566 P.2d 70 | Mont. | 1977
No. 13320
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 CAMDEN J. HENDRICKS, Deceased, Claimant and Respondent, -vs- THE ANACONDA COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Joseph J. Picarelli argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : Jack M. Scanlon argued, Anaconda, Montana Submitted: May 11, 1977 Decided : JUN 2 2 1977 Filed: JUN 2 2 1m
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
In October 1971 claimant Camden Hendricks was injured in an industrial accident while employed in a mine of defendant The Anaconda Company (Anaconda). He submitted a claim for compensation. Anaconda accepted it and began paying temporary total disability benefits, and continued until claimant's death in November 1973. The parties here stipulated the cause of death was unrelated to the industrial injury.
Claimant's widow requested a lump sum disability payment that was denied by Anaconda and subsequently, on appeal, by the Worker's Compensation Division. Claimant's widow appealed the decision to the district court, Silver Bow County. That court reversed the Division and awarded claimant's widow a lump sum of $6,000.
Prior to his demise claimant had seen two physicians and each made an estimate of the percentage of disability. The first physician estimated disability at 20%, the second, some months later, set the figure at 30%. The district court's award repre- sents an amount based on the 30% figure. Neither physician's report stated the period of healing had ended.
The only additional testimony taken by the district court was that of Albert Pillen, an administrator of the Division's State Campensation Fund. No transcript of his testimony was filed as a part of this appeal record, but the briefs indicate the testimony explained how the state fund handles such claims.
The question here is whether the widow has a right to a lump sum payment. I n 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, $58.40, t h e r e i s a general d i s c u s s i o n , p e r t i n e n t a s background f o r our d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i s s u e involved h e r e , i t s t a t e s :
"558.40 H e r i t a b i l i t y and a s s i g n a b i l i t y of b e n e f i t s , "In t h e opening p o r t i o n of t h e book i t was pointed o u t t h a t one of t h e f e a t u r e s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a compensa- t i o n award from a t o r t recovery i s t h e absence of any property r i g h t i n an award which can survive i n favor of h e i r s . The problem most frequently a r i s e s i n connec- t i o n with schedule o r o t h e r permanent p a r t i a l awards, when an employee who has been awarded, say, 312 weeks' bene- f i t s f o r l o s s of an arm d i e s a t t h e end of 1 2 weeks. The question i s whether h i s h e i r s have a claim upon t h e unaccrued 300 weeks' payments.
"Accrued b u t unpaid i n s t a l l m e n t s a r e , of course, an a s s e t of t h e e s t a t e , l i k e any o t h e r debt. This i s e q u a l l y t r u e of t h e widow's death b e n e f i t s , accrued but unpaid i n s t a l l m e n t s of which go on h e r death t o h e r h e i r s . When t h e award takes t h e form of a lump sum, t h e amount due a s accrued payments i s t h e e n t i r e amount of t h e lump sum.
"When, however, t h e award, although f o r a f i x e d number of weeks, i s paid weekly o r . p e r i o d i c a l l y , most j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n t h e absence of a s p e c i a l s t a t u t e t o t h e contrary have held t h a t t h e h e i r s have no claim upon t h e unaccrued payments, s i n c e t h e award i s a personal one, based upon t h e employee's need f o r a s u b s t i t u t e f o r h i s l o s t wages and earning capacity. There i s , however, some contra a u t h o r i t y .
"This r u l e has been modified by s t a t u t e i n some s t a t e s , b u t it i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e modification o f t e n t a k e s t h e form, n o t of giving t h e unaccrued balance t o h e i r s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , but of giving i t i n f i x e d proportions t o dependent h e i r s , * * *I1 The s t a t u t e p e r t i n e n t here i s s e c t i o n 92-608, R.C.M. 1947:
"(1) I f an i n j u r e d employee d i e s and t h e i n j u r y was t h e proximate cause of such death, then t h e bene- f i c i a r y of t h e deceased, a s t h e case may be, s h a l l receive t h e same compensation a s though t h e death occurred immediately following t h e i n j u r y , but t h e period during which t h e death b e n e f i t s h a l l be paid s h a l l be reduced by t h e period during o r f o r which compensation was paid f o r t h e i n j u r y .
" ( 2 ) I f t h e employee s h a l l d i e from some cause , o t h e r than t h e i n j u r y , t h e r e s h a l l be no l i a b i l i t y f o r compensation a f t e r h i s death.
"(3) The question a s t o who c o n s t i t u t e s a b e n e f i c i a r y s h a l l be determined a s of t h e d a t e of t h e happening of t h e accident t o t h e employee, whether death s h a l l immediately r e s u l t therefrom o r n o t . I 1 Subsection 2 of s e c t i o n 92-608 was discussed i n Breen v.
