Plаintiff owns a rendering business at Spencer. In connection with his business he operates four trucks. On January 7, 1955, at about 12:30 p.m., one of his employees, Don Aldrich, was driving one of the trucks easterly on highway 18. When he was approximately one-half mile east of the town of Kuthven he nоticed an automobile approaching him about 100 feet away. It suddenly left the north lane of travel and drove south into his lane of travel. This car was driven by defendant. The truck driver put on his brakes, but defendant kept coming, so he drove off on the shoulder. The shoulder was not wide enough to hold the truck.and he was forced into the ditch. He first struck a mailbox and then came to rest against a bank and a tree. The truck was wrecked. There were no personal injuries. Plaintiff sued defendant for the value of the truck, a hoist which was connectеd with the truck, and ten ruined barrels in the truck. The only testimony concerning the value of the truck and its contents was the testimony of plaintiff. He said he had been buying, selling and trading trucks for 10 years and was acquainted with their fair and reasonable value. He testified the 1953 two-ton Dodge truck which was wrecked was worth $2000 immediately before the accident. The hoist cost him $410 when new, was in good shape, 'and worth $300. It was stipulated that the ten barrels were worth $3 per barrel, and that the fair and reasonable value of the salvage from the truck and hoist subsequent to thе collision was $325. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, which means they held defendant was negligent. The verdict was for $500. Plaintiff filed motion for new trial on three grounds: (1) the value as returned by the jury is not sustained by the evidence; (2) inadequate damages were awarded in view of the undisputed еvidence, and it appeared therefore that the jury was influenced *511 by passion and prejudice; (3) the jury erred in fixing* the recovery excessively low when under the evidenge there was no room for speculation by the jury as to the amounts involved. The trial court sustained the motion on all three grounds. Defendant has appealed.
The only question involved in the case is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.
I. This case pertains to interpretation, of R. C. P. 244. The pertinent paragraphs of the rule are:
“Thе aggrieved party may, on motion, have an adverse verdict, decision or report or some portion thereof vacated and a new trial granted, for any of the following causes, but only if they materially affected his substantial rights: * * *
“(d) Excessive or inadequate damаges appearing to have been influenced by passion or prejudice;
“(e) Error in fixing the amount of the recovery, whether too large or too small, in an action upon contract or for injury to or detention of property.”
It is the duty and function of jurors to use their knowledge of affairs, and their judgment in connection with testimony offered. They may take all testimony into consideration, and using their good judgment may draw proper conclusions. However, they cannot disregard the testimony and arbitrarily fix amounts for which there is no basis in the evidence. When the verdict is radically inconsistent with undisputed evidence the trial court is justified in granting a new trial. Tathwell v. Cedar Rapids,
The only testimony in the case as to value of the personal property destroyed was: truck $2000; hoist $300; 10 barrels $30; total $2330. Stipulated value of sаlvage $325. This leaves $2005. The court instructed the jury that the verdict should not be in excess of this amount. Mathematics is an exact science. *512 There is no mathematical formula by which the jury could add and subtract these figures and arrive at an answer of $500'.
In Elings v. Ted McGrevey, Inc., supra, at page 822 of 243 Iowa, page 886 of 53 N.W.2d, we said: “The fact that a verdict may shock the conscience is not the sole test for reducing or setting aside a verdict or granting a new trial. A trial court may independently exercise these powers when it is convinced that a verdict does not effect justice or that a jury has not done its duty.”
It is doubtful if the second ground in the motion for new trial, of passion and prejudice, is effective in this case. The amounts involved are so modest that we can hardly conclude the jury was inflamed with passion and prejudice. We were confronted with this question in Hall v. West Des Moines, supra. In this case we were inclined to disagree with the trial court as to ground No. 1 of the motion, which xoertained to passion and prejudice, but held the action of the trial court in sustaining the motion for new trial was correct on another ground. We said at page 462 of 245 Iowa, page 736 of 62 N.W.2d: “It is evident here the court was exercising its inherent right to grant a new trial because it thought the jury had not truly responded to the issues involved as submitted to it.” In Whiting v. Cochran, supra, we said at page 592 of 241 Iowa, page 667 of 41 N.W.2d: “A new trial should be granted when the trial court is of the opinion that the verdict fails to administer substantial justice or whenever it appears that the jury has failed to respond truly to the real merits of the controversy.”
