Case Information
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
WILLIAM HENNEBERRY, Plaintiff,
- against -
SUMITOMO CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ROBERT GRAUSTEIN, SUMITOMO CORPORATION, аnd JOHN DOES nos. 1-50 (fictitiously named individuals),
Defendants.
USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONIC LLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: : :
OPINION AND ORDER
04 Civ. 2128 (PKL)
APPEARANCES
JOHN M. DEITCH, ESQ. Mendes &; Mount LLP One Newark Center, Floor Newark, New Jersey 07102 Attorneys for Plaintiff
STUART M. RIBACK, ESQ. Siller Wilk LLP 675 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 Stephen D. Hoffman, Esq. Pamela L. Kleinberg, Esq.
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LEISURE, District Judge:
Plaintiff William Henneberry brings this action against all named defendants for: (1) detrimental reliance, including promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) defamation, including slander per se; (5) injurious falsehood; and, (6) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Plaintiff's claims arise out of a business investment relationship between the company of which Henneberry was Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and majority shareholder, Smartix International Corp. ("Smartix"), and defendants Sumitomo Corporation of America as investor, its Senior Vice President Robert Graustein, [1] and Sumitomo Corporation as the parent company of SCOA.
Defendants SCOA filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on May 24, 2004. [2] Defendants make a series of arguments, in effect claiming that plaintiff's suit is a "strike suit" wherein plaintiff is litigating claims that are the sole province of Smartix as a company allegedly wronged and are not properly brought by Henneberry in his personal capacity as CEO and shareholder. Defendants also allege that the alleged defamatory utterances were mere opinion. SCOA finally takes issue with plaintiff's claim for damages which allegedly do not flow directly from the tort alleged. The parties' arguments for and against the instant motion to dismiss are addressed in turn below.
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BACKGROUND
I. The Parties
Plaintiff William Henneberry is a Connecticut resident and a creative marketing entrepreneur speciаlizing in developing new marketing strategies for credit cards. (Plaintiff William Henneberry's Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 10-11.) His successes involving athletic teams and credit cards are numerous. (Id. ¶ 15-19.) Further, prior to the parties' involvement here, Henneberry worked as a consultant for Major League Baseball and MasterCard from December 1995 through January 2000, earning between and per month. (Id. ¶ 139.) At all times relevant to this action, Henneberry was the Chairman and a stockholder of Smartix, a non-publicly traded New York corporation. (Id. ¶ 12-13, 21.) As chairman, Henneberry was entitled to per year in salary. (Id. ¶ 20.) As of September 9, 2003, Henneberry owned 1,740,666 shares of Smartix stock. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Defendant Sumitomo Corporation of America is a New York corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Sumitomo Corporation. (Id. ¶ 3, 34.) Defendant Robert Graustein is a New York resident and was Senior Vice President of defendant Sumitomo Corporation of America at all times relevant to this lawsuit.
II. The Program
Smartix was purposed to create an electronic ticketing promotion for Major League Baseball with MasterCard which, inter alia, allowed season ticket holders to sell unused tickets on the internet and at designated kiosks (the "Smartfan program"). (Id. ¶ 23, 24.) The Smartfan program was tested with the Boston Red Sox and the St. Louis Cardinals baseball teams. (Id. ¶ 25.) Pursuant to this aim, Smartix sought and obtained investors including SCOA. (Id. ¶ 31.)
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III. SCOA's Investment Activities
A. Spring of 2002 Investment Agreement
In anticipation of its future investment agreement, SCOA conducted an economic valuation of Smartix which valued Smartix at , or per share. (Id. .) In the Spring of 2002, SCOA agreed to invest at least and at most in Smartix, and SCOA agreed to share in the profits and losses of Smartix. (Id. .) Based on this agreement, Smartix engaged in the following аctions: (1) filed a restated certificate of incorporation with the Secretary of State of New York as required by SCOA; (2) convinced its original investors to subordinate their class of shares to those to be issued to SCOA; (3) convinced its original investors to reduce dividend percentages, forego dividends, and invest more cash into Smartix; (4) advised potential investors of SCOA's offer and that future investment would have to wait and suffer a higher valuation; (5) agreed to allow Hank Aaron to serve as a member of Smartix's Board of Directors; and, (6) ordered special stock certificates with legends as specifically requested by SCOA. (Id. 53.) In addition to Smartix's actions resulting from SCOA's anticipated investment, Henneberry also personally acted in reliance, loaning Smartix . (Id. 54.) However, after documents memorializing this agreement were sent by SCOA to Smartix's shareholders for execution, SCOA advised Henneberry that SCOA would not continue with the investment on the present terms. (Id. 57.) This advisement was made on June 4, 2002. (Id.)
B. Subsequent Investment Agreement by SCOA
SCOA ultimately invested in Smartix and agreed to share profits and losses with the other classes of Smartix stockholders. (Id. 60.) SCOA also stated that it was now Smartix's lead investor and would actively seek out new investments for Smartix. (Id. 61.) In
*5 fact, when faced with Smartix's financial troubles at a meeting in June 2003, Graustein stated that SCOA "would not let you [Smartix] fail." (Id. 99 63, 64.) At this meeting, SCOA also agreed to provide matching investments and to send a letter confirming this position. (Id. 65.) However, no letter was received. Smartix advised SCOA that Smartix would require a further investment and the implementation of the Smartfan program with ten sports teams. (Id. 9 68.) Based on SCOA's expressed support for this plan, Henneberry continued to pеrsonally loan Smartix money through October 2003, consisting of nine loans (ten in total, counting the initial loan of in the Spring of 2002): (1) $47,500; (2) $52,500; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (6) ; (7) ; (8) ; and (9) . (Id. 99 55, 69.) SCOA was repeatedly warned of Smartix's financial situation which was forcing Smartix to reneg on its financial obligations to the Red Sox and Cardinals. (Id. 99 70, 74.) Also, early on in this struggle, on June 16, 2003, Henneberry advised Graustein that Smartix may need to cease operations; however, Graustein informed him Smartix did not have the legal power to do so without shareholder approval. (Id. 99 71, 72.)
