E. L. McCausey and Lena McCausey, defendants and appellees, recovered a judgment for a substantial amount against Herman Hendricks, plaintiff and appellant, by way of set-off and recoupment. A writ of execution was issued Dеcember 24, 1940. On January 6, 1941, plaintiff filed his claim of appeal from said judgment, taking ‘ ‘ а general appeal in the nature of a writ of error.” He filed no supersedeas bond. On January 22, 1941, the writ of execution was returned and filed, unsatisfied. Therеafter defendants instituted the present proceedings, supplementary tо execution, in the cir *159 cuit court which had rendered the judgment in their favor. These proceedings are at law, in the nature of a judgment creditor’s bill, as authоrized by 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 15125-15139 (Stat. Ann. § § 27.2171-27.2185). In accordance with defendants ’ petition, the cоurt granted an order for discovery on oath and a restraining order against рlaintiff on January 28,1941. Plaintiff appeals from the denial of a motion to quash this order.
The effect of a writ of error at common law as a stay of exеcution is well expressed by the following excerpt from Perkins v. Woolaston (K. B. 1704), 1 Salk. 321, 322 (91 Eng. Rep. 284):
“A writ of error is a supersedeas from the time of the allowance, and that is notice of itself; but if the defendant [in error] have notice before allowance, it is from the time of that notice a supersedeas; but if a writ of execution be executed before a writ of error allowed, or notice, it may be returned after-wards. The utmost length of time the law allows for executing a writ, is the day whereon the writ is returnable; and it is not executable any longer that day than the court sits. So long as it is executable, but not executed, the allowance of a writ of error is a supersedeas, but not afterwards.”
In Michigan, however, change of law on this subject has been wrought by statute and rule of court. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 15492 (Stat. Ann. § 27.2592), provides:
“No writ оf error shall operate to stay or supersede the execution in аny civil action, unless the appellant with two sufficient sureties shall give bond to the appellee with condition that the appellant shall prosecute his writ to effect, and shall pay and *160 satisfy such, judgment as shall be rendered against him thereon.”
And Court Rule No. 62, § 1 (1933), provides:
“No appeal * * * shall operate as a stay of exеcution unless and until an appeal bond to the adverse party * * * shall be filеd.”
Plaintiff relies on
Scott
v.
Scott,
Plaintiff also relies on
People, ex rel. Worden,
v.
Manistee Circuit Judge,
We shall not comment on cases from other jurisdictions cited by plaintiff as we find nothing in them that changes our views. It would indeed be a strange anomaly for а court to permit a judgment debtor without giving a supersedeas bond to take аn appeal and, during the long period until its final disposition, tie the judgment creditоr’s hands, while in the meantime the judgment debtor may conceal or dispose оf his assets, so that the judgment if affirmed may become worthless. A judgment creditor *161 ■with knowledge of a pending appeal has a right to proceed at his own risk, to take all steps and proceedings provided by law to collect his judgment when no supersedeas bond has been filed.
The order of the circuit court overruling plaintiff’s motion to quash the supplementary proceedings is affirmed, but without costs as appellees failed to file a brief.