146 Iowa 270 | Iowa | 1910
The facts involved in this case, so far as they may be regarded ds established beyond question or admitted, are: That Francis N. Racine was subjected to guardianship by action of the proper court about one year prior to the institution of this action in 1909; the finding of the court being that he was of unsound mind and incapable of managing his business affairs, and was already heavily involved in litigation which he did not understand or appreciate, and that he himself desired that a guardian be appointed for his estate, to the end that his property be conserved and his legal rights therein protected; and that on June 21, 1880, the forty acre tract of land, title to which is involved in this action, was conveyed to Francis N. Racine by one Cahoon, and on the same date conveyed by Francis to his mother, who still on the same date executed a mortgage thereon for $500 to one Beck, which mortgage was satisfied in the latter part of the year 1881. The contention for plaintiff is that the deed from Francis to his mother, reciting a consideration of $800 in hand paid, was in fact a mortgage, and that the indebtedness to secure which the deed by way of mortgage was given has been satisfied, and that Francis became entitled, on the satisfaction of Mary Racine’s mortgage to Beck, to a reconveyance of the land. There is a further contention that the purchase price of the land was furnished by or on behalf of Francis, and that his mother held title subject to a resulting trust in his favor. And there is still further contention that Mary Racine took title'to the land with a promise on her part to reconvey it to Francis when the Beck mortgage should be satisfied, which promise gave rise to a constructive trust in Francis which a court of equity may now enforce. So far as we shall have occasion to consider the allegations of defendants’ answers, they amount to a general denial of the allegations for plaintiff. It should be said, also, that plaintiff alleges mental incapacity of Francis at the time the
The only equity case decided by this court which counsel rely upon is that of Brewer v. Hugg, 114 Iowa, 486; but, while that was a case in equity, the question to be determined was only whether plaintiff had made out a right to recover at law, the equitable relief asked being only the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien for whatever amount might be due from defendant to the plaintiff. It is evident that this case lends no support to the rule of equity practice for which appellant contends, and which we do not find to be recognized anywhere as a proper rule of procedure. The record seems to indicate that the court treated the ease on defendant’s motion, with the consent of the latter, as having, been finally closed, and we very .much doubt whether, if the court had ruled against defendants, they would have been entitled to then introduce evidence to meet the case made by plaintiff. The decision of the question presented is not, however, of any controlling importance in the determination of this case, for the reason that we shall dispose of it on the assumption that all the evidence offered was properly considered by the lower court. As is the usual practice in equity in this State, all the evidence offered was made of record without rulings of the court on objections interposed, and it is all before us. Under such a state of the record, it is proper for us, as it was proper for the lower court, to determine the competency and admissibility of the evidence thus offered in reaching a conclusion on the merits.
The most favorable interpretation which can be placed upon' the evidence in support of plaintiff’s claim is that Miller furnished some money to his daughter with the purpose that she should secure the land with the intention of ultimately conveying it to Francis. Indeed, the only evidence that Miller furnished any money to Francis is found in the testimony of these witnesses that he expressed a willingness to give up what money he had left of the amount received from Cahoon to enable his daughter to recover the land, and that $300 were necessary for that purpose in addition to the $500 borrowed from Beck. There is also evidence that Mary Racine had little or no property beyond her homestead and no means with which to make the purchase. In the absence of any satisfactory proof that Miller advanced $300 to Francis for the purpose of making this purchase, we are unable to see how we can establish a resulting trust in his favor, even to an aliquot part of the land conveyed to him by Cahoon. He seems to have served simply as a conduit for the title from Cahoon to his mother in order to enable his mother to get the title which Cahoon was unwilling to convey save to Francis. It is evident that a mere intention on the part of Cahoon that Francis should have the land, or a desire on the part of Miller that after his daughter acquired it she should convey it to Francis, would not establish a trust which Francis could enforce. The title could not have been procured by Francis without the affirmative intervention of his mother and her action in procuring on her own responsibility the $500 from Beck; and the sole question, as we think, is whether Mary Racine entered into an affirmative obligation to hold the title received by her for Francis. There is no written evidence of any such obligation such as is required by the statute of frauds, and there is no affirmative evidence of a parol agree
The decree of the trial court is therefore affirmed.