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Henry L. And Frances O. Hills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
691 F.2d 997
11th Cir.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 jurisdiction confers Georgia statute if cause of action HILLS, any over nonresident Henry L. and Frances O. any following: arises from Respondents, (a) business with- The transaction State; or COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL (b) The commission of a tortious act or REVENUE, Petitioner. State; omission within this or No. 81-7668. (c) injury of a tortious commission an act or omis- State caused of Appeals, United States Court State; sion outside the Eleventh Circuit. owns, (d) person possesses If the uses or 15, 1982. Nov. within the any real situated property State. Rehearing Rehearing En Banc allegedly Defendant’s tortious conduct 17, 1983. Denied Jan. place injury took and the said California occurred have resulted from this conduct own, in Tennessee. Defendant does not use possess any Georgia, real so (b), (c) (d) Ann.

subsections Ga.Code applicable. 24-113.1 are not

§ that,

Plaintiffs contend because the de-

fendant transacted substantial business Georgia, jurisdictional

within the State

“contact” exists between the nonresident State, per-

defendant and the and therefore jurisdiction

sonal exists under Ga.Code Ann. 24-113.1(a). court, on Whitaker v. relying

The district Inc., Alabama, Ga.App.

Krestmark of held that Ga. S.E.2d 24-113.1(a) applies only

Code Ann.

claims based on contract and not those

sounding in tort. all the claims in Since torts,

this case were based on law that the Georgia long-

district court found inapplicable. agree

arm statute was We analysis Georgia

with the court’s district Furthermore, even if 24-

case law. Section conduct,

113.1(a) applied to tortious apply

would not in this case because the their cause

plaintiffs alleged have not

of action arose from the transaction of busi- Georgia.

ness in

AFFIRMED. *2 HATCHETT, HILL and

Before Circuit *, Judges, and GOLDBERG Senior Circuit Judge.
GOLDBERG, Judge: Circuit 165 of the Internal Revenue Section Code allows, rule, as a general of 1954 deductions ... in- compensated for “losses appeal or otherwise.”1 In this surance presented question with a of first im- circuit; in this we are pression upon called voluntary to decide whether a election not to file an insurance claim for a theft loss deduction under precludes this section.

1. INTRODUCTION A. Facts Hills, Henry taxpayer-appel- and Frances lees, Dahlonega, own a vacation home near 1, 1976, Georgia. April About a thief dis- of their secluded re- turbed solitude treat, causing Though a loss of $760. insured, taxpayers loss was chose not to Murray, Atty. Gen., John F. Acting Asst. Instead, policy.2 file a claim Chief, Section, Michael L. Paup, Appellate taxpayers claimed loss deduc- Robert Duffy, T. William Wang, Attys., P. tion on their 1976 federal income tax re- Section, Appellate Justice, Dept, turn.3 Washington, D.C., petitioner. Hicks, Maloof Campbell, & Bruce M. Decision Be- History B. Procedural Edenfield, Atlanta, Ga., respondents. low taxpayers’ return was audited and a Notice

