24 S.E. 235 | Va. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the court.
There were three cases submitted to us styled 1 ‘Henley v. Hefferron.” The first is a bill in chancery, filed by Nettie L. Henley, brought to enjoin B. W. Hefferron and Mary C. Hefferron, his wife, from the prosecution of an action of unlawful detainer in the county court of King William county; and praying further that a contract, which is set out in the bill, and is alleged to have been made between B. W. Hefferron and the plaintiff, with respect to the purchase of the land which is the subject of the action of unlawful detainer, may be specifically executed. The second suit is that of Nettie L. Henley v. Hefferron and others, and grows directly out of the proceedings in the chancery suit just mentioned. After a final decree had been entered in the first-mentioned case in favor of the defendants to that bill, the plaintiff brought the case by appeal to this court, and thereupon a petition was filed asking the appointment of a receiver pending the appeal, and a receiver was thereupon appointed, and from this decree an appeal was taken. Subsequently, the action of unlawful detainer having been decided in the county court of King William county, an appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the judgment of the county court was reversed, and, the case being submitted to the circuit court of King William county, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, to which a writ of error was awarded by this court. Both of these appeals and the writ of error depend upon the disposition which shall be made of the appeal taken in the original suit in chancery for an injunction and the specific execution of the contract there prayed for. The bill in that case sets out that the complainant, Nettie L. Henley, is the daughter of Thomas B. Henley, who was possessed of considerable real estate in the county of King William and elsewhere,
We are of opinion that the contract upon which the appellant relies is insufficient to support a bill for specific performance. It is vague and indefinite in its terms, and wholly wanting in that mutuality of obligation which is essential. It is certain that if the defendant had desired to enforce the alleged contract set out in the bill he would have been wholly unable to do so. A contract, in order to be enforced specifically, must be certain, definite, equal, and fair, and sufficiently precise to obviate misunderstanding as to its import. If it be wanting in these qualities, a court of equity will decline to specifically enforce it, and will leave the party to the remedy at law, if there be any. 2 Minor, Inst. 786, 787. These principles are so elementary, and have been so frequently asserted by this court, that we do not deem it necessary to multiply authorities upon it. We think, therefore, that the demurrer to the bill should have been sustained.
As the appellant never had any title to the land, nor any contract with respect to it which a court of equity could enforce, it is obvious that the action of the court placing this property in the hands of a receiver pending the prosecution of her appeal could not have prejudicial to her, and with this remark we dispose of the second case.
In the unlawful detainer suit, in which Thomas B. Henley and Fannie R. Henley are the plaintiffs in error against M. C. Hefferron, it appears that the action was instituted in the first