Finally, on September 8, 2003, SCOA presented Smartix with a new investment proposal wherein SCOA would provide matching investments up to and would require that Henneberry convert his personal loans into company stock. (Id. 99 76, 77.) Smartix and Henneberry rejected this offer because it did not provide sufficient capital and it was based on a lower valuation of the company. (Id. 99 78, 79.)
The next day, Henneberry was called into a meeting with Michael Dee, Executive Vice President of Business Affairs for the Boston Red Sox, regarding the continuation of the Smartfan program for the next year. (Id. 99 45, 80.) Henneberry was forced to concede Smartix's financial
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difficulties and its potential instability in the coming baseball season, causing Dee to express concern about the business relationship going forward. (Id. 982.)
IV. SCOA's Meetings with the Red Sox and MasterCard and Final Dealings with Smartix
On September 22 or 23, 2003, Graustein and other SCOA employees met with Dee and informed him, in sum and substance, that Henneberry "lacked the necessary skill and ability to manage Smartix[,] otherwise disparaged his business acumen," and blamed Smartix's financial troubles and failure to pay monies оwed to the Red Sox on Henneberry's mismanagement of the company. (Id. 990.) SCOA also stated that it would be taking over Smartix and removing Henneberry. (Id. 996.) Thereafter, Dee lost faith in Henneberry and began using Graustein as the contact for the Smartfan program. (Id. 995, 95, 139-40, Ex. B.) Dee also refused to do business with Smartix if Henneberry was involved with the company (id. 9108), which directly contradicted Dee's earlier statement on July 2, 2003 that the Red Sox had "taken a leap of faith by aligning ourselves with Smartix, in large part due to my confidence and trust in you personally" (id. 9109).
At some point between September 19 and 23, 2003, Graustein met with MasterCard, including, inter alia, John Stuart, MasterCard's Senior Vice President of Global Sponsorship and Event Marketing, and informed it, in sum and substance, that Henneberry lacked the necessary skill and ability to manage Smartix, disparaged his business acumen, and blamed Smartix's financial condition and failure to pay the Red Sox and Cardinals monies owed on Henneberry's mismanagement of the company. (Id. 999, 100, 106.) MasterCard similarly lost faith in Henneberry. (Id. 995, 105, 139-40.)
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SCOA did not notify Smartix regarding either of these meetings (id. 89) until after the fact, at a meeting with Henneberry on September 24, 2003 (id. 107). Thereafter, Henneberry sent a letter to SCOA outlining its perceived bad acts and effect on the company. (Id. Ex. C.)
On October 9, 2003, Smartix held a shareholder's meeting wherein it was decided that Smartix would continue to pursue the Smartfan program with the Red Sox. (Id. 111.) SCOA represented that it had been in contact with investors who had expressed interest in investing in Smartix. (Id. 112.) SCOA again reiterated that it wanted Smartix to survive and succeed. (Id.) Based on SCOA's representations made at this meeting, Hennеberry continued to personally loan money to Smartix. (Id. 113.) There is no evidence SCOA invested any further monies in Smartix (id. 117) and Smartix's stock is presently worthless (id. 131).
DISCUSSION
Defendants SCOA claim that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and seek dismissal of the Complaint against them. The legal standard for this motion and plaintiff's six claims against SCOA are discussed, in turn, below.
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
When determining whether plaintiff's claim should be dismissed on motion for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in plaintiff's complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally." Gregory v. Daly,
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"
he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes,
Accordingly, the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint and repeated above do not constitute findings of fact by the Court, but rather are presumed to be true for the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss. See Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc.,
Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc.,
The decision of whether to hold an oral hearing regarding a motion to dismiss lies in the sound discretion of the district court. Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp.,
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1998). If the district court decides to dismiss any claims, that dismissal is generally considered a judgment on the merits, unless dismissed for "curable defect." Criales v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
II. Plaintiff's Claims Against SCOA
SCOA avers that plaintiff's Complaint against SCOA should be dismissed for failure to state a claim insofar as it alleges that SCOA, (1) caused plaintiff to detrimentally rely on its statements, stating alternative claims for promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation; (2) breached its contract with plaintiff; (3) breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiff; (4) defamed plaintiff to the Red Sox and MasterCard; (5) uttered an injurious falsehood under New York State law in its conversations with the Red Sox and MasterCard; and, (6) tortiously interfered with Hеnneberry's prospective economic advantage. [3]
A. Detrimental Reliance
Plaintiff claims, pursuant to two different legal theories, that defendants improperly induced plaintiff's reliance on defendants' statements to plaintiff's detriment. (Plaintiff Henneberry's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 3-6.) First, plaintiff asserts a claim under a theory of promissory estoppel. (Id. at 3-5.) Also, plaintiff claims that his detrimental reliance claim sounds in
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negligent misrepresentation. (Id. at 5-6; see also Compl. 114-19.) The Court addresses each theory in turn.