the Commissioner issued of Defi- * Irving only Goldberg, graph Honorable L. to the extent U.S. Circuit shall be allowed Judge Circuit, sitting by designa- for the Fifth that the amount of loss to such individual casualty, tion. arising or from each from each * * * theft, $100. exceeds (26 U.S.C.): Internal Revenue Code of 1954 SEC. 165. LOSSES. reader, idly 2. For the curious (a) General Rule. —There shall be allowed apparently pursue a claim because: declined to any during aas deduction loss sustained (1) they previously three theft had filed other year compensated taxable and not claims and feared a fourth would result can- insurance or otherwise. policy; (2) also cellation of the the same protection; (3) included their fire because of (c) Limitation on Losses of Individual. —In country to the near- the distance of their home individual, the case of an the deduction under station, difficult if not im- est fire would be (a) subsection shall be limited to— coverage. possible get These other fire business; (1) losses incurred in a trade or facts, interest, though pertinent are not (2) losses incurred in transaction en- holding. our profit, though tered into for not connected business; with a trade or $660 3. The claimed deduction was for rather losses of not connected $760, 165(c)(3) allows deduc- because business, trade or if such losses arise from they only exceed tion for to the extent losses fire, storm, casualty, shipwreck, or other $100. para- from theft. A loss in this described now one determine ciency. taxpayers, aggressively analysis: must first if there loss, then prevent economic has been a consider trying appealed the loss been the Tax Court. This was also a case of first whether or otherwise.8 The Commissioner full Tax In a impression for the Court.4 deny view that the fine, does Tax Court’s thoughtful opinion reviewed detriment here was not court,5 compen- economic diverged prior full Judge Nims *3 otherwise; rather, by sated insurance or he judicial treatment the allowed deduc- that these do not meet the first claims facts exist- tion.6 Tax Court assumed the requirement of a loss. statutory dealt primarily ence of a loss and compensated whether the loss was insur- by argu- advances The Commissioner three meaning ance or within the of otherwise position for the that the taxpayers ments 165(a). on Relying section the clear statu- First, a deductible loss. he not suffer did legislative tory language and limited histo- 165(a) requires that a tax- argues section ry, taxpayers’ the court held the loss was possibilities all reasonable payer compensated. not The court further held an economic recompense of before detri- by taxpay- that this loss not caused the considered a loss. Because ment is the tax- claim, election file an ers’ not to insurance claim, not insurance they did file an payers by and so was not the limitations precluded Second, undergo not a loss. he revives did on deductions personal, nonprofit-seek- for rejected by the Tax the Court We ing 165(c).7 losses contained in section by taxpayers’ this loss was caused affirm. claim, and so election not file a is not a 165(c) of personal loss the sort Arguments Appeal on C. Finally, deductible. makes Commis- appeal strongly the economic argues On the Commissioner sioner detriment calls was in urges two-part by that section 165 for a suffered substance Commissioner, case, 1968). Subsequent 4. In an Axelrod v. courts have followed earlier (1971), majority 56 248 the Tax T.C. consider what we view of Ken undesirable unnecessary pass See, found the de- tucky Towing Court ductibility on e.g., Waxier v. Utilities. Co. uncompensated insured losses. States, (W.D.Tenn. F.Supp. 297 United 510 however, judges concurring separately, Two 1980); v. Bartlett United 397 Judge Quealy did reach the issue. would Commissioner, (D.Md.1975); Morgan 37 216 grounds. have allowed First, a deduction on such two (CCH) (1978) (following Kentucky 524 T.C.M. claim, by failing file rule, under the Golsen v. Com Utilities Golsen ‘not “had no 1965 which was aff'd, missioner, 445 54 T.C. 757 compensated’ good’ by or ‘made insurance denied, (10th Cir.), 404 985 cert. F.2d meaning within statute and [the (1971)). 30 254 See also L.Ed.2d regulations.” 261 Id. at Commissioner’s] Comment, v. United States: De Bartlett Case J., Second, (Quealy, concurring). “[a]ny loss Compensat Losses not duction Nonbusiness by petitioner his sustained resulted from Separate for a Insurance —The Need ed compensation election not than to claim rather Individuals, Mary 18 Wm. Standard for & being compensated from the loss not Commissioner, (1976). In Miller v. L.Rev. 200 J., (Quealy, Id. at 263 con- insurance.” (CCH) (1980) the Tax Court 41 T.C.M. 528 curring). Judge Fay would have allowed Kentucky Utilities under the Golsen followed rule, taxpayer has, valid deduction “where the light opinion in but then withdrew its reasons, practical relinquished rights to (CCH) (1981). 665 Hills below. T.C.M. compa- claim from the insurance Circuit, appealed been to the That has Sixth circumstances, ny,” because these “[u]nder (6th 1981). disa 81-1717 Cir. Nov. We No. gree practical purposes such an is for all individual interpreta subsequent insurance,” courts’ with these without See infra III.B. Utilities. Part tion Reported (1981). at 76 T.C. 484 below already sparked Tax some Court decision ground. judges Four dissented on scholarly commentary. Vogel, Tripp Un- & J., dissenting). (Sterrett, T.C. at Hills, Casualty reimbursed Losses Añer 60 Tax- es Judge two-part analysis appeared in first 8. This supra Quealy’s in Axelrod. See concurrence squarely denying 6. The first deduction case 4; Tripp Vogel, supra note at 156-57. note & uncompensated, insured for an loss was Ken- Glenn, tucky Utilities Co. v. F.2d 631 insur- the Commissioner favors nothing disposition more a nondeductible a section 165 deduc- deny ance We shall review the Tax in this case would premium. is covered insurance. holding regarding compensation, Court’s tion time equivalent reading functionally each This is and then consider Commission- arguments as if it said “not covered er’s in turn. statute to point

