67 A.2d 652 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1949
Argued March 24, 1949.
In this workmen's compensation case the question is whether there is sufficient competent evidence to support the finding that claimant's condition changed from 75% partial disability to total disability. If this finding is justified our hand is stayed. Mallory v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.,
Claimant was injured while employed by defendant when he fell from a ladder on August 23, 1938, and fractured the neck of the femur of his left hip. He was hospitalized until December 8, 1938 and remained in *586 bed at home until February 22, 1939. For a year he got about on crutches and then used a cane, which he still finds necessary for walking.
An agreement for compensation was executed for total disability under the Act of June 4, 1937, P.L. 1552, which was in force when the incident occurred and controls this decision. On petition by defendant this agreement was modified on May 13, 1942, and claimant was awarded compensation for total disability up to February 27, 1942 and partial disability thereafter on a 75% basis. On September 3, 1946 claimant petitioned for modification of this award contending his disability had changed from partial to total. Following a hearing before the referee, claimant's position was sustained and the referee's findings were affirmed by the board and the court below.1 Defendant was directed to pay compensation to claimant at the rate of $18.00 per week from April 22, 1946 for 500 weeks and then $30.00 a month in accord with § 306(a). This appeal followed.
Whether claimant's disability was total or partial is a factual question to be considered and determined by the compensation authorities. On appeal our function is limited to ascertaining if such finding is supported by substantial competent evidence.Jones v. Philadelphia Reading Coal Iron Co.,
Dr. Beck testified that because of the pain and limitation of motion in the left hip claimant had to grasp the sides of the chair to stand up and sit down. His left hip is sufficiently rigid to prevent him from touching his left foot with his hands and for the same *587 reason he is unable to cross his left leg over his right leg. The flexion, extension and abduction of the left hip are limited to fifteen per cent of normal. He testified that from his examination "this man has total disability of his lower left extremity for industrial purposes, . . . working in an erect position . . . is absolutely out of the question." This condition, he stated, was attributed to the fractured neck of the femur. X-rays confirmed the doctor's findings. Dr. Gash, also a witness for claimant, testified his findings were practically the same and the rotation of the left hip was greatly limited. His examination of the hip revealed internal rotation zero; external rotation about five degrees; adduction, zero; abduction, ten degrees. In his opinion claimant was totally disabled.
Claimant testified he is 73 years of age. He was able to get up and down the stairs fairly well but now has to practically slide down and drag himself up. In 1942 he was able to go down in the cellar twice a day and take care of the heater and carry the coal but cannot do so now. He is no longer able to take short walks because of the severe and almost continuous pain in his hip. He is unable to bend over and must put his left shoe on by using a string attached to a shoe horn. He also now requires assistance in getting dressed. Claimant's wife corroborated this and added that her husband could no longer do odd jobs around the house such as fixing the washer on the spigot, hanging pictures or taking up the rugs.
Defendant's position is that the only injury established by claimant is the loss of the use of his left leg for which he has been fully compensated under § 306(c). Defendant recognizes the principle expressed in Clark v. Clearfield Opera House Co.,
This Court has consistently followed the Clark case. Toth v.Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp.,
This Court has also repeatedly stated that where the testimony fails to show a "destruction, derangement or deficiency in the organs of the other parts of the body" causing a total disability, compensation must be had, if *589
at all, under § 306(c). O'Donnell v. S. Fayette Twp. SchoolDist.,
As claimant is seeking to modify the compensation agreement he must assume the burden of establishing the allegations upon which he relies. Zuro v. McClintic Marshall Co., supra. The foregoing recital of material portions of the record clearly show claimant has adequately met this burden.
Medical testimony in two similar cases sharply brings out the distinction that must be made. In Hayden v. Stony Spring CoalCo., supra, we held the injuries did not extend beyond the leg. There the doctors testified the hip joint was normal and its function was not interfered with. "The hip joint — not a part of the leg — was not involved and was not impaired". The motion of the hip joint was entirely free in extension, flexion and adduction. In Manno v. Tri-State Engineering Co., *590 supra, the question was the extent of the injuries and whether claimant should be compensated under § 306(a) or § 306(c). The testimony of the medical experts was comparable to that given in the instant case. External rotation of the hip was limited and painful. Claimant was unable to dress and undress himself and lacked coordination and balance and he could not bend his body. We held the disability, as a result of the injury, affected the physical structure of the body beyond the mere loss of the use of a member.
Here, claimant has produced evidence that other parts of his body, separate, apart and distinct from the loss of the use of his leg, were permanently injured and that it was the direct result of the fracture. Lente v. Luci,
While defendant's witness, Dr. Rechtman concurred generally with the findings of claimant's doctors he was of the opinion that claimant was able to work but was merely unwilling to do so. However, credibility of medical witnesses and the weight to be attached to their testimony is a matter exclusively within the province of the compensation authorities who must resolve any conflict and decide which expert opinion to adopt. Wilkinson v.United Parcel Service,
We have noted that there is no specific finding of fact "of injury to other parts of the body", as required by Lente v. Luci,
supra. See also Flood v. Logan Iron Steel Co.,
Affirmed.