1. Promissory Estoppel
Both parties agree that in order for plaintiff to assert a claim under a theory of promissory estoppel, plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) there was a clear and unambiguous promise; (2) plaintiff's reliance on that promise was reasonable and foreseeable to defendants; and, (3) plaintiff sustained injury due to his reliance on defendants' promise. See Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., Inc.,
Defendants first argue that SCOA's alleged promises were to Smartix, and not to Henneberry personally and, therefore, Henneberry cannot assert a claim of promissory estoppel. While defendants are correct that the majority of promissory estoppel caselaw does not deal with promissory estoppel as asserted by a third party, that does not foreclose the possibility at this preliminary stage in the litigation that plaintiff could assert a claim of promissory estoppel as a third party to the promise. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines promissory estoppel as:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) (emphasis added). In addressing the availability of a claim of promissory estoppel to a third person other than the promisor or promisee, comment c of the Restatement asserts that courts have allowed this claim
*11 where the third party was a beneficiary of the promise at issuc. Id. cmt. c. However, the Restatement also states that, in rare cases, promissory estoppel might be justifiable for third parties that were not beneficiaries of the promise. Id.
Caselaw from this Court also supports this position. In von Kaulbach v. Keoseian,
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Defendants will protest that the cases above are readily distinguishable and that the Restatement's edict that third parties who are not intended beneficiaries of the contract can assert a promissory estoppel argument is only to be applied in the rarest of situations. While true, at this stage of the proceeding the Court must only determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim which he should be allowed to support factually. Because precedent does exist for third parties to assert promissory estoppel arguments, and plaintiff could supply further facts gained from discovery to liken his case to the ones above, the Court will allow plaintiff to procеed on this theory for the time being.
b. The Alleged Promises and Reliance
Defendants next argue that the statements plaintiff hinges his argument on were not clear and unambiguous promises. Plaintiff does not explicitly identify which statements allegedly constituted promises under the first count in the Complaint. However, in its opposition brief, plaintiff identified the following statements as possible "promises": (1) SCOA contracted to invest at least and at most ("June 2002 agreement") (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3), and to share in the profits and losses of Smartix (Compl. II 49); (2) SCOA stated "we won't let you fail" at a June 2003 meeting with Smartix employees including Henneberry where SCOA also represented it would "pursue a plan to match investments and agreed to provide a letter confirming its position to Smartix" (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3); and, (3) "SCOA repeatedly communicated to Mr. Henneberry that it was actively soliciting outside investment and had investors who were willing to invest" (id. at 4).
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i.
Defendants challenge plaintiff's characterization of this alleged promise, arguing that it only constituted an agreement to agree while they were negotiating with Smartix. (Defendants SCOA and Graustein's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Defs.' Mot.") at 12.) Defendants claim that this argument is supported by plaintiff's Complaint because plaintiff does not point to any written document evidencing the June 2002 agreement wherein SCOA agreed to invest to and share in the profits and losses. Further, SCOA eventually did memorialize in writing an agreement to invest on July 2, 2002 ("July 2nd agreement"). (Id.) Defendants further contend that the July 2nd agreement contained a merger clause which superseded any alleged promise made by SCOA to invest to and to share in the prоfits and losses. (Defendants Sumitomo Corporation of America and Graustein's Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply") at 1-2.) Plaintiff claims that the June 2002 agreement was memorialized by SCOA and sent to Smartix shareholders for execution. (Compl. 57).
In deciding the motion to dismiss, the Court can look at any document relied on by plaintiff in making his Complaint. Brass,
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[e]xcept for the agreements explicitly contemplated by this Agreement . . . there are no agreements, understandings, instruments, contracts, proposed transactions, judgments, orders, writs or decrees to which the Company [Smartix] is bound that may involve (i) obligations (contingent or otherwise) of, or payments to, the Company in excess of
.
(Id. § 3.15 (emphasis added).)
"Under New York law 'the initial interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to decide,'" Fleet Capital Corp. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 01 Civ. 1047,
The merger clause is inapposite to the present analysis because, as stated in the Complaint, the relevant promise was affirmatively rescinded on June 4, 2002, almost a full month prior to the effective date of the merger clause. (See Compl. 57.) Therefore, the merger
*15 language to the effect that there are no other agreements to which Smartix is bound does not conflict with a claim for promissory estoppel based on a prior wrong. Further, taking the factual allegations of the Complaint as true, the June 2002 agreement to invest to in Smartix is clear and unambiguous; therefore, defendants' arguments go to the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance on the promise.
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for reasonable and foreseeable reliance regarding what he terms the June 2002 agreement. (See Compl. II 57.) The claimed actions in reliance on this promisе are: (1) Smartix filed a re-stated Certificate of Incorporation reflecting changes required by SCOA; (2) Smartix convinced original investors to subordinate their shares to those to be issued to SCOA, reduce their dividend percentages, forego dividends, and invest additional cash in Smartix; (3) Smartix advised additional investors that future investments would be postponed until a later round at a higher valuation; (4) Smartix allowed Hank Aaron to become a Member of the Smartix Board of Directors; and, (5) Smartix ordered special stock certificates with legends that SCOA requested. (Compl. II 53.) Henneberry also personally loaned to Smartix in reliance on SCOA's promised investment. (Compl. II 54.) Even as a third party beneficiary, Henneberry cannot assert injury based on Smartix's actions taken in reasonable reliance. The only action Henneberry personally took in reliance was the loan. However, plaintiff did not plead that it would be foreseeable to SCOA that Henneberry, the CEO, would make a personal loan to Smartix while waiting for a promised investment from SCOA. Nor does it appear to the Court to be an ordinary course of conduct that SCOA should have anticipated. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to properly plead promissory estoppel. Moreover, the Court notes that any purported reasonable and foreseeable action taken by plaintiff in reliance on this promised investment would only be
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reasonable up until June 4, 2002 when SCOA affirmatively disavowed their promise to invest to . All action after that time would be neither reasonable, based on SCOA's expressed intent, nor foreseeable, based on SCOA's expressed understanding of the parties' status.
