68 Pa. Super. 553 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1917
Opinion by
Dennis Hennessey, while an employee of the defendant, on January 24, 1916, was injured. Shortly after the accident, or on April 20th, he executed an agreement under the Compensation Act by which his claim was settled. Before that, or. on April 3d, he worked at the Baldwin Locomotive Works and continued at such employment until May 27th. He developed a swelling in the neck which grew rapidly worse and death ensued from cellulitis of the neck. A dependent’s claim for compensation was then filed against the appellant, who takes this appeal from the action of the court below in sustaining an award under that claim.
It will be necessary to examine the Workingmen’s Compensation Act to determine our authority to pass on the questions presented by this appeal, as all the procedure for such claims is regulated by statute. After the claim has been passed on by a referee, it provides for an appeal to the compensation board. Where if an appeal is based on errors of law, it is the duty of the board to hear and determine such questions. Where the appeal avers a finding of fact contrary to the evidence, it is discretionary with the board as to whether it shall grant a hearing de novo, or determine from the testimony submitted whether the referee’s report should be sustained. It is, however, the duty of the board, when an appeal is taken, to examine all the evidence submitted when questions of fact are presented and a hearing de novo is not allowed. As to these matters, the board acts under Section 421, and its decision is found as the referee’s findings are warranted or “unwarranted by the evidence.” The right of the parties to insist that the board shall examine all the evidence and from it make its finding, is- a right given by the act, and where it affirmatively appears from the board’s report that it has not considered the material and relevant evidence of one of the parties, such action is a denial to that person of a substantive right which the law
In holding that the injury was received during the course of employment, the board based its finding exclusively on the compensation agreement made by Hennessey on the 20th of April and held “that the matters contained in said compensation agreement are res adjudicata” and could not be disturbed unless it be shown that “it was secured by fraud, accident or mistake.” The court below held that while the agreement was not res adjudicata, the board, not being a court of law, it was admissible in evidence as an admission that would be an estoppel.
When the agreement was executed, a small amount of money was allowed for the few weeks’ incapacity and the claimant thereafter returned to a different class of work at another establishment. It is urged that this agreement for compensation was made to avoid unnecessary litigation over a small amount of money, and if the effect attributed to it by the board, or the court below, is to be the law, it would have a tendency to stifle meritorious settlements when small amounts are involved. Further, the agreement shows on its face that it was not tO' be conclusive, as to employment. The cause of the accident is stated: “Hennessey claims he stepped on a tack which ran into his toe.” Under the compensation act the board is not held to “be bound by the technical rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation,” and the agreement was admitted in evidence by the referee. Its value or weight was for the referee in the first instance, and the compensation board on appeal. Undoubtedly, these compensation agree
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below whence this appeal comes with direction to refer it to the Workingmen’s Compensation Board for further hearing and determination.