Henry v. Dennis, 95 Me. 24

95 Me. 24 | Me. | 1901

Wiswell, C. J.

For some time prior to May 1,1896, Henry, the plaintiff in one of these suits, had been engaged in the wool business alone, under the name of W. S. Henry, Jr. & Co. On that day he formed a copartnership in the same business with one Charles C. Parsons and the business was subsequently carried on in the firm name of Henry & Parsons. But after the formation of the firm, Mr. Henry continued his individual business, in the name of W. S. Henry, Jr. & Go., to the extent of selling from time to time a quantity of wool which he had on hand at the time of the formation of the copartnership.

On August 15,1896, after the formation of the firm of Henry & Parsons, but while Mr. Henry was still selling on his own account the wool which he previously had on hand and which had not been turned over to the firm, Henry wrote a letter to the Gardiner Woolen Company, in which he referrred to an order for wool just received and in which he says: “At Mr. W. D. Eaton’s request we sent you the little lot without any knowledge of your financial standing, but if we are to continue to ship you wool on 60 days time, we feel justified in informing ourselves in that respect and we presume that you would prefer to have us inquire directly of you than of outside parties.....Will you kindly favor us with full particulars which, we trust will warrant a continuation of our business relations to our mutual benefits.” This letter was dictated by Mr. Henry, as shown by the letter, but was signed in the name of W. S. Henry, Jr. & Co.

In reply to this letter of inquiry, the defendant, to whom the letter was turned over for reply, under date of August 24, 1896, wrote a letter directed to W. S. Henry & Co., which, it is claimed, contained false and material representations as to the financial standing and condition of the Gardiner Woolen Company, which were subsequently acted upon by Mr. Henry, both individually and as a member of the firm of Henry & Parsons, by making sales to the Woolen Company on credit, upon his own account and upon that of the firm. The plaintiffs, Henry in one case and Plenry & Parsons in the other, being unable to collect of the Woolen Company the amounts due them, because of its insolvency, brought these two actions to recover for the injuries sustained by them by reason of the alleged misrepresentations of the defendant.

The two cases were tried together and the jury found against the defendant in both cases. The only question now presented by the exceptions is, whether or not the representations contained in the defendant’s letter directed to W. S. Henry & Co. could have been so acted upon and relied upon by Mr. Henry as a member of the firm of Henry & Parsons, that the defendant would be liable to that firm for any injury sustained by it on account thereof, as well as to Henry individually for any injury .sustained by him for the same, reason.

It is urged in behalf of the defendant that he should not be and is not liable to the firm of Henry & Parsons for any misrepresentations contained in that letter, because the letter was not directed to the firm and because there was no privity between it and the defendant. The case shows that the defendant did not know of the existence of Mr. Parsons or of the firm of Henry & Parsons. But Henry was the active member of the firm and the one who made these sales upon credit to the Woolen Company, and the jury must have found that Henry was induced to make these sales upon credit, both for himself and for the firm, by the representations contained in the defendant’s letter, and that in making the sales and in extending credit to the company, both individually and as a member of the firm, he relied upon these representations.

No authority exactly in point has been called to our attention, but the general principles relative to the liability of a person for injuries caused by such misrepresentations, are well settled. One who makes a misrepresentation must, to render himself liable, have made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the person to whom it is made or by one to whom he intended it should be communicated, and he is therefore responsible to such persons only as it was intended for.

It is a general rule that a person cannot complain of false representations, for the purpose of maintaining an action of deceit, unless the representations were either made directly to him, with the intention that they should be acted upon by him, or made to another person with the intention that they should be communicated to him and acted upon by him. A representation made to one person with the intention that it shall reach the ears of another and be acted upon by him, and which does reach him, and is acted upon by him to his injury, gives the person so acting upon it the same right to relief or redress as if it had been made to him directly. Am. & Eng. Encyl. of Law 2d. Ed. Vol. 14, pp. 148 and 149, and cases there cited. See also Hunnewell v. Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286; Nash v. Minn. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 159 Mass. 437.

Applying these general principles to the particular question here involved, we think that the defendant is liable to the firm for such injury as it suffered in consequence of the misrepresentations contained in his letter, whereby the firm was induced to make sales of its goods to the Woolen Company upon credit. The answer of the defendant to the letter of inquiry was directed to a firm, its object was to obtain credit for the Woolen Company from a firm of which' Henry was a member. True, the defendant did not know that Parsons was associated in business with Henry, nor did he know, so far as the- case shows, that Henry was also doing business alone under a firm name. But he must have contemplated that the contents of this letter would either be communicated to other members of any firm of which Henry was a partner, in that business, and be acted upon by the firm, or that Henry, acting for a firm, would be induced by his letter to give credit' to the Woolen Company. The letter was not only intended for'Henry, but as well for those associated with him in that business.

It is of no consequence that the letter was directed to W. S. Henry & Co., when it was in fact relied upon by Henry as a member of the firm of Henry & Parsons. It is not necessary, in order for a defendant to be liable for the consequences of his misrepresentations, that he should know the names of the persons to whom the misrepresentations may be communicated, provided he contemplated that they should be communicated to others and be acted upon by them.

Here, as the case shows, Henry, to whom the misrepresentation was directly made, was induced thereby, as a member of the firm of Henry & Parsons, to sell the firm’s goods on credit, and thereby the firm suffered. This is precisely what was within the intention of the defendant, he is consequently liable therefor. This result is in accordance with the ruling of the court at the trial.

Exceptions overruled.