ii. "We Won't Let You Fail," Matching Investments and Confirmation Letter
Plaintiff claims that he continued to loan his own money to Smartix based on SCOA's guarantee, at a meeting in June 2003, that it would not allow Smartix to fail and SCOA's representation that it would pursue a plan to match investments and send a confirmation letter to that effect. (Compl. 64, 69.) Defendants claim that the above only evidenced a willingness to cooperate with Smartix, but did not constitute an enforceable oral promise. As above, the Court must determine whether this quote constituted a clear and unambiguous promise on which plaintiff reasonably and foreseeably relied to his detriment. Cyberchron,
The Court finds that these cannot, as a matter of law, be construed as clear and unambiguous promises. "We won't let you fail" is vague and ambiguous on its face for it could mean, as plaintiff contends, that SCOA would invest the amount necessary for Smartix to continue its Smartfan program; or it could mean, as defendants contend, any manner of things including a willingness to work with Smartix in order to come to an agreement regarding investments. It does not clearly mean that SCOA was guaranteeing Smartix's survival, but rather appears more of a policy statement akin to that in Ward v. New York Univ., No. 97 Civ. 8733,
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provide and to follow guidelines for student treatment," were not clear and unambiguous but rather policy statements which could not support a claim for promissory estoppel). See also United States v. Rosario,
Plaintiff also claims that at the June 2003 meeting, SCOA represented that it would pursue a plan to match investments and send a confirmation letter to Smartix to that effect. (Compl. I 69.) These statements similarly cannot be construed as clear and unambiguous promises. A promise to pursue is nothing more than a preliminary representation that SCOA would look into whether it felt a matching investment strategy was prudent. Further, that SCOA never sent a confirmation letter evidences that it did not intend to be bound to a matching investment program. These statements do not evidence SCOA's intent to be bound and therefore, cannot constitute promises for purposes of Henneberry's promissory estoppel argument.
iii. SCOA's Representations That They had Located Investors Interested in Investing in Smartix
Plaintiff asserts that SCOA's representations that they had located investors interested in invеsting in Smartix constituted clear and unambiguous promises on which Smartix and Henneberry relied by revising and updating documents for presentation to these investors and by Henneberry's continued provision of personal loans to Smartix. However, it is clear to the Court
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that these statements as pleaded in plaintiff's Complaint were not clear and unambiguous promises to obtain investors. Rather, at most, they constituted representations that SCOA had already contacted interested investors. Therefore, plaintiff cannot argue promissory estoppel as to these statements. Plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation, assuming these statements constituted false representations of then-present fact, is arguably more tenable but ultimately fails, as discussed below.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
As an alternative to his promissory estoppel argument, plaintiff contends that his complaint supports a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the statements discussed above were false and he reasonably relied on them to his detriment. Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim is meritless because the Complaint did not allege any "special relationship" between defendants and plaintiff as necessary for a claim of negligent misrepresentation.
To state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff must allege that:
1) the defendant had a duty, as a result of a special relationship, to give correct information; 2) the defendant made a false representation that he . . . should have known was incorrect; 3) the information supplied in the representation was known by the defendant to be desired by the plaintiff for a serious purpose; 4) the plaintiff intended to rely and act upon it; and 5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on it to his or her detriment.
(Pl.'s Opp'n at 5 (citing Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power, Inc.,
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Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC,
Plaintiff claims that a special relationship sufficient to support a claim of negligent misrepresentation existed between himself and SCOA because SCOA, in holding themselves out as the "lead investor,"also held themselves out as having special expertise, akin to an investment banker. Defendants dispute this contention, instead stating that the relationship was solely contractual and SCOA was nothing more than an investor in Smartix. In Kimmel v. Schafer,
Plaintiff relies heavily on EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs &; Co.,
*20 actually entails. However, even if plaintiff did so plead, it is plain to the Court that SCOA was merely a common investor, despite the use of the term "lead investor." "Lead investor" is not, as plaintiff would have the Court believe, a magical term transforming SCOA and Smartix's common contractual relationship into a special relationship sufficient to sustain a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Nor does that term endow SCOA with unique expertise on the subject of investing. Supporting this conclusion is the parties' July 2nd agreement where SCOA is termed only an investor. (Riback Reply Decl. Ex. A § 1.19).
Plaintiff does sufficiently allege that SCOA knew that plaintiff would use the information regarding SCOA's potential future investment and the investment of third parties in Smartix to float personal loans to Smartix. This is because SCOA was aware of Smartix's financial difficulty and Henneberry's past provision of personal loans. It is unclear whether SCOA supplied the information in order to induce Henneberry to provide loans to Smartix but it is certainly conceivable that SCOA wished Smartix to survive long enough for SCOA to take over its operation, as this was SCOA's goal as alleged in the Complaint. However, this pleading alone does not justify a claim for negligent misrepresentation, even at this early stage. "This Court has held that a 'sparsely pled' special relationship of trust or confidence is not fatal to a claim for negligent misrepresentation where 'the complaint emphatically alleges the other two factors enunciated in Kimmell.'" Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co.,
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In Suez Investors, the Court found plaintiff had impliedly pled a special relationship where defendants initiated contact with plaintiff, induced plaintiff's actions in reliance on the misrepresentations, and repeatedly asserted their false statements were true.