insurance.” It is sufficient out plain meaning has a II. that “covered” also “COMPENSATED” DOES NOT “compensat- that of MEAN rather different from “COVERED” ed,” must enforce the and that this Court 165(a) allows a for any Section deduction actually enacted. If statute “loss insurance compensated ... response, were not sufficient small plain language or otherwise.” The on this sec- fragment legislative history presents two-part inquiry: statute surely dispositive.12 tion The initial loss?; (2) Was there Was it Means lan- Ways House Committee Although otherwise? *4 by “losses ... not covered insur- guage was rely any does not now on Commissioner compensated or otherwise and for.” ance gloss “compensated,” strained on we con- amended Finance Committee Senate First, sider that now two reasons. its final and form language enacted understanding history and meaning compensated by of “losses ... not in- 165(a) the compensation half of section is change surance or otherwise.”13 This necessary to understand the loss half. the fact that makes clear Second, prior some courts to the Tax Court difference between “covered” aware below have relied on an view of the unusual to enact “compensated” and and intended word.9 it in fact enacted. what “Compensated” respectable, is a everyday English respectable, word with a III. AN UNCOMPENSATED LOSS IS cir everyday meaning. Absent unusual A STILL LOSS by plain cumstances we are bound Completed and Transac- A. The Closed meaning language Congress has ena Impose Does Not tion Doctrine “Compensated” quite cted.10 here seems Compensation to Pursue Duty everyday meaning being able to take its Indeed, 165(a) allows a deduction reimbursed. Commissioner’s Section (1) and regulations support and endorse this com an economic detriment compensated is not mon-sense construction.11 See, Anderson, e.g., adjusted ... Broderick v. “insurance 9. 23 lowed should 488, (S.D.N.Y.1938) (“No giv- received”). 492 force can be plaintiffs en to claim that ‘not does not mean ‘not covered in- insurance’ language originally of this section was 12. The meaningless.”). It it is surance.’ means that or of 1894. in 28 of the Revenue Act § enacted 349, 509, 227, 28 553. This Pub.L. No. ch. Stat. Illinois, See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. 10. 451 Pol- particular held unconstitutional act was 304, 1784, 1791, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d 114 Co., 157 U.S. Loan & Trust lock v. Farmers’ Silver, Corp. 807, (1981); Mohasco v. 447 U.S. 673, 429, 759 but the 15 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed. 826, 2486, 2497, 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d 532 language without rele- was reenacted relevant Corp. Higginbotham, 436 (1980); Mobil Oil v. appears change and now vant or comment 2010, 2015, 625-26, I.R.C. § Intent, (1978). Note, But see Clear L.Ed.2d 581 Statements, Statutory and the Common Law: Seidman, Legislative Histo- See J. Seidman’s Court, Interpretation Supreme 95 Harv. 1938-1861, Laws, ry Tax of Federal Income (1982) (arguing L.Rev. 892 courts should feel (1938). no Finance Committee There was prece- free to treat old statutes as common law Comment, also Theñ for this bill. See report dent). the Small Inves- as Relief for Loss Deductions tor, nn. 860-61 & 1978 Duke L.J. Treas.Reg. 1.165-l(a) (deduction 11. al- legis- citing (discussing sources for limited and good by lowed for loss “not made insur- 165(c)(3)). history of § lative ance”); 1.165-l(c)(4) (amount id. al- of loss it, your and returns person does not now takes otherwise. The Commissioner taxpayers’ make a frontal attack is place. equally plain no loss has taken It argue pointlessly position by attempting person your prop- that if an unknown takes compen- the economic detriment was it, taken erty destroys place. and a loss has Rather, attack flanking sated. he makes many There are shades between these two argues that the detriment was not a extremes; however, line-drawing prob- loss. deductible precisely when determining lem of there is The Commissioner’s first relies a loss is not before us. represented on the rule loss must be that a is not line-drawing problem That before to be completed closed and transaction it is clear the taxpayers us now because argues require- deductible. He loss; night have had a a thief in the reasonably ment means a must away which has not spirited property, possible all sources of recovery be- though recovered. Even subsequently been fore an a deductible economic detriment might compensated by the loss later be In 165(a) support posi- loss. of his “insurer or other- third-party unrelated tion the Commissioner cites Alison Unit- wise” a loss has still been suffered. ed 344 U.S. phases between the two of loss distinction Alison, Supreme L.Ed. 186 mandated the statu- that a theft loss is not Court noted sus- The distinction tory language. between place

tained when embezzlement takes be- recovery principals in the loss possible cause whose funds have been embez- “[o]ne phase15 possible recovery from unrelat- may pursue wrongdoer zled and recover *5 parties compensation phase ed third property wholly part.” or in Id. at 170 statutory language. is also mandated the added). (emphasis Treas.Reg. See also compensated It refers to “losses ... 1.165-l(d) (timing of depends deduction § Thus a potential insurance or otherwise.” completed on evidence of “closed and trans- action;” recovery indemnificator must no sustained while “there ex- compensation the part be treated as of respect ists a claim for reimbursement with prospect phase.16 Accordingly, to which there is a reasonable the Commissioner’s recovery”).14 passing timing requirement We note in that that the argument a authority the Commissioner cites all relates completed imposes closed and transaction a timing a to loss deduction. a is duty prevent to because we are now concerned misdirected problem with this lies in half of the transac- with the two-part nature of the transaction. attempt does not tion. Commissioner Congress has divided into the transaction extrapolate duty pursue compensa- just compensation, “compen- loss and as tion; to do so would to run afoul of the meaning, sation” has a clear “loss” also has discussed in Part statutory language clear meaning a clear different from that II, proposes. plain supra.17 It is that if a Commissioner 14. The Commissioner also cites as related au unrelated, third-par- party is an tion or when ty thority entity requirement in this under 166 that a indemnificator. The relevant § reasonably pursue clearly creditor a debtor before a in the second case is an insurer and See, e.g., addressing Presumably debt is as a bad debt. category. deductible a court Southwestern Life Ins. v. United scope Co. precise otherwise” of “insurance or (5th 1977), 560 F.2d 643-44 Cir. cert. de ejusdem generis apply would the doctrines of nied, 435 U.S. 56 L.Ed.2d 84 legislative are a matter of and “deductions (1978) (obligations are not deductible bad debts grace” and use a narrow construction. merely creditor elects not to enforce because obligations). 17. Cf. Ramsay Scarlett and Co. v. Commission (4th er, aff'd, 521 F.2d 786 T.C. 15. This seems Alison, to be the concern in right duty 1975) (taxpayer Cir. recovery supra, at 192. 344 U.S. at honoring against U.C.C. bank

16. We need not embezzle before loss from embezzler’s checks great determine in detail now sustained). party principal ment is when a to the loss transac-

