court ordered visitation the parent suspected causing abuse, such that employee becomes subject to contempt proceed- ings. Nothing in 12-12-509 indicates that is such not be power to § exercised so as to impinge on rights visitation in a ordered divorce suit, or pending concluded.
But if even the conduct in appellants’ this affair renders them culpable, and jail fines sentences are imposed seriously disproportionate to circumstances. These are not court, nor of the authority flaunting disgruntled parties them. concern does not that in an affair intermeddlers officious government state of that division Rather, agents are task of assigned specific has legislature which the (DHS) abuse, or substantiated whether child alleviating preventing to some acting pursuant was appellant Neither merely suspected. responsibil- to a perceived in response motive but purely personal responsibility that that suggest I do not the law. under ity court, but I do submit trial of the authority to the transcendent leniency greater the side of mitigate number of factors that a thing, For one imposed. harsh sentences the singularly than that the serious sufficiently abuse were of parental indications another, measures; the trial for extraordinary trial court took but on February delivered (verbally order court’s in its terms: vague weeks) decidedly six writing for reduced visitation, I’m to order going And as to THE COURT: conditions, the defend- for by provided visitation under else present third someone party, there will be a ant that there’s if he’s accused to make sure that visiting when he’s his can vouch for present some reputable person And that time. throughout conduct conduct and the child’s that, good, that’s a wise I think agreeable since he’s decision, (R. 532-533). way. and we’ll do it that this week- we start our visitation MS. DUNCAN: Can Mark has seen his son. been a time since long end? It’s Yes. You bet. THE COURT: MS. DUNCAN: Thank you. what, the third party we know who
MR. EVANS: Do *14 so we something in this? Could submit going to be child? at least condition the kind of can in a Well, to involved get I’m reluctant THE COURT: to having this side is talking where we’re about situation words, in other You know. The plaintiff, that side. approve to see names to the plaintiff are we to submit a list of going to be the third party? if they’re okay I didn’t mean to I didn’t that. say MR. EVANS: No. think, child, will need to be I indicate that. It’s— The certain, this one’s you’re going conditioned to that to be And we know going thing. there that sort of if who be, then were to we could parties going lay foundation. is,
THE If know who I Okay. you COURT: the person them, telling don’t mind but it’s not a condition of the (R. 535-536). decree. Honor, Your
MR. EVANS: was that visitation going this or—? be weekend Yes,
THE as I’m I COURT: far as concerned. don’t know any why (R. 537) reason not. concerned,
THE And COURT: as far as the visitation is know, for I you long, ordering, how intend like weekend visitation and holiday visitation For directive. this week, know, time, you to, for the first you might want you know, I don’t how know much time you have visit nor long, how might feel it visit you appropriate to less than, a shorter of time. period sir, MR. DUNCAN: Yes discussed, that’s what we had fact, aas matter of was for a period maybe four hours on Saturday and again then for a of about period four hours on Sunday. Well,
THE COURT: that sounds like you’re using your head.
MR. EVANS: That’s what you’re proposing?
MS. DUNCAN: That’s for this weekend.
MR. EVANS: Yeah.
And the
Okay.-
rest of
visita-
tion, you’re
to set
going
that out at a later time?
decree,
THE
I’ll
COURT:
it in
put
But I’ll
right.
try
be
pretty
(R. 538).
standard with it.
For
thing,
another
not only
law
an
imposes
affirmative
duty
others,
the appellants, among
but clothes them with
immunity
the discharge of those
Ark.
responsibilities.
Code Ann.
12-12-
§
(1987).
while
Finally,
appellants may have been generally
order,
aware
verbal
there is no showing that their claim to
*15
terms,
into
these factors
Taking
of its
have been unaware
false.
have been an
solution would
judicious
I believe a more
account
fine,
jail
to a sizeable
a
warning
as opposed
admonition and
examination.
and a psychiatric
sentence
HUDDLESTON,
v. Lee
et al.
CITY OF POCAHONTAS