See Lasalle Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7868,
4 The Court notes that SCOA did allegedly repeat its assurances that it would seek out investors and would not allow Smartix to fail. However, those assurances are irrelevant to the present inquiry as they were not misrepresentations of present fact as required for a claim of negligent misrepresentation. See Eternity,
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Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat'l Bank,
3. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff's claim for detrimental reliance is dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a claim under either a theory of promissory estoppel or negligent misrepresentation. (See Compl. 114-19 ("First Count").)
B. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff also alleges that SCOA is liable for breach of contract stemming from the June 2002 agreement that SCOA would invest to in Smartix. Plaintiff claims that breach occurred on June 4, 2003 when SCOA informed plaintiff they would not invest more than . This claim, like that for promissory estoppel, is unaffected by the merger clause in the July 2nd agreement because the purported wrong occurred prior to that agreement. Therefore, the Court only addresses whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements for a breach of contract claim.
In order to state a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must allege an intent to be bound demonstrated by an offer, acceptance, and supported with consideration. Deutsche Asset Mgmt.
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v. Callaghan, No. 01 Civ. 4426,
The Court finds that, on the present record, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that a contract for SCOA to invest
to
existed between the parties up until SCOA breached by repudiation on June 4, 2002. Plaintiff's allegations that SCOA agreed to invest and that plaintiff acted in reliance on that agreement to their detriment are sufficient. (Compl. 48-54.) Defendants' point that the written memorialization of this promise remained unsigned at the time of breach is not fatal to plaintiff's claim at this time. The Second Circuit has enforced contracts against non-signatories "where the non-signing party 'has accepted [the] written agreement and has acted upon it.'" Argo Marine Sys., Inc. v. Camar Corp.,
However, defendants rightly point out that, in order to sue for breach of contract, plaintiff must be a party to the contract, which is not alleged, or an intended third party beneficiary to the contract. See Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown &; Co.,
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101, 104 (2000) (quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit &; Spitzer v. Lindner,
The alleged contract at issue was one which, on its face, was only intended to benefit the signatories. SCOA, as investor, benefited from the possibility of reaping the rewards of Smartix's possible success. Smartix, as the recipient of the investment, benefited from an injection of liquidity, a sorely needed boon to the bеleaguered start-up company. Plaintiff's sole argument supporting his assertion that he was an intended third party beneficiary of this contract is that he suffered a unique injury distinguishable from that suffered by all Smartix's
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shareholders. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 15-16.) Plaintiff claims that his status as employee, earning a salary, and creditor, loaning the company , sets him apart from other shareholders and supports the contention that SCOA intended to benefit him personally through this investment contract. The Court cannot discern how Smartix's decision to employ plaintiff, and plaintiff's decision to loan money to Smartix, in any way implicates SCOA's intent to benefit plaintiff. Plaintiff points to, and the Court has discovered, no caselaw which enforced a contract on behalf of a third party in this situation. Therefore, plaintiff has not alleged a claim for breach of contract as an intended third party beneficiary and the Court dismisses the claim. (See Compl. 99158 -68 ("Fifth Count".)
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In his Complaint, plaintiff asserts that SCOA owed and breached a fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing owed to him by virtue of the relationship between Smartix and SCOA as joint venturers. (Compl. 171.) Plaintiff asserts two further theories of fiduciary relationship in his opposition to the instant motion to dismiss: (1) SCOA was an investment banker; and, (2) SCOA was the de facto majority shareholder of Smartix owing a duty to all other shareholders, including Henneberry. As to the joint venturers theory, defendants argue that, at best, Henneberry does not assert a fiduciary duty between himself and SCOA, but rather only asserts a duty between Smartix and SCOA. Defendants further argue that there is no factual support for Henneberry's claim that SCOA was an investment banker nor that SCOA was the dе facto majority shareholder. [6]
6 Defendants also argue that plaintiff should be barred from arguing these last two theories because they were not represented in the Complaint. However, as stated above, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court may properly consider all factual allegations in the Complaint, attached documents, matters of judicial notice, or documents the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit. Brass,
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To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must plead that, (1) a fiduciary duty was breached; (2) defendant knowingly aided the breach; and, (3) damages resulted from the breach. See Whitney v. Citibank, N.A.,
*27
trusted another." Brass,
The Court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff has not alleged that SCOA owed him a fiduciary duty. First, plaintiff is correct that joint venturers owe each other a fiduciary duty, as conceded by defendants. (Defs.' Reply at 9, \|| 2.) However, it is also true that, at best, plaintiff only alleges that SCOA and Smartix entered into a joint venture, specifically failing to allege that Henneberry himself and SCOA entered into any agreement, much less a joint venture. (Compl. II 60, 170.) Without assessing the merits of whether the relationship between SCOA and Smartix in fact constituted a joint venture, the Court finds that plaintiff has not alleged that SCOA owed him a fiduciary duty personally and, therefore, plaintiff cannot prevail on this theory as a mаtter of law.