Moreover, etymolog. “compensated” Commissioner’s definition iand “covered” of loss renders second and conclude that there is not a scent of compen- “and two, symbiosis between the no similarities surplusage. sated” clause According to the except or similitude for a vowel here Commissioner, to the extent there even a syllable consonant there. There is not possibility reasonable compensation, justifies even a legislative history Thus, there is no loss. an economic detri- vague using inference that the that was in fact compensated is cer- ment “compensated” word intended to use tainly not a loss. That would mean that “covered,” plain, word while the unvar- definitionally all deductible losses are not nished truth the enactment carries compensated, so Congress energy wasted convincing words that the deduction is by limiting ink deductions losses not predicated upon taxpay- not the whether or compensated for by insurance or otherwise. er for the loss. We are loathe to ascribe such foolishness to Congress, particularly when a common- interpretation sense plain based on the AB. Two-Part Transaction View of meaning of the words would avoid the in- Kentucky Utilities sult.18 Kentucky Glenn, Utilities Co. di- Although the Commissioner does not 1968), F.2d 631 one view of the

rectly argue “compensated” should is that an bottom line economic detriment take its meaning, urged natural we are taxpayer, suffered which is covered though Code as read section 165 of the compensated by but not insur- simple, uncomplicated words are either ab- ance, is not a serious 165 loss.19 The Tax struse or arcane. We have followed felt Court below that due to the factual philological arguments tarrying here and complexity this sim- there for a minute plistic, inadequate examination bottom-line view was an support claim, 18. In of the Commissioner’s definition abandoned the such as the execution Treas.Reg. 1.165-l(d), he cites to of a release. dealing timing Though (ii) year of the deduction. If in other reject position, regu- portion this section of the *6 event a of the loss is not covered lations raises the issue of when it respect is clear a loss claim for reimbursement with compensated. 1(d)(2) pro- is not prospect Sec. there is a reasonable of re- which 1.165— vides: covery, portion then such of the loss is sus- year during tained the taxable in which the (2)(i) If a or other event occurs * * * casualty or other event occurs. may and, year which result in a loss of (iii) If in the deducted a loss ac- event, such or there exists a claim provisions para- of cordance with the this respect for reimbursement with to which year graph subsequent in taxable re- prospect recovery, there is a reasonable of no portion ceives reimbursement for such he does respect of the loss with to which recompute year sustained, may not the tax for the taxable in reimbursement be received is purposes which the deduction was taken but includes of section until it can be certainty of in his the amount gross such reimbursement ascertained with reasonable wheth- year er income for the taxable in which or not such reimbursement re- will be received, subject provisions prospect ceived. recovery to the of section Whether reasonable of III, relating recovery previous- respect exists with of amounts to a claim for ly question reimbursement of a loss is a of fact deducted. upon regulations to be determined an examination of all It would seem that under these facts and circumstances. Whether or not what the Hills have done is to abandon their may against such reimbursement will be received their claim for reimbursement insurer. certainty, objected ascertained with reasonable for ex- The has not to the ab- Commissioner claim, ample, by “objective a settlement of the an sence of ment, evidence” of the abandon- claim, adjudication an abandon- Presuma- such as a release or affidavit. ment of the claim. When a bly claims subsequently if the Hills recovered under year insurance, the taxable in which a sus- l(d)(iii) govern loss is would § 1.165— tained is fixed his abandonment of the the reimbursement. reimbursement, claim for he must be able to produce objective having supra evidence of 19. See cases cited note 6. In its law the district expression holding.20 the Of course the conclusions of court by Kentucky that, is not bound with the Eleventh Circuit first noted in accord closed importance the of that doctrine, Utilities. Given completed transaction no decisions, however, subsequent case we in kind in 1951. was suffered The pause agreement our with the express $10,000.00, court then found that in Tax the result the instant Court that amount, a loss “because deductible was K- with a two-part case is not inconsistent against was not in Lloyds dispute. U’s claim view of Utilities. transaction $34,- K-U is not entitled to a deduction (“K-U”) generator had a utility sup- 486.67 as loss not plied Westinghouse, which 1951 was predeces- under insurance or otherwise [the $147,537.60. damaged for a loss West- 165(a) at sor of section ].” inghouse investigated the accident and was found that Finally, the district court liable that it was not for the loss convinced necessary not business ordinary was an warranty. K-U valued its busi- expense. Westinghouse ness and did relations sustained district Sixth Circuit litiga- not them jeopardize through want to generator loss. First regarding court $10,000.00 tion. K-U had deductible insur- findings of fact quoted two London, Lloyds ance coverage with “This quoted. Then it stated: record have liability which did not contest its under the Judge’s quot- us District convinces that the However, policy. Lloyds insisted upon its clearly findings of fact are not errone- ed right subrogation pur- and would have $10,000 K-U’s loss over and above ous. Westinghouse paid sued had it K-U not Judge was allowed the District parties claim.21 a set- In 1953 reached Wallingford loss.’ P. Grain ‘uninsured Sam divided; in which the loss was tlement Revenue, of Internal Corp. Commissioner $65,550.93, paid Lloyds paid Westinghouse 1934).” Kentucky 74 F.2d 453 $44,486.67. $37,500.00, paid and K-U court at 633. The then F.2d findings the following district court made assumption that the was upheld finding of fact: necessary business not an ex- ordinary reasons, For business K-U did This the entire section pense. brought any litigation against want the loss. opinion dealing with Moreover, Westinghouse. pos- because of the policy. sible this character on its except [*] want difficulty [*] Lloyds $10,000.00 [*] retaining equipment, pay [*] deductible under all [*] K-U did [*] have court ences between that and the Sixth opinion The Sixth Circuit we, opinion quoted help illustrate our because retrospect, length from perhaps would wish. significant differ- view that more Circuit’s district terse We *7 $34,- using two-part a Circuit was in fact voluntarily 8. assumed K-U Sixth repairs gener- to The district court ex- 486.67 of the cost the transaction analysis. Westinghouse ator from -suit that protect to conclusion of law this based its plicitly by to avoid in ob- Lloyds difficulty and not a deductible loss was Lloyds. The ex- taining insurance with undisputed nature by insurance $34,486.67 in penditure of this manner The Lloyds. Sixth against of the claim ordinary a loss or does not constitute an as findings of fact accepted the Circuit expenditure. necessary and business erroneous, made alterna- instead clearly but law, implicitly re- Glenn, thus tive conclusions Co. v. Kentucky Utilities conclusion law. jecting the district court’s (W.D.Ky.1965). Commissioner, again expressed (CCH) opinion Utili- T.C.M. Miller v. controlling. docketed, at 667. was not Id. (1981), appeal ties No. 81-1717 10, 1981), factually to a case closer Nov. possible dif- about 21. K-U was also concerned Kentucky Utilities, Hills the Tax Court ficulty retaining insurance. 165(c)(3). theory Sixth Circuit’s affirmative theft.” I.R.C. The Commis- is law hinted at of Walling- the citation argues sioner in this case the loss was Wallingford a ford. is bad debt case deal- theft, solely by part not caused but was with a ing duty reasonably creditor’s to taxpayers’ the election not caused pursue prior deducting a debtor the bad pursue coverage poli- under their insurance Holding debt. the transaction was not a Thus, cy. this loss is not deductible Wallingford, followed a cite to 165(e)(3).26 section shows that the was Sixth Circuit concerned however, tenable, position This reasonably pursuing principal a to a viewing when entire of loss transaction loss transaction before a sustained.22 compensation as a whole. Because we view of Kentucky Our Utilities is that the statute, two-part view we a of the adopt agrees Circuit Sixth with us argument. this was reject also The loss 165 calls for a two-part inquiry, first into clearly caused the elusive thief. The loss, then compensation. They, into unlike compensation lack was caused us, were interested in the loss half of the file, expressly election not but that seems transaction,23 directly addressing and were by Congress. permitted To read the statute scope duty reasonably to pursue would be to otherwise rewrite the statute to principal to a loss transaction.24 K-U insurance,” read covered a form “not pursue not to Westinghouse directly; chose rejected. K-U also chose not to claim under its insur- with Lloyds ance because it not want to did V. THE POLICY BEHIND SECTION Westinghouse indirectly pursue either. The 165(C)(3), SUCH ITAS IS holding then, of Kentucky is that argument The Commissioner’s final duty reasonably principal a inquire Court to into the forces this transaction also extends to indirect key 165. The in under behind section fact pursuit.25 This regarding result the loss this is that for indi standing of a half transaction is not inconsistent with vidual, nonde premiums are a holding today our regarding compensa- personal expense, ductible I.R.C. § half tion transaction. are whereas losses deductible. casual pay here have chosen to IV. THIS BY LOSS WAS CAUSED A ty pocket of their own in order to loss out THIEF prevent insurance rates from increas second argu Commissioner’s Thus, Commissioner, ing. says the ment focuses on the the economic cause of really in money spent nondeductible detriment. Unlike deductions business surance premium. losses, profit-seeking personal loss deduc argu- “fire, point of this arising tions limited to losses The basic economic storm, shipwreck, casualty, or from taken. other ment is well No substantial econom- inquiry one, theory 22. This the kind factual 24. That is of issue the Commissioner perhaps explains why III, A, supra, attempted of a loss was absence to raise in Part and as finding “clearly there, apposite as pointed affirmed of fact under the out that issue is not standard; theory inquiry erroneous” on other present into the to our existence of a loss would be a conclusion of law half the transaction. subject to a different standard review. scope duty before 25. Because is not perhaps explains This Circuit’s un- Sixth now, accept reject Sixth we neither nor us *8 loss," phrase use of usual “uninsured in duty. view of the Circuit’s quotes. 394 district F.2d at 633. The court precisely “compen- was interested in whether 26. The reductio ad absurdem of the Commis- “covered,” quoted sated” meant the statu- and argument casualty is that all are losses sioner’s tory language. By declining use the statuto- to procure taxpayer’s failure to “caused” court, language ry or that of the district but certainly or collect on it. That was insurance loss,” discussing rather an “uninsured Congress intended. what emphasized Sixth Circuit its interest in of half the transaction.

