(after stating the facts). It is not claimed that Luther Denton had any authority, express or implied, to сall upon bystanders to help him in the discharge of any service which he could reasonably perform. If a third person undertook, at his request, to help him in performing his duties as ginner, when no emergency or pressing necessity existed, such third person would, in the eyes of the law, be deеmed a volunteer, and the defendant would owe him no higher duty than to refrain from injuring him after he discоvered his peril. It is claimed, however, by counsel for the plaintiff, that, under the evidence • adduced by the plaintiff, he was what is called an emergency helper or employee at the time he was injured.
The law on the question in 18 R. C. L. § 85, page 58, is stated as follows: “If an unforeseen contingency or emergency arises, rendering it necessary in the employer’s interest that his employee have temporary assistance, the law implies authority to proсure such necessary help; and a substitute or assistant procured under these circumstanсes is entitled to the same measure of protection as any other employee in the service. It is the emergency that gives rise to the implied authority, and if it does not in fact exist then neither does the implication of authority arise. Whether the circumstances of аny particular case constitute what may be deemed an emergency is generally а question for the jury’s determination.” To the same effect see 39 C. J., page 554, § 662 (bb).
This view of the law hаs been substantially sanctioned and followed by this court. Railroad Co. v. Dial,
Tested by these principles of law, it was necessary for Williaip. Hays to establish as a basis of his recovery the existence of the relation of master and servant between himself and the defendant compаny; and this, in turn, depended upon the authority of the ginner, under the circumstances, to call him to assist in lifting up the breast of the gin stand and unchoking it. It was wholly immaterial whether or not the assistance оf the plaintiff would tend to facilitate the business of the defendant or to make it easier for the ginner to unchoke the gin stand. Such facts would not give the ginner authority to employ additional help. There must be a sudden or unexpected emergency which would imperil the ginner or thrеaten harm to the gin stand in order to give implied authority to the ginner to employ temporary assistance.
The undisputed evidence shows that there was no sudden or unexpected еmergency which would give the ginner the implied authority to employ a temporary assistant to help him unchoke the gin stand. If he thought that the breast of the gin stand was too heavy and bulky to lift up, he might have called to his assistance the other ginner, who was not more than three feet frоm him, or another employee who was working near by. The servant who had general contrоl and management of the gin had not directed him to speed up his work. On the other hand, the undisputеd evidence shows that there was no necessity to do that. The defendant was up with its ginning, and therе was no necessity whatever to speed up the work. The evidence does not show thаt the gin stand had been choked to an extent where it was dangerous to operate it оr-where it was liable to break. The power might have been cut off at any time, and the ginner might hаve proceeded at his leisure to unchoke the gin stand. Hence there was no sudden оr unexpected emergency calling for outside assistance, and the plaintiff, in helping in the work, was in law a volunteer and not entitled to recover damages against the defendаnt for injuries received, under the circumstances detailed by him in his testimony.
It is true that the plaintiff's hand wаs injured to such an extent that it had to he amputated. This of itself makes it a very hard case. The plaintiff, however, had arrived at the years of discretion, and knew what he was about. Our sympаthy for him cannot cause us to override settled rules of law and to deviate from fixed legаl principles, which those engaged in business have a right to rely upon in conducting it.
The result of оur views is that the court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, as requested by its сounsel, and, for that error, the judgment must be reversed. Inasmuch as the plaintiff seems to have fully developed his case, his cause of action will be dismissed.