34 So. 2d 232 | Miss. | 1948
Lead Opinion
In August 1947 the Board of Supervisors of Newton County made "an order declaring the transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt and/or manufacture of wine and beer of the kind and character legalized by Chapter 171 of the Mississippi Laws of 1934 to be unlawful in Newton County." This order of the Board has been brought to this Court by an order of certiorari. It was based on an election held in July 1947, pursuant to an order of the board made on July 4, 1947. Section 10208, Code 1942, under which the order for this election was made, provides that "no election on the question shall be held in any one county oftener than once in five years, provided, however, that in counties which have elected or may elect by a majority vote of the duly qualified electors voting in the election that the transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt or manufacture of wine or beer of an alcoholic content of not more than four per centum by weight shall not be permitted in said county that an election may be held in the same manner as the election herein above provided on the question of whether or not the said transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt or manufacture of said beverages and shall be ordered by the board of supervisors of such county on a petition of twenty per cent (20%) of the duly qualified electors of such county; but no election on this question can be ordered more often than once in five years." The order of the board for the election does not adjudicate or in any way recite anything relative to any prior election on this question in Newton County, and notice of the election was given by publication in a newspaper and by *787 posting a notice thereof on the bulletin board at the court-house.
The contentions of counsel for the appellant are: (1), whether an election had been held on this question in Newton County within five years prior to the making of this order therefor was a jurisdictional fact which the board of supervisors should have adjudicated in accord with the statute before it was authorized to make the order; (2), there was no legal notice of the election; and (3), that the published notice does not "contain a statement of the proposition to be voted on at said election", as required by the statute.
Whether or not the holding of a prior election on this question in the county is a jurisdictional fact, on the decision of which in accord with the statute and its recital in the board's minutes depends the jurisdiction of a board of supervisors to order such an election, is a difficult question to decide, and a difference of opinion thereon has arisen among us. Since the enactment of this statute in 1934, a number of elections have been held under it without the order of the board of supervisors therefor containing any reference whatever to whether any such election had been theretofore held in the county. Some of them have been brought to this Court and the elections upheld without this question being raised or discussed by the Court. It therefore becomes our duty to obey the well-established rule that the interpretation put upon a doubtful statute by the department of the government charged with its administration and followed for a considerable time should be accepted by the courts. Briscoe v. Buzbee,
Section 10208, Code 1942, provides that the elections thereunder shall be held "under the election laws of the state," and under Section 3018 thereof, thirty days' notice of the election must be given to the qualified voters. Simpson County v. Burkett,
This published notice was as follows: "To The Qualified Electors of Newton County, Mississippi: In pursuance of an order of the Board of Supervisors of Newton County, Mississippi, made and entered in the minutes of said board of the 4th day of June, 1947, notice is hereby given that an election will be held in said County on the 22nd day of July, 1947, as provided by Section 2 of Chapter 171 of the Laws of 1934, as amended by Chapter 224 of the Laws of Mississippi of 1942, and as contained in Section 10208 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 for the purpose of determining by a majority vote of the qualified electors voting in said election whether or not the transportation, storage, sale, distribution, receipt, and/or manufacture of beer and wine of an alcoholic content of not more than four per centum (4%) by weight shall be excluded from said County of Newton." It is difficult to *789 see how the notice could have more specifically stated the proposition to be voted on.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
Appellant says in his suggestion of error that in order that the quoted maxim may be applied, the custom must have been established by a long and uniform practice, and he says that in fact there has been no such uniform and generally recognized practice as that assumed in the original opinion. He calls our attention to the fact that within less than two years ago there was a case in this Court wherein the order contained the recital which he contends is necessary.
Inasmuch as we cannot take judicial notice of the records and orders of any tribunal other than our own, we are without dependable information, so far as this record is concerned, whether in fact there has been any such custom *790 as that relied upon by the Court in the original opinion herein. For that reason, although voting to overrule the suggestion of error, I do so upon a different and a firmer ground, as follows:
The order made by the board of supervisors in this case is in all material respects the same as that in Martin v. Board of Supervisors of Winston County,
But in that case, the Martin case, this Court said: "We find no error in the orders of the board dealing with this election, in any part of the proceedings, which would render their action void." If the point now made had been made in the Martin case, then, of course, the quoted language would have been direct decision that the recital and adjudication by the board that no valid election had been held in the county within the past five years were not necessary to the jurisdiction of the board.
But appellant in the present case calls attention to the fact that the point now relied on was not raised in the Martin case, and appellant invokes the rule that points not raised in or mentioned by the appellate court are not within the rule of stare decisis. To this rule there is an exception well settled in this State, as well as elsewhere, and that exception is when the point not raised or mentioned goes to the jurisdiction of the Court, 21 C.J.S., Courts, Secs. 113-115. This exception was fully reviewed and distinctly applied in Drummond v. State,
It follows therefore that when the Court in the Martin case took jurisdiction and proceeded to an affirmance, instead of dismissing for want of jurisdiction, it decided at the same time that the order of the board was not jurisdictionally invalid for the want of the recital about any previous election within five years, and that we must now follow that decision unless manifestly wrong or mischievous in operation, and it is neither of these.
L.A. Smith, Sr., and McGehee, J., concur in the foregoing special opinion.
Addendum
Suggestion of Error overruled.