1005 rather their insurance insur- Uncle Sam than paying exists between from ic difference Bartlett, and losses premiums paying casualty company.” supra, ance 397 they very as There is a pocket of arise. Indeed, out thing goes to a believe such 218. for situations strong argument taxing both instincts against carefully judicial all honed fact, same, are proposals and in such out tax motives. sniffing of avoidance See, U.S. General regularly e.g., made. However, that seems to be upon reflection Office, Casualty Personal Accounting has enacted. exactly Congress the scheme Analysis Loss Tax Theft Deduction: and taxpay- that the has never been doubted It (Pub. no. for Proposals Change pay nonde- er elect prospectively could for GGD-80-10); Treasury, Blueprints U.S. premiums or deductible insurance ductible 17, 1977), (Jan. reprinted Basic Tax Reform they as arise. casualty might losses J. Federal In- Kragen McNulty, in 1 A. & Congress’ the statute indicates language of Taxation, 1979).27 568-69 In (3rd ed. come election choice allow that free deliberate fact, Congress very itself been careful has suggests as casualty Nothing well. after medical parallel for treatment of provide election to taxpayer’s preliminary that a premiums.28 and medical insurance expenses policy out an insurance should be bind- take However, casualty case personal in the 30 Congress event has focused on ing; has out-of- Congress seen fit to treat losses to make is whether significant and chosen insurance differently losses pocket actually received. Congress for those Thus coverage losses. codal or discor- incongruity is no There reason, has, whatever chosen to focus on for finding a event where a in taxable dance payment rather than economic the form in the absence claims deduction ec- And so substance.29 the Commissioner’s could taken but did that which he have onomically correct observation effect, example, For a creditor who for- have, not take. paid premi- in insurance Hills import is of no more the debt of debtor vests income gives ums tax obser- complementary economically correct in the v. purposes debtor. Cf. U.S. for tax premiums that all insurance vation Co., 4, 76 Kirby Lumber nothing casualty more than losses. prepaid (1931). might Here insurance L.Ed. 131 the loss was have been collected because A latent somewhat covered; col- the fact it was not but in- “Congress is hard to believe the insurer increases income of lected 165(c)(3) option- to serve as tended] deduction on permits correlative coverage al insurance those who suffer fact, this raises damage taxpayer. but who choose to collect part pays casualty Fortunately necessary out of into when it 27. it is to wade otherwise base, account). fray concerning prop prepaid the tax whether conceived; erly should allow deductions Andrews, casualty Compare, e.g., Per losses. might making suggest such factor that 30. One Tax, 86 sonal Deductions in an Ideal Income binding important tax is if it had an election Kelman, (1972) with Harv.L.Rev. 331-333 part congressional consequences as They Why Fit Personal Deductions Revisited: area of medical That is the case in the scheme. Why They Poorly “Ideal" Tax and in an Income insurance, specific enacted where World, 31 Stan. Fit Worse a Far From Ideal providing parallel provisions treatment 859 n.87 L.Rev. supra In con- note 28. medical insurance. trast, no tax conse- 165 there are 105(a), 213(e)(1)(C); 213(a)(1), See I.R.C. §§ Congress’ quences from the election related Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Finan- only tax conse- treatment of losses. The tax Intermediaries, Yale L.J. & cial insure, quence deduction from the election to (contrasting nn. treatment pur- profit-seeking premiums for business or expenses). treatment of losses with medical plan. congressional part poses, distinct way judgment one specifically disavow We Helvering, F.2d 709 29. Cf. Comar Oil Co. area, expense the other the medical 1939) (taxpayer self-in- elaborate point that our out this factor mention scheme, including prepaid surance present unique holding factors is based accounting, does loss accounts its internal statutory scheme §of not have loss *9 what we Motivations, believe to be the actual economic reasons explanations substance and tax behind policy section 165. change verbiage cannot of the Code and From the perspective of this loss transac- regulations. The fact relevant tion, the insurance contract has trans- the decision in this case is whether or not formed the insurer and the insured into a who claims a taxpayer casualty loss was single economic unit. The net worth of this compensated for his loss. There is no hint economic unit has been decreased by the in the statute or the regarding Code amount of the so somewhere in this function purposes of motivations and in not unit the system tax should allow a deduc- taking insurance compensation. tion. The Commissioner would not allow only words in the statute speak either the insurer or the insured to take the deductibility inquire whether or not the loss deduction; policy. senseless On compensated. has been The answer to this view, our if the insured is not compensated, inquiry taxpayer is that this was not com- gets deduction; the insured if the insur- pensated. The looks simply Code to wheth- insured, er compensated the the insurer er he received or did not compensa- receive gets the Symmetry preserved deduction. tion for his loss. and the Commissioner collects the revenue to which he is entitled.31 point we wish Congress juncture atmay want to do to make is that this election is not an illogi- investigation legislation further cal or an alien concept for the Internal subject, up until the very but date of this Revenue Code. opinion, the Code stands as it reads. “Per- CONCLUSION haps the we possess today wisdom would The historicity of the Code sections under job enable us to do a better lawmaking] [of gives review some indication that Congress than Congress [1894], did in but even if that was concerned with whether or not mere true, be authority we have no to substitute coverage, though uncollected, justify could expressed our views for those by Congress denying a deduction for a casualty loss. duly in a enacted statute.”32 In section 165 in its collective wisdom deter- Congress duly enacted a straightfor- mined that the deduction would be ward determining method of whether losses premised upon whether or not the loss was are deductible. Whether or not that stat- compensated. ute implements the tax this Court or “Compensated” is a word distinct from the prefer Commissioner would irrele- “covered.” We do not read the Code as vant. It is nor duty prerog- neither our our permitting taxpayer paper over his ative to make that which was not compen- loss. The speak Code does not in terms of a compensation by any legal leger- sated into right compensation, speaks with a clar- demain. sound, ion with decibels not minimized aby AFFIRMED. mute, sordino, not stifled by a that in order for the deduction to viable, become the loss must not compensated. It does not refer HATCHETT, Judge, dissenting: Circuit right to the to compensation or the failure I dissent I because do not believe: “The right. exercise the It simply says that simply taxpayer] Code looks to whether [the shall deduct if he has a loss received or did not receive

