124 Mo. App. 157 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1907
(after stating the facts). — 1. Depositions of witnesses residing in the State of Kentucky were taken in narrative form. Defendant moved to quash these depositions because they were not taken on
2. Over the objection of defendant, the court instructed the jury as follows on the measure of damages:
“If the j-ury find for the plaintiff you will assess her damages at such sum as you may believe from the evidence will be a fair compensation to her.
“1. For any pain or anguish of body or mind which the jury may believe from the evidence she has suffered and with ^reasonable certainty will suffer in the future, if any, fi'om her injuries and directly caused thereby.
• “2. For any loss of the earnings of her labor, already suffered, if any, and such as with reasonable certainty she will suffer in the future from the impairment of her ability to work and earn money, if the jury shall believe from the evidence that she has or will suffer any such impairment of ability as the direct result of her injuries, in all not to exceed the sum of $4,500.”
The second paragraph of this instruction authorized the jury to award plaintiff damages for any loss of earnings, past or future. Plaintiff testified that she lived with her husband and kept house for him; that he was old and infirm, unable to work and without means, and that their children were all grown up; that she had no occupation other than keeping house and doing fancy work, had no store or shop but went out and took or
In Plummer v. Trost, 81 Mo. 1. c. 429, the court, referring to the statute giving a married woman the -wages of her separate labor, said:
“While this statute gives the wife her wages, it is to be observed that it is limited to the wages ‘of her separate labor.’ The very foundation, therefore, of her right to such wages depends upon the fact whether the services were for her ‘separate labor.’ Under similar statutes allowing the Avife her earnings, the accepted construction is, that when her labor is performed on account of, or in connection with her husband, or is bestoAved on his business, or AAdiere there is nothing in the terms or circumstances of the contract to indicate an intention or purpose to concede to her the fruit of the given labor, the statute does not apply. [Beau v. Kiah, 4 Hun 171; Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Hazelbaker v. Goodfellow, 64 Ill. 238.]”
The Plummer Case is approvingly cited in Plummer v. City of Milan, 70 Mo. App. 1. c. 603.
Rogers, in his work on Domestic Relations, section 235, says:
“At common law there is no difficulty in solving the question who is entitled to the earnings and services of the wife during the coverture. These clearly belong to the husband. But under statutes enlarging her common laAV rights the difficulty is greater. These statutes, however, are not construed, as a general rule, so as to enlarge or modify the common, law rule further than is
Perrigo v. St. Louis, 185 Mo. 274, 84 S. W. 30, was a suit by a married woman to recover damages for personal injuries, caused by a defective sidewalk. At pages 288-9, the court said:
“It is true that the evidence discloses the fact that the plaintiff is a married woman, but it also discloses the further fact she was engaged in the business of running a boarding house in which she did her own work and that her husband was a cripple who did only such 'chores’ incident to the business as he was able to do. Under our statute a married' woman 'is 'deemed a feme sole so far as to enable her to carry on and transact business on her own account,’ in whom is also vested a right of action for any money due her as 'the wages of her separate labor’ or has grown out of any violation of her personal rights.’ The impairment of her ability to work in the business she was conducting would seem to be a proper element of her damages for the injury which caused it.”
Under our statute and decisions construing the same, any wages earned by a married woman by her separate labor, not pertaining to her ordinary household duties, are her separate property, and it is no concern of the courts how she spends such earnings. They are hers to dispose of as she will, and if by an injury she is rendered unable to perform such separate labor by which she theretofore earned wages or received compensation, the particular loss is hers and not her husband’s. These views, we think are supported by Perrigo v. St. Louis, supra, and that the second paragraph of the in
The judgment is affirmed.