Second, plaintiff's vague reference to New York courts' recognition that investment bankers have "special skill, knowledge and experience in their field" is inapposite, for, as stated above, plaintiff's Complaint does not allege any circumstances wherein SCOA could be considered an investment banker. See supra Discussion Part II.A.2.
Finally, plaintiff argues that SCOA was a de facto majority shareholder based on its power over Smartix, as stated in Smartix's Re-Stated and Amended Certificates of Incorporation (see Compl. II 53; Declaration of John M. Deitch, Esq. ("Deitch Decl.") Exs. 3-5), to: (1) control whether Smartix could sell, convey, or dispose of its Intellectual Property license; (2) prevent
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Smartix from reorganizing, consolidating or merging; (3) prevent Smartix from declaring dividends; and, (4) prevent Smartix from amending its Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation.
[7]
Defendants argue that these powers were also held by Series A preferred shareholders. Further, defendants note that Henneberry was Chairman and CEO of Smartix, exerting considerable control, and owned three times as many shares as SCOA, though concededly those shares were of common, rather than preferred stock. The Court finds defendants' arguments persuasive as courts have almost exclusively found that a shareholder held a de facto majority where that shareholder maintained overwhelming control over the operation of the company. See Gould v. Ruefenacht,
Thus, for all these reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (See Compl. 169-74 ("Sixth Count").)
D. Defamation
Plaintiff claims that defendants defamed him during meetings with both the Boston Red Sox and MasterCard held between September 19, 2003 and September 23, 2003. Plaintiff
7 Plaintiff asserts that SCOA's status as majority shareholder is further evidenced by his own e-mail communication to SCOA employees, dated September 19, 2003, wherein he refers to SCOA as a "major shareholder." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 17; Compl. Ex. A.) However, plaintiff's e-mail reference cannot supplant this Court's determination of matters of law. See Papasan v. Allain,
*29 alleges that, while he was on vacation out-of-town, defendants, represented by Graustein and John Does 1-10, surreptitiously met with both the Red Sox Executive Vice President of Business Affairs, Michael Dee, and, at a separate meeting, with MasterCard Senior Vice President of Global Sponsorship and Event Marketing, John Stuart. At these meetings, defendants made statements that, in sum and substance, allеged that Henneberry "lacked the necessary skill and ability to manage Smartix and otherwise disparaged his business acumen." (Compl. 90, 90, 100.) Further SCOA "placed blame for Smartix' present financial condition, and inability to pay monies owed to the Red Sox and St. Louis Cardinals, upon the purported mis-management of Smartix by Mr. Henneberry." (Id.) Plaintiff argues this constituted defamation per se and also that he suffered special damages. Defendants counter that the statements were nothing more than opinion, and, in the alternative, were protected by the privilege of common interest.
- Defamation Law
To plead defamation under New York law, the plaintiff must establish four elements regarding the statements at issue: (1) a false and defamatory statement of fact; (2) regarding the plaintiff; (3) published to a third party by defendants; and, (4) resulting in injury to the plaintiff. See Dellefave v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098,
*30
raise the defense of res judicata if appropriate." Kelly v. Schmidberger,
In addition to the aforementioned elements, the plaintiff in a defamation action must also plead special damages,
[8]
unless the language at issue qualifies as defamation per se. Defamation per se is a statement that casts aspersions upon the basic character and integrity of an individual or business. Thus, a statement "which tends to disparage a person in the way of his office, profession or trade" is defamatory per se and does not require proof of special damages because injury is assumed. Davis v. Ross,
At this stage of the proceeding, where the plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his favor, see Conley,
*31
F.2d at 46 ("[O]n a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the issue is not whether the court regards the language as libelous, but whether it is reasonably susceptible of such a construction."). If the Court deems the statements to be reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interprеtation, then "it becomes the jury's function to say whether that was the sense in which the words were likely to be understood by the ordinary and average" listener. See James v. Gannett Co., Inc.,
Further, because the Court accepts plaintiff's allegations as true, it assumes that defendants' statements are false and that defendants were culpable in making the statements. See Lucking v. Maier, No. 03 Civ. 1401,
In interpreting allegedly defamatory utterances, the Court must view the statements in context as the literal meaning of the words does not always coincide with their meaning in a grander setting. See Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A.,
*32
trier of fact, not for the court acting on the issue solely as a matter of law, to determine in what sense the words were used and understood." Davis,
2. Protected Speech: Opinion and Common Interest Privilege
The New York State Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, рrovides for absolute protection of pure opinions. See Flamm v. Am. Assoc. of Univ. Women,
The Court's "essential task" in this inquiry is to determine whether the allegedly defamatory statements "may be reasonably understood as implying the assertion of undisclosed facts justifying the opinion," when considering the statements in the immediate context of the communication as a whole and the broader context in which the statements were published. Steinhilber v. Alphonse,
*33
the New York Constitution. See Steinhilber,
The New York Court of Appeals has considered the following factors when distinguishing between assertions of fact and non-actionable expressions of opinion: (1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false; and (3) whether either the full context of the communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as to "signal . . . readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."
Gross v. N.Y. Times Co.,
Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan,
*34
A.D.2d 471 (App. Div. 2000), and where a cаr purchaser warned the parent company that its dealership was "deceitful, fraudulent, dishonest, disrespectful," Leary v. DiBlasi,
3. Analysis of the Statements
As alleged, the statements constitute defamation per se because they disgraced plaintiff's business aptitude, chipping away at a pillar of the reputation plaintiff had worked hard to build. (See Compl. 99 11, 14-19, 46.) This point is not contested by defendants. Instead, defendants contend the statements, even as vaguely alleged, are statements of opinion rather than fact.
The Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the statements at issue were merely opinion rather than "reasonably understood as implying the assertion of undisclosed facts justifying the opinion,"Steinhilber,
*35
1997). However, the Red Sox and MasterCard could have assumed that SCOA had unique access to undisclosed facts precipitating the demise of Smartix. See Levin v. McPhee,
*36
defects or derelictions" to justify a claim for defamation (Defs.' Mem. at 16 (citing Cohen v. Feiden,
It is also not appropriate to dismiss plaintiff's defamation claim at this stage of the proceeding based on defendants' assertion of the qualified common interest privilege. The Court agrees with defendants that, as investors, they shared an interest in Smartix's success with both the Red Sox and MasterCard. However, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that defendants were acting outside the scope of the privilege when they advised the Red Sox and MasterCard that Henneberry was the cause of Smartix's demise. Plaintiff alleges that this advice was given in order to allow SCOA to take over control of Smartix. (Compl. 98, 124.) In fact, plaintiff states that SCOA informed the Red Sox that SCOA "would be taking over Smartix and making changes in management so as to remove Mr. Henneberry." (Compl. 96.) The Court does not find these to be conclusory allegations but rather specific statements of intent made by SCOA to third parties. See Stern v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp.,
*37
privilege by determining that Hathaway had an improper purpose, in that he was deliberately exaggerating . . . so as to use Tripodi's failure to report the incident as a device to force Tripodi's discharge.") with Stillman v. Ford,
Thus, plaintiff's claim for defamation survives defendants' motion for dismissal on the present record. (Sec Compl. 120-43 ("Second Count".)
E. Injurious Falsehood
Plaintiff alleges that the statements underlying his defamation claim also give rise to a claim for injurious falsehood under New York State law. In order to recover for injurious falsehood, plaintiff must plead that (1) defendants had malicious intent, intended the statement to harm plaintiff, or uttered the statement with reckless disregard such that a reasonably prudent person would anticipate damage; (2) defendants knew of the stаtement's falsity or acted recklessly in disregard of the statement's veracity; (3) special damages directly resulted "in the form of lost dealings." See Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Blasland &; Bouck Engineers, P.C.,
Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
*38 (Second) of Torts (1981). Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead scienter and special damages. [10]
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled scienter. It is clear that a reasonable person would recognize that statements disparaging a CEO's business acumen would harm his reputation. Defendants' reliance on the argument that, " hough there is an allegation of reckless disregard of falsity, that is different from the kind of reckless heedlessness of consequences that the case law requires" is specious. The Court will not engage in defendants' proposed duel of semantics.
Defendants' second argument, however, is more persuasive. Special damages are those that "flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation; not from the effects of the defamation." Matherson,
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered damages of (1) for lost future business opportunities with MasterCard and Major League Baseball ("MLB"); (2) $20,000,000 for injury to his reputation; (3) at least for diminution of Smartix's stock value; (4) for failed loans made to Smartix; (5) for unrcimbursed costs and expenses arising from
*39
Smartix's operation; and, (6)
per year for lost salary. (Compl. II 151.) The claim for reputational damage is undoubtedly insufficiently alleged as it cites no basis for its amount, nor specific repercussions of the tort which gave rise to the damage. See Korry v. Int'l Tel. &; Tel. Corp.,
Plaintiff's remaining four pleas for special damages stem from the demise of Smartix. These damages, while lamentable, do not flow from defendants' statements and, therefore, are not appropriately characterized as special damages. Plaintiff's Complaint details Smartix's
*40 hardship beginning in June 2003. Specifically, plaintiff states that, in June 2003, he told SCOA that Smartix could not continue without additional funding and advised them on June 16, 2003 that Smartix may need to cease operations. (Compl. 63, 71.) On September 8, 2003, plаintiff advised SCOA that Smartix's lack of funding would prevent continuation of the Smartfan program. (Compl. 6 78.) The next day, Henneberry advised Dee of the Boston Red Sox that Smartix's financial stability was not guaranteed for the following year. (Compl. 6 82.) Dee responded with concern that Smartix would not satisfy its financial obligations to the Red Sox. (Compl. 6 83.) Defendants' statements were not made until around September 19, 2003, after the occurrence of the above events. Thus, it is apparent that Smartix was plagued by financial difficulties well before those statements were made. Moreover, at least MLB was aware of this difficulty.
It is not necessary that defendants' statements be the only cause of Smartix failure, but they must be a contributing factor. Plaintiff's Complaint makes it clear that the statements did not contribute to the failure; rather they may have actually been Smartix's last ray of hope. After Henneberry made Dee aware of Smartix's woes, SCOA's statements reassured Dee that the cause of the problem, plaintiff, would be removed and Smartix would be run by new management, namely SCOA. (Compl. 6 96.) Thereafter, Dee called SCOA directly regarding the Smartfan program, the shareholders voted to continue Smartfan, SCOA represented that investors were still interested in Smartix, and plaintiff floated Smartix loans to continue operations. (Compl. 6 97, 111-13.) This evidences that MLB was aware of a problem prior to the statements and chose to continue its relationship with Smartix after the statements. Thus, any damages flowing from the decline of Smartix cannot be attributed to SCOA's statements regarding Henneberry. Rеgarding MasterCard, plaintiff does not allege what effect, if any,
*41
SCOA's statements had on MasterCard's relationship with Smartix. Again, this causes the Court to conclude that any damages flowing from Smartix's failure were not caused by statements made to MasterCard.