for which he was not compensated. “Com- precedent his loss.” Without cir- pensation” receipt connotes and “not com- cuit, without of tax policy consideration pensated” means not received. Section 165 life, practicalities of real read in and in total text and in context cannot mean disregard applicable treasury regula- who could have collected not, but did tion, is not entitled to the deduction. majority reaches the conclusion Comment, supra 31. See Corp. Higginbotham, Case note Mobil Oil 436 U.S. 618, 625, n.54. L.Ed.2d *10 whether or not such reim- certainty receive it—-he didn’t re- ble that “if he didn’t did bursement will be received. ceive it.” The fact that willing reimbursement from a not seek given which must be cre- regulation, majority’s analy- source is irrelevant in the court, points out that no loss dence sis. sustained, purposes 165(a), is of section “claim (26 if there exists a for reimbursement regulation, 1.165-1 there is a reasonable C.F.R.) respect with which provides: prospect recovery.” taxpayers Since 1.165-1 Losses. claim for reim- ripe good here had a bursement, have been deduction should no (d) Year of deduction. because no loss was sustained. A allowed (2)(i) other event oc- If a or does not casualty simply theft or become a and, may in a loss curs which result for recov- prospects loss until all reasonable event, year of such there ex- ery have been exhausted. The distinction with re- ists a claim for reimbursement an event and a loss has been amply between spect pros- to which there is reasonable explained in Alison United pect recovery, portion no of the loss 97 L.Ed. 186 S.Ct. respect with to which reimbursement between an em- making the distinction sustained, is may purposes be received Supreme bezzlement and a Court 165, until it can of section be ascertained stated: certainty with reasonable whether or not Furthermore, the terms embezzlement such reimbursement will be received. synonymous. The theft and loss of recov- prospect Whether reasonable occurs, is a loss may but whether there with to a claim for ery respect exists funds remain uncertain. One whose have question reimbursement of a loss is a may pursue wrong- been embezzled upon fact to be determined an examina- in doer and recover his whole or tion of all facts and circumstances. Events in the Alison case part.... in Whether or not such reimbursement will of this practical recovery. show the value be ascertained with rea- may be received proportion A of the embezzled substantial a set- certainty, example, by sonable years ten funds was recovered claim, by adjudication tlement of the occurred. after the first embezzlement claim, of the an abandonment of recovery ample This refutation taxpayer claims that the claim. When a inevitably a loss is “sustained” view that year the taxable in which a loss is sus- time an embezzlement is com- very at the tained is fixed his abandonment of the mitted. reimbursement, claim for he be able must objective Whether and when a deductible loss produce evidence of hav- a factual claim,

ing such as the exe- results from an embezzlement abandoned one to be decided question, practical cution of a release. according surrounding circumstances. Commissioner, Boehm v. 326 U.S. 287 (3) Any arising from theft shall be 120, 90 L.Ed. [66 78]. during sustained the taxable treated as at The tax- in which the discovers 344 U.S. year 1.165-8, not as a poorer, in this case are (see relating payers to theft loss- theft, However, as a result of their es). if in the result of the but year discovery decision, knowledge, not to made with full there exists a claim for reimbursement the insurance seek respect to which there is a reasona- reimbursement suffered no dam- company. taxpayers prospect recovery, portion ble no effect, damages to paid respect ages. They, to which reimbursement loss with thereby sustained, company their may purposes be received is to finance caused other year of section until the taxable “loophole.” which it can be ascertained with reasona- pertinent of 1939. The is, however, reason nal Code a more serious Revenue

There *11 part that I dissent than that stated above. The read: inconsistency now creates majority opinion (f) by corporations. Losses in- corporations, within section 165 between á losses corporation, “In the case of business,” a in a “trade or or dividuals year and not during the taxable sustained venture, making and “profit” non-business other- insurance or position in individuals. The commissioner’s wise.” expressed through regula- as this case 23(f) (1952) (Internal 26 Reve- U.S.C.A. § tion, provides pur- that all must 1939). 23(f), only nue Under § Code readily majori- sue available remedies. The corporations participate were allowed ty’s position, requiring taxpayers in not Whereas, un- of this section. benefits remedies, giving corpora- results in (c)(3), three classes of tax- 165(a) der and § or and in a “trade busi- tions individuals the benefits accorded payers are allowed venture, ness,” making a dou- “profit” (2) (1) corporate taxpayer; this section: ble bite under the tax laws. business engaged in a taxpayer the individual who premium and entity deducts the insurance “profit” making or a “trade or business” may individual the theft. A non-business venture; (3) taxpayer. and the non-business the theft. only deduct important because These distinctions result as to may this be desirable While treatment requires each different taxpayer, an non-business individual policy tax economic and consistent with result where should desirable per- Given this considerations of Code. or an corporation individual different, a more or at least spective, a engaged “prof- in a “trade or business” or a as to non- holding applying restrictive sense, making it” venture. In this the ma- would have better individuals been business practical and jority fails to consider majority. than that rendered Such consequences of its decision. economic accomplish objectives: two holding would regarding for all basis decisions Ken- consistent with (1) it would remain is, 165(a) interpretation of section as men- Utilities, (2) it would remain tucky and Kentucky majority opinion, tioned in the realities of the with the economic consistent Glenn, (6th Utilities v. 394 F.2d 631 Cir. Code. Utilities, 1968). Kentucky two cases Since v. have followed its lead. Axelrod Internal ECONOMIC REALITIES THE 248, Service, (Quealy, Revenue 56 T.C. 260 Code, under the as present Under the v. concurring),