II. We can properly consider this case on grounds Nos. 1 and 3 in the motion for new trial. A new trial is proper if the verdict is contrary to the evidence, and where a verdict is completely inadequate in view of undisputed evidence. This applies to both contractual and tort situations. Trial cоurts and this court have frequently ordered a new trial unless the successful party consents to a reduction of an excessive verdict. We have also held many times that inadequacy of verdicts, because of failure of the jury to comply with the evidence or cоurt’s instructions, is a proper basis for granting a new trial. Tathwell v. Cedar Rapids, supra; Ward v. Marshalltown L. P. & R. Co.,
*513
In Wilson v. Manville, supra, we said at page 28 of 194 Iowa, page 933 of 188 N.W.: “If it may be said in any case upon a careful study of the entire record that the amount awarded by the jury is so excessive or so small and inadequate that a just, reasonable, and intelligent mind is forced to the conclusion that the jury failed to comprehend the case on the facts and the instructions submitted, or was influenced by passion and prejudice, then it may be said that a court is justified in granting a new trial.” (Emphasis ours.) In Leake v. Azinger, supra, the jury allowed the meager amount of $151 for decedent’s death. He was a young man 31 years of age. This court (214 Iowa, page 930, 243 N.W., page 197) said: “Undoubtedly the district court was fairly within its discretion when it granted appellee a new trial under the circumstances.” In Hanna v. Central States Electric Co., supra, a verdict was rendered for $10,000. The trial court ordered a remittitur of $1500, or a new trial. Remittitur was filed. Both parties appealed. This court held the verdict was still excessive. The following significant language was used (210 Iowa, page 876, 232 N.W., page 427) : “It may be conceded that the quantum of damages is a jury question, but the verdict returned must be within reasonable limits, under the facts disclosed by the evidencе. We believe that the jury failed to comprehend the case as submitted.” In DeMoss v. Brown Cab Co., Inc., supra, plaintiff sued for personal injuries. His hospital bill was $216.50. He also had doctor bill and loss of time. The jury allowed $216.51, or only one cent beyond his hospital bill. We held he was entitlеd to a new trial on account of inadequacy of verdict (218 Iowa, page 78, 254 N.W., page 18) : “The conclusion cannot be escaped that the amount of the verdict was not arrived at by determining the various elements of recovery to which plaintiff was entitled *514 under the law and the instructions of the court.” In Tathwell v. Cedar Rapids, supra, we held at page 54 of 122 Iowa, page 97 of 97 N.W.: “* * * the power to set aside the verdict, when manifestly inconsistent with the evidence, and the result of a misconception by the jury of their powers and duties, is as fully recognized where the verdict is inadequate as where it is excessive * * *.” A general statement of the law as pertaining to all jurisdictions appears in 66 C. J. S., New Trial, section 77(c), “* * * a new trial will be granted in, presumably, any jurisdiction where the damages awarded in an action for personal injury are less than the pecuniary loss definitely shown, especially where the verdict is contrary to undisputed evidence * * In the rather recent case of In re Estate of Murray, supra, this court (page 115 of 238 Iowa, page 60 of 26 N.W.2d) said: “While we have frequently said a verdict should be set aside which is so large or so small as to shock the conscience, it appears from many of our decisions this is not the sole test. A trial court should grant a new trial where it appears the verdict does not effectuate substantiаl justice or the jury, from any cause, has failed to respond truly to the real merits of the controversy.”
III. The trial court has wide discretion in ruling on motion for new trial. We interfere with reluetancy, and only where it appears the discretion has been abused. Sparks v. Long,
This principle has been enunciated so often that extensive quotations are not necessary. We will quote from the recent case of Hall v. West Des Moines, supra, where we find an exceptionally clear analysis of the principle at page 469 of 245 Iowа, page 740 of 62 N.W.2d: “We have often said we interfere reluctantly with the grant of a new trial by the trial court. Brooks v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen,
IV. Appellant has cited only six сases, five in his Brief and Argument and one in his Reply Brief and Argument.
The early case of Foley v. Brocksmit,
Fowle v. Parsons,
Main v. Ellsworth,
Heisdorffer v. Hammes, supra. The trial court granted a new trial. This court held the case was properly submitted to the jury and the verdict was not excessive and reversed the trial *516 court. The facts are so at variance with the facts in this case that it has no bearing on the case at bar.
Appellant cites Nichols v. Kirchner,
In his Reply Brief and Argument appellant cites Baker v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 8 Cir., Iowa,
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. The case is affirmed. — Affirmed.