Because plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead special damages flowing from the allegedly tortious statements, his claim of injurious falsehood is dismissed. (See Compl. 14451 ("Third Count").)
F. Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage
Plaintiff claims that defendants' tortious action in meeting with MLB and MasterCard and making the allegedly defamatory statements give rise to a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage under New York law.
To establish a claim for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, plaintiff must prove that: (1) there was a business relationship with a third party; (2) defendants "knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it"; (3) defendants either acted "solely out of malice" or used wrongful means; and (4) defendants' "interference caused injury to the relationship" with the third-party. See Carvel Corp. v. Noonan,
A properly pleaded complaint for this tort must allege relationships with specific third parties with which the respondent interfered. See Four Finger Art Factory, Inc. v. DiNicola, No. 99 Civ. 1259,
*42
at
4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996) ("As Winner does not allege that Kryptonite's conduct interfered with its business relationship with any specific party, it cannot establish the elements necessary for this tort . . . "). Further, the relationship must be in existence at the time of the interference. See Minnesota Mining,
The Complaint must also state how defendants interfered in those relationships. See Four Finger,
*43
(providing that plaintiff may establish this element of the tort by showing either that defendant used "wrongful means" or acted "solely out of malice").
As stated supra Discussion Part II.D, plaintiff has adequately pled that defendants engaged in the tort of defamation when meeting with MLB and MasterCard in September 2003. Thus, wrongful means were used. However, plaintiff again fails to sufficiently allege a causal link between the tort and his injury giving rise to damages. Plaintiff's allegation of damages mirrors that listed supra Discussion Part II.E. (See Compl.
157.) As stated above in the same section, the damages flowing from the decline of Smartix are not attributable to SCOA's meetings with MLB and MasterCard. Plaintiff's allegation of reputational injury is again plainly inappropriately pled as it does not relate to any plausible prospective economic advantage. Finally, plaintiff's plea for damages resulting from lost future business opportunities as a consultant for MLB and MasterCard fails because he does not allege that any such consulting relationship existed at the time of the interfering meetings. See Huntington Dental,
Therefore, plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with prospective advantage fails and is dismissed. (See Compl. 152-57 ("Fourth Count").)
III. Leave to Amend the Complaint
Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, prohibiting plaintiff from repleading his claims. Plaintiff can replead as of right one time without leave of the Court
*44
prior to defеndants' filing a responsive pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). However, this right extinguishes when the Court grants a motion to dismiss. Sbrocco v. Pacific Fruit, Inc., No. 82 Civ. 5650,
However, if the Court finds that it would be futile to allow plaintiff to replead because he cannot set forth facts supporting a viable claim, leave to amend should be denied. See Ellis v. Chao,
*45
New York,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants Sumitomo Corporation of America and Robert Graustein's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Only plaintiff's claim for defamation survives. Plaintiff's claims for detrimental reliance, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, injurious falsehood, and tortious interference with prospective advantage are hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiff has TWENTY DAYS from the date of this Order to seek to leave to replead. The parties are ORDERED to appear before this Court at 500 Pearl Street,
*46
Courtroom 18b for a status conference on May 19, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. unless а motion is pending.
SO ORDERED.
New York, New York April 26, 2005
Copies of this Opinion and Order have been mailed to: John M. Deitch, Esq. Mendes &; Mount LLP One Newark Center, Floor Newark, New Jersey 07102 Stuart M. Riback, Esq. Siller Wilk LLP 675 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017
NOTES
Notes
Because the claims against Sumitomo Corporation of America and Graustein are indistinguishable, the Court will refer to both defendants collectively as "SCOA" or "defendants" hereinafter. 2 On August 16, 2004, defendant Sumitomo Corporation filed its own motion to dismiss. The Court will address the merits of that motion in a companion Opinion and Order to follow.
3 Plaintiff's claims are governed by state law, but the parties have not raised choice of law issues. Instead, the parties' briefs assumed that New York State law applies. Where the parties so assume, the Court need not address choice of law sua sponte. See In re Chateaugay Corp.,
Complaint as part of his fiduciary duty claim (Compl. ) and the Court properly makes all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.
8 Special damages constitute "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value which must flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation . . ." Matherson v. Marchello,
9 Defendants also argue that plaintiff's alleged damages such as "loss of stock value, fаiled loans, unreimbursed expenses and loss of salary" did not directly flow from defendants' alleged defamatory statements, but rather resulted from Smartix's general decline and ultimate failure. Defendants' objection fails, however, because a plea of special damages is not a necessary element of a well-pleaded tort for slander per se. While the Court recognizes, infra Discussion Parts II.E and II.F, that damages resulting from Smartix's failure could not have stemmed from SCOA's allegedly defamatory statements as demonstrated by the timeline of the Complaint, the purpose of removing the requirement to plead special damages is to allow plaintiff to assess his damages after discovery. Therefore, plaintiff's defamation claim cannot fail simply because he went beyond the call of the caselaw and alleged inappropriate specific damages.
10 In their reply papers, defendants raised for the first time the argument that plaintiff's claim fails because it failed to allege the exact words giving rise to the tort of injurious falsehood. (Defs.' Reply at 4-5.) The Court will not address this argument because to do so would render the Court's procedural limits moot. See Dunlop-McCullen v. Pascarella, No. 97 Civ. 0195,