J. Bartlett United en- Code, corporations and individuals 1939 (Md.1975). on these 397 216 Based “profit” or a “trade or business” gaged in a decisions, pro- the Internal Revenue Service venture, deductions for are allowed making 78-141, Ruling 1978-1 mulgated Revenue premiums as an ordi- of insurance payment 8102010, Ruling and Letter all hold- C.B. 58 expense. business nary necessary and ing right where a to an insurance claim 23(a) (1954) and I.R.C. § I.R.C. 162 exercised, is not the deduction under Co., Paper v. Weber (1939); States United 165(a) The Commissioner may be denied. 1963); Bennett v. (8th F.2d 199 Cir. 320 position here. Because advances same Revenue, 139 of Internal Commissioner importance placed great precedential Car- (8th 1944); generally, see 961 Cir. F.2d on it deserves close Rev- of Internal v. Commissioner nation Co. notwithstanding age. scrutiny, 1981) enue, (9th Cir. 1012 640 F.2d are de- premiums “[ijnsurance (stating must be considered Kentucky Utilities necessary business ‘ordinary (1) Kentucky ductible as points: light of two crucial were al- Code; ”). No such deductions expenses.’ the 1939 Utilities was decided under Code, as under the the 1939 lowed (2) in that case was the insured Code, premiums present 1954 Kentucky Utilities case corporation. The individual. See paid the non-business governed 23(f) of the Inter- by section

1009 24(a)(1) produce which would not an absurd result. 1.R.C. I.R.C. § 70-394, (1939); Ruling 1970- Alabama ex rel. v. Ten Revenue C.B. State of Graddick Auth., (5th 636 F.2d 1061 p. importance point Valley 34. The be- nessee readily taxpayer, when the apparent 1981); Mikelberg, comes v. 517 F.2d United States reasons, denied, Cir.), motivated business financial cert. U.S. the deductible out of fear of a assumes 47 L.Ed.2d 313 Our ob S.Ct. premium cancellation or a increase. jective produce interpretation har instances, posed In such the economic threat purpose monious with statute. company’s premium the insurance in- Young, Gonzalez *12 upon corpo- crease or cancellation 1905, (1979); 60 L.Ed.2d United States * * * ration or the business individual is not as Drug Bacto-Unidisk, v. Article of upon harsh as it is the non-business individ- 1410, 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 726 U.S. corporation ual. The and business denied, reh’g inevitably pass will the increased cost on to 2013, L.Ed.2d 473 When inter individual, its customers. The on the other statutes, tax preting must exercise hand, possible is faced with a economic great according taxpay care in not to some hardship company if the insurance either “windfalls.” “double-dips” ers premiums. cancels or increases hold, statutory I would in the interest of Moreover, government, busi- consistency, that a suffers a de- corporation, actually ness individual nor the casualty or theft after only ductible pays premiums through the insurance de- prospects exhaustion of all reasonable ductions, expenditure. a form of tax reimbursement. McDaniel, Surrey The Tax Expenditure & Concept Budget and the Reform Act of Indus.L.Rev. 17 B.C.Com. &

(1976). Because this subsidization transfer, burden on

the cost these tax- than the burden

payers obviously less the non-business individual. borne America, UNITED STATES Plaintiff-Appellee, holding, was correct on the facts of perspective, that case because had the court allowed the BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. Carl corporation, loss deduction to the it would No. 81-7610. (other effectively government have left the twice, taxpayers) pay the bill once for Appeals, Court United States deduction, premium again for the Eleventh Circuit. loss deduction. This is the situation 19, 1982. Nov. holding with majority advances intent, Congress’s this case. This was not Rehearing and on Denial of As Amended nor with the tax is it consistent nation’s Jan. Rehearing En Banc policy. problem with such a restrictive however,

interpretation, reconciling such holding the words of section 165. with

Thus, statutory in the interest of consisten-

cy, accepting the commissioner’s result

would not be consistent with a reason- Code, interpretation

able but also policy. this nation’s tax job interpreting statutes is to ef-

Our Congress.

fectuate the intent of This re-

quires give practical interpretation us to

Case Details

Case Name: Henry L. And Frances O. Hills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Nov 15, 1982
Citation: 691 F.2d 997
Docket Number: 81-7668
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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