Ind. Ace. Board, 150 Mont. 463, 475, 436 P.2d 701, where t h e Court s a i d :
" A s we construe t h i s provision i t simply means t h a t i f an employee i s receiving compen- s a t i o n a s t h e r e s u l t of an i n d i s t r i a l i n j u r y and subsequently d i e s from causes o t h e r than t h i s i n j u r y , l i a b i l i t y f o r f u r t h e r compensation by way of death b e n e f i t s o r continuing d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s i s c u t o f f . But we do n o t construe t h i s s t a t u t e a s terminating l i a b i l i t y f o r compensation accrued p r i o r t o death but unpaid a t t h e time of death.'' 150 Mont. 475. Claimant's widow argues claimant had an accrued r i g h t t o
a lump sum idemnity payment and t h a t such r i g h t accrued when t h e physicians made t h e i r e s t i m a t e s of t h e percentage dfi impair- ment. The major d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s argument i s t h a t a lump sum indemnity payment was not t h e only option a v a i l a b l e t o claimant a t t h e time of h i s death. A s noted i n McAlear v. McKee
Mont . , 558 P.2d 1134,1136,1137, 33 St.Rep. & Co., 'I* * * t h e r e a r e two d i s t i n c t types of p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s which a claimant may seek 9~ * *. A claimant may e l e c t a d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t under s e c t i o n 92-703.1, R,C.M. 1947, o r an indemnity b e n e f i t under s e c t i o n 92-709, R.C.M. 1947.
"The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s e two b e n e f i t s i s t h a t s e c t i o n 92-703.1 bases t h e b e n e f i t upon a c t u a l l o s s of earning c a p a c i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n j u r y , whereas s e c t i o n 92-709 awards compensation r e g a r d l e s s of earnings t o compensate f o r p o s s i b l e l o s s of earning capacity i n t h e f u t u r e . Jones v. Glac. General Assurance Co., 145 Mont, 326, 400 P.2d 888." 33 St.Rep. 1341; 558 P.2d 1137. I f Here claimant made no e l e c t i o n p r i o r t o h i s death.
claimant had e l e c t e d t o receive d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s Breen s t a t e s t h e s e would have ceased a t death. To say claimant had accrued r i g h t s i n a lump sum indemnity b e n e f i t r e q u i r e s t h a t options which t h e deceased claimant could have exercised be made f o r him and given r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t .
1A second d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t p r i o r t o c l a i m a n t ' s death t h e r e was never a determination made t h a t t h e h e a l i n g period had ended. McAlear p o i n t s out:
"* * * The s t a t u t e s which govern a r e s e c t i o n 92- 701.1, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : " I * * * T o t a l temporary d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s s h a l l be paid f o r t h e duration of t h e worker's temporary d i s a b i l i t y . ' and s e c t i o n 92-439, R.C.M. 1947, which d e f i n e s temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y a s :
* * a condition r e s u l t i n g from an i n j u r y a s
I"*
defined i n t h i s a c t t h a t r e s u l t s i n t o t a l l o s s of wages and e x i s t s u n t i l t h e i n j u r e d workman i s a s f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e permanent c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l permit. I (Emphasis added.) Therefore, temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y ceases when t h e workman's physical condition i s a s f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e permanent c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l permit. When t h e claimant has reached t h i s s t a g e i n h i s h e a l i n g process temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y c e a s e s , and p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y begins i f t h e r e i s permanent p a r t i a l impair- ment." 33 S t . Rep. 1340; 558 P.2d 1136. No indemnity payment may accrue u n t i l t h e healing period i s
completed. Blessed with h i n d s i g h t , i t i s easy t o s e e t h e b e n e f i t t o c l a i m a n t ' s e s t a t e t h a t would r e s u l t from having claimant f u l l y healed and having made an e l e c t i o n t o go under t h e indemnity provisions. The l e g i s l a t u r e could g r a n t death b e n e f i t s t o depen- dents of claimants who d i e from causes u n r e l a t e d t o t h e i r indus- t r i a l i n j u r y , a s y e t i t has not done so. I n s t e a d i t has p r o h i b i t e d payment of compensation a f t e r death from unrelated causes. Although i t i s unfortunate claimant had no accrued lump sum indemnity pay- ment due him p r i o r t o h i s death, t h e f a c t remains he d i d n o t .
Since no compensation accrued to the claimant remains unpaid, the district court erred in granting a lump sum award to claimant's widow. The cause is reversed with direction to dismiss. We Concur:
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